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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
The Dog That Barks: Understanding Propaganda Campaigns on Territorial Disputes 
by 
Yaping Wang 
Why do authoritarian states promote media coverage of foreign disputes in some contexts, but 
censor coverage in others? The use of media on matters of foreign policy is prevalent in both 
autocracies and democracies, yet their functions, especially in autocracies, are not well 
understood. This dissertation seeks to explain a statecraft autocratic leaders are especially adept 
at and are commonly engaged in – propaganda campaigns on territorial disputes. This project 
thus provides a window into the domestic constraints and motivations of authoritarian foreign 
policy and the resulting statecraft in managing its domestic publics on foreign policy issues.  
In explaining the adoption or non-adoption of propaganda campaigns, I develop a 
(mis)alignment theory that proposes two independent variables – existing public opinion and 
state foreign policy intent. I argue that together and interactively, the juxtaposition of these 
conditions drives a popular autocrat to employ media as a tool of statecraft to “bridge” the 
opinion gap between the public and the state. When the gap is between a pacifist public and a 
hardline state, the state uses a propaganda campaign to mobilize public support for a potentially 
risky policy. Conversely, when the gap is between a militant public and a government favoring 
peaceful resolutions, the state might counterintuitively also adopt a propaganda campaign, but in 
this case to subdue public opinion. Like a dog that barks but does not bite, autocratic leaders 
could use propaganda campaigns to keep up the appearances of a hard stand, thus to fend off 
nationalist criticisms, to save face, and to maintain social stability, while allowing the public to 
   vii
let off steam through the echoing and the venting functions of the media. An absence of the gap 
would explain an absence of propaganda campaigns. The pacifying propaganda campaign is 
worth special notion because it is not commonly understood, but is commonly practiced by 
authoritarian states, and increasingly so as a way in dealing with rising nationalist sentiment in 
many of these countries. A medium-n congruence test of nineteen Chinese diplomatic crises on 
territorial disputes and process-tracing four of these crises, using primary sources and content 
analysis of the Chinese official newspaper People’s Daily, render strong support for this theory. 
This project contributes to domestic theories of international disputes by focusing on the 
role of public opinion and media in an authoritarian context. It also contributes to the 
Comparative Politics literature on authoritarian public opinion by moving the testing field of the 
complex state-society relations in authoritarian states from domestic politics to the international 
policy arena. 
   viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1: (Mis)Alignment Theory Causal Diagram I .................................................... 22 
Figure 2.2: (Mis)Alignment Theory Causal Diagram II ................................................... 28 
Figure 2.3: Two Logical Steps of Audience Cost Theory ................................................ 38 
Figure 2.4: Causal Diagram of the “Audience Cost” Argument ...................................... 38 
Figure 2.5: Causal Diagram of the Diversionary Argument ............................................. 41 
Figure 4.1: Daily Search Volume of “South China Sea” on Baidu.com, 4/8/2011-4/8/2012
........................................................................................................................................... 96 
Figure 5.1: Monthly Count of People’s Daily Articles on the Sino-Vietnamese Border 
Dispute, 1978-1991 ......................................................................................................... 108 
Figure 6.1: Monthly Count of People’s Daily Articles on the Sino-Philippines South 
China Sea Dispute, 2010-2016 ....................................................................................... 162 
Figure 6.2: Daily Search Index of the Word “South China Sea” on Baidu.com, 5/31/2015-
5/31/2016 ........................................................................................................................ 192 
Figure 6.3: Timing of the End of Propaganda Campaign ............................................... 216 
Figure 7.1: Daily Search Volume of “South China Sea” on Baidu.com During One-Year 
Pre-Crisis Period, 5/2/2013-5/2/2014 ............................................................................. 244 
   ix
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1: The State-Public (Mis)Alignment Theory ....................................................... 22 
Table 2.2: Alternative Hypotheses in Comparison ........................................................... 44 
Table 2.3: Contrasting Observable Implications .............................................................. 46 
Table 3.1: Six Disputes, Nineteen Crises, and Eleven Propaganda Campaigns ............... 49 
Table 3.2: Nineteen Chinese Diplomatic Crises Placed in My Theoretical Framework .. 53 
Table 3.3: Measurements of the Dependent and the Independent Variables .................... 58 
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics of Media Coverage on China’s Nineteen Diplomatic Crises
........................................................................................................................................... 62 
Table 4.1: Predicted and Actual Outcomes on China’s Nineteen Diplomatic Crises on 
Territorial Disputes ........................................................................................................... 79 
Table 4.2: Deviant Cases in Theoretical Framework ........................................................ 80 
Table 4.3: Average Monthly Numbers of Front-Page Articles and of All-Relevant 
Articles .............................................................................................................................. 82 
Table 4.4: Number of People’s Daily Front-Page and Any-Page Articles Around the 1959 
Sino-Indian Border Dispute Propaganda Campaign ......................................................... 86 
Table 4.5: Chinese Public Thermometer Towards Japan, 1999-2015 .............................. 92 
   x
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BAS  Beijing Area Study 
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
BSI  Baidu Search Index 
CCP or CPC Communist Party of China 
CMC  Central Military Commission (China) 
CMS  China Marine Surveillance  
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
CPD Central Propaganda Department (China) 
CPV Communist Party of Vietnam 
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies 
DOC Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone 
FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operations (United States) 
ITLOS  International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 
LAC  Line of Actual Control 
MoFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
PCA  Permanent Court of Arbitration 
PLA  People’s Liberation Army (China) 
PLAN  People’s Liberation Army Navy (China) 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan) 
SRV Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
VWP  Vietnam Workers’ Party 
   xi
Chapter 1: Introduction 
A curious yet understudied phenomenon in international disputes is states’ publicity strategies – 
how widely a dispute is made known and how strongly a dispute is made felt by the state to the 
public. Sometimes in order to encourage reportage of a dispute, governments actively feed 
information to the media; other times they purposefully keep a dispute out of the public’s sight. 
Among some of today’s hottest interstate disputes, from Crimea, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 
Jammu and Kashmir, the South China Sea, to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, we see at 
display this curious variation in states’ media behaviors both across time and between disputes. 
Authoritarian states, who have direct control of the media and engage in a large share of the 
world’s interstate disputes, are particularly masterful at this statecraft. 
Examples of the use of this statecraft abound in the contemporary history of international 
conflicts and diplomatic crises. In the background of two incidents over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands between China and Japan in 2010 and 2012, “[Chinese] authorities have ordered major 
satellite broadcasters across the nation to feature shows of patriotic or anti-fascist themes.” As a 
result, news coverage of the dispute and anti-Japanese dramas flooded the Chinese TV screens.1 
Three new public holidays, all involving the Japanese invasion during World War II, were also 
instated by Chinese authorities. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the state-controlled 
media launched an aggressive propaganda campaign painting the violent separatists as 
“supporters of federalization” and justifying the incursion as “rescuing Russians and Russian-
speakers from the depredations of Fascists.”2 On a long-standing dispute between China and 
1 “Anti-Japanese Dramas to Flood Chinese TV Screens Next Month,” South China Morning Post, August 28, 2014, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1581474/anti-japanese-dramas-flood-chinese-tv-screens-next-month, 
accessed May 31, 2018. 
2 “In Ukraine, Russia Plays a Weighted Word Game,” New York Times, April 16, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/world/europe/in-ukraine-russia-plays-a-weighted-word-game.html, accessed 
May 31, 2018; Dougherty 2014. 
1
Vietnam over the South China Sea, the 1988 military clash between the two countries “was 
vividly recalled and widely covered by Vietnam’s [state-controlled] media” at the battle’s 28th 
anniversary in 2016.3 At the dawn of the release of an international tribunal ruling on the 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines, China mounted an 
aggressive public relations blitz dismissing the court’s jurisdiction over the case and accusing the 
U.S. militarism in the disputed area. 
What makes these campaigns particularly puzzling is their contrast with the stark 
opposite – media censorship and the muted disputes. For example, the border dispute between 
China and North Korea have remained quiet for decades. On the same dispute between China 
and Japan described above but three decades earlier, just months before the then Chinese Premier 
Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Japan in 1978 to finalize the peace treaty to end the Sino-Japanese War, 
over eighty Chinese fishing boats appeared unprecedentedly in the waters around the disputed 
islands.4 The Chinese reporting on this incident was close to none. People’s Daily had no 
explicit mention of it at all.5 Analogously, before Putin’s propaganda campaign at the time of the 
Russian invasion, the state-controlled media first shied away from reporting the issue. “Treading 
carefully, many mainstream Russian newspapers are giving prominence to stories other than 
Ukraine, including President Vladimir Putin attending the opening ceremony of a new football 
stadium in Moscow.”6 In the same fashion, the 1988 Spratlys clash between Vietnam and China 
3 “Did 1988 Battle Anniversary Hint Rise in Vietnam-China Tensions?” Asia Times, March 23, 2016, 
http://www.atimes.com/did-1988-battle-anniversary-hint-rise-in-vietnam-china-tensions/, accessed May 31, 2018. 
4 Tretiak 1978. 
5 People’s Daily archives within fifteen days after the incident occurred on April 12, 1978 had no direct mention of 
the incident at all. Only when China’s Sino-Japanese Friendship Society President Liao Chengzhi met with Japan’s 
Socialist Democratic Federation delegation headed by Hideo Den the day after the incident, Liao remarked that 
“signing the peace treaty between the two countries was historical trend, it cannot be stopped by disruptive forces 
who conspire to create obstacles,” – only alluding to the incident. 
6 “Russian media report ‘invasion of Ukraine,’ BBC News, August 28, 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-28965597, accessed May 31, 2018. 
2
had remained a taboo topic for nearly three decades in Vietnam until recently. Similarly, alleged 
border clashes between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the 1980s were never confirmed by the 
Saudi authorities and were kept from the public sight.7  
Why does a state make deliberate efforts to publicize an otherwise quiet dispute? In 
particular, what makes an autocrat who has the wherewithal to censor contents allow or even 
encourage coverage of a territorial dispute? Understanding this powerful statecraft being used so 
skillfully by autocrats in the world’ hottest conflict zones is the task of this dissertation. This 
dissertation hence studies the motivations of and the ways by popular authoritarian states in 
using media to influence public opinion on territorial disputes. 
Studying the domestic media perspective of territorial conflicts draws upon and 
contributes to the domestic theories of international relations. For example, in Useful 
Adversaries, Thomas Christensen shows how Mao and Truman used external threats to mobilize 
domestic support for domestic national programs, which had inadvertent foreign policy 
implications.8 Randall Schweller uses the difficulty in rallying domestic public support for a 
hegemonic bid to explain why great powers forgo opportunities of regional expansion and thus 
the puzzle of under-aggression and under-expansion of great powers.9 Along a similar line, 
Fareed Zakaria argues that it is the lack of extractive and mobilization capacity that had delayed 
the emergence of American superpower.10 This study follows the footsteps of this line of work, 
but focuses on the role of public opinion and media in the conduct of foreign policy in 
international conflicts and diplomatic crises. 
7 Allcock et al 1992, 398. 
8 Christensen 1996. 
9 Schweller 2009. 
10 Zakaria 1999. 
3
Studying how authoritarian states manipulate rhetoric for the sake of foreign policy also 
has great practical significance. The frequent “rhetorical wars” or “wars of words” between 
countries, in which the control and manipulation of state mouthpieces and public opinion take 
center stage, have become one important, if not the most important, feature of today’s 
international relations. This is partly due to the expanded role of mass media in international 
relations, adding an eminent spectacle effect to the conduct of foreign policy. In addition, the 
advent of nuclear weapons and mutually-assured destruction has rendered interstate wars rare. 
But at the same time, conflicts of interests have not dissipated; on the contrary, they have been 
on the rise as our world flattens and expands, with new problems emerging at ever faster speeds. 
As a result, states have retreated to using mouthpieces instead of actual weapons to settle their 
disputes and pursue their foreign policy goals. Understanding the role of this statecraft, 
particularly its causes and consequences, in one of the most contentious type of interstate 
disputes – territorial disputes, is thus of paramount significance to world peace and order. 
Besides, given the lack of transparency in authoritarian states, the media aspect offers a window 
to look into the domestic pressures and constraints these autocrats face at home. If interpreted 
correctly, the messages a state conveys through the mass media could also help us read their 
foreign policy preferences.  
Existing studies come in short in explaining authoritarian states’ media behaviors on 
international disputes. Two domestic theories of international relations have implications for this 
empirical question, but neither examines it directly. The audience cost theory implies that leaders 
publicize a dispute as a hand-tying strategy to enhance threat credibility in foreign coercions.11 
11 For a classic version of the audience cost theory, see, for example, Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001. Weeks’ and Weiss’ 
works expand the gift of generating audience cost from democracies to most autocracies. See Weeks 2008; Weiss 
2013 and 2014. 
4
Diversionary war theory suggests that leaders publicize a dispute to divert public attention away 
from a domestic crisis, or to stoke nationalism to consolidate regime.12 Three other literatures are 
related, but also come in short in providing a comprehensive picture. While the use of media has 
traditionally been the subject of Media Studies and Political Communication, this discipline 
focuses on the approaches and techniques than on the political rationale, using cases in American 
domestic politics or war-time propaganda rather than international disputes and diplomatic 
crises.13 The literatures on authoritarian public opinion and on Chinese nationalism are important 
foundations for this study, but the former engages predominantly with domestic politics,14 and 
the latter either does not examine media in a systematic way or does not theorize beyond 
China.15  
This dissertation develops and tests a state-public (mis)alignment theory that explains 
authoritarian media maneuvers on interstate disputes. This theory differs from the audience cost 
and the diversionary war theory in that it argues that the state manipulates public opinion through 
the use of media, for the objectives of bringing the public in line with the preferred foreign 
policy, not for the purpose of enhancing foreign coercions or creating a diversion. I do not, 
however, argue that these theories have no force in determining state media behaviors. The 
regime survival assumption of the diversionary war theory is embedded in my argument. I also 
find that audience cost might be adept at explaining the cases in which the state and the public 
12 See, for example, Christensen 1996; Lake 1992; Levy and Vakili 1992; Russett 1990; Smith 1996; Stoll 1984. 
13 For classic works in media studies, see Bernays 1928; Ellul 1965; Jowett and O’Donnell 1992; Lasswell 1927. For 
an overview of Political Science study of the relationship between public opinion, mass media and foreign policy in 
a democratic setting, see Baum and Potter 2008. 
14 See, for example, Chen, Pan, and Xu 2016; Distelhorst and Hou 2017; King, Pan and Roberts 2013; Levitsky and 
Way 2010; Lorentzen 2013; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Manion 2014; Meng, Pan, and Yang 2017; Truex 2017. In 
the realm of foreign policy, see Bell and Quek 2017. 
15 For studies on Chinese nationalism in foreign policy, see, for example, Fewsmith and Rosen 1978; Gries 2004; 
Quek and Johnston 2018; Reilly 2012; Shirk 2007; Zhao 2004, 2005, and 2013. 
5
are aligned for a hardline policy. But given its limited scope condition that requires an ongoing 
coercion, my theory is able to explain a significant share of cases that fall out of this scope.  
Because of the scant research on this subject, I limit my scope to the extreme cases where 
state media maneuvers are the most visible – in authoritarian states,16 who have direct control of 
the mass media, and on territorial disputes,17 the most incendiary type of disputes susceptible to 
state manipulations. By focusing on these extreme cases as an initial step, I hope in the future to 
evaluate the extent to which my theory applies to democracies and other types of interstate 
disputes.18 Even though democracies also enjoy diverse ways to influence public opinion via 
mass media,19 and that the commercialization of media and the development of the internet 
weakens autocratic control of the media, authoritarian states still have more direct control of 
information flow and more straightforward means to influence public opinion than democracies. 
The concern that democracies and autocracies might have different approaches and that 
democracies’ approach might be more ambiguous make it reasonable to confine my research 
scope to authoritarian states. Authoritarian states are also involved in the majority number of 
territorial disputes in the twentieth century, thereby guaranteeing sufficient number of cases 
where the theory could be tested and applied to. In the Huth and Allee Territorial Claims Data of 
16 For definition of authoritarian regimes, I adopt Geddes’ (1999; 2003) and Weeks’ (2012; 2014) definition to 
include personalist, military, single-party, or amalgams of these pure types. Press in sixty-six countries or territories 
are rated by the Freedom House in 2016 as “not free,” while seventy-three others as “partly free.” That’s a total of 
one hundred and thirty-nine countries/territories. See Freedom House 2017. The following authoritarian countries, 
for example, have state-dominated media: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cambodia, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. “In all these countries, communist, postcommunist, and 
noncommunist alike, established systems circumscribe news and information for mass audiences and shape the 
dominant political narrative.” See Walker and Orttung 2014, 71. 
17 Territorial disputes in this study are the presence of disagreements over the delimitation of border or the 
ownership of territory among commonly recognized states. 
18 The MIDs dataset proposes three principal objects that a state sought to change, based on which interstate disputes 
could be about territory, policy, or regime. Besides territorial disputes, a policy dispute is when one state wants “to 
change the foreign policy behavior of another state”; a regime dispute is when a state wants “to change the 
government of another state.” See Jones et al. 1996, 178. 
19 See, for example, Baker and Oneal 2001; Baum, 2003; Baum, 2004; Baum and Potter 2008; Carruthers 2011. 
6
348 territorial disputes during 77 years from 1919 to 1995,20  authoritarian dyads account for 
43.7 percent of dyad-years, while mixed authoritarian-democratic dyads account for 45.1 percent 
of dyad-years. That is a total of 88.8 percent of the universe of disputes in the twentieth century. 
Despite arguments that territoriality is becoming less and less important due to the effects 
of globalization and trade, territorial disputes continue to wreak havoc in recent years in the 
South China Sea, the East China Sea, and Ukraine. The control and manipulation of publicity is 
particularly salient in territorial disputes. This is because first, territorial issues are exceptionally 
inflammatory as “people tend to respond to territorial issue intensely.”21 Second, territory can be 
a symbol to be manipulated for nationalistic purposes, either through ethnic or identity ties or 
historical possession (ancestral land). Often infused with intangible values such as sovereignty, 
irredentism, religious divinity, historical glory or humiliation, etc., territorial disputes are 
particularly “malleable” for states to shape public perceptions. Territorial disputes, therefore, 
could afford the clearest views of the puzzling variation in states’ use of publicity, thus offering 
an arena most conducive to discovering the causal mechanisms.  
Propaganda campaigns are government-orchestrated, concerted efforts to attract public 
attention to a dispute by the use of mass media. I argue that autocratic states use propaganda 
campaigns to bridge the opinion gap between the public and the state. When the public does not 
support a hardline policy, but that is what the state prefers, the state uses a propaganda campaign 
to mobilize the public. When the public and the state diverge the other way – if the public is 
already strongly agitated, but the state desires a moderate policy, I argue the state would seek to 
subdue the strong public opinion by counterintuitively also adopting a propaganda campaign. 
But in this case, the purpose of the propaganda is to keep up the appearances of a hard stance to 
20 Available at http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/huth/. 
21 Tir 2010, 413. 
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meet the public demand, while moderating public opinion by echoing their emotions and letting 
them vent, eventually making way for a preferred moderate policy. Thus, authoritarian 
propaganda has two contrasting functions – to agitate and to pacify, depending how the state and 
the public are misaligned. On the flip side, when the public and the state are aligned, both 
favoring a hardline or a moderate policy, the state does not need to work with a disagreeing 
public through propaganda; it just goes ahead with its intended policy.  
The pacifying use of propaganda deserves highlighting, because that is not how we 
usually interpret aggressive foreign propaganda. Not only commoners, even the intelligence 
community routinely reads aggressive propaganda as hint of aggressive policy intent. But if the 
pacifying use of propaganda truly exists, our common belief can be dangerously misleading.  
In order to gauge the salience of the theory across time and space, I first test my theory 
with a medium-n congruence test using a sample of nineteen diplomatic crises on territorial 
disputes between China and other countries. Then leveraging primary sources gathered from 
Chinese and Vietnamese archives and fifty-seven interviews, as well as content analysis of the 
Chinese official newspaper People’s Daily, I evaluate the causal processes by tracing four cases 
representative of each possible combination of public opinion and state policy intent – the Sino-
Vietnamese Border War during 1979-1990, the Sino-Philippine arbitration case in 2016, the 
Sino-Vietnamese cable-cutting incidents in 2011, and the Sino-Vietnamese oil rig crisis in 2014.  
This study makes three contributions. First, it seeks to elucidate our understanding of an 
understudied phenomenon of increasing empirical prevalence – authoritarian states’ use of mass 
media in interstate disputes. By incorporating domestic variables into the analysis of 
international disputes from the angle of a new empirical puzzle, I hope to reinvigorate the well-
established literature on domestic politics of international relations. Second, the theory dwells on 
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the nature of state-society relations in authoritarian states and the fact that these regimes 
increasingly need to work with its domestic audience. Corresponding to a rising wave of popular 
authoritarianism in world politics, this study enriches the literature on authoritarian public 
opinion by moving the context to the international arena. Third, this study informs policy makers 
of a less-known but commonly-practiced use of propaganda – a pacifying use. This could serve 
as an antidote to the currently over-simplistic view of foreign propaganda. Reading foreign 
propaganda more sophisticatedly could also help policy-makers to make better-informed foreign 
policy decisions. 
  The remainder of the dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 lays out in 
greater detail the conceptual and theoretical bases of the study. I flesh out the assumptions, the 
concepts, and the logic of the theory. In addition to addressing the potential inferential threats to 
the theory, I also derive alternative explanations to the empirical puzzle from existing literatures 
of audience cost and diversionary war.  
 Chapter 3 has two sections. The first section outlines the research design used to test my 
and the alternative explanations; the second section reviews the development and the features of 
the Chinese propaganda system, with comparisons to other authoritarian regimes. In the method 
section, I present how the medium-n congruence test and the process-tracing shall proceed. I 
present and justify the sampling, the case selection, the data sources used for these tests, the 
measurements for the variables, as well as the observable implications for the proposed and the 
alternative casual mechanisms. The section on the Chinese propaganda system serves as a 
background introduction in which these tests are grounded in. Comparisons to other authoritarian 
regimes could help extend the theory to cases beyond China.  
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 The empirical tests of the argument are to be found in Chapter 4 through 7. Chapter 4 
demonstrates the results of the congruence test, evaluating the overall consistence of the results 
and examining the deviant cases. The next three chapters cover the process-tracing of four cases, 
the Sino-Vietnamese Border War during 1979-1990 (Chapter 5), the Sino-Philippine arbitration 
case in 2016 (Chapter 6), the Sino-Vietnamese cable-cutting incidents in 2011, and the Sino-
Vietnamese oil rig crisis in 2014 (with the latter two cases in Chapter 7). Besides evaluating the 
Chinese media strategy in these cases, Chapter 7 also includes an analysis of the Vietnamese side 
of the story, which helps extend the geographical application of the theory. 
 In Chapter 8, I conclude by summarizing the empirical evidence, assessing the theory’s 















Chapter 2: The (Mis)Alignment Theory 
 
When are territorial disputes let known to the public, sometimes even made known, compared to 
other times when they are shrouded in secrecy? Under what conditions does a state decide to 
ramp up the rhetoric of a dispute by the use of mass media? What purposes do these propaganda 
campaigns serve to the state interests? This chapter develops a state-public (mis)alignment 
theory of propaganda campaigns as strategic state action in response to the (mis)alignment of 
existing public opinion and state foreign policy intent. This theory has important implications for 
studies on domestic politics and international relations, since it suggests the interaction of 
domestic factors and foreign policy, rather than using one to explain the other like most “second 
image” theories or “second image reversed” theories do.22 It also adds nuances to Putnam’s 
“two-level game” by substantiating a relationship between the domestic and international 
imperatives.23 Additionally, the theory also enriches the emerging literature on authoritarian 
public opinion by moving the theoretical setting from domestic politics to the international arena.  
I argue that popular autocrats hike up domestically the rhetoric of a foreign dispute, 
especially a territorial dispute, when public opinion and state policy intent on the issue are at 
odds with each other. When public opinion is moderate or weak, but state foreign policy intent is 
hardline, states hike up the dispute to mobilize domestic public for the hardline policy that risks 
conflicts. But when public opinion is hardline, yet state foreign policy intent is moderate, states 
counterintuitively hike up the dispute as a strategy to pacify the public. On one hand, the harsh 
rhetoric helps the government to keep up the appearances of a hard stand to meet the public 
demand. On the other, the state mollifies public opinion by echoing their emotions and letting 
them vent, with the goal of easing off the public pressure for a hardline policy that risks 
22 Gourevitch 1978. 
23 Putnam 2009. 
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escalations. In either scenario, the strong rhetoric works as a “bridging” instrument to close the 
gap between the state and the public before the intended foreign policy is carried out. This is 
important for autocrats who care about public support, while at the same time have the 
wherewithal - its strong propaganda machines - to effectively affect public opinion to meet its 
needs. On the contrary, when the state and the public are aligned, the state does not bother with a 
propaganda campaign; it just goes ahead with the intended foreign policy - hardline or moderate. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I identify and justify my theoretical assumptions. 
Next, I then the dependent variable and the independent variables and draw out the causal logic 
of my theory by explicating how the two different kinds of propaganda work. Finally, I derive 
alternative explanations from existing theories. 
 
I. Theoretical Assumptions 
The (mis)alignment theory developed here explains authoritarian propaganda campaigns on 
territorial disputes. I make three assumptions about the nature of authoritarian states and the 
state-society relations: 1) these states are rationally led, and their top priorities are regime 
survival against domestic competitors and state security against external threats; 2) the public 
could exert some pressure on the state’s foreign policy, and that is why the state cares about 
public opinion; 3) but such pressure is limited because the state is also capable of effectively 
influencing public opinion. 
The first assumption is about the nature of actors. By rationally led, I mean that regimes 
seek survival and states as international actors maximize interests against risks and costs in their 
foreign policy. I assume that leaders act according to the expected utility from a cost-benefit 
perspective. Their rationality may be bounded and information may not be complete. But I rule 
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out the cases in which leaders’ personality or emotions, but not rational calculations, sway their 
decisions. I do not assume unitary actors - leaders are affected by political pressure from the 
public. But for the purpose of parsimony, I assume only two domestic actors - the state24 and the 
public;25 I exclude the role of bureaucracies, factions, interest groups or individuals within these 
two actors.26 So the proposed theory should work to the extent that reality resembles such a 
simplification - that is, when the effects of the differences within the state or within the public 
could be ignored. This simplification of reality is represented in some but not all cases. As such, 
I do not claim my theory will explain all state propaganda strategies on territorial disputes, but an 
ample number of cases that fit the assumptions specified here. 
The second and the third assumptions are about the nature of authoritarian state-society 
relations. These are the core assumptions driving the theory. On one hand, the public could exert 
some amount of pressure on the state, so that public opinion matters to the state in terms of 
foreign policy decision-making. The public has to play some, not utterly submissive, role in the 
state’s foreign policy decision making. There are very few countries in the world in the 
contemporary times that do not meet this criterion, but perhaps North Korea could be one 
example. On the other, the state is capable of effectively influencing public opinion towards its 
likes. In other words, public opinion matters in authoritarian states, but its influence is not 
decisive; the state is not omnipotent, but it is capable of changing public opinion to meet its 
policy needs.  
24 I use the word “state” in two senses: one relative to the domestic public, equivalent to “the 
regime,” “the government,” and “the leaders,” meaning the governing body; the other is used 
relative to other states, including both the governing body and the public but at an international 
level. 
25 I use “the public” and “the society” interchangeably. 
26 A vast body of literature studies the effects of interest groups and individuals on war. See, for 
example, Allison 1999; De Mesquita 2005; Legro 1996; Snyder 1993; Van Evera 1998. 
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These are important assumptions about state-society relations in authoritarian states that 
could find strong support in existing literature. These two assumptions about state-society 
relations in authoritarian foreign policy are an extension from the notion of state autonomy in a 
Neoclassical Realist tradition and are grounded in the literature of authoritarian public opinion in 
domestic politics.27 Even beyond authoritarian states, there is variation in the degree of state 
autonomy vis-à-vis society. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro write in the Introduction to 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy that “The degree of state autonomy vis-a-vis 
society varies over time and across different states. This variation, in turn, affects whether states 
respond to international pressures in a timely and efficient fashion.”28 While there is ongoing 
debate about how much influence the public has over the state and the state over the public in 
authoritarian states, the consensus is a two-way interaction. Fewsmith and Rosen argue that 
public opinion “has begun to play a role [in Chinese foreign policy], albeit one that remains 
restricted and significant only under certain conditions.”29 Reilly’s study of strong anti-Japan 
sentiment among the Chinese public shows an evolving government strategy composed of 
tolerance and responsiveness on one hand, and persuasion and repression on the other. 
On one hand, there is increasing evidence suggesting that genuine, bottom-up public 
opinion does exist and play an active role in authoritarian politics, and that explains why 
authoritarian states have to care and respond.30 Gries delineates how China’s extreme popular 
nationalism, once government-instigated, has taken on a life of its own.31 Chen, Pan and Xu 
finds that top-down oversight and bottom-up societal pressures could pressure local governments 
27 The authoritarian public opinion literature examines whether, why, and how autocrats respond to public opinion, 
usually in domestic politics. Many works cited are part of  this literature. 
28 Lobell et al, 2009, 27. 
29 Fewsmith and Rosen 1978, 152. 
30 See, for example, Chen, Pan, and Xu 2016, Truex 2014; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Manion 2014; Meng, Pan, 
and Yang 2014. 
31 Gries 2004. 
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to respond to citizen demands.32 Truex’s, Manion’s, and Malesky and Schuler’s respective study 
on Chinese and Vietnamese parliamentary bodies offer evidence that although not without limits, 
these authoritarian states do respond to the needs of local constituents.33 Meng, Pan and Yang’ 
experiment of provincial- and city-level leaders in China are receptive to citizen suggestions 
unless they perceive antagonism between the state and citizens.34 
The marketization and the advance of the Internet and social media has equipped the 
public with a longer reach to a diverse pool of information, the ability to express their opinions 
more freely than before, and the ability to mobilize among themselves, thus to pressure or 
constrain the state. Guobin Yang describes the various ways the Internet has revolutionized 
popular expression and activism in China.35 Scholars have documented various functions of the 
Internet, such as networking and organization of activism,36 political satire,37 and public shaming 
(“human flesh searches (ren rou sousuo)”),38 all of which the public can use to incur social 
changes, sometimes even to pressure the state.  
On the other, the influence of public opinion is often limited, especially on issues of 
national interest such as foreign policy. Although this is still part of a larger debate, this 
assumption is supported by a significant number of studies on the relations between public 
opinion and foreign policy in authoritarian states.39 The point here is not to engage in this debate, 
but rather to take the assumption in the agency of the state in influencing public opinion that has 
been amply demonstrated by existing studies. This school of thought argues that while possibly 
32 Chen et al 2016. 
33 Truex 2017; Manion 2014; Malesky and Schuler 2010. 
34 Meng et al 2017. 
35 Yang 2009. 
36 Sullivan and Xie 2009. 
37 Yang and Jiang 2015. 
38 Ong 2012; Gorman 2016. 
39 See, for example, Chubb 2018; Fewsmith and Rosen 1978; Gries 2004; Quek and Johnston 2018; Reilly 2011 and 
2014; Zhao 2004, 2005, and 2013. 
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more influential in democracies, public opinion is usually not influential enough in autocracies to 
sway a state’s decision on foreign policy. For example, Zhao argues that Chinese foreign policy 
before 2008 was not dictated by nationalist sentiment; after 2008, there was a convergence of 
assertive foreign policy and nationalist appeals, but that was because the Chinese government 
was more willing to play to the nationalist demands, not because they were compelled to.40 
Chubb develops a methodological framework to test the relationship between public opinion and 
foreign policy. He finds that popular nationalism has little to do with China’s assertive maritime 
policy since 2006 on five recent maritime dispute cases. Quek and Johnston’s survey experiment 
study suggests that China “may have more agency in the face of public opinion during a crisis 
than they themselves may believe.”41 Frames such as China’s peaceful identity, the economic 
cost of war, the availability of other tools such as U.N. mediation and economic sanctions, have 
proven to be effective in deescalating public opinion. 
The limited role of public opinion in authoritarian states is because it is relatively easy 
and cheap for autocratic leaders to change public opinion to their likes, through various frames, 
information gathering, traditional media and the internet, censorship, allowing protests 
selectively, quasi-democratic institutions, etc.42 Tsai enumerates the various new “networked” 
techniques the CCP has mastered to consolidate its control of public opinion.43 Repnikova and 
Fang enumerates the Chinese state’s revamped mass persuasion in online forms – digital 
versions of state media, the government’s official social media accounts, and the government’s 
promotion of patriotic bloggers.44 Esarey, Stockmann, and Zhang find evidence in Chinese 
40 Zhao 2013. 
41 Quek and Johnston 2018, 11. 
42 See, for example, Quek and Johnston 2018; Shirk 2007; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; Levisky and Way 2010; 
Lorentzen 2013 
43 Tsai 2016. 
44 Repnikova and Fang 2018. For government’s adoption of official microblogs, also see Schlæger and Jiang 2014. 
16
television public service advertisements that even the public is supportive of state propaganda 
efforts to guide public opinion.45 This study applies these findings from the context of domestic 
politics to international politics and focuses on one way autocrats cope with the role of public 
opinion in international disputes – through mass media. 
The importance of understanding and controlling public opinion is recognized by 
authoritarian rulers. In an editorial, China’s main official newspaper People’s Daily proclaims 
that “Territorial disputes are extremely complex, involving the people’s emotions and sometimes 
becoming bound up with domestic disputes. Unless extra restraint is taken, emotions could get 
out of control, which would doubtless result in unintended consequences.”46 Lacking the 
information feedback commonly provided by democratic institutions such as free elections and 
free press, authoritarian leaders make up for this information deficiency by a myriad of unique 
means. These include, for example, allowing small-scale, narrowly economic protests as 
harbingers of public opinion,47 adopting large-scale social surveys and polls to gauge public 
opinion,48 maintaining loose control of certain social space (although not without limits) to allow 
civil groups to grow and provide feedback to the government,49 tolerating investigative 
journalism and critical reporting on a number of domestic issues to let them function as 
watchdogs for the state,50 allowing citizen petitions,51 and using the Internet as a reflection of 
public opinion.52 
The authoritarian public opinion literature also demonstrates that the autocratic regimes 
45 Esarey et al 2017. 
46 Zhong Sheng, “Bie rang Nanhai wenti ganrao hezuo daju (Don’t let the South China Sea problems interfere with 
the general situation of cooperation),” People’s Daily, August 20, 2011, 3. 
47 Lorentzen 2013. 
48 Thornton 2011. 
49 Weller 2012. 
50 Repnikova 2017. 
51 Dimitrov 2014 and 2015. 
52 Meng et al 2017. 
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are selective in adopting democratic institutions,53 in tolerating protests,54 in censoring content,55 
and in responding to citizen demands.56 Part of the reason that they are selective is that some 
interests could be compromised to make up the appearance of accommodating public opinion, 
but other interests, such as those related to national security or regime survival, could not be 
compromised. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that autocratic leaders are not likely to yield 
on foreign policy issues to public opinion, which are issues of national interest but of relatively 
low relevance to citizens’ daily lives, especially when cheaper alternatives are available. To 
appear accommodating to public opinion, they usually select on issues of high relevance to the 
public livelihood such as social welfare. 
The prototype regime that best meets the second and the third assumption is what 
comparativists have coined as “popular authoritarianism.” Popular authoritarianism is the type of 
autocratic regime that “relies on popular support to maintain the continuance of one-party 
rule.”57 Instead of basing its top-down legitimacy on an ideology or the monopoly of force, 
popular authoritarian regimes’ “right to rule is more and more based on bottom-up legitimacy.”58 
But that legitimacy is based on a stronghold on the monopoly of information and the control of 
public opinion. China, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, Vietnam are examples of popular 
authoritarianism. “Competitive authoritarianism”59 and “illiberal democracies”60 are also close to 
this prototype. 
Slater (2003) and Weeks (2012) develop two conceptual dimensions to delineate a two-
53 Levitsky and Way 2010. 
54 For example, Chen 2012; King et al 2013; Li 2014; Lorentzen 2013; O’Brien and Li 2006; Weiss 2013 and 2014. 
55 King et al 2013. 
56 For example, Malesky and Schuler 2010; Manion 2014; Meng et al 2014; Truex 2017. 
57 Brady 2008, 191. 
58 Brady 2009, 451. 
59 Levistsky and Way 2010. 
60 Bell et al 1995; Mutalib 2000; Smith 2005; Smith and Ziegler 2008; Zakaria 1997 and 2007. 
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by-two typology of different autocratic regimes: militarism (or infrastructural power) and 
personalism (or political power). Organized along these two dimensions, there are four autocratic 
regime types: machine, junta, boss and strongman, with machine and junta being non-personalist 
regimes, boss and strongman being personalist regimes, machine and boss being non-military 
regimes, and strongman and junta being military regimes. It is generally believed that personalist 
regimes have more freedom in conducting foreign policy and military regimes have more vested 
interests in preferring escalation than other foreign policy options. As a result, there should be 
variations across these different types of autocracies, but as long as the “public opinion matters” 
assumption is met, all four kinds are included in this study. 
 
II. Propaganda Campaigns, State Foreign Policy Intent, and Public Opinion  
Propaganda campaigns are government-orchestrated, concerted efforts to attract public attention 
to a dispute by the use of mass media. A government attracts public attention by the volume and 
the salience of the message: volume is how much or how often a dispute is featured; salience is 
whether a dispute is featured in prime sections or at prime times of a media program. Therefore, 
a propaganda campaign distinguishes itself from normal media coverage by the high volume and 
salience of the coverage, and also by its nature of being intentional and deliberate, rather than 
being accidental or event-driven. Propaganda campaigns can be likened to the dissimilar twin of 
censorship. It has the same origin – the state, and the same essence – news and information 
manipulation, but different and almost opposite appearances – propaganda campaigns is hiking 
up; censorship is damping down. It is close to “reverse censorship” mentioned in King et al. 
2017 but travels far beyond social media posts fabrication.61 
61 King et al. 2017, 484. 
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Domestic propaganda campaigns on a foreign dispute could be regarded either as a 
domestic policy or a foreign policy depending on how they are viewed. They are domestic in the 
sense that their targets are domestic audiences and they are implemented domestically via 
domestic media outlets. Their goals might be domestic. They are foreign in the sense that their 
content is foreign-related and their goals might be foreign as well. Note that I do not differentiate 
the content of the message the state tries to convey through the propaganda campaigns other than 
it being related to the territorial dispute. The specific content and the tone in which the content is 
delivered could probably define different kinds of propaganda, which might warrant a whole new 
project. Given the scarce research on the subject, this dissertation focuses on the dimension of 
volume and salience of state media coverage as a first step, rather than opening up to the myriad 
perspectives and tones the coverage could take.  
I argue that propaganda campaigns are a strategic state action in response to the 
(mis)alignment of two conditions – state foreign policy intent and existing public opinion. 
Popular autocrats hike up domestically the rhetoric of a foreign dispute, especially a territorial 
dispute, when these two conditions are out of sync. The aggressive propaganda works to close 
the state-society gap before the intended policy is carried out.  
The first condition, a state’s foreign policy intent, is a state’s intended policy against a 
particular target country during a specific crisis on a dispute. This can be characterized as 
hardline or moderate. A hardline policy is the unprovoked threat, display, or use of force or 
economic sanctions; or when provoked, escalated responses. A moderate policy involves 
territorial compromise, “shelving” a dispute, or passive and proportionate responses to 
provocations. “Shelving” a territorial dispute is defined as deferring settlement, peaceful or 
military, and avoiding territorial compromise and escalations. It is usually achieved by putting 
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the dispute aside or “freezing” it to the status quo. Proportionate response is defined as in-kind 
response of similar scale. Some may argue that a proportionate response should be categorized as 
a hardline policy, since it may involve a reactive provocation. I argue that territorial disputes 
provide a unique context for a passive and proportionate response to be defensive in nature. 
When challenged on a territorial dispute, the lack of action could be deemed as tacit consent of 
the initial breach and could be used in the future against the country who fails to act. As a result, 
in-kind response of similar scale is almost necessarily called for even when maintaining the 
status quo is the objective. 
The second condition, the existing public opinion, is the public knowledge, sentiment, 
and policy orientation against a foreign rival during a specific crisis on a dispute before a state 
responds to the crisis. There are three aspects of public opinion that a propaganda campaign aims 
to affect - the extent of public knowledge, the intensity of public emotion, and the policy 
orientation of public opinion: the “knowledge” describes how public a dispute is, that is, how 
many people know about a dispute; the “emotion” captures how strongly the people who know 
about the dispute feel about it; the “orientation” can be characterized as hardline or moderate, 
following the same definitions of being “hardline” or “moderate” described above in terms of the 
state’s policy orientation. In relation to the state foreign policy intent, the “orientation” 
dimension of public opinion is the most relevant. Additionally, public opinion can be weak if the 
dispute is little known (public knowledge) or weakly felt (public sentiment). I collapse the 
“moderate” public opinion with the “weak” public opinion into one category, as they have 
similar effects on state media behaviors.  
As shown in Table 2.1, combinations of state foreign policy intent and existing public 
opinion form four scenarios, resulting in the adoption (scenarios I and II) and the non-adoption 
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(scenarios III and IV) of propaganda campaigns. 
 
Table 2.1: The State-Public Alignment Theory 
 






 Hardline Moderate 
Moderate/Weak I. Propaganda Campaigns to Mobilize  
IV. No Propaganda 
Campaigns  
Hardline III. No Propaganda Campaigns 




III. The Mobilizing Propaganda 
Depending on how the values of the independent variables diverge, the “bridging” process could 
take one of two distinct causal pathways. When existing public opinion on a dispute is moderate 
or weak, yet the state prefers a hardline policy, the state launches a propaganda campaign to 
prepare the public and garner public support for its hardline policy. This is what I call the 
mobilizing propaganda. This causal logic is reflected in the diagram in Figure 2.1:  
 









This mobilizing use of propaganda is intuitive and commonly known. A hardline policy on a 
territorial dispute, by definition, is the unprovoked threat, display, or use of force or economic 
sanctions; or when provoked, escalated responses. A preferred hardline policy would necessarily 
raise the probability of conflict, and conflicts demands material and human resources of the 
nation. But if the public opinion on the issue is moderate or weak, meaning either people prefer a 
moderate policy, or not many people know about it or the people who do know do not consider it 
Existing Public Opinion 
= Moderate/Weak 
State Foreign Policy 
Intent = Hardline 
Propaganda Campaign 
= Yes To Mobilize 
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important enough to risk conflict, a popular autocrat who cares about public opinion (by 
assumption) would want to mobilize the public before the hardline policy is carried out. 
 The mobilizing campaigns, however, are not uncontroversial in academic settings. For a 
similar scenario, both the diversionary war theory and the audience cost theory would predict the 
same outcome – the adoption of propaganda campaigns, but with different motivations. For the 
diversionary logic, the state launches a propaganda campaign to divert public attention away 
from a domestic crisis, ultimately for the sake of domestic stability; for the audience cost logic, 
the state makes a dispute public to tie its own hands to enhance its threat credibility for coercive 
purposes, ultimately for the sake of foreign policy. In the alignment logic, however, the state 
launches a propaganda campaign for the sake of both domestic stability and foreign policy. It is 
about achieving balance between public opinion that the state has to to some extent cater to for 
the sake of domestic stability and keeping its foreign policy goal. This is a new story of 
authoritarian resilience, both at the domestic level vis-à-vis its domestic public and at the 
international level vis-à-vis a foreign rival. 
This part of my theory draws inspiration from Thomas Christensen’s two-level game 
“mobilization” model in his Useful Adversaries.62 He argues that leaders (Truman in 1947-50 
and Mao in 1957-58) manipulates international crises for domestic political purposes. 
Specifically, they exaggerate external threats through crusading ideological rhetoric to mobilize 
domestic support for unpopular national strategies. In the case of Truman in 1947-50, when the 
need for military expenditure expansion contradicts the public desire to lower taxes and end 
conscription, Truman resorted to anti-Communist rhetoric, which resulted in the unintended 
confrontation with China. The same logic applies to Mao in 1957-58, when Mao used the 
62 Christensen 1996. 
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confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan and anti-Imperialist rhetoric to mobilize domestic 
support for the Great Leap Forward program.  
My theory shares some important elements in the independent variables, the causal 
mechanism, and the dependent variable - the juxtaposition of state and popular intention on 
certain policy, overcoming domestic mobilization obstacles, and the resulting rhetoric. However, 
my theory departs from Christensen’s “mobilization” model in the logic of the two-level game, 
in the sense that his mobilization model is about using external crises for the sake of domestic 
policy, while mine is about using external crises for the sake of both domestic stability and 
foreign policy. For Christensen, foreign policy (U.S.-China confrontation) is an inadvertent 
consequence, while mine is part of the motivation. Besides, state rhetoric is the intervening 
variable for Christensen, whereas it is the dependent variable of my study. 
The mobilizing part of my theory also draws upon a number of other representative 
works in the Neoclassical Realist approach. In explaining the puzzle of under-aggression and 
under-expansion of great powers, Randall Schweller stresses the great powers’ difficulty in 
rallying domestic public support for such hegemonic bids.63 Along a similar line, in explaining 
the delayed American ascendance as a world superpower, Fareed Zakaria cites the lack of 
extractive and mobilization capacity.64 These works all emphasize the state’s domestic 
imperative owing to its public. In explaining a different puzzle, the mobilizing theory elaborated 
here expands the scope of this emphasis to authoritarian states and their policy in international 
crisis. 
This part of my theory also falls in line with the “threat inflation” argument made by 
renown scholars such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in a number of policy publications 
63 Schweller 2009. 
64 Zakaria 1999. 
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provoked by the 2003 Iraq War.65 This argument uses the Iraq War as a classic example in which 
an external threat was “inflated” by the state through manipulating and dominating the political 
discourse and the media. I make the same line of argument but focus on authoritarian states 
where media manipulation is supposedly easier.    
In a mobilizing propaganda campaign, the state calls for the agenda-setting, the priming, 
and the framing effects of the mass media.66 First, people need to know about a dispute if it is 
not already widely known, especially when the dispute is about remote and sparsely-populated 
borderlands or uninhabited outlying islands. The first function of the media is to raise awareness 
of a particular issue, or what Media Studies call “agenda-setting.” Agenda-setting refers to the 
“ability [of media] to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda.”67 It affects in 
particular the public knowledge aspect of public opinion mentioned in previous text. By 
increasing the extent and frequency of coverage of a particular dispute in the media, the state 
forces attention to that dispute. Moreover, the increased awareness could also heighten the 
perceived importance of the disputed territory. The positive correlation between awareness and 
perceived importance – what social psychologists call “availability heuristic,” has been 
repeatedly confirmed by psychological experiments.68 That is, the more the public hears about a 
dispute, the greater importance they are likely to associate to the dispute. 
Second, the priming role of media works through “stimulat[ing] related thoughts in the 
minds of audience members.”69 It is about the accessibility of information (just like the agenda-
65 Mearsheimer 2011 and 2013; Walt 2009, 2010 and 2013. 
66 For works on these media effects, see, for example, Berkowitz 1984; Brown and Deegan 1998; 
McCombs and Shaw 1972; McCombs and Reynolds 2002; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; 
Weaver 1981. 
67 McCombs and Reynolds 2002, 1. 
68 Tversky and Kahneman 1973; 1974. 
69 Straubhaar et al. 2013, 421. 
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setting effect), association of related ideas, and activation of one thought triggering another.70 
For example, the Chinese propaganda campaign on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with 
Japan in 2012 were not necessarily on the territorial issue itself, but instead took on the theme of 
anti-fascism. Yet the recall of Japanese intrusion during World War II is likely to trigger a 
similar reaction in the Chinese public about the more recent events. 
Last but not the least, media framing directly affects people’s attitudes towards a dispute, 
specifically the public sentiment and policy orientation aspects of public opinion. Framing “is 
based on the assumption that how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an inﬂuence 
on how it is understood by audiences.”71 When publicizing a territorial dispute, the propaganda 
almost always legitimizes a state’s own territorial claim to the detriment of the other(s)’s, 
whitewash one’s own behaviors, or victimizing oneself and accusing the other(s) for aggression. 
These tend to induce strong public emotion on the issue. Framing has been taken seriously by 
social psychologists. Tversky and Kahneman argue for the significant effects of frames on 
preferences;72 Nelson et al specifies the psychological mechanisms by which framing affects 
public opinion and proved through experiments that mass media can profoundly influence public 
opinion even through unintended frames.73 In addition, the war mobilization role of mass media 
has been long argued by the media and war literature. Carruthers illustrates the media’s role in 
painting war as “defensive, just and unavoidable: an overdue rectification of past wrongs and/or 
a preemptive aversion of future assault by an enemy whose malignance is clear but whose 
inferiority will ensure rapid defeat.”74 
70 Domke et al. 1998. 
71 Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11. 
72 Tversky and Kahneman 1981. 
73 Nelson et al 1997. 
74 Carruthers 2011, 16. 
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By utilizing these three media effects, the state mobilizes public opinion towards the 
following positions about a hardline policy and the potential of conflicts: 1) that the territory 
would be worth the costs of conflicts; and 2) that conflicts are defensive and necessary. Through 
this mobilization process, the state is able to bring public opinion in line with the preferred 
hardline policy.   
 If the mobilizing mechanism is at work, we should observe the following implications: 
Ha1 (State Concern): Government officials express concerns about the moderate/weak 
public opinion and the need to mobilize. Given the state’s hardline policy intent, the existing 
moderate/weak public opinion should cause leaders’ concerns. These expressed concerns, 
especially if expressed privately, reveal their motivations to bridge the gap. 
Ha2 (Media Directives): The state issues media plans or directives to media outlets to 
mobilize the public. The mobilization should leave traces within the state apparatus, especially 
for “government-orchestrated, concerted efforts” such as these propaganda campaigns. Traces 
like these should amount to “smoking gun” evidence.75  
Ha3 (Inflammatory Content): Media content is inflammatory – self-victimizing, 
accusing others for aggression, or implying injustice. As mentioned earlier in the framing 
effect, the themes and the tones of the articles should generally be inflammatory to achieve a 
mobilizing objective. 
Ha4 (Motivation Disappears): Media coverage diminishes as execution of a hardline 
policy comes to an end. As the goal of the propaganda campaign is to prepare the public for a 
hardline policy, the campaign should come to a stop when that goal is achieved, that is, when the 
hardline policy ends. 
75 See Collier 2011. 
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 IV. The Pacifying Propaganda 
When the values of the independent variables diverge the other way, that is, when public opinion 
is hardline, yet the state prefers a moderate policy, the state might also resort to a propaganda 
campaign counterintuitively to mollify public opinion to bring it in line with the intended 
moderate policy. But this time, the “bridging” process takes a disparate causal pathway from 
mobilization - what I call a pacifying propaganda. The causal logic is reflected in the diagram in 
Figure 2.2:  
 









A hardline public opinion means that not only the issue is widely known, but also the public is 
intensely agitated towards aggressive state actions risky of conflicts. Yet the state might prefer a 
moderate policy that seeks to avoid conflicts by offering territorial compromises, putting the 
dispute aside, or merely passively and proportionately responding to provocations by the foreign 
rival. I argue that when faced with such a state-society divergence, a popular autocrat who cares 
about public opinion (by assumption) would want to subdue public opinion by also launching a 
propaganda campaign. 
In contrast to the mobilizing use of propaganda, this second use – to pacify an otherwise 
agitated public, although also commonly practiced, is less known and has not been theorized. 
Dispute propaganda, despite its disputative content and sometimes provocative tone, is still a 
Existing Public Opinion 
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significant step back from real military actions. Like a dog that barks but does not bite, a popular 
autocrat could use propaganda campaigns to meet the public demand to keep up the appearances 
of a hard stand, while at the same time allowing public emotions to subside through echoing and 
venting, thus easing off the public pressure for a substantially hardline policy that carries real 
escalatory consequences. In this way, these media campaigns are essentially staged shows to 
satisfy and to calm down an angry public and a pretense to cover up a restrained policy intent. 
The pacifying logic is in tension with the audience cost theory, which always sees such 
propaganda as hands-tying. But here, pacifying rhetoric is essentially hand-freeing. This logic 
should apply particularly to 1) countries that have strong nationalist traditions and, 2) 
controversial issues that have already gained salience through previous militarization and media 
exposure. 
Pacifying propaganda campaigns have two specific functions to bring an angry public 
closer to a moderate policy. One is appeasing the public by keeping up the appearances of a hard 
stance. Ordinary people care more about public discourse than following up on the actual policy, 
especially on matters of territory and sovereignty where national dignity is at stake, but only a 
minority of people are affected on the ground. Recent survey experiments conducted in China 
show that citizens approve of government “bluster” – tough but vague talk, without necessarily 
being followed by tough action.76 Additionally, Media Studies have long argued for the short 
attention span of the general public on some social issues.77 The “issue attention cycle” 
hypothesis describes the public opinion and the media cycle during which a problem “suddenly 
leaps into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then – though still largely unresolved – 
76 Weiss and Dafoe 2017. 
77 See, for example, Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Bodensteiner 1995; Downs 1972. 
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gradually fades from the center of public attention.”78 Issues that only affect a minority of people 
on a day-to-day basis, that are caused by social arrangements beneficial to a powerful few, and 
that are not intrinsically exciting in a sustained way, are likely to go through the cycle.79 Foreign 
policy issues, especially those concerning remote periphery borders or uninhabited islands, fit the 
description. Because nationalists often equate a moderate foreign policy with weakness and 
failure, a strong state rhetoric helps fend off nationalistic criticism, save face, and maintain social 
stability. 
The other function of a pacifying propaganda campaign is to moderate public emotion by 
making use of the echoing and the venting functions of the media. The “catharsis theory” in 
psychology claims that violence in media releases pent-up anger and reduces aggression.80 
Similarly, dispute propaganda could soothe an angry public simply by talking about it, echoing 
public sentiment, or offering rational analysis of the issue. Besides, venting on “participatory” 
media such as social media or online forums also releases anger. Recent research on social media 
confirms such an effect.81 This venting function, however, is a recent phenomenon with the 
advent of the Internet. Before the creation and the spread of these online venting venues, the 
media relies predominantly on the echoing functions of traditional media and guiding public 
opinion through balanced information and rational analysis. In these smart ways, a propaganda 
campaign releases the pressure for an aggressive policy, so that a preferred moderate policy 
could prevail. The moderate policy is usually carried out quietly after the public has cooled off 
and has moved on to other headlines in the news. 
A pacifying campaign is thus distinct from a mobilizing campaign not only in its 
78 Downs 1972, 28. 
79 Ibid., 41-42. 
80 Murray and Feshbach 1978. 
81 Cairns and Carlson 2016; Hassid 2012; MacKinnon 2008. 
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objective but also in its content and means. It should still seek to attract public attention in terms 
of the media’s agenda-setting function, but it should perform differently in terms of priming and 
framing. The goal of the campaign, despite its copious volume just like the mobilizing campaign, 
is to reorient the hardline public opinion towards more rational and moderate policy choices and 
to release the public anger. A pacifying campaign, just like a mobilizing campaign, could 
certainly fail – sometimes it encounters public pushbacks or even backfire. Propaganda is an art 
about winning the hearts and minds, so it takes time to be effective. But sometimes the time 
window of a crisis does not allow enough time for a propaganda campaign to be successfully 
implemented. Sometimes an exogenous shock might disrupt a propaganda campaign and divert 
the public attention. In light of these possibilities, the theory is limited in that it does not consider 
enough of the outcomes of these campaigns. But the frequent occurrence of the pacifying 
campaigns regardless of their outcomes deserves our devotion to them in this dissertation and 
deserves to be made explicit, especially given our relatively poor understanding about them. 
One specific challenge is a possible “ratchet effect” that public opinion, once riled up, 
might not be able to retrench to the status quo ante. Authoritarian states cultivating nationalism 
to consolidate regime might have trouble paring it down to the pre-mobilization level. The 
sustained intense Chinese nationalism against Japan on the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
provides a plausible example that such a “ratchet effect” might exist. Yet we should not 
underestimate the public’s oblivion of the past, given the short attention span of the public. 
Seeing how the Chinese people have been able to carry on close people-to-people relations with 
the United States after an outpour of intense emotions during the Belgrade embassy bombing 
crisis in 1999 should strengthen our confidence in this regard. Nor should we underestimate the 
state’s ability in overcoming strong popular nationalism in the conduct of foreign policy. Quek 
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and Johnston confirms the effectiveness of numerous frames the Chinese government could use 
to deescalate in the face of strong public opinion.82 Weiss also finds that “the Chinese 
government has been effective at both stoking and quashing nationalist sentiment over the South 
China Sea.”83 So the bottom line is that mobilizing today does not foreclose choices of pacifying 
tomorrow. 
Another challenge is the inescapable aspect of foreign policy implications and their 
preemptive effect in turn to the state leaders making the decisions. Although this project focuses 
on the domestic propaganda, because of the foreign content of the issues, the international 
ramifications are an inescapable concern. On one hand, a domestic campaign could have a 
spillover effect on a foreign audience if the domestic campaign is observed by foreign 
governments especially the foreign rival, or if the content of the domestic campaign is reported 
in the international media. This spillover effect is implicit in Christensen’s mobilization model. 
For Christensen, it was Truman and Mao’s domestic-oriented rhetoric that resulted in the 
unintended confrontation between the two powers.84 The risk of a spillover challenges the 
pacifying logic in that a foreign rival may interpret an aggressive but pacifying campaign as a 
hardline position by the government and reacting with its own hardline position. This dynamic 
can lead to a conflict that neither side wanted. A pacifying campaign could therefore be self-
defeating for a goal of successfully implementing a moderate policy. On the other, a feedback 
loop might exist if the concern for possible spillover effects on a foreign rival restrains a state’s 
media behavior in a certain way. Expectations of unwanted escalations might in turn keep a state 
82 Quek and Johnston 2018. 
83 Kacie Miura, Jessica Chen Weiss, “Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?” 
Washington Post Monkey Cage, July 14, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/12/06/will-beijing-cut-trump-some-slack-after-that-phone-call-with-
taiwan/?utm_term=.30954c7ec9e1, accessed June 1, 2018. 
84 Christensen 1996. 
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from pursuing a pacifying propaganda campaign. 
These risks of foreign ramifications and their feedback effect to the state leaders certainly 
exist, but they are not deterministic. First, there is a natural barrier between a domestic media 
campaign and an international one, especially if their language source and media carriers are 
different. Second, a pacifying campaign, as mentioned earlier, is distinct from a mobilizing one 
in terms of content and means. So if such a campaign caught the attention of the foreign rival at 
all, its pacifying characteristics should also be noticed. These characteristics should at least 
caution the foreign rival from jumping to hardline conclusions. Third, states sometimes have 
private and credible channels to convey their intentions to the other state in order to preempt 
unintended external consequences. A main function of track two or track 1.5 dialogues is to offer 
backchannels like this. The literature on the prevalence of secret diplomacy in international 
politics has demonstrated the existence of credible private diplomatic channels. For example, 
Yarhi-Milo argues for the credibility of secret assurances, which often defies a prima facie 
understanding of existing scholarship on costly signals especially audience cost theory. She 
argues that possible revelation of the secret assurance, either intentional or not, by the adversary 
or third parties, could incur a risk of domestic punishment for the initiator due to existing 
domestic opposition, thereby rendering a credible signal of cooperative intentions.85 Fourth, a 
myriad of conflict reduction measures are at states’ disposal.86 For example, Senese and Vasquez 
find that ritualized dispute behaviors reduce the probability of war.87 Some dramatic yet 
routinized, low-cost confrontations have proven to be tacitly understood by the foreign rival to 
be merely symbolic and domestic-oriented. Take the Korea-Japan dispute on the 
85 Yarhi-Milo 2013. 
86 Azar 1972;  
87 Senese and Vasquez 2005. 
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Dokdo/Takeshima Islands for example, recalling ambassadors to express protests each time the 
dispute flares up has become a routinized practice that both countries understand to be geared 
towards satisfying a nationalist domestic audience and would not overreact to it. Finally, state 
media have certain techniques to echo the angry public sentiment without inflaming the tensions 
with the foreign rival. For example, Vietnamese media during the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese oil rig 
crisis echoed the anti-China public emotion only in foreign observers’ assessments instead of 
direct condemnation. 
If the pacifying mechanism is at work, we should observe the following implications: 
Hb1 (Nationalistic Criticisms): The state is exposed to nationalistic criticisms. A 
government under nationalist attacks will be more motivated to align the public to its preferred 
moderate policy. 
Hb2 (Bark but No Bite): Official statements are harsh, but without any substantive 
threats of punishment. To keep up the appearances of a hard stand and to fend off nationalist 
criticisms, a government needs to adopt a particularly harsh rhetoric, sometimes even in 
hyperbole and colorful language. But the absence of any substantive threats of punishment belies 
its real moderate intentions. In the end, it is all bark but no bite. 
Hb3 (Non-Inflammatory Content): Media content is informative and analytical, not 
inflammatory. Besides echoing the hardline public emotion to release their anger, a significant 
portion of the media content should be geared towards guiding public opinion towards rational 
thoughts, so that the public would be less likely to resort to violence or collective actions that 
might endanger social stability or regime security. 
Hb4 (Hoop Test for Venting Mechanism): Venting venues such as social media and 
online forums are open, and venting is allowed or even encouraged. This is a necessary 
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condition for the venting function of the media to work.  
Hb5 (Motivation Disappears): Media coverage diminishes as a moderate policy is 
carried out. As the goal of the media campaign is to subdue public opinion for a moderate 
policy, the campaign should come to a stop when that goal is achieved, that is, when the 
moderate policy is rolled out. 
 
V. The Alignment 
When the state and the public are aligned, either for a hardline or a moderate policy, or when the 
public does not know or care when the state intends for a moderate policy, the state lacks the 
aforementioned incentives to work with a disagreeing public through a propaganda campaign. In 
other words, there is no need to mobilize an already hardline public or to mollify an already 
moderate/weak public. The state just moves ahead with its intended policy. 
 
VI. Competing Explanations 
In explaining states’ motivations in hiking up the rhetoric of a dispute, International Relations 
theories offer two alternative explanations. In short, they suggest that states arouse public 
opinion on international disputes, particularly territorial disputes: 
1. for the purpose of engaging audience cost to prevail in coercions with the foreign rival 
(“audience cost”); or  
2. in order to divert public attention away from domestic problems to foreign disputes 
and/or to strengthen regime legitimacy (“diversionary war”). 
The “audience cost” and the “diversionary war” arguments are both two-level-game theories, but 
the “audience cost” argument stresses a state’s foreign agenda - to prevail in international 
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coercions, whereas the “diversionary war” argument emphasizes a state’s domestic ends - to 
survive a domestic crisis or to strengthen regime at home. In comparison, the (mis)alignment 
theory develops Putnam’s framework that underlines a “general equilibrium” between diplomacy 
and domestic politics and adds specificity to it. In the space below, I elaborate these alternative 
explanations, in order to lay the foundation for testing them in later chapters alongside the 
(mis)alignment theory. The purpose of testing these alternative explanations is in no way to 
“defeat” these two theories but is merely to establish the possibility of the “misalignment” 
rationale in addition to the other theories out there. 
 
1. Audience Cost 
Audience cost is the potential cost leaders have to pay if they back down from their publicly-
made threat to another state. Audience cost theory contends that by making threats public, states 
willfully tie their hands to signal resolve in standing firm.88 A classic version of the audience 
cost theory links regime type to states’ ability to generate audience cost and to use it to enhance 
threat credibility,89 but Weeks expands the gift of generating audience cost from democracies to 
most autocracies.90 She argues that audience cost is conditioned on the ability and willingness of 
domestic audience to sanction/punish leaders and on the visibility of the cost to foreign leaders. 
Except for “personalist” regimes and certain types of monarchies, most autocracies also have the 
ability to generate audience cost. Weiss’ study on authoritarian states’ management of anti-
foreign protests corroborates this finding and introduces a mechanism through which 
authoritarian regimes generate audience cost - by managing anti-foreign protests.91 She argues 
88 Fearon 1994. 
89 Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001. 
90 Weeks 2008 and 2012. 
91 Weiss 2013 and 2014. 
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that because protests in authoritarian states are costly to repress and risky for going out of 
control, authoritarian states are able to generate audience cost to signal the resolve to stand tough 
by tolerating popular mobilization, or conversely, to signal the willingness to cooperate by 
stifling popular mobilization. All in all, at the core of the audience cost logic is an inherent trade-
off that frequently confronts leaders between enhancing threat credibility and increased scrutiny 
over their foreign policy choices. The former could lead a state to prevail in a crisis without a 
fight, and the latter to more constraints in foreign policy and greater risks of domestic 
punishment if the outcome is not good.    
The audience cost theory involves two logical steps that have rarely been distinguished 
from each other, but nevertheless warrant a distinction. The first step is whether audience cost 
exists for a specific regime or regime type. On this, audience cost theorists usually investigate 
the ability of a specific regime type to generate audience cost.92 This depends on the ability and 
willingness of domestic audience to sanction leaders if the leaders were to back down from a 
publicly-made threat and whether the audience views backing down negatively.93 In this logical 
step, we are mainly concerned about a domestic audience. Audience cost is the dependent 
variable; we study the effect of regime type on the generation of audience cost.  
The second step is whether such costs can help states to signal resolve in standing firm - a 
story about turning a liability into a leverage. On this, we are concerned about whether a state 
has the ability to translate audience cost into enhanced threat credibility in coercions. This 
depends on whether the audience cost is visible and convincing to foreign leaders. In this step, 
we are mainly concerned about an audience of foreign leaders. As Schultz points out, ultimately, 
92 Eyerman and Hart 1996; Fearon 1994; Partell and Palmer 1999; Prins 2003; Schelling 1963; Schultz 2001; Weeks 
2008. 
93 Weeks 2008. 
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what matters is not the generation of audience cost, but the perception by the opponent of the 
audience cost.94 If the audience cost is perceived to be great, then the threat credibility is great, 
then the party that lacks credibility will be more likely to back down. Here, audience cost is the 
independent variable; we study the effects of audience cost on threat credibility and foreign 
policy outcomes.  
The above two logical steps are reflected in the following diagram in Figure 2.3.  
 






Publicity comes in the first step - the generation of audience cost. Only if a domestic audience is 
aware of and is concerned about an issue, can the public act upon this knowledge to punish 
leaders for backing down from a publicly-made threat. So public knowledge is a precondition for 
the ability of domestic audience to sanction leaders, and hence the existence of audience cost. 
Therefore, the audience cost theory would suggest that propaganda is used to generate audience 
cost in order to enhance threat credibility in coercions. In other words, it is a state’s foreign 
policy intention to prevail in coercions, through exploiting audience cost, that motivates the state 
to hike up the publicity of a dispute. The causal diagram in Figure 2.4 captures this logic.  
 






Therefore, propaganda campaigns can be regarded as a self-binding mechanism, leveraged 
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ultimately to force the foreign rival to back down. If a state’s policy intention is to prevail in a 
coercion, it might intentionally constrain its choices to demonstrate its resolve by raising 
publicity of the dispute. But as some critiques of the audience cost theory go, leaders rarely push 
themselves into a corner and leave no leeway for backing down. Besides, audience cost has a 
rather limited scope – states have to be engaged in a foreign coercion.  
 If an audience cost logic is at work, we should observe the following hypotheses, some of 
which directly contradict those for the (mis)alignment theory.  
Hc1 (Hoop Test about Scope): The propaganda campaign should be adopted during an 
ongoing coercion with the foreign rival. The audience cost theory is a theory about coercions. 
Without ongoing coercions, the audience cost theory becomes irrelevant. Negotiations are signs 
of an ongoing coercion but are not a necessary condition, as sometimes bringing a target state to 
the negotiation table itself could be a coercive goal. In most circumstances, I examine whether 
the state has made demands to the foreign rival. 
Hc2 (Tying Hands): Officials make public threats with substantive punishment. The 
key of an audience cost logic is that the state makes a clear threat public so that backing down 
would be costly and less attractive. This, in turn, enhances the threat credibility and forces the 
opponent who fears a collision to back down. This contrasts Hb2 of the (mis)alignment theory in 
whether the harsh official rhetoric commits the state to a substantive punishment. If the state 
issues no public threat, or the threat the state issues is vague in terms and hollow in content, then 
the state is not committed to a domestic cost, and the propaganda is likely for the purpose of 
mobilizing or pacifying the domestic public, rather than for a foreign coercive purpose. 
Hc3 (Bargaining Advantage): On average, given the occurrence of the propaganda 
campaign, the international outcome should be more favorable to the government. This is 
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borrowed and adapted from Weiss’ work on anti-foreign protests. She reasons that “Once the 
government has tied its hands and demonstrated resolve by allowing anti-foreign protests, the 
burden of conciliation falls to the foreign government. On average, therefore, anti-foreign 
protests should lead to a more advantageous bargain for the authoritarian government.”95 She 
also points out that the actual outcome also depends on the strategic interactions with the other 
parties, so that negotiations may collapse, and crises may escalate. Propaganda campaigns, like 
anti-foreign protests, could also be a costly signal to show the state’s resolve. So once engaged, 
the international outcome should be more favorable to the initiating state.   
Hc4 (Motivation Disappears): Media coverage diminishes as the coercion succeeds or 
fails. The propaganda campaign should end when the coercion has succeeded or has failed, 
because that is when the coercive motivation disappears. This directly contradicts Ha4 and Hb5 
of the (mis)alignment theory. 
 
2. Diversionary War 
Diversionary war theory stipulates that state leaders use international conflicts to divert public 
attention from domestic problems.96 Further, invoking nationalism through hiking up 
international disputes might also help strengthen regime legitimacy at home – the so-called “rally 
around the flag” effect.97  
In summary, the diversionary war literature suggests four diversionary logics: 
1. Scapegoating: divert public attention away from domestic problems by creating or 
magnifying external “enemies”; 
95 Weiss 2008, 27. 
96 Russett 1990; Smith 1996; Stoll 1984. 
97 Levy and Vakili 1992. 
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2. Bolstering regime legitimacy: stoke nationalism and rally around the flag – strengthen 
domestic unity and regime legitimacy;  
3. Rent-seeking: states as “monopoly supplier of protection,” create or exaggerate foreign 
threats to “sell” their protection to society;98 and 
4. Mass distraction: Leaders provoke external crises sometimes to “protect their 
legislative agendas or programs at home.”99 
The logic of the diversionary argument is summarized in Figure 2.5. 
 








The limitation with this argument is that resorting to nationalism for regime legitimacy is a 
dangerous venture. For one, it increases the chance of unwanted conflicts that might eventually 
wear off the nationalist sentiments. The audience cost theory argues that diversions are too risky 
because they tie a government’s hands. Two, the anger of the mass might turn inward and 
backfire to threaten regime survival.100 State leaders are aware of these risks. Existing literature 
on state-instigated nationalism has not reached a conclusion on why and when states would 
overcome such trade-offs and deliberately pursue such a risky policy. Managing nationalism 
within control is, after all, a delicate game. Besides, for authoritarian states where domestic stress 
is a constant concern and governing legitimacy is always a valued good given the non-
98 Lake 1992. 
99 Christensen 1996; Downes 2009. 
100 Weiss 2013 and 2014. 
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democratic nature of the government, it remains a puzzle as why stoking nationalism through 
hiking up territorial disputes is not a constant effort. It also does not explain why states choose 
some disputes but not others to attract the public eye for regime consolidation purposes. Despite 
these shortcomings, diversionary war theory has often been used to explain authoritarian 
international behaviors because of its emphasis on domestic politics and regime survival at 
home, which are critical in understanding authoritarian foreign policy. So it deserves our 
attention here. 
 If the diversionary logic is at work, we should observe the following hypotheses, some of 
which directly contradict those for the (mis)alignment theory. 
Hd1 (Hoop Test about Scope): States are more likely to adopt a propaganda campaign 
on a foreign dispute when they face severe domestic challenges. Because of the risks involved 
in inciting public anger, it is likely that states only resort to scapegoating and diversionary logics 
when they are faced with severe domestic challenges. These domestic challenges should be 
severe enough to cause legitimacy crisis at home that makes diversionary strategies appealing. 
Hd2 (Motivation Disappears): Media coverage diminishes as the predominant domestic 
challenge, if any, subsides. Diversion is no longer needed when the motivating domestic 
challenge is alleviated. This directly contradicts Ha4 and Hb5 of the (mis)alignment theory and 
Hc4 of the audience cost theory.  
 
3. The Audience Cost and Diversionary Logic in Relation to the (Mis)Alignment Theory 
For comparison reasons, I put the audience cost and the diversionary logic in the framework of 
the state-public (mis)alignment theory. In relation to the proposed two conditions – existing 
public opinion and state foreign policy intent, the audience cost theory is the most relevant to the 
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scenarios in which state foreign policy is hardline. This is because coercion is more commonly 
associated with hardline policies – the threat, display, or use of force and economic sanctions, or 
escalated responses when provoked. So in scenarios I and III, the audience cost theory would 
predict propaganda campaigns if there is concurrent coercions. An archetypal scenario of 
audience cost is to have a hardline public opinion and a hardline state foreign policy intent, 
similar to the conditions in scenario III. If an audience cost logic is at work in scenario III, a state 
would publicize a dispute to a hardline domestic audience, and use that as a costly signal to 
foreign states to buttress threat credibility. Thus, in this scenario, the audience cost theory would 
predict the adoption of a propaganda campaign, whereas my theory would predict the opposite – 
the absence of a propaganda campaign. Coercions in moderate policy choices are more rare – 
territorial compromises would not require coercions; shelving a dispute might but rarely do; 
reactive and proportionate responses when provoked also might require coercions in order to 
deter or compel the aggressor to stand down. So in scenarios II and IV with moderate state policy 
intent, the state might still engage in coercions and hence adopt a propaganda campaign, but such 
scenarios are less common than the hardline state intent scenarios.  
 Diversionary war is also more likely in the hardline state policy scenarios I and III. This 
is because a hardline foreign policy and its resulting escalation could more easily create a 
diversion. In scenario I, whereas in my theory the propaganda prepares the public for a hardline 
policy, in diversionary war theory the propaganda diverts public attention. Although the 
predicted media discourse is the same, the motivating logic is different. Diversionary is solely 
concerned with a domestic crisis or regime survival at home, while the (mis)alignment theory is 
about mobilizing the public to support the hardline policy. In scenario III, diversionary war 
would predict the opposite outcome of my theory – a propaganda campaign for diversionary 
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purposes, whereas my theory would predict none. In scenario II with a hardline public opinion 
and a moderate state policy intent, the state might utilize a diversionary rhetoric campaign to 
divert public attention but opts for a moderate policy later. The prediction is the same with the 
(mis)alignment theory, but for different logics – to divert or to pacify. When a moderate state is 
faced with a moderate/weak public opinion (scenario IV), diversion is less likely because the 
state would need to instigate the public through a diversionary rhetoric campaign. If the state has 
other easier options, such as other potential issues with existing hardline public opinion, the state 
could choose the other options to divert public attention than going through all the trouble to use 
this one.  
 Table 2.2 summarizes these alternative explanations in relation to the (mis)alignment 
theory. 
Table 2.2: Alternative Hypotheses in Comparison 
 






 Hardline Moderate 
Moderate
/Weak 
I. Div: PC to Divert 
AC: PC to Coerce 
Alignment: PC to Mobilize 
IV. Div: PC Unlikely but Possible 
AC: PC Unlikely but Possible 
Alignment: No PC 
Hardline 
III. Div: PC to Divert 
AC: PC to Coerce 
 Alignment: No PC 
II. Div: PC to Divert 
AC: PC Unlikely but Possible 
Alignment: PC to Pacify 
 
(PC: Propaganda Campaigns; Div: Diversionary War; AC: Audience Cost; Alignment: (Mis)Alignment) 
 
 
To evaluate these theories, I would need to assess the actual outcomes of the cases and see which 
theory’s predictions the case outcomes are consistent with. For scenario I and II where the 
predicted outcomes are the same, I would need to look into the causal logic of the cases and 
assess which theory is the motivating story.  
 
VII. BRINGING THE THEORIES TOGETHER 
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The preceding sections have outlined the assumptions, the causal mechanisms, and the 
observable implications of the state-public (mis)alignment theory. I have also reviewed the 
alternative theories which do not directly address, but nevertheless have theoretical implications 
for, my empirical puzzle. I conclude this theoretical discussion by examining how these theories 
relate to each other. Table 2.3 summarizes their contrasting observable implications, which will 
be further assessed in the following empirical chapters, particularly in the process-tracing 
chapters. 
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Table 2.3: Contrasting Observable Implications 
(Mis)Alignment – Mobilizing (Mis)Alignment – Pacifying Audience Cost Diversionary 
Ha1 (State Concern): Government 
officials express concerns about the 
moderate/weak public opinion and 
the need to mobilize. 
Ha2 (Media Directives): The state 
issues media plans or directives to 
media outlets to mobilize the public. 
Ha3 (Inflammatory Content): Media 
content is inflammatory – self-
victimizing, accusing others for 
aggression, or implying injustice. 
Hb3 (Non-Inflammatory Content): 
Media content is informative and 
analytical, not inflammatory. 
Ha4 (Motivation Disappears): Media 
coverage diminishes as execution of 
a hardline policy comes to an end. 
Hb5 (Motivation Disappears): Media 
coverage diminishes as a moderate 
policy is carried out. 
Hc4 (Motivation Disappears): 
Media coverage diminishes as the 
coercion succeeds or fails. 
Hd2 (Motivation Disappears): Media 
coverage diminishes as the predominant 
domestic challenge, if any, subsides. 
Hb1 (Nationalistic Criticisms): The 
state is exposed to nationalistic 
criticisms.  
Hb2 (Bark but No Bite): Official 
statements are harsh, but without any 
substantive threats of punishment. 
Hc2 (Tying Hands): Officials 
make public threats with 
substantive punishment. 
Hb4 (Hoop Test for Venting 
Mechanism): Venting venues such as 
social media and online forums are 
open, and venting is allowed or even 
encouraged. 
Hc1 (Hoop Test about Scope): 
The propaganda campaign should 
be adopted during an ongoing 
coercion with the foreign rival. 
Hd1 (Hoop Test about Scope): States are 
more likely to adopt a propaganda 
campaign on a foreign dispute when they 
face severe domestic challenges. 
Hc3 (Bargaining Advantage): 
The international outcome should 
be more favorable to the 
government. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and the Chinese Propaganda System 
 
The first part of this chapter describes a research design to test the (mis)alignment theory and the 
alternative explanations sketched out in Chapter 2. The second part reviews the background of 
the Chinese propaganda system. In the method section, I delineate the research scope, introduce 
the mixed methods used, describe and justify the case selections for each method, the data 
sources, and the measurements adopted for each variable. The background section provides a 
brief introduction to the Chinese propaganda system, tracing its development, summarizing its 
main features, decision processes, and control mechanisms, and comparing the Chinese system 
to other authoritarian systems.  
 
I. Research Design 
1. Case Selection and Method 
The population of cases for this study is all diplomatic crises on territorial disputes since World 
War II that involve authoritarian states. For definition of “diplomatic crises,” I use Brecher 
(1979)’s definition of foreign policy crisis of a single state: “All three [criteria] are perceptions 
held by the highest-level decision-makers: (a) a threat to basic values, with a simultaneous or 
subsequent (b) high probability of involvement in military hostilities, and the awareness of (c) 
finite time for response to the external value threat.”101 I interpret “high probability of 
involvement in military hostilities” as an involvement of one or more Militarized Interstate 
Disputes (MIDs). “Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which 
the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed 
101 Brecher 1979, 447. The selection of cases in this dissertation, however, are not based on the ICB data. This is 
because the ICB data stops at 2007 while many of the cases studied here took place after 2007; and the cases in this 
study are confined within territorial disputes but the ICB data include all international crises. For the ICB data, see 
http://www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/, accessed May 29, 2018. 
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towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another 
state.”102 
I also limit my scope to territorial disputes in which not the whole territory of a nation is 
at stake. In other words, this excludes the kind of disputes that challenges the very existence of a 
state, in which case willful compromise of the disputed territory is usually not a viable option. 
These cases are excluded because of the fundamental challenge the disputes are to the state 
survival, so different causal mechanisms might be at work from the classic interstate territorial 
disputes. This exclusion includes 1) homeland disputes where two or more governments 
occupying different parts of a formerly single country question the very existence of and seek to 
annex one another, such as North Korea and South Korea, Mainland China and Taiwan. These 
are essentially regime disputes, not territorial disputes; and 2) intrastate territorial disputes that 
occurs within a state when domestic groups seek secession from the mother state, such as 
Quebec in Canada, Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom.103 But I include both land border 
and off-shore disputes, as the land features generally should not affect the propaganda strategies 
a state adopts. 
I test my and the alternative theories in a sample of nineteen Chinese diplomatic crises 
with a medium-n congruence test and process tracing. These nineteen cases selected are all 
China’s diplomatic crises on all its territorial disputes. Six of China’s total eighteen territorial 
disputes experienced diplomatic crises. Only eleven of these nineteen crises experienced 
102 Jones et al 1993, 163. 
103 For “disputes” in general, I adopt the definition from the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset: “a 
‘dispute’ refers to the engagement in argument, the call into question, or the contestation over one or more 
unresolved issues between two or more actors” (Jones et al, 168.) These actors must be “diplomatically recognized 
member states of the global system” (Small and Singer 1982, 39-50.) Disputes are not necessarily militarized, so are 
interstate territorial disputes. Militarization needs to involve the threat, display, or use of force. “Incidents” are 
militarized episodes of a dispute “that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war” 
(Jones et al 1993, 163). 
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propaganda campaigns, so I have both the “1”s and the “0”s. Table 3.1 lists all these crises with 
the territorial dispute involved, the number of crises on each dispute and their years, and the 
number of propaganda campaign(s) each dispute incurred and their years.  
Table 3.1: Six Disputes, Nineteen Crises, and Eleven Propaganda Campaigns 
 
Disputes Diplomatic Crises Propaganda Campaigns 
India, Border Seven (1959, 1962, 1967, 1986, 2013, 2014, 
2017) 
Three (1959, 1962, 2017) 
Soviet, Border One (1969) One (1969) 
Vietnam, Border One (1979-1991) One (1979-1991) 
Japan, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Four (1978, 2005, 2010, 2012) Three (2005, 2010, 2012) 
Vietnam, South China Sea Four (1974, 1988, 2011, 2014) One (1974) 
Philippines, South China Sea Two (2012, 2016) Two (2012, 2016) 
 
I choose China for three reasons. First, because each propaganda campaign needs to be identified 
in the country’s own language, it is unfeasible for one single author, due to one person’s limited 
language ability, to identify all propaganda campaigns of all territorial disputes in the whole 
world. China offers a rare opportunity with a rich pool of diplomatic crises over a variety of 
territorial disputes. Being a country with the most borders in the world, China has involved in 
eighteen unique territorial disputes with eighteen neighboring countries since its foundation in 
1949. Its disputes vary widely in topography, population, natural resource stocks, strategic 
endowments, historical legacies and dispute country.104 Second, choosing one state has the 
advantage of holding constant the country-specific particularities such as history, economic 
development, culture, etc. Although China’s political system is unique in many ways, its control 
of media is representative of and emulated by other non-democracies. A second half of this 
chapter will detail the particularities and the commonness of China’s propaganda system. Third, 
as the country continues to rise, the Chinese management of the mass opinion of a 1.4-billion 
104 For a comprehensive study of all these territorial disputes, see Fravel 2008. 
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population in its foreign affairs is probably the most consequential to global security in the 
future. 
 In selecting the nineteen Chinese territorial crises, because of the territorial scope, I 
debated about whether to include two cases that the territorial dispute was only part of the crisis. 
One is the Sino-Japanese crisis in 2005. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute was only a small 
part of the crisis. Besides the territorial dispute, the crisis originated from Japan’s bid for the 
United Nations Security Council and also involved a dispute on Japanese history textbooks. So it 
was a mixture of various disputes. The other is the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979-1991. 
The border conflicts, although a major dispute amidst the war, was accompanied by a number of 
other issues such as Vietnam’s mistreatment of ethnic Chinese, disagreement in policy towards 
the Soviet Union, etc. The ultimate decision to include these two cases was based on the very 
reason of why the study is confined within territorial disputes, that intangible values of these 
territories are salient and easy to manipulate by the state so that state media manipulations, if 
any, would be readily observable. 
I adopt a medium-n research design appropriate to the sample size that incorporates the 
congruence method. The congruence method works by “ascertain[ing] the value of the 
independent variable in the case at hand” and “ask[ing] what prediction or expectation about the 
outcome of the dependent variable should follow from the theory.”105 I then check the overall 
consistence between the predicted and the actual outcomes of the cases. The goal of the 
congruence test is not to provide definitive evidence for causality, because the relationship could 
be spurious even given overwhelming consistence. Rather, I use it as a plausibility probe to test 
the salience of the theory across time and space.  
105 George and Bennett 2005, 181. 
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Choosing one single country, nevertheless, does pose a potential challenge in that the 
cases might not be independent from each other, temporally or geographically. Temporally, it is 
possible that the independent variables – existing public opinion and state foreign policy intent in 
one crisis, are products of the dependent variable – state media behavior in a previous crisis. In 
other words, states “inherit” public opinion and foreign policy choices from an array of historical 
factors including past actions of their own – previous propaganda strategies. Take the Sino-
Indian border dispute for example, as shown in Table 3.1, it incurred a total of seven crises, three 
of which provoked propaganda campaigns. So it is possible that the propaganda campaign in 
1959 might affect the existing public opinion in the 1962 crisis. It is also possible that the 
independent variables or the dependent variable in one crisis are not independent from those 
same variables in previous crises. In other words, public opinion in previous crises might affect 
public opinion in subsequent crises; state foreign policy intent in previous crises might affect 
state foreign policy intent in subsequent crises; state propaganda strategies in previous crises 
might affect state propaganda strategies in subsequent crises. These possibilities could not be 
ruled out. This would be a problem if there is a “ratchet effect” in public opinion. But as already 
discussed in Chapter 2, given the public’s short attention span and the authoritarian state’s ability 
to deescalate, a possible “ratchet effect,” even if truly exist, is not unsurmountable. 
Geographically, it is also possible that China’s dispute episodes with Vietnam in the South China 
Sea are not independent from those with the Philippines in the South China Sea, especially if 
these crises cluster around the same time. These would be problems if I were to conduct a large-n 
statistical analysis because of the assumption of independence in many statistical tests. But these 
should not be a problem to the medium-n design I have laid out above as I am not claiming an 
average effect. Notwithstanding, the path dependence and interrelatedness between the cases do 
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deserve extra caution in their actual evaluations and special attention to the sequence of events. 
The temporal setup of the theory also helps ease this tension because in each single crisis, 
existing public opinion and state foreign policy intent at the beginning of a crisis naturally occur 
before, so are exogenous to a state media strategy that follows. 
This potential challenge also stresses the importance of paying attention to the sequence 
of events which calls for the method of process tracing. After the medium-n congruence test, I 
process-trace four of the nineteen cases, to assess the causal logic of the theory. A detailed 
tracing of events can demonstrate whether it is the proposed causal mechanisms, rather than the 
alternative mechanisms, that are at work. My strategy of case selection for the process-tracing is 
to choose the most similar cases that cover all four scenarios of my theory, so that my 
independent variables vary. In Table 3.2, I place all nineteen cases in Table 2.1 according to their 
values on the independent variables. These cases are all unique in their own ways, but a 
consideration of similar dyads and similar time frames yields the selection of these four: the 
Sino-Vietnamese border war during 1979-1991, the Sino-Philippine arbitration case on the South 
China Sea in 2016, the Sino-Vietnamese cable-cutting incidents in the South China Sea in 2011, 
and the Sino-Vietnamese oil rig crisis in 2014.  
These four cases, three between China and Vietnam and one between China and the 
Philippines, three that occurred in the 2010s and one in 1980s, are far from being perfectly 
similar, but they are the most similar available. India, Japan, and the Soviet Union all have very 
unique historical relationships with China. Vietnam and the Philippines are the most similar 
countries in my options and have cases that cover all four boxes of the table. The Sino-
Vietnamese clash in the Spratlys in 1988 could be another choice, but it is also unique in that it 
broke out in the middle of a war between the same two countries. Hence the bolded four cases in 
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Table 3.2 are chosen. By controlling the country-dyad and time particularities, the result should 
strengthen our belief in the explanatory power of the theory. In process-tracing these four cases, 
the observable implications drawn from my and the alternative theories listed in Chapter 2 will 
be evaluated respectively.  
Table 3.2: Nineteen Chinese Diplomatic Crises Placed in My Theoretical Framework  
(The cases for process tracing are bolded) 
 
2. Primary Data Sources  
The primary data for this study come from nine collections of Chinese and Vietnamese archives 
and fifty-seven semi-structured interviews I conducted in China. I visited the archives at the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Centre for China Studies at the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, the library of the School of International Studies at Peking University, the Center 
for Cold War International History Studies at East China Normal University, municipal archives 
of Pingxiang, Guangxi Province and of Wenshan, Yunnan Province of China, the No. 3 National 
Archives of Vietnam in Hanoi, the National Library of Vietnam, and the No. 2 National Archives 
of Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City. The archives include declassified government documents 
(internal communications and minutes of closed-door meetings) and leaders’ personal 
memoirs/diaries. I also rely on the personal collections of a couple of historians.106 These 
106 I thank Professor Shen Zhihua and Professor Kosal Path in sharing materials.  
 State Policy Intent 
 











Sino-Indian Border 1962 
Sino-Soviet Border 1969 
Sino-Vietnamese Paracels 1974 
Sino-Vietnamese Border 1979-1991 
Sino-Vietnamese Spratlys 1988 
Sino-Indian Border 1959, 1967, 
1986, 2013 and 2014 
Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku 1978 
Sino-Vietnamese Oil Rig Crisis 2014 
 
Hardline 
Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku 2010 
Sino-Vietnamese Cable-Cuttings 2011 
Sino-Philippines Scarborough Shoal 
2012 
Sino-Japanese Various Dispute 2005 
Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku 2012 
Sino-Philippines Arbitration 2016 
Sino-Indian Border 2017 
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collections are particularly valuable as they once were but are no longer accessible in some of the 
above archives. Additionally, I also visited the Carter Library and the United Nations Archives 
for materials on the Sino-Vietnamese border war case.   
I also conducted fifty-seven semi-structured interviews in China in May and June 2017, 
with individuals who were directly involved in the state policy-making or policy-execution in the 
four process-tracing cases and a few other crises in the nineteen congruence test cases.107 These 
include seven former government officials, forty journalists and editors (covering all major 
Chinese news outlets), and ten scholars.  
For officials, I asked about the general procedures of media-policy making on foreign 
disputes, especially during times of crises. I asked their specific experience in the crises under 
study – including the role of his/her organization, his/her responsibilities, what transpired on the 
policy side during the crisis. I then ask about their experience in the lens of the alignment and the 
alternative theories – affirming the values of the independent and the dependent variables and 
testing the salience of the causal logic. For example, I asked about the target audience, the 
motivations, and the goals of a propaganda campaign if any, or the reasons for their absence; 
how was such a campaign implemented and whether they thought the goals were achieved; when 
did the campaign end and why did it end; how they perceived public opinion and whether it was 
a concern; whether there was ongoing coercion and whether the state initiated a campaign with 
the motivation of gaining leverage in the foreign coercion; whether there were other domestic 
concerns that the state wanted to divert the public attention away from.  
For journalists and editors, I focused more on the execution of the media policy: what 
policy guidance they had received; how it changed over time as the crisis developed; how they 
107 IRB Reference No.: 2017-0197-00, Institutional Review Board for the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 
University of Virginia. 
54
implemented the policy; if they were sent to the dispute site, what they saw and what were they 
expected to report and not to report; were they given a quota to write; were there special 
considerations in terms of what angle to take, what sources to use, what location or time to place 
the news, etc. I also asked about their professional impressions of the public opinion. The 
interview questions to government officials, journalists, and editors are listed in Appendix II.  
For scholars who were involved in the policy making, I asked similar questions to the 
officials. But since these scholars were involved mostly in the foreign policy making rather than 
media policy making, my questions to them focused on interpreting the state foreign policy 
intentions and how it changed over time if it did. I also asked whether and how media policy was 
part of the internal policy deliberation and what functions are they supposed to play.  
These primary sources are probably the closest to offering smoking gun evidence. They 
are particularly useful for affirming/disaffirming the values of the proposed conditions – public 
opinion and state foreign policy intent. They are also critical in validating/invalidating the 
theory’s causal logic. They do this by demonstrating the internal deliberations on leaders’ foreign 
policy intent and their perception of public opinion, as well as by shedding light on the state’s 
inner thinking on media strategies of foreign disputes.  
The archival and interview source, however, is not always available for all cases. For 
example, archives are limited to the older cases and interviews are limited to the researcher’s 
personal connections. I supplement these with secondary sources, such as surveys and historical 
accounts, to be described in detail in the next section. Besides, when archives and interviews are 
available, situations maybe complicated as different sources might represent distinct 
organizational and personal interests and perspectives, and they might therefore contradict each 
other. This is why in the process of my archival research and interviews, I followed a rule of 
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agreement. That is, I should continue to seek alternative and diverse sources on any one variable 
in any one case I am trying to code until I can find overwhelming agreement among the majority 
of sources available. In other words, if I find sources that contradict each other, I should keep 
looking for alternative sources until I find a majority agreement. For example, when I found 
multiple interviews to people with diverse backgrounds largely repetitive of previous interviews 
I had conducted, I knew I had satisfied the rule of agreement.  
There were rarely cases where no agreement emerged from the interviews. The only 
exception is on the state policy intent in the more recent cases. For example, on China’s decision 
to place the oil rig in the disputed area in 2014 that had provoked the crisis, interviews disagreed 
on whether the top leadership was directly involved. As information like this is extremely 
sensitive, the lack of information has spawned many speculations even with interviewees who 
claim to have various “access” to the central decision body. Given this disagreement, it is, 
therefore, hard to make a definitive judgement. But the consensus is that the decision was not 
well-informed and most possibly a miscalculation. This is enough to conclude that the initial 
Chinese provocation was not deliberate and probably erroneous. All in all, disagreements are 
rare and limited on the state intent in the more recent cases; even when there are disagreements, 
the disagreements are mostly on the details, so they are not substantial obstacles in making an 
overall judgement on the state intent. 
The political sensitivity on the subject matter put significant constraints to the archives 
and the interviewees I was able to access. The timing of the interviews taking place in the 
summer of 2017 was also associated with political tightening under the Xi Jinping administration 
and ahead of the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. In Vietnam, for example, many of the 
archives I requested were not granted permission for access as along as they contain the word 
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“border dispute.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s archives were reopened in 2017 after several 
years’ closing off to the public, but I found that many previously declassified documents were re-
classified. So in this regard, working with historians and accessing to their personal collections 
were critical to the success of this project, especially to the one historical case in Chapter 5. 
Many people also turned away my invitation for interview because of the political sensitivity. 
Benefiting from having lived and worked in China for over two decades, I relied heavily on my 
personal network and had rare access in the field.  
3. Measurements and Coding Rules
Table 3.3 lists the measurements of the variables in the congruence test and the process tracing, 
with the coding rules, observables and data sources for each variable. Treating official media as a 
proxy, I measure the dependent variable – the adoption/non-adoption of propaganda campaigns, 
mainly by conducting content analysis of China’s most authoritative official newspaper, People’s 
Daily. People’s Daily represents the mainstream official line – other media rarely stray away 
from it. As one of the most long-standing state media outlets – in existence since as early as 
1946, it offers a relatively time-consistent measurement of state media behavior in China. 
According to interviews with retired editors who have decades of experience working in China’s 
state media system, People’s Daily is one of the few official media that have stayed relatively 
static over time in terms of style and influence.108 China Central Television (CCTV) News 
transcripts offer another measurement. Compared to People’s Daily which are read primarily by 
party cadres, CCTV reaches the masses. But CCTV News only exists since 2003. Besides, it 
rarely covers China’s foreign disputes. When it does, it mostly just copies Ministry of Foreign 
108 Interview 4, May 19, 2017, Washington DC; Interview 5, May 19, 2017, Washington DC; Interview 7, May 22, 
Washington DC. 
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Table 3.3: Measurements of the Dependent and the Independent Variables 







efforts to attract public attention to a 
dispute by the use of mass media 
Content analysis of People’s Daily: a propaganda campaign is identified only when these 
conditions are met: 
1) Minimum coverage requirement: TWO front-page and TEN any-page articles a month, and
2) Continuous requirement: if a campaign lasts longer than a month, newspaper coverage needs
to meet the minimum coverage requirement each month continuously, although ONE month’ 
lapse is allowed. 




Hardline: unprovoked threat, display, or 
use of force or economic sanctions; 
when provoked, escalated responses 
Moderate: territorial compromise;  
shelving a dispute (deferring settlement); 
passive and proportionate responses to 
provocations 
1) Archives and Interviews: records of internal deliberations; recollections by officials and
analysts with privileged access; 
2) Logical deduction from international and domestic factors about state incentives to pursue a
hardline or moderate policy; 
3) Secondary sources: accounts of the actual policy pursued.
IV2: Existing 
Public Opinion   
(Hardline or 
Moderate/Weak) 
Whether the public favors a hardline or a 
moderate policy before the state 
responds to a crisis situation. 
Public opinion is coded as “weak” if the 
public does not know or care strongly 
about the dispute 
1) Interviews and Archives: state officials’ perception about public opinion prior to or at the
beginning of a crisis; 
2) Surveys taken prior to or at the beginning of a crisis: thermometer towards the target country;
3) Baidu Search Index: average daily search volume during the one-year pre-crisis period;
4) Spontaneous anti-foreign protests prior to or at the beginning of a crisis;
5) Social media: expression of public emotion prior to or at the beginning of a crisis;
6) Interviews with journalists and editors: professional observation of public opinion prior to or
at the beginning of a crisis; 
7) Secondary sources: historical accounts of public opinion prior to or at the beginning of a
crisis. 
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Affairs (MoFA) statements or People’s Daily editorials. Therefore, I resort to CCTV news 
transcripts only as a supplementary measure for the more recent cases.   
For this purpose, I hand-collected all People’s Daily articles between 1949 and 2017 that 
are directly on the subject of the six territorial disputes, covering all nineteen diplomatic crises. 
An article needs to have a dispute as the first main subject to be included in the dataset. Take a 
news report about leaders meeting, for example, the dispute in question needs to be the main 
issue discussed by the leaders. The article will be filtered out if it only mentions the dispute in 
passing. By this criterion, I manually filtered out all non-relevant and not-directly-relevant 
articles, and ended up with 7,334 articles on the border dispute with Vietnam, 626 articles on the 
border dispute with the Soviet Union, 1,723 articles on the border dispute with India, 1,294 
articles on the maritime dispute with Vietnam, 1,150 articles on the maritime dispute with the 
Philippines, and 1,037 articles on the maritime dispute with Japan. 
The monthly numbers of front-page articles and those of all articles are then tallied along 
six timelines. A propaganda campaign is identified only when the monthly number of front-page 
articles exceeds two and the monthly number of all relevant articles exceeds ten. Although these 
numbers are arbitrary, they were suggested by Chinese editors who had worked for decades in 
the propaganda system and were agreed by all journalists interviewed to be reasonable. The 
campaign continues until those numbers drop below the standards, although one month’s lapse if 
allowed to account for special occasions, such as holidays, and distracting random events, such 
as natural disasters.  
Many propaganda campaigns are so prominent that are hard to miss by anyone. These 
include, for example, the ones during the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, the Sino-Vietnamese 
border war in 1979-1990, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in 2012, and the Sino-Philippines 
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arbitration case in 2016. These campaigns easily pass the quantitative qualifiers and are 
indisputable. However, the operational boundary between propaganda campaigns and normal 
media coverage are not always clear-cut. Propaganda campaigns and their dissimilar twin 
censorship should be considered as two extremes on a spectrum, with normal coverage in-
between, rather than two distinct categories. This fuzziness in the conceptual boundary between 
propaganda campaigns and normal media coverage has created a challenge for accurate 
measurement and tensions with the arbitrary quantitative cutoffs described above. 
To mitigate this challenge, I identify the borderline cases generated by the arbitrary 
quantitative cutoffs and examine them with further evidence including other state media 
coverage, leaked policy directives if available, and opinions of area specialists. The four 
borderline cases by the quantitative standards are: the 1988 Sino-Vietnamese Clash in the 
Spratlys, the 2010 Sino-Japanese Boat Incident near Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the 2012 Sino-
Philippines Scarborough Shoal Standoff, and the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese Oil Rig Standoff. The 
1988 Sino-Vietnamese Clash in the Spratlys had sheer salience but no volume; the other three 
borderline cases only had volume but little salience. Further investigations conclude that the 
1988 and the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese cases did not incur propaganda campaigns; the other two 
involved some state publicization efforts but with reservations, so were ambiguous. Chapter 4 
will examine in more detail three of these borderline cases. Chapter 7 will look into the Sino-
Vietnamese oil rig crisis. But the bottom line here is that three of the four borderline cases based 
on these quantitative criteria are deviant cases, so the results of the congruence test would not be 
negatively impacted if the cutoffs were moved up or down – they might show even more 
consistence.  
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Both the number of front-page articles and that of all relevant articles are important 
measurements for the scale of the propaganda, because when a state means to propagandize, it 
attracts public attention by both the salience of the message and the volume of reporting. Front-
page articles are important because it indicates a high priority the official newspaper, and hence 
the state, gives to the dispute. If we see a significant number of articles appearing elsewhere in 
People’s Daily but never on the front page, it could very likely be event driven – meaning the 
state is only passively responding to provocative events. Because the public will likely hear 
about the events from other sources, not responding at all would be inappropriate, so the state 
chooses to merely allow, but not encourage, media coverage, thus in essence not propagandizing 
the issue. The number of all relevant articles is also important because the volume itself indicates 
the state’s willingness to raise public attention. If it is solely a number of front-page articles 
without a great number of all relevant articles, it means that the state takes the issue seriously (a 
hardline stand), but it does not intend to propagandize it. 
Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics of the propaganda campaigns or the absence 
thereof on all nineteen cases. I catalog the start, the end dates and the duration of the propaganda 
campaigns, if a campaign is adopted, or the state, the end dates and the duration of a crisis, if a 
campaign is not present; the number of front-page articles and that of all relevant articles during 
each campaign, as well as their monthly averages. 
When these quantitative measurements generate borderline results, which concerns four 
of the nineteen cases, I resort to qualitative measures of a mixture of sources,  
I measure the first independent variable – a state’s foreign policy intent, by 1) looking 
into the state policy deliberations in archives and interviews, 2) deducing logically from 
international and domestic factors on whether a hardline or a moderate policy would be 
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics of Media Coverage on China’s Nineteen Diplomatic Crises 
(PC: Propaganda Campaign. Propaganda campaigns are bolded; ambiguous cases are in italic.) 













Average No. of 
Front-Page 
Articles/Month 
Average No. of 
All-Relevant 
Articles/Month 
1 1959 Sino-Indian Border Skirmish at Longju and Kongka Pass 9/10/1959 11/27/1959 77 17 91 6.6 35.5 
2 1962 Sino-Indian Border War 6/1/1962 12/31/1963 570 346 1034 18.2 54.4 
3 1967 Sino-Indian Border Clashes at Nathu La and Cho La 9/13/1967 9/26/1967 13 0 7 0.0 16 
4 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflict 3/3/1969 9/21/1969 198 56 445 2.8 2.2 
5 1974 Sino-Vietnamese Clash in the Paracels 1/12/1974 2/18/1974 36 7 12 5.8 10 
6 1978 Fishing Boat Incident near Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 4/12/1978 5/11/1978 29 N/A2 N/A N/A N/A 
7 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War 11/5/1978 3/31/1990 4164 579 7195 4.2 51.8 
8 1986 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Sumdorong Chu 5/1986 8/1987 457 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9 1988 Sino-Vietnamese Clash in the Spratlys 2/23/1988 4/28/1988 65 7 10 3.2 4.6 
10 2005 Japanese History Textbook, Diaoyu/Senkaku, and Japan’s Bid for the UNSC 4/1/2005 6/1/2005 61 13 163 6.4 80.2 
11 2010 Sino-Japanese Boat Incident near Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 9/9/2010 11/6/2010 57 2 31 1.1 16.3 
12 2011 Sino-Vietnamese Cable-Cutting Incidents in the South China Sea 5/26/2011 6/26/2011 31 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
13 2012 Sino-Philippines Scarborough Shoal Standoff 4/12/2012 6/4/2012 53 1 64 0.6 36.2 
14 2012 Japanese Nationalization of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 9/3/2012 10/31/2012 58 25 137 12.9 70.9 
15 2013 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Ladakh 4/15/2013 5/5/2013 20 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
16 2014 Sino-Vietnamese Oil Rig Standoff 5/2/2014 7/17/2014 74 0 36 0.0 14.6 
17 2014 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Ladakh 8/18/2014 10/1/2014 44 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
18 2016 Sino-Philippines South China Sea Arbitration 6/1/2016 8/1/2016 61 9 206 4.4 101.3 
19 2017 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Doklam 6/27/2017 8/4/2017 38 2 17 1.6 13.4 
1 If there is no PC, then dates mark the beginning and the end of a potential PC or of the crisis. 
2 “N/A” means that the numbers of articles are so small that they are negligible. 
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favorable, given the government’s goals are regime survival at home and state security abroad, 
and 3) looking at what policy the state ended up pursuing. Because of their respective 
limitations, these three sources/observable implications should corroborate each other. In the rare 
cases they contradict each other, they are weighted according to the sequence they are listed 
above. I do not measure a state’s policy intent by publicly-expressed intentions. This is because 
given states’ incentives to misrepresent, states rarely convey their real intentions to their 
opponents. Even if they do, their credibility is almost always in doubt.109 
State foreign policy intentions could also be deduced logically from a constellation of 
international and domestic factors. If these factors undoubtedly point to a favorable hardline or 
moderate policy, then assuming the rationality of the actors should lead to the conclusion that 
they would pursue a favorable policy to the nation and the regime itself.  
Lastly, the actual policy that a state ended up pursuing is also indicative of the state 
policy intentions. Actions are usually reflective of intentions unless actions are unscrutinized or 
miscalculated. If that is the case, subsequent actions would then reveal a state’s real intentions.  
 I measure the other independent variable – existing public opinion, by a range of 
indicators listed below. In adjudicating contradictory sources, they are weighted according to the 
sequence they are listed. Recall that public opinion has three dimensions – public knowledge, 
sentiment, and policy orientation. Policy orientation can be hardline or moderate. If either public 
knowledge or sentiment is weak, then public opinion is considered weak. To control for the 
temporal setup of the theory and to preclude reversed causality, public opinion has to be 
“existing,” so that these measures have to be taken prior to, or at the beginning of a crisis, so 
essentially before a state responds to a crisis. These measurements are: 1) Interviews and 
109 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist explanations for war,” International organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995): 379-414. 
63
Archives: state officials’ perception about public opinion; 2) Surveys: thermometer towards the 
target country; 3) Baidu Search Index (BSI): average daily search volume; 4) Spontaneous anti-
foreign protests; 5) Social media: expression of public emotion; 6) Interviews with journalists 
and editors: professional observation of public opinion; 7) Secondary sources: historical accounts 
of public opinion, with all measurements taken prior to or at the beginning of a crisis.  
Public opinion surveys that are taken right before or at the beginning of a crisis could be 
used to evaluate existing public opinion. For this purpose, I rely mainly on the Beijing Area 
Study (BAS) and occasionally on the Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends 
Datasets.110 These surveys usually carry data on thermometer towards the target country. A 
substantially low country thermometer towards the target country can indicate a strong emotion 
and a hardline policy orientation.  
The Baidu Search Index (BSI), an analytic tool that tracks the daily search activity on 
given keywords on China’s most dominant search engine, offers a useful measurement for the 
level of public attention in China, but only for cases after the BSI was launched in 2011. If the 
average search volume of the key word of the name of the dispute during the one-year pre-crisis 
period is substantially lower than the all-time average,111 then public opinion should be 
considered weak. Besides BSI, a few published studies on social media trends by private 
companies and research institutes are useful on some of the more recent cases. Among these, I 
find the South China Sea Public Opinion Newsletter published by the Collaborative Innovation 
110 I thank Professor Iain Johnston for sharing the BAS data. For the Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and 
Trends Datasets, see http://www.pewglobal.org/datasets/. 
111 “All-time” is calculated from January 1, 2011, when BSI data became available, to October 25, 2017, when this 
research was conducted. 
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Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University comprehensive and consistently 
objective.112  
Large-scale and widespread anti-foreign protests and conspicuous surges of nationalistic 
social media posts across a variety of social media platforms are indicators of a strong and 
hardline public opinion. But further investigations into the sources of these protests and social 
media surges are needed to exclude possible government instigation. This could be done 
relatively easy by interviewing citizens and journalists who participated or observed the protests 
and the social media surges. Besides, if the protests or the social media posts expressed 
dissatisfaction towards the government, that could be an indicator of genuine public opinion as 
well. Public opinion perceived by government officials, media editors, or recorded by historical 
accounts could be measuring any of the three public opinion dimensions.  
In measuring “thick” concepts such as state foreign policy intent and public opinion, I 
face significant challenges. First, the hardline/moderate dichotomy of state policy intent is a 
mere simplification of the reality. A state’s foreign policy is usually a mixture of both elements 
or a point on a spectrum rather than one of two categories. I try to overcome this challenge by 
having clear definitions of each category and leveraging on internal documents and interviews 
with people in the “inner circles.” The more detailed case studies in Chapter 5-7 do offer more 
nuances than the congruence test in Chapter 4, so we should not read too much into specific 
values of the variables in the congruence test. The congruence test only offers a broad picture of 
the overall consistence. Second, most of the evidence are not available for all of the cases 
especially on the public opinion variable, so there is not a consistent measurement that are 
comparable across the cases. Fortunately, many of the historical cases are easy to make 
112 See https://nanhai.nju.edu.cn/nhyqjb/list.htm. 
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judgements of, as the public knowledge of these disputes were low, and there are more data 
available on the more recent cases and most of them do not contradict, but rather reinforce, each 
other. All in all, although far from ideal, the rubrics listed in Table 3.3 and elaborated here are 
efforts to make the measurements of these variables more objective, transparent, and replicable 
than traditional qualitative studies. As more documents become available in the future, these 
tests should be reevaluated for accuracy.  
 
II. The Chinese Context 
This section provides an overview of the Chinese propaganda system in terms of its 
development, main features and comparison to other autocratic regimes. This overview is 
necessary as it provides an important background to the empirical tests that are to follow. It also 
helps us estimate the extent to which the theory tested in a Chinese setting would apply to other 
authoritarian states.  
 
1. Development 
The Chinese media control has evolved tremendously over the seven decades the nineteen 
Chinese crises span. The most prominent changes are the commercialization of the Chinese 
media and the rise of the Internet. The state control over media became diffused and more 
sophisticated in the process. But whether this diffusion means a weakened or a strengthened 
control is still of debate. Partly due to its own cultivation, the Chinese government is also faced 
with a stronger popular nationalism, which enriches the variation among these cases. But what 
has not changed over time is the general rationale to publicize or not publicize an interstate 
dispute. 
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In the Mao Zedong era, propaganda was the hallmark of the central political control. As 
early as the revolutionary era, Mao regarded propaganda as the “first most important task of the 
Red Army.”113 Mao learned much of the organizational structure and control techniques from the 
Soviet and the Nazi governments.114 The main pillar of the Maoist “thought work” (sixiang 
gongzuo) was indoctrination and mass persuasion. The media, all under the tight control of the 
central government, was regarded as the “throat and tongue” of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). Despite the limited reach of the traditional media due to the technological constraints of 
the time, the Chinese government had a variety of other “thought control” channels and 
techniques that reached far and deep into the Chinese public. These channels and techniques 
included community- and village-based ideological study groups, loudspeaker systems in almost 
every village, pamphlets, the deployment of traveling propaganda teams (xuanchuan dui), 
“thought reform” (sixiang gaizao) or brainwashing in prisons, creating and promoting “models” 
or exemplars to be emulated, as well as spreading documents and slogans to be memorized.115 
The Chinese propaganda system had completed its transition by the end of the twentieth 
century from a totalitarian system with “thought control” to a new authoritarian one with soft 
“guiding” and “channeling” of public opinion.116 Although these two systems differ in style and 
specific means, they are not quite different in terms of control of public opinion; and whether the 
degree of control has strengthened or weakened is still being debated.  
113 Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee (Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shi) 
1993, 96. 
114 For comprehensive studies of the propaganda systems and techniques of the Third Reich, see Welch 1993. For 
studies of the Soviet propaganda, see Ebon 1987; Inkeles 1950; Kenez 1985.  
115 See studies of the Maoist propaganda techniques, see, for example, Chang 1997; Houn 1961; Lifton 1961; Liu 
1971; Schoenhals 1992; Schurmann 1971; Whyte 1974; Yu 1964. 
116 Maria Repnikova summarizes Maoist media control to have the features of “more uniformity of political 
discourse, deployment of violence and explicit top-down directives,” whereas the new authoritarian media control is 
“somewhat flexible.” See Repnikova and Fang 2018, 2. 
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Amidst this transition, the first change came in the late 1970s as China geared towards 
reform and open during Deng Xiaoping’s era. The Chinese media experienced marketization and 
privatization.117 Media outlets were privatized to various degree. Although the state retained a 
fast grip to the official media and maintained the majority shares in them, many others to a large 
degree had to change their mindsets about funding and profitability. Besides political 
motivations, economic incentives started to play a larger role in reporting decisions. Besides 
adhering to the state lines to ensure their political survival, newspapers now have to write stories 
that sell to ensure their economic survival.  
Subsequently, the advance of information technology brought the second change – the 
rise of the Internet and the spread of social media, such as micro-blogging. Since China was first 
connected to the Internet in 1995, the number of Internet users skyrocketed from 111 million (8.5 
percent of the population) in 2005 to 731 million (53.2 percent of the population) in 2016, now 
constituting 20 percent of the internet users worldwide.118 Concomitantly, strong popular 
nationalism began to surface in the 1990s, with the publication of the best-selling book titled 
“China Can Say No” in 1995 as a symbolic benchmark. This trend was manifested in the 
mushrooming of nationalist online forums, such as “qiangguo luntan” (Strong China Forum) 
managed by People’s Daily, and “Tiexue” (Iron Blood), the emergence of vocal PLA 
generals,119 and the more and more frequent anti-foreign protests during times of diplomatic 
crises.120 
These changes posed both challenges and opportunities to the Chinese propaganda 
system. On one hand, some scholars argue for their erosive effects on the state control over the 
117 Stockmann 2013. 
118 Calculated on data from the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC). 
119 Chubb 2013. 
120 Weiss 2008, 2013 and 2014. 
68
media and the society. Lynch contends that the administrative fragmentation, property-rights 
reform, and technological advance have reduced the Party’s control over the traditional “thought 
work.”121 Taubman points out that “the scope and ease of obtaining information on the Web,” 
“the communication capabilities available to users,” and “the decentralized nature of the 
Internet” pose challenges to the non-democratic rule.122  Yang’s work delineates the strong 
activism and creative protest forms nurtured by the Chinese cyberspace.123 But all these scholars 
recognize that the Chinese state still retains the ultimate control of the media and public opinion.  
On the other, Chinese propagandists have quickly adapted to the new environment and 
upgraded their game. The new challenges have apparently propelled the transition and the 
adaptation of the Chinese propaganda system, which Min Jiang coined as the “coevolution of the 
internet, (un)civil society and authoritarianism.”124  With the spread of the Internet came the 
creation of the “great firewall,” as well as a number of legal, organizational, and personnel 
support that came with it. These supports include, for example, the real name registration policy 
implemented in 2016 as part of the Cybersecurity Law, the establishment of the Cyberspace 
Administration of China (guojia hulianwang xinxi bangongshi) and the Central Leading Group 
for Internet Security and Informatization (zhongyang wangluo anquan he xinxihua lingdao 
xiaozu), as well as the recruitment of an army of state-funded nationalist trolls, the so-called 50 
cent party.125 The Xi Jinping government also reconfigured the institutional framework to govern 
the Internet, placing digital technologies at the heart of its propaganda work and created a more 
centralized and streamlined control process.126 
121 Lynch 1999. 
122 Taubman 1998. 
123 Yang 2009. 
124 Jiang 2016. 
125 For studies on the 50-cent party, see, for example, Han 2015; King et al. 2017; Miller 2016. 
126 Creemers 2017. 
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The state strategy also became more sophisticated. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
crackdown, Chinese President Jiang Zemin introduced the “guidance of public opinion” (yulun 
daoxiang), emphasizing the “soft” approach of directing public opinion rather than the traditional 
forceful approach of indoctrination.127 President Hu Jintao refined this soft approach further to 
the “channeling of public opinion” (yulun yindao). On January 23, 2007, Hu first brought up the 
term when addressing to CCP Politburo members. He said “[we should] grasp the online 
discourse power, enhance our ability to channel online discussions, emphasize the art of 
‘channeling,’ actively leverage new technologies, increase positive coverage, and promote a 
positive mainstream discourse.”128 In a speech addressing delegates participating the National 
Propaganda Thought Work Meeting (quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi) in 2008, Hu 
again used the term “enhance our ability to channel public opinion.”129 When Hu visited the 
Strong China Forum at People’s Daily in June 2008, he fleshed out the idea to full scale. He said 
“[We should] strengthen our traditional media and new media and form a new setting for 
channeling public opinion…”130 Borrowing from the wisdom of the legendary leader Yu the 
Great in taming the floods by effective “channeling” rather than mere obstruction, “channeling 
public opinion” stresses the need to leverage the market force and the Internet to “draw public 
sentiments in useful directions,” rather than simple censorship and oppression.131 “Channeling is 
less focused on suppressing negative news coverage and more concerned with spinning news in a 
direction favorable to the leadership.”132 The deployment of a gargantuan 50 cent army is only 
127 Xu 2004. Xu was then Vice Minister of the Central Propaganda Department and head of the State Administration 
of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT). 
128 For full-text of the speech, see http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/5324268.html, accessed February 22, 
2018. 
129 Full speech available at http://www.hbnu.edu.cn/sqjlz/hjt2.htm, accessed February 22, 2018. 
130 Available at http://tv.people.com.cn/GB/28140/141316/index.html, accessed February 22, 2018. 
131 Bandurski 2015; Chubb 2016, 269. 
132 Bandurski 2010. 
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one step among many towards forming that “new setting for channeling public opinion,” through 
inundating the Internet with positive, state-fabricated messages.  
Eyeing these changes, some scholars, in contrast to the first group of scholars who saw 
the erosive and liberating power of the market and the Internet to the state monopoly of media 
and public opinion, argue for a strengthened state control. Brady contends that the Chinese 
propaganda machine has reinvented itself and strengthened its hold to the Chinese society not 
despite, but because of its marketization and globalization.133 Stockmann argues that the effect of 
marketization depends on the institution design of the state. In the case of China and many other 
authoritarian states, marketization sustains, rather than destabilizes, authoritarianism.134 
Stockmann and Gallagher delineate how the marketized Chinese media as reinvented 
propaganda outlets has boosted citizens’ trust in the authoritarian legal system to resolve 
grievances rather than resorting to protests.135 Esarey shows that in the case of the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, the state utilizes the commercial incentives of 
media to encourage them to produce content that are popular but politically acceptable.136 
Mackinnon demonstrates how China has utilized the “networked authoritarianism” to bolster its 
regime legitimacy.137 By tracing the physical network infrastructure control, the content control, 
and foreign influence on the network in China, Harwit and Clark prove that the state is the 
unmistakable powerful hand shaping the Internet in China.138 Morozov further confirms the 
repressive nature of the Internet in China and Iran and breaks the delusion that the Internet is 
necessarily liberating.139  
133 Brady 2008. A similar argument is made in Brady and Wang 2009. 
134 Stockmann 2013. 
135 Stockmann and Gallagher 2011. 
136 Esarey 2005. 
137 Mackinnon 2011. 
138 Harwit and Clark 2001. 
139 Morozov 2012. 
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In the realm of foreign policy, these developments in the Chinese propaganda system 
have mixed effects. Diversification of information sources makes it harder, if not impossible, for 
the government to hide a dispute entirely, but the state has a legion of resources and means to 
play it down, or to direct public opinion towards useful ways. The rise of the Internet also 
resulted in broader public engagement in foreign policy. Together with the stronger nationalist 
sentiment in the public, these changes put more constraints to decision-making in foreign policy. 
But that does not mean that the state is necessarily constrained, as with the explosion of new 
technologies, the state is also equipped with newly founded power to overcome these potential 
constraints. In the end, what has not changed is the effective state control over media and public 
opinion and the basic state rationale in adopting or not adopting a propaganda campaign on a 
foreign dispute, as this study seeks to demystify.  
 
2. Features 
The Central Propaganda Department (CPD), the CCP propaganda epicenter, commands an 
extensive range of media outlets and government branches in the bureaucratic system. This 
amounts to over 3,442 television stations, 1,906 newspapers, and 10,014 periodicals in 2015,140 
as well as a dozen corresponding institutional organs in the State Council and the People’s 
Liberation Amy (PLA).141 The CCP propaganda also reaches deep. In the Mao era, this was 
reflected in the study sessions and loudspeakers in every village; Nowadays, this is reflected in 
140 National Bureau of Statistics of China 2016. 
141 For comprehensive studies on the organizational structure of the Chinese propaganda system, see Brady 2008; 
Shambaugh 2007. 
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the 98.77 percent TV coverage and a 53.2 percent internet penetration rate of the whole 
country.142  
 At the pinnacle of the system, the decision making on domestic media policy on foreign 
policy issues falls under the purview of the Central Leading Group on Propaganda and 
Ideological Work (zhongyang xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu), with the consultation 
of the Foreign Affairs Leading Group (waishi lingdao xiaozu) because of the foreign policy 
content. The long-term and medium-term policies are delivered in the National Propaganda 
Thought Work Meetings (quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi) and the annual National 
Conferences of Propaganda Department Directors (quanguo xuanchuan buzhang huiyi). The 
speeches and other important guidelines are then transmitted either orally at propaganda 
department meetings at lower levels or through internal publications.143 Short-term guidelines on 
the themes and issues to be highlighted in the coming week are determined by a working group 
within the Central Propaganda Department and issued to senior editors at their regular meetings 
with the CPD officials.144 During times of diplomatic crises, depending on the level of the 
escalation, the two aforementioned corresponding Leading Small Groups might get involved and 
daily instructions on what and what not to cover and how to cover them are transmitted through 
the CPD to senior editors at major official media outlets, and then further down to the editors on 
duty. Some of these event-based article- or topic-specific daily directives have been leaked by 
editors to China Digital Times, which keeps an online archive of these directives.145  These 
directives, called the “zhenlibu zhiling (The Truth Department directives),” although useful, need 
142 TV coverage data is from National Bureau of Statistics of China 2016. Internet penetration rate is from CNNIC 
2016. 
143 Shambaugh 2007, 54. 
144 Brady 2008, 19. 
145 These directives are available at https://goo.gl/6edxde, accessed February 22, 2018.  
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to be further corroborated because of their unknown source. This is why interviewing senior 
editors who experienced these nineteen diplomatic crises are particularly helpful, as the editors 
interviewed might disclose the policy instructions they received during the crises.  
 The CCP maintains control over news reporting via several mechanisms.146 The first is 
monetary, through direct ownership and financial incentives such as financial rewards to media 
outlets and bonuses to journalists who stay within the limits of the state propaganda.147 The 
second is personnel. The Party appoints the top management of all official media outlets. The 
third is legal and structural, through licensing, required organizational sponsorship, etc.148 The 
fourth is brute force, through censorship, closedowns of media outlets, and imprisonment of 
journalists. The fifth is administrative, through the editor responsibility system. The chain of 
approval of an article is held responsible, not just the author. The last but not the least is 
coercive. Through combinations of rewards and threats of punishment, the state sets examples to 
inspire self-censorship. The state also purposely makes the limits of state tolerance obscure and 
state inspections random to facilitate self-censorship of journalists and Internet users.149 
 
3. Comparison to Other Autocracies 
Compared with other authoritarian propaganda systems, the Chinese system is of no difference in 
substance, but only varies in degree. China is ranked as “one of the world’s most restrictive 
media environments” by Freedom House with a press freedom score of 87 out of 100 in 2016,150 
after eleven other countries/territories. On the top of the list are North Korea, Turkmenistan, 
146 Some of these categories are borrowed from and explained in more detail in Hassid 2010, 8-10. 
147 Brady 2008, 110; Esarey 2005. 
148 Brady 2008 has a section examining the legal regulations as a means of control in China. See Brady 2008, 104-8. 
149 Stern and Hassid 2012. 
150 The higher the score is, the less free the country is.  
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Uzbekistan, Crimea, Eritrea, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Azerbaijan, Iran, Syria and Bahrain.151 
Press in sixty-six countries/territories are rated as “not free,” while seventy-three others as 
“partly free.” The essence of an unfree press is consistent – news and information circumscribed 
for mass audiences and a dominant political narrative shaped by the ruling power.152 The specific 
approaches and techniques may vary, but even on a tactical level, these states are starting to learn 
from each other’s experiences.  
 A number of features help extend the Chinese setting of the empirical tests in this study 
to other authoritarian states. First, like China, most authoritarian states have experienced similar 
developments such as the commercialization and digitization processes described above. 
Countries such as Jordan, Afghanistan, Iran, Morocco, Egypt, Singapore, Malaysia, Syria, 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and many others all experienced these global waves of 
commercialization and digitization.153 Although they each may have unique experiences, they 
scatter on a spectrum of different degrees of liberalization and retained authoritarianism that can 
be observed in China. Jonathan Becker describes the differences between a totalitarian media 
system in the Soviet Union and a neo-authoritarian media system in the present-day Russia, 
including “the degree of relative autonomy vis-à-vis the state, the breadth of negative and 
positive control, the degree of pluralism and the mechanisms of control, not to mention 
ideological context.”154 
Second, internet censorship is prevalent on a global scale. In 2013, the world witnessed a 
general trend of decline in Internet Freedom, displayed in “broad surveillance, new laws 
151 Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press 2017: Table of Country Scores,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/table-
country-scores-fotp-2017, accessed February 23, 2018. 
152 Walker and Orttung 2014, 71. 
153 These examples are summarized in Stockmann 2007, 4-6. For further details, see Jones 2002 (on Jordan), Rawan 
2002 (on Afghanistan), Rodan 1998 (on Singapore and Malaysia), Ayish 2002 (on Syria, UAE, and Qatar). 
154 Becker 2004, 144. 
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controlling web content, and growing arrests of social-media users.”155 “In Asia alone in the last 
several years, incidents in India, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam (not a comprehensive list) 
have highlighted the restrictions that a variety of regimes are putting in place.”156 
China is a leader on Internet censorship. China hosts the annual World Internet 
Conference. Initiated by China, the conference is one of China’s global efforts to defend its 
rights to govern its Internet to its likes without foreign interference – an idea hiding behind the 
concept “Internet sovereignty” coined and chanted by China at the conference.  
Its sophisticated methods are being emulated worldwide. “Beijing readily shares its 
expertise with other regimes, reportedly including those in Belarus, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.”157 
In Vietnam, where the Internet is relatively freer, the government also maintains various means 
to censor content. For example, Google is required to maintain its servers inside Vietnam, so that 
it is easier for Hanoi to censor content when needed to.158 “In September [2013], the state 
introduced Decree 72, which restricted all websites and social media from publishing anything 
that ‘provides information that is against Vietnam.’”159 In Russia, a law signed in 2013 allows 
the state to shut down websites with inappropriate content. “More than 20,000 websites were 
blocked at the year’s end.”160 “A 2014 law requires any website, blog, or public social-media 
account with more than 3,000 daily viewers to register with Roskomnadzor [the Russian 
telecommunications regulator] as a media outlet and comply with the regulations accompanying 
155 Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2013: Despite Pushback, Internet Freedom Deteriorates,” 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2013, accessed February 23, 2018. 
156 Greitens 2013, 263. 
157 Walker and Orttung 2014, 78. 
158 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014, Vietnam,” 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2014/vietnam, accessed February 23, 2018. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Freedom House, “Russia: Freedom of the Press 2016,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2016/russia, accessed February 23, 2018. 
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that status, including bans on anonymous authorship and legal responsibility for comments 
posted by users.”161  
Third, like China, the control strategies have become more subtle and sophisticated. The 
“channeling” strategy and the emphasis on positive, state-sourced content is not unique in China. 
Similar to China’s 50 cent party, Vietnam has a “Force 47” and Russia has a “troll army.” “A 
reliable cast of government-approved pundits” are regularly featured on Russian mainstream 
televisions.162 Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez has 4.21 million twitter followers,163 some of 
whom he offered financial rewards for following him.164 During the Arab Spring, Bahraini 
authorities flooded social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook with pro-regime 
content.165  
These similarities between the Chinese propaganda system and the rest of the 

















162 Walker and Orttung 2014, 81.  
163 As of February 23, 2018. 
164 “Hugo Chávez rewards three-millionth Twitter follower with new home,” The Guardian, June 2, 2012. 
165 Aday et al. 2012, 8. 
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Chapter 4: Congruence Test of Nineteen Chinese Diplomatic Crises 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the congruence test on nineteen Chinese 
diplomatic crises. The first section presents the overall results, which suggest strong patterns 
consistent with the (mis)alignment theory. The second and the third sections discuss the two 
deviant cases and the two ambiguous cases in detail, exploring possible explanations for their 
deviation. 
I. Test Results 
Table 4.1 presents the nineteen Chinese crises as well as the two critical variables – existing 
public opinion and state policy intent, which I claim explain the adoption/non-adoption of 
propaganda campaigns. For each case, I identify the values of these variables. Appendix I 
provides a brief justification for each of these judgements according to the rubrics listed in Table 
3.3. Based on the values of these variables, I deduce whether my theory would predict a 
propaganda campaign. Finally, by comparing the predicted and the actual outcomes of the cases, 
I reach a summary judgement of whether my theory is correct in predicting the propaganda 
campaigns.  
Except for four cases, the test has shown overall consistence between the predicted and 
the actual outcomes, which suggests a historical pattern. Notably, two of the four deviant cases 
are ambiguous on the scale of propaganda.  
Table 4.2 places all these cases in the theoretical framework and marks the deviant cases 
in bold and the ambiguous cases with asterisks. As shown, the pacifying propaganda cases did 
particularly well and all four of them were predicted correctly. Notably, they all took place in the 
twenty-first century, suggesting a more contemporary setting of the causal mechanism. The 
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Table 4.1: Predicted and Actual Outcomes on China’s Nineteen Diplomatic Crises on Territorial Disputes 
(PC: Propaganda Campaign. Deviant cases are in bold in the “Theory” column; ambiguous cases are marked with asterisks.) 




















3 1967 Sino-Indian Border Clashes at Nathu La and Cho La Moderate/Weak Moderate No PC No PC True 














6 1978 Fishing Boat Incident around Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Moderate/Weak Moderate No PC No PC True 






8 1986 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Sumdorong Chu Moderate/Weak Moderate No PC No PC True 
9 1988 Sino-Vietnamese Clash in the Spratlys Moderate/Weak Hardline 
PC to 
Mobilize 
No PC False 
10 2005 









Japanese Coast Guard’s Arrest of a Chinese Trawler Captain near 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 




12 2011 Sino-Vietnamese Cable-Cutting Incidents in the South China Sea Hardline Hardline No PC No PC True 












15 2013 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Ladakh Moderate/Weak Moderate No PC No PC True 
16 2014 Sino-Vietnamese Oil Rig Standoff Moderate/Weak Moderate No PC No PC True 
17 2014 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Ladakh Moderate/Weak Moderate No PC No PC True 













mobilizing propaganda scenario and the moderate - moderate scenario did fine as well, with one 
deviant case in each box. The hardline - hardline scenario did the poorest, with two out of three 
cases falling out of the theoretical prediction, although both two were ambiguous on the 
dependent variable. This leads to the belief that this quadrant is falsified. It however does not 
invalidate the overall argument. This is because when the alignment incentive is absent, it is 
possible that other incentives are present, such as an audience cost incentive in the hardline – 
hardline scenario. The results in this quadrant confirm the existence of an audience cost incentive 
especially when existing public opinion and state foreign policy intent are both hardline. The 
states’ refraining from going all out on these propaganda campaigns also confirms previous 
challenges to the audience cost theory and adds nuances to state’s hands-tying behaviors. The 
confirmation of the overall theoretical framework, together with the falsification of this quadrant, 
also suggests that the conditions proposed are sufficient, but not necessary for the adoption of 
propaganda campaigns.  
 
Table 4.2: Deviant Cases in Theoretical Framework 
 
166 I hold some reservation on the most recent Sino-Indian border incident in Doklam, as events are still developing 
at the time of writing this dissertation. 
 State Policy Intent 
 











Sino-Indian Border 1962 
Sino-Soviet Border 1969 
Sino-Vietnamese Paracels 1974 
Sino-Vietnamese Border 1979-1991 
Sino-Vietnamese Spratlys 1988 
Sino-Indian Border 1959 
Sino-Indian Border 1967 
Sino-Indian Border 1986 
Sino-Indian Border 2013 
Sino-Indian Border 2014 
Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku 1978 
Sino-Vietnamese Oil Rig Crisis 2014 
 
Hardline 
Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku 2010* 
Sino-Vietnamese Cable-Cuttings 2011 
Sino-Philippines Scarborough Shoal 
2012* 
Sino-Japanese Various Dispute 2005 
Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku 2012 
Sino-Philippines Arbitration 2016 
Sino-Indian Border 2017166 
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It also deserves our attention to ruminate over the fact that all pre-1990 cases in Table 4.1 have 
moderate/weak public opinion. This is partly due to the natural development of these territorial 
disputes that the disputes were less known at their inception, and partly due to the development 
of the Chinese propaganda system that the public’s access to information was relatively more 
limited in the pre-1990 era. It might seem like a problem that all pre-1990 cases have weak 
public opinion, but it would only be a problem if there is a confounding factor associated with 
time. To qualify as a confounding factor, it would have caused both the independent variables 
and the dependent variable. As suggested in Chapter 3, the Chinese propaganda system 
transitioned from a Maoist totalitarian system characterized by indoctrination and “thought 
work” to a new authoritarian system with “soft” but not necessarily weaker control underlining 
the “guiding” and the “channeling” of public opinion. So what have changed are the public’s 
expanded access to information, and the specific means of state control over media and public 
opinion; what have not changed are the essence and the outcome of control. Although it is 
plausible that the public’s access to information and the state’s specific means to control public 
opinion could have affected public opinion, but it would be a stretch to argue that they would 
have any effect on a state’s foreign policy intent on a dispute or a state’s decision to publicize or 
not publicize a dispute. What have also changed before and after 1990 are the social economic 
situations, but it is hard to imagine any social economic factor is accountable for both the 
independent and the dependent variables. China has become richer. But could social economic 
development account for public opinion, state foreign policy intent, and state propaganda 
decisions? Hardly. 
Table 4.3 summarizes the results of the test by averaging the numbers of published 
articles in each scenario. Because of the small number of cases and the fact that several of these 
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cases are path dependent or interrelated, I am not claiming an average effect, so it makes no 
sense to calculate or report a P-value. But the misaligned scenarios show substantially higher 
media exposure than the aligned ones. Besides the overall consistence demonstrated in Table 4.1, 
this overall contrast between the misaligned and aligned scenarios in the average numbers of 
articles in Table 4.3 also suggests a strong correlation.  
 
Table 4.3: Average Monthly Numbers of Front-Page Articles and of All-Relevant Articles 
 
 State Policy Intent 
 




Moderate/Weak 8.0, 37.7 1.0, 9.7 
Hardline 0.5, 18 6.3, 66.4 
 
The following section evaluates the four deviant cases and explores why they differ from the 
(mis)alignment theory predictions.  
 
II. Two Deviant Cases 
An investigation of the deviant cases reveals that they could be explained by either a variation of 
the (mis)alignment theory or ad hoc factors such as the presence of an ongoing war. On the 1959 
Sino-Indian border case in which both the public and the state preferred a moderate policy, China 
stayed remarkably quiet at the beginning despite an aggressive Indian media campaign, which 
was consistent with the theory’s prediction. The outcome began to deviate from the theory when 
the Chinese leaders reluctantly launched a propaganda campaign, in part to counter the Indian 
campaign, and in part to prepare the Chinese public for an increasingly hostile environment. 
While the case outcome is not what the theory predicts, the fact that the Chinese government felt 
the need to prepare the public for an increasingly hostile environment is consistent with the 
fundamental logic of the (mis)alignment theory. The Sino-Vietnamese clash in the Spratlys in 
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1988 occurred amidst a war between the two countries, so the Chinese public needed little 
mobilization.  
 
1. The 1959 Sino-Indian Border Clashes at Longju and Kongka Pass 
Like many of China’s territorial disputes, the Sino-Indian border dispute is a historical product – 
the colonial legacy and the lack of prior delimitation. The situation was further aggravated by a 
lack of administration due to its remote location. The McMahon Line established at the 1913-14 
Simla Conference by Great Britain was the only delimitation effort in history, but was rejected 
by the then newly founded Republic of China (ROC) on the basis of the lack of authority of the 
Tibetan representatives and was subsequently negotiated only between the British and the 
Tibetan representatives, without Chinese representation.167 These problems formed the crux of 
the dispute that arose shortly after the independence of India and the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
The Sino-Indian border dispute first broke out into armed conflicts in August 1959, five 
months after the Tibetan uprising and Dalai Lama’s fleeing to India. Two bloodshed events 
occurred in the disputed area – the August 25 incident at Longju and the October 21 incident at 
the Kongka Pass. 
 
Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
The border issue was hidden from the public view before 1959. Not a lot of people knew about it 
and those who did know, in this case the state leaders, did not feel strongly about it to even put it 
on the negotiation table. The Chinese leaders insisted that conditions were not yet “ripe for 
167 Lamb 1966. 
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settlement.”168 They were unwilling to discuss the issue and tried side-stepping it at several 
occasions when the two sides could have discussed about it. These occasions include when 
China and India negotiated about India’s trading privileges and Tibet’s political status in 1953-
1954, when Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai exchanged visits in 1954, and when a Chinese 
magazine China Pictorial showed large areas of Indian-claimed territory as Chinese in 1958 and 
that once again propelled Nehru to request a clarification from the Chinese side which was only 
brushed aside by Beijing. 
 
State Policy Intent: Moderate 
China sought to resolve the dispute with India through peaceful negotiations. After a small 
border conflict broke on August 25, 1959, Mao Zedong held a politburo meeting, and concluded 
that China would “seek to resolve the border issue through negotiations.”169 Wu Lengxi, who 
attended the meeting, recollects that Mao said “Before the negotiations, [we] should suggest [to 
the Indian counterpart] to keep the status quo, neither side should move their troops, and random, 
small strife on the ground should be resolved by ad hoc agreements.”170 Wu was at the time the 
head of Xinhua News Agency and General Editor of People’s Daily, and also the Politburo’s 
record keeper for relations with the Soviet Union. This recollection of Mao’s decision is 
corroborated by a declassified CIA study on March 2, 1963: “By fall 1959, the Chinese leaders 
had decided to switch from a policy of no negotiations on an overall border settlement, coasting 
168 Han 1987, 218. 
169 Wu 1999, 209.  
170 Wu 1999, 212. 
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along on the basis of the existing status quo, to one of preliminary discussions with a view to an 
eventual overall settlement.”171 
 
Predicted Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
Actual Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Mobilize 
Given the weak public opinion and the moderate state policy intent, the state should have not 
pursued a propaganda campaign based on the causal logic of the (mis)alignment theory, because 
in this case the state and the public were actually aligned. But the Chinese state did launch a 
propaganda campaign, although brief.  
 Table 4.4 lists the number of relevant articles in People’s Daily during the 1959 
campaign. I also list a few months before and after for comparison. Based on my operational 
definition of a propaganda campaign – at least two front-page and ten any-page articles a month, 
with one-month lapse allowed – the months of September, October and November qualify as the 
campaign duration. In September, People’s Daily published a total of sixty-two articles on the 
subject, with ten in the front pages. But the number of articles reduced sharply from September 
to October. The month of October does not meet the minimum number of any-page articles and 
counts as a lapse month. The numbers in November picked back up slightly but not nearly as 
high as those of September and the campaign ended there. So overall, the campaign was modest 
and short-lived, with a total of ninety-one articles including seventeen front-page articles during 




171 Central Intelligence Agency. “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Section 1: 1950-59,” The CAESAR, ESAU, and 
POLO series, DD/I Staff Study, Reference Title POLO XVI, March 2, 1963, 
www.archieve.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/polo-07.pdf, accessed May 30, 2018. 
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Table 4.4: Number of People’s Daily Front-Page and Any-Page Articles Around the 1959 Sino-Indian Border 
Dispute Propaganda Campaign 
 
Year Month No. of Front-Page Articles 
No. of All 
Articles 
1959 Mar 0 0 
1959 Apr 3 0 
1959 May 2 1 
1959 Jun 1 0 
1959 Jul 0 0 
1959 Aug 0 0 
1959 Sep 10 62 
1959 Oct 3 8 
1959 Nov 4 21 
1959 Dec 1 8 
1960 Jan 1 8 
1960 Feb 0 3 
 
Why did the Chinese government feel the need to propagandize the issue even when the public 
was aligned with its policy intent? First, it is important to note that when India launched an 
aggressive media campaign against China starting from March after the Tibetan uprising and 
Dalai Lama’s fleeing to India, China had initially stayed remarkably quiet in contrast, manifested 
in the low number of articles between March and August, for as long as half a year. In a 
conversation between Chinese Vice Minister Zeng Yongquan and Charge d’Affaires of the 
Soviet Embassy in China S. Antonov, Antonov commented that “China kept silent even though 
the whole world was fussing about it.”172  
 Even after China responded by launching its own propaganda campaign, the campaign 
was moderate and brief, as demonstrated earlier. The account of Wu Lengxi reaffirms the 
restrained nature of this campaign and discloses that this was under Mao’s directive. In a meeting 
with Wu and the Politburo Standing Committee members on September 15, 1959, Mao said that 
172 “Memorandum of Conversation Between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zeng Yongquan and Charge d’Affaires 
of the Embassy of the Soviet Union in China S. Antonov,” September 10, 1959, History and Public Policy Program 
Digital Archive, PRC FMA 109-00873-12, 76-79. Obtained by Dai Chaowu and translated by 7Brands. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114757. 
86
they should “consider bringing the public debate with India on the border issue to a stop soon.” 
“Before putting it to a stop, we should publish an editorial … to clarify that out engagement in 
this debate is against our will. The debate has its benefits – it can present both sides’ positions 
and expose the truth on the border issue. But we do not want to continue the debate; we still hope 
to resolve the issue through negotiations.”173 
Second, China’s propaganda campaign was a result of increased threats perceived by the 
leaders and the strategic need to prepare the public. Two things took place around September 
1959 that affected the Chinese leaders’ threat perception. One, the two incidents elevated the 
salience of the dispute. With India’s media campaign, the pressure for China to respond reached 
a tipping point. The mounting pressure to respond to the Indian media campaign is confirmed in 
the memoir of Wu Lengxi. Wu laments that “The Party’s original intention was not to use the 
border incident to accuse India. We did not want to make a great deal of it. But India publicized 
it first, then slandered China, and accused China of being an “invader,” whipping up an anti-
China wave around the World. This forces us to respond; we cannot but debate with Nehru, with 
whom we established the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. This is against our will, but 
out of necessity.”174  
Two, it became clear during this time that the Soviet Union was siding with India. The 
first sign was a Soviet News Agency TASS statement without incorporating the Chinese 
opinion.175 Moscow’s attitude became clear when Khrushchev visited China and criticized 
China’s role in the dispute on October 2.176 
173 Wu 1999, 215. 
174 Wu 1999, 214. 
175 “Memorandum of Conversation Between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zeng Yongquan and Charge d’Affaires 
of the Embassy of the Soviet Union in China S. Antonov,” 1959; also see Wu 1999, 213-14. 
176 “Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong.” 1959. Archive of the President of the Russian 
Federation (APRF), f. 52, op. 1, d. 499, ll. 1-33, copy in Volkogonov Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of 
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All these factors augured a worsening security environment for China. Under these 
circumstances, China felt the need to prepare the public for an increasingly hostile environment 
despite its moderate policy intention. While the case outcome is not what the theory predicts, the 
facts that the Chinese campaign was a very much delayed and restrained one and that the 
Chinese government felt the need to prepare the public for an increasingly hostile environment 
are consistent with the fundamental logic of the (mis)alignment theory. 
 
2. The 1988 Sino-Vietnamese Clash in the Spratlys 
The Spratly Islands are a group of islands in the South China Sea disputed between six 
claimants, including People’s Republic of China (China), Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Both land features in the area and the maritime rights 
derived from the ownership of these land features are being disputed. The dispute involves not 
only resource conflicts over fish and energy, but also the strategic shipping routes that connects 
the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, carrying one third of global shipping.177 Moreover, the 
dispute also draws the attention of the United States because of the American commitment to its 
Asian allies and the competition of influence between China and the U.S. in the Western Pacific. 
Chapter 6 will provide a more detailed background to the South China Sea dispute in general. 
In March 1987, China took the opportunity of a UNESCO-commissioned task of building 
observation posts in the Spratlys to expand its control there. This led to a series of confrontations 
between the Vietnamese and the Chinese navies which culminated to a brief battle near the 
Johnson South Reef on March 14, 1988.  
Congress, Washington, D.C. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112088.  
177 “How much trade transits the South China Sea?” Center for Strategic and International Studies China Power 
Project. https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/, accessed April 16, 2018. 
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 Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
The Chinese public had little knowledge of the offshore dispute in the Spratly Islands, so public 
opinion was weak. 
 
State Policy Intent: Hardline 
The international conditions were favorable for China to pursue a hardline policy. With the 
Soviet Union still bogged down in Afghanistan and the U.S. enjoying a relatively harmonious 
relationship with China, the prospect of a possible third-party intervention was low.  
Eyeing the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC)’s worldwide 
ocean survey as an opportunity, China volunteered to build observation posts in the Spratlys with 
the goal of increasing its presence in the area. Although the Chinese and the Vietnamese 
recollections are contradictory as to who fired the first shot in the battle,178 China in the end 
seized control of six land features in the area including the Johnson South Reef.  
Predicted Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Mobilize 
Actual Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
This case is unique in the sense that it occurred amidst a war between the two countries. The year 
1988 marks the ninth year into the Sino-Vietnamese Border War. Although the Chinese public 
opinion on this particular dispute was weak (having little knowledge), it was strong and hardline 
against Vietnam with whom the Chinese people had been fighting a major war. The Chinese 
178 For Chinese accounts of the battle, see Yang 2014; Wang 2015; for Vietnamese accounts, see “Deadly Fight 
Against Chinese for Gac Ma Reef Remembered,” TN News, March 14, 2013, 
http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/deadly-fight-against-chinese-for-gac-ma-reef-remembered-3235.html, and 
“Vietnamese Soldiers Remember 1988 Spratlys Battle against Chinese,” Thanh Nien News, March 14, 2016, 
http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnamese-soldiers-remember-1988-spratlys-battle-against-chinese-
60161.html, accessed May 30, 2018. 
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public needed no extra mobilization for this brief battle on the side of the war. During the 65 
days of the crisis, People’s Daily published 7 front-page articles, but only 10 articles all-together. 
The significant number of front-page articles confirmed China’s hardline position and high 
priority given to the issue. Yet China did not publicize the dispute in volume, evident in the low 
number of all relevant articles, because it did not need to, given the prior mobilization due to the 
war.  
 
III. Two Ambiguous Cases 
The two ambiguous cases, the 2010 Sino-Japanese fishing boat incident and the 2012 Sino-
Philippines Scarborough Shoal standoff, seem to suggest an audience cost argument, given the 
concurrent coercions in both cases. But further investigation is needed to confirm such a logic. 
Interestingly though, neither of these “propaganda campaigns” are without reservations, which 
implies the state’s hesitation in engaging too much audience cost which would undermine social 
stability and foreign policy flexibility. 
 
1. The 2010 Sino-Japanese Boat Incident Near Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands  
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute concern a group of uninhabited islands in the East China 
Sea. Japan, having maintained the de facto control of the Islands since 1895 except for a 1945-
1972 period of post-war U.S. administration, does not recognize the existence of the dispute. 
China holds that the Islands had always been possessed by China before the first Sino-Japanese 
War in 1984 and was a Japanese seizure which should be returned to China after the Second 
World War. The dispute was sidestepped when the two countries normalized relationship in 1972 
and signed a peace treaty in 1978. But the dispute deteriorated as the history issue broke out in 
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the 1980s, on which the Chinese complain about the Japanese reluctance to admit its atrocities to 
the Chinese people and many other people in Asia during World War II. The territorial dispute 
concern resources such as fish and alleged oil reserves. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security between the United States and Japan binds the United States to come to Japan’s aid 
should a war broke out in the defense of the territory.  
On September 7, 2010, the Japanese Coast Guard arrested a Chinese fishing trawler 
captain who allegedly rammed his vessel into Japan Coast Guard ships near the disputed Islands. 
Beijing demanded the immediate release of the captain. When Japan decided to hold the captain 
for further investigation, China responded aggressively. Japan eventually released the captain on 
September 25. Widespread anti-Japanese protests took place in China in mid-October. 
 
Public Opinion: Hardline 
By the 2010 incident, nationalist sensitivities towards Japan had become acute among the 
Chinese public. The Beijing Area Study (BAS) reaches a representative sample of Beijing 
residents in eleven years between 1998 and 2015, and has data on the respondents’ country 
thermometer towards North Korea, Japan, America, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines. 
The BAS shows that the Chinese public’s thermometer towards Japan stayed in the low 30s ever 
since the 2005 Sino-Japanese crisis over history textbook and Japan’s bid to the United Nations 



















1/2000 47.4 -5.77% 
3/2001 44.5 -6.12% 
3/2002 34.9 -21.57% 
3/2003 45.2 29.51% 
5/2004 36.7 -18.81% 
5/2005 29.9 -18.53% 
5/2007 33.2 11.04% 
5/2009 33 -0.60% 
10/2013 31.3 -5.15% 
6/2015 30 -4.15% 
 
 
State Policy Intent: Hardline 
Beijing perceived the Japan Coast Guard’s handling of the incident a departure from the status 
quo. In Beijing’s perspective, Japan’s previous handling of such incidents usually involved 
expelling or deporting the intruders. But in this case, the Japanese authorities arrested and 
detained the captain based on Japanese domestic law. Intentional or not, the Japanese behavior 
asserts Japan’s de jure sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which constitutes a direct 
challenge to the status quo. Accepting the legality of such actions would compromise China’s 
claim to the disputed Islands.  
However, China’s response to such a provocation was excessive and escalatory.179 
China’s escalated responses included suspending high-level exchanges with Tokyo, detaining 
four Japanese nationals for allegedly entering restricted military area, and informal economic 
sanctions impacting tourism and rare earth mineral exports to Japan.180 In addition, when Tokyo 
179 See, for example, Mochizuki 2010. 
180 “Relations between China and Japan worsen over filming of military targets,” Guardian, September 23, 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/china-japan-relations-video-filming; “Amid Tension, China 
92
released the captain, instead of reciprocating with defusing the tension, Beijing demanded an 
apology and compensation.  
 
Predicted Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
Actual Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Coerce? 
During the fifty-seven days of the crisis, People’s Daily published a total of thirty-one articles on 
the dispute, only two of which were in the front pages. These numbers bordered on the criteria 
set forth in the measurement of a propaganda campaign. To determine whether China’s 
propaganda during the crisis count as a propaganda campaign, we need to take a closer look into 
other official media reporting and leaked policy directives. 
It appeared that China did make conscious efforts to publicize the dispute, yet with clear 
reservations. Besides People’s Daily’s reporting, CCTV flagship news program at seven o’clock, 
Xinwen Lianbo (Network News), covered the dispute on four evenings between September 13 
and October 5. This was unusual considering that the program rarely covered foreign disputes. 
But apparently the coverage on the September 18th public events commemorating the Japanese 
invasion during WWII did not mention about the ongoing territorial crisis. A leaked policy 
directive on China Digital Times confirms that this disconnection was ordered by propaganda 
officials. The directive told media outlets to report the commemorating events as “business as 
usual” and “[they] should not be connected to the recent incident involving the arrest of the 
fishing boat crew.”181 CCTV 10pm Wanjian Xinwen (Evening News) had more coverage of the 
dispute, broadcasting events on eleven out of twenty nights between September 11 and 
Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” New York Times, September 22, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?mcubz=0, accessed May 30, 2018. 
181 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department). “Diaoyudao Zhuangcuan Shijian (Diaoyu Islands Boat Collision Incident).” 
China Digital Times. September 17, 2010. https://goo.gl/nCFyAH, accessed May 30, 2018. 
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September 30. CCTV also featured the issue in its “Xin Shiye (New Horizon)” program on 
October 20 and 21.182 
The state’s serious reservation was reflected in several leaked state directives dated 
between September 10 and October 19, which could be summarized into three main policies. 
First, the state ordered the media to use the Xinhua copies only, and not to conduct their own 
interviews or report their own stories.183 This was validated by the fact that fourteen of the thirty-
one People’s Daily articles were copies of MoFA statements. Second, the state instructed the 
media not to place these reporting on prominent sections or during prime times.184 This could 
explain the small number of front-page articles and the little primetime TV coverage. Third, the 
state did not allow online discussions or comments, and requested any inciting or action-driven 
posts be censored.185 
 
Explanation 
The content of the People’s Daily articles seemed to imply an audience cost story. At the 
beginning of the crisis, China could use the harsh rhetoric to engage an audience cost to coerce 
Japan into releasing the captain and offering an apology China had demanded. But Beijing at the 
182 “Xunhang Diaoyudao (Patrolling the Diaoyu Islands).” Xinshiye (New Horizon). CCTV. October 20 and 21, 
2010. http://tv.cntv.cn/video/C22733/fa3ef7a9ae6e45ad6cc07d8e9f53bf1d and 
http://tv.cntv.cn/video/C22733/f6af12a02f3946e406f6a6892e7dffd2, accessed May 30, 2018. 
183 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department). “Guanyu Diaoyudao Zhongri Yuchuan Jiufen Shijian (About the Sino-
Japanese Boat Incident near Diaoyu Islands).” China Digital Times. September 10, 2010. https://goo.gl/1ZCpBc, 
accessed May 30, 2018. 
184 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department). “Guanyu Rifang Renyuan Shanchuang Wo Junshijinqu (About Japanese 
Citizens Illegally Entering Restricted Military Area).” China Digital Times. September 30, 2010. 
https://goo.gl/is5UnK, accessed May 30, 2018. 
185 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department). “Guanyu Riben Fanghuai Wo Bei Kouya Chuanzhang Yi Shi (About Japan 
Releasing Detained Chinese Captain).” China Digital Times. September 24, 2010. https://goo.gl/8UQuLh, accessed 
May 30, 2018. 
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same time appeared hesitant to invoke too much nationalism, so it kept a lid on the media 
coverage.  
 
2. The 2012 Sino-Philippines Scarborough Shoal Standoff  
The Scarborough Shoal, or known as Huangyan Dao in Chinese, is a chain of reefs, rocks and an 
inner lagoon in the South China Sea. China, Taiwan and the Philippines have conflictual claims 
to the Shoal. On April 8, 2012, a Philippine navy frigate cornered several Chinese fishing vessels 
in the lagoon at the Scarborough Shoal, based on reasons of suspected poaching. Two China 
Marine Surveillance (CMS) ships soon arrived, interposing themselves between the frigate and 
the fishing vessels to prevent an arrest, triggering a two-month standoff between the two 
countries in the Shoal. 
 
Public Opinion: Hardline 
Before the crisis began, there had already been widespread knowledge and strong nationalist 
sentiment in China about the South China Sea dispute, especially against the Philippines during 
2011, just months before the crisis broke. The strong nationalist sentiment on the South China 
Sea dispute was a recent phenomenon starting from around 2009 due to the heightened tension 
that captured the attention of commercial media and hawkish Chinese online forums, the 
increased U.S. involvement since 2010, and the Chinese government’s increased willingness to 
allow publicity of the dispute. In June and July 2011, China experienced a “wave of public 
mobilization” on the South China Sea issue.186 A search of the term “South China Sea” in the 
186 Chubb 2016, 210. In footnote 70, Chubb quotes Reilly’s definition of a wave of mobilization as a “rapid shift in 
public opinion and popular emotions, growing political activism, and expanded sensationalist coverage in popular 
media and on the Internet.” See Reilly 2011, 24. 
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BSI shows notable surges in June and July 2011 and a weekly average index of four thousand 
during the one-year pre-crisis period (Figure 4.1). For comparison, the weekly average during the 
one year before the Sino-Vietnamese oil rig crisis in 2014 was just about one thousand and seven 
hundred, which I interpret as low. The all-time average of search volume during non-crisis 
periods between January 1, 2011 and October 15, 2017 is 2,773.187 So an index average of four 
thousand during non-crisis period should be considered high. 
 





As the news of the confrontation spread, online forums and social media were flooded with 
intense public reactions. Bottom-up mobilization such as small-scale protests outside the 
187 The period between January 1, 2011 and October 15, 2017 is the period the BSI data is available. The indices are 
not the actual number of daily searches but an indicator that reflects the “relative” level of search activity. The 
formulae are not transparent, but it takes in account China’s increasing population of internet users, so these data are 
comparable over time and between different keywords searched. I also excluded data during the three crisis periods 
related to the South China Sea because the data during these crises would puff up the average. The excluded periods 
include 5/26-6/26/2011 during the Sino-Vietnamese cable cutting incidents, 4/12-6/4/2012 during the Sino-
Philippines Scarborough Shoal standoff, and 6/1-8/1/2016 during the Sino-Philippines arbitration crisis. If not 
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Philippine Embassy and hacking attacks were spontaneously initiated by the public.188 These 
further confirm the existing hardline public opinion.  
 
State Policy Intent: Hardline 
China’s disproportionate escalations from the very onset of the crisis indicate a hardline policy 
intent. This was manifested in its uncompromising behavior on the sea and informal economic 
sanctions. The Chinese decision to send CMS ships to confront the Philippine naval frigate and 
to prevent the arrest of the Chinese fishermen departed from previous Chinese behaviors and 
reflected a change towards more aggressiveness. Previously, China “had never attempted to 
impose punishment beyond diplomatic protests in response,” on “a string of comparable cases of 
Philippine authorities detaining PRC fisherfolk at the atoll.”189 After the initial standoff, in an 
attempt to ease the tension, Manila withdrew the navy frigate and replaced it with a coast guard 
vessel and a Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessel.190 But instead of reciprocating 
the gesture, China reinforced its presence by sending its most advanced fishery patrol ship, the 
Yuzheng 310, joining two other ships that had already been there.191 The number of Chinese 
ships in the area continued to rise and reached fourteen on May 3.192 Shortly after the retreat of 
both parties at the threat of an oncoming typhoon, Chinese vessels returned to the Shoal, 
establishing a regular presence until October 2016.193  
188 “Chinese hackers attack more Philippine websites,” ABC-CBN News, May 12, 2012, http://news.abs-
cbn.com/nation/05/12/12/chinese-hackers-attack-more-philippine-websites, accessed May 30, 2018. 
189 Chubb 2016, 283. 
190 Thayer 2012. 
191 “Chinese Patrol Ship Yuzheng-310 Reaches Waters off Scarborough Shoal,” The China Times, April 20, 2012, 
http://thechinatimes.com/online/2012/04/3107.html, accessed May 30, 2018. 
192 “Chinese Boats Crowding Shoal,” Philippine Star, May 3, 2012, 
http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/802659/chinese-boats-crowding-shoal, accessed May 30, 2018. 
193 “Philippines and China Ease Tensions in Rift at Sea,” The New York Times, June 18, 2012, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/world/asia/beijing-and-manila-ease-tensions-in-south-china-sea.html; Ratner 
2013; “Chinese Vessels Leave Disputed Fishing Grounds in South China Sea”, The New York Times, October 28, 
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 In terms of economic sanctions, although the alleged banana ban was refuted by some 
scholars,194 China went out of its way in publicizing the travel advisory, the reduction of China 
Southern Airlines flights to Manila, and the fruit quarantine – all coincided with the crisis and all 
were reported by People’s Daily.195 China Youth Travel Service, a state-owned national tourist 
company, also offered to reimburse tour packages.196 These acts, taken together, were suspicious 
of at least an unofficial sanction, if not a formal one.  
 
Predicted Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
Actual Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Coerce? 
During the fifty-three days of the crisis, People’ Daily published a total of sixty-four articles on 
the topic, with only one article in the front page. That one front-page article was on the launch of 
a deep-water drilling rig “Hai Yang Shi You 981” in the South China Sea, rather than directly on 
the crisis itself. These numbers border on the criteria set forth in the measurement of a 
propaganda campaign. So to determine whether China’s propaganda during the crisis justifies as 
a propaganda campaign, I need to take a closer look into other official media reporting.  
China did make deliberate efforts to publicize the dispute. But like the Sino-Japanese 
boat incident in 2010, the media efforts were lukewarm. During the fifty-three days of the crisis, 
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/world/asia/south-china-sea-scarborough-shoal.html?_r=0, accessed May 
30, 2018.  
194 Poh 2017. 
195 “Guojia Zhijian Zongju dui Jinkou Feilvbin Shuiguo Jiaqiang Jianyanjianyi (General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine Stepping Up Quarantine of Imported Philippine Fruits),” People’s Daily, 
May 11, 2012, 4; “Guojia Lvyouju Tixing Chufei Biyao Zhongguo Youke Ying Zanhuan Fufei Lvyou (National 
Tourism Administration Advises Chinese Tourists to Suspend Travel to the Philippines),” People’s Daily, May 14, 
2012, 4; “Nanhang Tiaojian Fufei Hangban (China Southern Airlines Reduces Flights to the Philippines),” People’s 
Daily, May 15, 2012, 10. 
196 “Guojia Lvyouju.” 
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the Chinese MoFA had twenty-nine press conferences addressing the issue. Many of the 
questions at these press conferences were pre-arranged. The state media reporting mirrored these 
MoFA statements. CCTV Network News did not mention the standoff. But CCTV Evening 
News broadcasted on the issue every other night during April 11-18. Vice Foreign Minister Fu 
Ying delivered a stern message to the Philippine Embassy Charge D’affaires on May 7 accusing 
the Philippines in making “serious mistakes” and threatening that China has “made all 
preparations to respond to any escalation of the situation by the Philippine side.” The message 
was publicized on the MoFA website the next day and was followed by a flurry of media reports. 
On May 8, CCTV covered the issue again in the 10pm Evening News and featured the issue in 
its “Huanqiu Shixian (Global View)” program with expert commentators.197 People’s Daily 
published four articles on the dispute on May 9. Although with none in the front page, these took 
up half of an entire page three. China Youth Daily, PLA Daily and China Newsweek all had 
headlines on the dispute in the following days. To sum up, media coverage was comprehensive, 
but little in the front-pages and no prime-time TV coverage. Although leaked policy directives 
are not available, we can tell from the reporting patterns that this was a lukewarm propaganda 
campaign with clear reservations, if it counts as a campaign at all. 
Some might argue that the state propaganda on the Scarborough Shoal standoff might be 
due to the developing Bo Xilai scandal in a diversionary logic. But it is hard to believe that the 
Chinese government created the whole standoff or escalated the tension embracing the risks 
involved just to divert public attention away from the Bo Xilai scandal, since China had cheaper 
and easier means for such purposes. Besides, the fact that the state did not shy away from 
197 “Zhuanjia Jianyi Baoli Xingdong Huiying Feilvbin Dui Huangyandao Gaiming Chaibiao (Experts Recommend 
Violent Response to Philippines Changing of Huangyan Island’s Name and Demolishing the Markers).” Huanqiu 
Shixian (Global View). CCTV. May 9, 2012. https://news.qq.com/a/20120509/000261.htm, accessed May 30, 2018. 
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publicizing the Bo Xilai scandal, and even featured the story in more prominent places than the 
territorial dispute, defies a diversionary logic. On April 11 – the same day the Scarborough Shoal 
standoff was made public, People’s Daily featured in its front page the news of the Politburo’s 
decision to try Bo Xilai, whereas it made no mention of the Scarborough Shoal crisis until the 
next day, on page three.198 CCTV Network News, which did not mention the Scarborough Shoal 
crisis at all throughout the crisis, devoted a substantial amount of time on the Politburo’s 
decision.199 
The Chinese propaganda might be explained by the audience cost theory. Negotiation to 
resolve the standoff started on April 19, was suspended by the Philippines on April 27, and 
reopened again on May 10. Throughout this period, China might be using the harsh public 
rhetoric and public attention for coercive purposes – first to coerce the Philippine navy to back 
off, then to stop the Philippines from involving the United States and stoking domestic 
nationalism, and also to urge the Philippines to go back to the negotiation after it was suspended.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
The congruence test on nineteen Chinese diplomatic crises on territorial disputes in this chapter 
indicates a strong correlation between the state-public (mis)alignment and state’s adoption/non-
adoption of propaganda campaigns. The two deviant cases could either be explained by a 
variation of the theory, or ad hoc factors such as an ongoing war amidst the crisis. The weakest 
link seems to be the hardline - hardline cases, where audience cost might explain two of the three 
198 “Firmly Support the Party Central Committee’s Correct Decision,” People’s Daily, April 11, 2012, 1; “Chinese 
Marine Surveillance Ships Stops Philippine Naval Vessel Harassing Chinese Fishing Boats,” People’s Daily, April 
12, 2012, 3.  
199 For CCTV Network News transcript on April 11, 2012, see http://cctv.cntv.cn/lm/xinwenlianbo/20120411.shtml, 
accessed May 30, 2018. 
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cases in that category. But even on these cases, the scale of the propaganda was moderately 
noticeable, with observable state publicity efforts though not without reservations. This shows 
that the government was hesitant to involve too much audience cost that might undermine social 
stability or tie its hands in foreign policy implementation. These results, however, do falsify the 
hardline - hardline quadrant, suggesting the proposed conditions are sufficient but not necessary.  
 Overall, the results confirm a strong correlation that warrants a closer examination into 
the proposed causal mechanisms. Chapter 5 will trace the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979-
1991 to see whether the propaganda campaign was a mobilization effort. Chapter 6 will 
investigate the Sino-Philippines arbitration case in 2016 to see whether the propaganda campaign 
was used to pacify public opinion. Chapter 7 will examine two negative cases to see whether the 
absence of a propaganda campaign was indeed due to a state-public alignment. As an aside, 
Chapter 7 also includes the Vietnamese side of the story in the 2014 oil rig crisis, further 
confirming the pacifying mechanism and extending the theory’s application to another 




















“If there is something big to happen, there must first be propaganda. Public opinion must 
be made before opening fire. This is the importance of propaganda – it mobilizes people’s hearts 
and wins their support.”  
– Author’s interview to a retired journalist who reported on the Sino-Vietnamese 
border war that broke out in 1979 and lasted a decade.200  
 
 “Why have we delayed the attack? ... we want to create public opinion…Our repeated 
toleration will enable everyone to know the aggressiveness of the Cuba in the East. Only through 
such exposure can we …educate the people… and strengthen the morale of the broad masses of 
our officers and men. At a suitable time, we may launch fierce attacks and win a sweeping 
victory over our enemies.”  
– In a leaked report by Geng Biao, a Chinese Politburo member and the then 
secretary general of the Central Military Commission (CMC), addressing to an 
enlarged Politburo meeting on January 16, 1979.201 
 
Chapter 5: The Sino-Vietnamese Border War – A Mobilizing Propaganda 
Campaign 
 
The Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979-1990 is the last war China has fought. It began in the 
background of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet split, and ended after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War. It was sparked by the specific problems on the Sino-
Vietnamese border, but had global implications for balance of power. This is a fascinating case 
associated with a number of historic events including the exodus of Chinese Vietnamese in 1978-
1979, the conclusion of the Vietnam-Soviet security alliance, the normalization of Sino-U.S. 
relations, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, etc. Also prominent about the case was the 
impressive propaganda campaign the Chinese government had promulgated. This chapter 
reviews that part of the history and uses the historical facts to test one scenario of the 
(mis)alignment theory and the competing theories. 
The case has only been moderately studied by a few Cold War historians and has not 
been used much in political science studies.202 A number of historical studies came out in the 
200 Interview 40, June 8, 2017, Beijing. 
201 Geng, Biao. 1981. “Geng Blao’s Report on the Situation of the Indochinese Peninsula.” Journal of Contemporary 
Asia 11 (3): 379–91, 390. 
202 For example, Chanda 1986; Chen 1987; Duiker 1986; Hood 1993; Ross 1988.  
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2000s and 2010s due to newly available Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese archives after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.203 But these scholars do not agree on the causes of the war. Several 
other aspects of the case, such as the U.S. role in the war, the specific timing of the Chinese 
decision for the war, are still being debated or left unresolved because of the lack of available 
evidence.  
For clarification on the details of the case, I not only reviewed these historical studies, but 
also visited several Chinese, Vietnamese, and American archives and interviewed a number of 
former Chinese officials and journalists involved in the conflict. Some of these materials are 
used for the first time. But the goal here is not to study the case comprehensively like historical 
works do, but to evaluate the logic of the proposed and competitive theories against their 
empirical expectations of the case. This case study focuses on the period from the deterioration 
of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship roughly from 1975 leading up to the outbreak of the war on 
February 17, 1979. The war involves much more than the border dispute, but because of the 
scope of this dissertation on territorial disputes, this case study focuses on the border dispute and 
includes details on other aspects of the war only when necessary.  
Before I begin, I should provide a short introduction to the primary sources used for this 
case study and the way I used them. Besides secondary studies in Chinese and English, I resort to 
mainly five groups of primary-source materials.204 First are memoirs, diaries, and talks of, or 
written works by political leaders, mainly Chinese leaders, for example, selected works of Deng 
Xiaoping, selected works of Hoang Van Hoan, articles written by Li Jiazhong, etc. The Chinese 
vice-premier Deng Xiaoping was allegedly the mastermind behind the Chinese attack in 1979. 
203 Goscha 2017; Khoo 2011; Ni 2010; O’Dowd 2007; Roberts 2006; Westad and Quinn-Judge 2006; Westad et al. 
1998; Womack 2006; Zhai 2000; Zhang 2015.  
204 These sources are cited in the complete form first and in shortened form subsequently. The shortened forms are 
bracketed in the bibliography. 
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Hoang Van Hoan was a founding leader and a politburo member of the Vietnam Workers’ Party 
(VWP) and Vietnam’s ambassador to Beijing during 1950-1957. He was later exiled to Beijing 
because of his pro-China position. Li Jiazhong was China’s ambassador to Vietnam from 1995 to 
2001 and was personally involved in the border negotiations following the post-war 
normalization of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. There are many more of this kind, which will 
be introduced when necessary as they are referenced.  
Second are memoirs, diaries, and talks of, or written works by high-ranking military 
officials and soldiers participating in the war, for example, Zhou Deli’s memoir Personal 
Recollections of a High-Ranking Chief of Staff, Zhang Zhen Memoir, an article published by 
Long Xiang. Both Zhou Deli and Zhang Zhen were high-ranking military officials closely 
involved in the decision-making and the implementation of the military campaign. Long Xiang 
was a veteran who participated in the 1979 combat.  
Third are internal documents authored by various Chinese political organs, such as the 
Xinhua News Agency’s International Department, various branches (including the intelligence 
department) within the PLA or the PLA regional units, as well as the provincial governments in 
the two Chinese border provinces, Yunnan and Guangxi. These documents were circulated 
internally. They were sometimes submitted to the upper echelons as background materials. Some 
of these were declassified and made available in archives. Others were accessed from a few 
historians’ personal collections.  
Fourth are Vietnamese archives including political leaders’ internal speeches such as 
“Comrade B,” a speech by Le Duan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV), as well as internal meeting memorandums and documents of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Ministry of Defense. Some of these were made available by the Wilson Center’ Cold 
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War International History Project. I accessed others from the National Archives in Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City and a number of historians’ personal collections.  
Fifth are English original sources available at the Carter Library and the United Nations 
Archives. The Carter Administration was both an observer and a participant in the Soviet-China-
Vietnam-Cambodia dynamics in Southeast Asia. Given the far and deep reach of the U.S. 
intelligence service and the observer role of the U.S. in the conflict, some declassified 
intelligence files and accounts by U.S. officials are useful for fact checking and are overall more 
objective than some Chinese, Vietnamese and Soviet accounts. The accounts of Deng Xiaoping’s 
visit to the U.S. immediately preceding the war are critical for analyzing China’s motivation and 
preparation for the war. The U.N. Archives have rich materials China and Vietnam submitted to 
the U.N. on Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, the Chinese refugee issue, the Sino-Vietnamese 
border dispute, as well as China’s invasion of Vietnam.  
In the cases that these sources contradict each other – the Chinese and Vietnamese 
sources often do, I adjudicate between them by referring to 1) American original sources, if 
available, but also keeping in mind the U.S. interests in the matter; 2) secondary studies by 
historians. For example, Vietnamese documents flatly deny the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese 
by the Vietnamese authorities.205 The arguments sent by the Vietnamese and the Chinese 
representatives to the U.N. often contradict each other. On this, I take the agreement reached by 
historians that the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese is a historical fact. Another example is that the 
Chinese flatly deny the penetration of Vietnamese airspace by the Chinese fighters in July 
205 See, for example, Vietnam MoFA, “Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on Question of Hoa People in Viet Nam,” June 6, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, S-0442-0365-01, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section. Obtained for CWIHP by 
Charles Kraus. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118403. 
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1978.206 I consider the overflights as facts, as the U.S. declassified documents recorded these 
similar penetrations not just once, but at multiple times.207  
But I also recognize that the real story should be much more nuanced and complicated 
than any one side of the story. On this, I take advantage of having access to Chinese, 
Vietnamese, American documents, and sometimes materials from other countries. Whenever 
possible, I try to use multiple sources of information to triangulate at what really transpired. For 
example, the Chinese archives do not mention about the Chinese rejection of entry of more 
refugees from July 12, 1978, but the Vietnamese archives do, and American archives also 
confirm this. Besides validating the source by the interests of the author, their purpose, and 
intended audience, I also try to understand the materials in the context of the larger strategic 
dynamics during the Cold War.  
Below, I first describe the propaganda campaign launched during this crisis, before 
presenting a narrative of events that unfolded. I then analyze the case in the lens of the 
(mis)alignment theory and the competing theories, evaluating their respective predictions against 
the case.   
 
I. A Massive Propaganda Campaign 
Broadly speaking, Beijing’s rhetoric became openly negative against Vietnam from late May 
1978. But at first, it was primarily about the Chinese refugee issue. The first refugee article in 
People’s Daily appeared on May 27, 1978 in the front page, with the title “The Chinese 
206 “Wo waijiaobu xinwensi fayanren jiu yuenan waijiaobu niezao huangyan fabiao tanhua: suowei zhongguo feiji 
‘qinfan’ yuenan lingkong shiijan chun xi pingkong niezao (Remarks by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson 
on the Vietnamese Fabrication of Our Penetration into Vietnamese Air Space),” People’s Daily, July 13, 4.  
207 “Research Paper Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency: The Sino-
Vietnamese Border Dispute,” Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject 
File, Box 49, Mondale 8/79 China trip: Briefing Material: 3/78-8/79. Top Secret. 
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Government to Send Ships to Pick up the Overseas Chinese Persecuted by the Vietnamese 
Authorities.”208 In a speech in September 1978 on the occasion of the National Day of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), Vietnam Prime Minister Pham Van Dong accused Beijing 
of “recently whipp[ing] up an anti-Vietnam psychosis among the Chinese people, fabricat[ing] 
the absurd stories of ‘Vietnam ostracizing the Hoa [Chinese] people,’ ‘opposing China,’ and so 
on.”209 
As the refugee issue, especially the expulsion of Chinese residents at the border, bled into 
the border dispute, the media rhetoric started to pick up on the border dispute. The first article on 
the border dispute appeared on August 15, 1978, with the title “Director of the Department of 
Asian Affairs at Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Summoned Vietnamese Representative in 
Beijing and Strongly Protested against the Invasion of Yunnan Border by Armed Vietnamese 
Police.”210  
Starting from November 1978, the Chinese government launched a massive propaganda 
campaign against the Vietnamese on a number of issues between the two countries. This 
campaign lasted over a decade and totaled 7,195 People’s Daily articles, including 579 front-
page articles, averaging at 51.8 articles and 4.2 front-page articles a month. These numbers are 
impressive because, as previously mentioned, the public has short attention span on matters that 
affect only a minority of people on a day-to-day basis. This sustained extensive media coverage 
therefore has to be a state effort.  
208 “Wo guo zhengfu jueding pai chuan qianwang Yuenan, jie yun bei Yue dangju pohai de huaqiao huiguo,” 
People’s Daily, May 27, 1978, 1. 
209 “Speech made by Pham Van Dong,” September 05, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, S-
0442-0365-03, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section. Obtained for CWIHP by Charles Kraus. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118418. 
210 “Wo Waijiaobu Yazhousi fuzeren yuejian Yue zhuhua shiguan daibiao, qianglie kangyi Yuenan wuzhuang 
gong’an ruqin wo Yunnan bianjing,” People’s Daily, August 15, 1978, 5. 
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the monthly numbers of relevant articles in People’s Daily on the 
dispute. The solid line follows the count of all relevant articles and the dotted line the count of 
front-page articles. As the graph demonstrates, media reports picked up dramatically in 
November 1978 and peaked in March 1979. The campaign, despite ups and downs that likely 
reflect the occurrence of events, sustained over a period of ten years and gradually tapered off by 
the year 1990. 
 





II. From 1975 to 1979, History in Short 
What then had propelled this massive propaganda campaign? What purposes did this campaign 
serve? Before getting to that question, this section first traces the series of events, organized by 
themes and timing, that led up to the outbreak of the war.  
  The Sino-Vietnamese relationship used to be a relationship intimately characterized by 
Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh as “comrade plus brother.” In 1963, Chinese vice-chairman Liu 
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a militant friendship, forged in the storm of revolution, a great class friendship that is proletarian 
internationalist in character, a friendship that is indestructible.”211  
Ironically, the once “indestructible” relationship began to sour from the mid-1970s even 
before the Vietnam War ended on April 30, 1975. A number of problems plagued the 
relationship: Vietnam having to choose sides between China and the Soviet Union due to the 
Sino-Soviet split; Vietnam’s maltreatment of the ethnic Chinese residents in Vietnam; 
heightened border tensions; and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. These problems culminated in 
China’s attack of Vietnam in February 1979, which developed into a decade-long war. The war 
was in part spurred by the territorial dispute, but it involved several other disputes as well. 
 
1. Historical Grievances 
Historical grievances did exist underneath the “comrade plus brother” relationship. They only 
surfaced after the relationship had gone sour. One issue was the Geneva Accords that divided 
Vietnam into the North and the South at the 17th Parallel. Some Vietnamese leaders blamed the 
Chinese in coercing Vietnam into accepting the partition. Another was North Vietnam’s 
reunification efforts, which some Vietnamese leaders held grudge against China’s 
discouragement. These grudges were not necessarily justified, but the fact that they did exist in 
some leaders’ mind and that they were used by the Vietnamese authorities later to stoke anti-
China sentiment deserves some notion here. 
 On the Geneva Accords, Le Duan explicitly blamed the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai: 
“When we had signed the Geneva Accords, it was precisely Zhou Enlai who divided our country 
211 Cited in Khoo 2011, 201. 
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into two [parts].”212 This blame was not groundless since Mao himself expressed regrets at a 
meeting with the Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in November 1968: “In the past, I 
did say that we had made a mistake when we went to the Geneva conference in 1954. At that 
time, President Ho Chi Minh wasn’t totally satisfied. It was difficult for President Ho to give up 
the South, and now, when I think twice, I see that he was right.”213 After the Chinese attack in 
February 1979, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry released a document entitled “The Truth about 
Vietnam-China Relations over the Last 30 Years.” This was a major Vietnamese condemnation 
of the Chinese action. In it, Vietnam also publicized this historical grievance it had held privately 
for a long time. It accused Zhou Enlai in making “substantial political concessions [with the 
French] which were detrimental to the interests of the peoples of Vietnam…”214 It alleged that 
Zhou forced Vietnam into agreeing to the partition of Vietnam into two zones. 
However, in Hoang Van Hoan’s recollection, the division was a necessary compromise 
and a negotiation success that pushed the division line in Hanoi’s favor from originally-proposed 
13th or 16th parallel to the 17th parallel. Hoan disclosed that negotiation was proposed by Ho Chi 
Minh himself in November 1953. Hoan argued that the partition was not forced upon Vietnam by 
Zhou. During the break of the conference, Hoan and Zhou went to Liuzhou to discuss with Ho 
where Ho was resting. Ho agreed with the partition plan and estimated that the other parties 
212 “Comrade B on the Plot of the Reactionary Chinese Clique Against Vietnam,” 1979, History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, People’s Army Library, Hanoi. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Christopher 
Goscha. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112982. The document was known to be a speech given by 
Le Duan because of Duan’s known alias as “Anh Ba (Brother Number Three)” and the style of the language. Stein 
Tonnesson estimates that the speech was addressed to “a small group of party leaders” shortly after China’s decision 
to withdraw its troops on March 5, 1979, but before Hoang Van Hoan’s exile to China in July 1979. See Tønnesson 
and Goscha 2001, 273. 
213 “77 Conversations,” 139. 
214 Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1980. “The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations over the Last 30 Years 
[Condensed].” Journal of Contemporary Asia 10 (3): 325–44, 328. 
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would at most compromise to the 17th parallel, which turned out to be the division line eventually 
accepted at the conference.215 
As for the blame on reunification, Le Duan said in his 1979 speech that “After our 
country had been divided into northern and southern zones in this way, he [Zhou Enlai] once 
again pressured us into not doing anything in regard to southern Vietnam. They forbade us from 
rising up [against the US-backed Republic of Vietnam].”216 This again might be only a prop used 
by the Le Duan regime to stoke hatred against the Chinese government. As Chen Jian concludes: 
“the Beijing leadership neither hindered nor encouraged Hanoi’s efforts to ‘liberate’ the South by 
military means until 1962.” They are “not enthusiastic” about the Vietnamese military struggles 
in the South, which “was basically an initiative by the Vietnamese themselves,” but “Beijing 
took no active steps to oppose a revolution in South Vietnam.”217 
  
2. Vietnam: Caught in the Middle of the Sino-Soviet Split and Alignment with the Soviets 
One main cause many historians argued for the eventual break of the Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship was the Sino-Soviet split.218 The cause was a geopolitical one, as the Soviets could 
use Vietnam to expand its sphere of influence in Southeast Asia and counter China from the 
south, and China feared an encirclement. As Le Duan said during his trip to Beijing in November 
1977, “On various questions, our two countries have different viewpoints, [but the] most 
important difference relates to how we view the Soviet Union and the United States.”219 As early 
as in 1966, Zhou Enlai warned Le Duan: “After Kosygin returned from Hanoi, the Soviets used 
215 Hoang, Van Hoan. 1988. “YueZhong Zhandou de Youyi Shishi Burong Waiqu (The Reality of the Sino-
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their support to Vietnam to win your trust in a deceitful way. Their purpose is to cast a shadow 
over the relationship between Vietnam and China, to split Vietnam and China, with a view to 
further controlling Vietnam to improve [their] relations with the US and obstructing the 
struggle and revolution of the Vietnamese people.”220 
As history played out, the Sino-Soviet rivalry did drive a wedge between the two former 
“comrades and brothers.” In a conversation between Deng Xiaoping and Le Duan and a few 
others as early as April 1966, Deng expressed the concern several times whether Vietnam was 
suspicious of Chinese intention because China’s “overenthusiasm” in the Vietnam issue (since 
Mao expressed such concern earlier). Although Le Duan refuted such suspicion, we can see his 
efforts and difficulty in trying not to offend the Soviets and the Chinese at the same time. Duan 
said that “I have had an argument with Khrushchev on a similar problem. Khrushchev said the 
Vietnamese supported China’s possession of the atomic bomb so China could attack the Soviet 
Union. I said it was not true, China would never attack the Soviet Union.” He even tried to 
reduce the tension between China and the Soviet Union by saying that “So my personal opinion 
is that China, while upholding the revolutionary banner, should cooperate with reformist 
countries [implying the Soviet Union] to help them make revolution. It is our judgment as well 
as our policy line.”221 This effort, given the deep rift between China and the Soviet, was futile. In 
fact, for years Vietnam pursued a straddling policy not to offend either side, but straddling did 
not resonate well with the Chinese. The Vietnamese leadership was also divided within itself. 
With the pro-Soviet faction led by Le Duan gaining more traction and external developments 
such as China’s rapprochement with the U.S., the Vietnamese balancing act became more and 
more difficult. 
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The struggle was also evident in the Sino-Soviet dispute over aid to Vietnam. Zhou Enlai 
told Pham Van Dong in October 1965: “I do not support the idea of Soviet volunteers going to 
Vietnam, nor [do I support] Soviet aid to Vietnam. I think it will be better without it.”222 
Vietnam, on the other hand, certainly did not want to give up the Soviet aid just because the 
Chinese desired so. In another conversation in April 1966, Zhou felt so strong about the Soviet 
aid that he did not even want the two aids mentioned together: “It is OK that you praise the 
Soviets [for giving] great aid. But that you mention it together with Chinese aid is an insult to 
us.”223 
China’s ultra-left ideology and the hardship resulting from the turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution certainly did not help drawing the Vietnamese closer. China’s economic hardship 
resulting from the Cultural Revolution made its international aid a great burden. But exporting 
revolution was one tenet of Mao’s Great Cultural Revolution. So despite much difficulty, Beijing 
tried its best to carry on its aid programs to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Thus, the 
end of the Vietnam War in 1975 gave Beijing a legitimate reason to finally cut down on its aid to 
Vietnam and concentrate more resources on its domestic difficulty. In September 1975, Le Duan 
visited Beijing to press for more aid. But Mao reminded Duan that “Today, you are not the 
poorest under heaven. We are the poorest. We have a population of 800 million. Our leadership 
is now facing a crisis.”224 Although a zero-interest loan was provided, no grant or nonrefundable 
aid was given.225 In contrast, Duan’s subsequent October visit to Moscow proved to be much 
more fruitful. The Soviets promised $3 billion in aid for the period of 1976-1980, $1 billion of 
222 Ibid., 87. 
223 Ibid., 94. 
224 Ibid., 192. 
225 Guo 1992, 273; Khoo 2011, 118. 
113
which was grant aid.226 Duan and the Soviet leader Brezhnev also signed a joint communiqué 
with “effusive praise bestowed on the Soviets.”227 The communiqué confirmed the 
“comprehensive relationship” between the two countries and agreed that they “cooperate 
closely” in international affairs, proclaiming that the relationship had entered into an “important 
new phase” of “comprehensive development.”228 Brezhnev also praised Vietnam to be a “solid 
outpost for socialist countries in Southeast Asia.”229 The warm rhetoric emitting from Duan’s 
Moscow trip formed a stark contrast to his Beijing trip.  
In his memoir, the former justice minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government 
of South Vietnam, Truong Nhu Tang revealed that movement towards alignment with the 
Soviets had already began “as far back as 1969” and Ho Chi Minh’s death that year made the 
change easier. In the infighting between the pro-Soviets (Le Duan and Poliburo member Le Duc 
Tho) and the “neutralists” (General Vo Nguyen Giap, Hoang Van Hoan, and former Foreign 
Minister Xuan Thuy), the pro-Soviets had already won a “clear victory” by 1974.230 The fact that 
Hoang Van Hoan lost all his positions at the VWP’s Fourth Party Congress in December 1976 
was another clear sign.231 But because Hanoi still needed the Chinese aid, the policy change was 
kept unannounced.  
In action, Hanoi indeed became more and more tilted towards the Soviets. Vietnamese 
archival sources show that Vietnam began to forge military alignment secretly with the Soviet 
Union from late 1975 on. “On 30 December 1975, with an urgent request from the Ministry of 
Defense, Pham Van Dong agreed to send a military delegation to bring ‘secret documents’ of the 
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Ministry of Defense to Moscow and to maintain total secrecy as they traveled through China.” 
The secret documents were lists of military supplies Hanoi requested from Moscow.232  Despite 
the end of the war with the U.S., Vietnam requested the Soviet “1) to prioritize the delivery of 
the anti-aircraft missiles SA-75M and battle ships, 2) to supply modern radars and equipments to 
strengthen Vietnam’s capability to defend its sky and sea, 3) to urgently begin the construction of 
defense projects the Soviets have pledged to help.”233 
On June 28, 1978 Vietnam joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON), a Soviet-led economic alliance system to counter the Western Bloc’s Marshall 
Plan. The dollar amount of Soviet military aid to Vietnam jumped ten times from 75-125 million 
US dollars in 1977 to 600-800 million US dollars in 1978.234 On November 3, 1978, Hanoi 
signed a military treaty with Moscow. This treaty dispelled any doubts of Beijing of a formal 
Vietnam-Soviet military alliance. In Deng’s talk with President Carter during this visit to the 
U.S. right before the war, Deng condemned that “Vietnam has become totally Soviet controlled,” 
and “an important factor in the Soviet ‘Asian collective security system.’”235 
 
3. A Betrayal in Hanoi’s Eyes: Beijing’s Secret Rapprochement with Washington 
Beijing’s secret rapprochement with the U.S sowed further mistrust between the two former 
allies. Vietnam considered it as a betrayal. During his secret visit to Beijing on July 9-11, 1971, 
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Henry Kissinger raised the Vietnam issue to the Chinese leaders and “attempted to wed China’s 
interest in resolving the Taiwan issue to Washington’s interest in closing the Vietnam War.”236 
But in the interests of reserving the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, Beijing decided to ignore 
Kissinger’s request to pressure Hanoi.237 To dispel any concern, Zhou Enlai flew to Hanoi 
immediately after Kissinger’s visit to brief the Vietnamese of the meeting. Zhou informed Hanoi 
of the U.S.’ intention to “link the settlement of the Indochina problem with the settlement of the 
Taiwan problem,” but assured that the Vietnam problem should take priority. “We do not 
demand that the Taiwan problem be settled first.”238 
Nonetheless, Hanoi still suspected that Beijing negotiated a U.S. withdrawal of troops 
from Taiwan at the price of “press[ing] Hanoi to accept a compromise solution with the United 
States.”239 Pham Van Dong visited Beijing in November 1971 and asked Mao to cancel the 
planned Nixon trip, but was refused.240 When informing the Vietnamese side that Nixon during 
his first visit to China in February 1972 would also like to discuss about the Vietnam question, 
the Vietnamese side rejected sternly: “Vietnam is our country, we don’t allow you to discuss 
with the United States the question of Vietnam. You have already admitted your 1954 mistake 
[referring to the Geneva Conference mistake], so you should not commit another one.”241 In fact, 
as disclosed by a classified Vietnamese document obtained by the Chinese in 1979, Hanoi had 
already regarded China as an enemy after Nixon’s visit in 1972. But Hanoi needed to 
“concentrate on fighting one enemy” – the United States, so it did not “announce its animosity 
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[towards China] at that time.”242 After Nixon’s visit, Zhou again tried to dispel any suspicion. 
But Le Duan told Zhou on March 3, 1972: “Nixon has met with you already, comrade. Soon they 
[the US] will attack me even harder.”243 Duan believed that “the two [the U.S. and China] had 
discussed how to hit us harder, including B-52 bombing raids and the blocking of Haiphong 
[harbor]. This was clearly the case.”244 
 
4. Regional Competition and Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia 
The Sino-Vietnamese regional competition in Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam’s rapid 
expansion of influence into Laos and Cambodia, was a catalytic cause of the Chinese 1979 
attack. This regional competition also played into the larger strategic rivalry between China and 
the Soviet Union. The Soviets were long aware of Hanoi’s intention and exploited it as part of its 
strategy in Southeast Asia. In a report to Moscow in as early as February 1973, the Soviet 
ambassador to Hanoi described his perception of Hanoi’s ambition. 
“The program of the Vietnamese comrades for Indochina is to replace the reactionary 
regimes in Saigon, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh with progressive ones, and later when all 
Vietnam, and also Laos and Cambodia, start on the road to socialism, to move toward the 
establishment of a Federation of the Indochinese countries. This course of the VWP flows 
from the program of the former Communist party of Indochina.”245 
Beijing recognized this dynamic as well and saw the Soviets as the “behind-the-scenes supporter 
of the Vietnamese authorities in seeking regional hegemonism” and Vietnam as the Soviets’ 
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“junior partner.”246 In a leaked report by Geng Biao, a Chinese Politburo member and the then 
secretary general of the CMC, addressed to an enlarged Politburo meeting on January 16, 1979, 
Geng demonstrated clear understanding of this dynamic: 
“As a matter of fact, as early as before the liberation of South Vietnam, Vietnam had 
harboured malicious intention. The small handful of its war maniacs, at the instigation of 
their social-imperialist behind-the-scenes boss, had wanted to encroach on Cambodia, 
drawing it into the So-called “Indochina Alliance,” and turning it into the springboard 
and base of social-imperialism in its attempt to realize its global strategic plan and 
expand into Southeast Asia.”247  
The incorporation of Laos into Vietnam’s sphere of influence was confirmed in February 1976, 
soon after the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) was founded. The statement, just 
like the Soviet understanding, stressed the common origin of the two parties and explicitly called 
the relationship a “special relationship.” The “special relationship” was further validated by a 
twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in July 1977.248 The Treaty 
allowed for continued stationing of Vietnamese troops in Laos, preferential trade terms for 
Vietnam, and permitting Vietnam to work in Lao propaganda apparatus – essentially making 
Laos a satellite state of Vietnam’s. 
Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge regime, however, was more of a “renegade.” Vietnam saw 
Cambodia’s anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge as their most imminent threat. The Vietnamese 
MoFA report in July 1977 noted that “The Communist Party of Kampuchea has always been on 
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a collision course with us on international arena.”249 As the CIA analyzed in June 1978, 
“Cambodia is pivotal in the rift between China and Vietnam since it is the current focus of their 
rivalry for regional influence. Hanoi seems determined to bring a more malleable regime to 
power in Phnom Penh, while China shows no sign of willingness to soften its support of the 
current Cambodian leadership.”250  
In a conversation with the Chinese leader Hua Guofeng in September 1977, the Khmer 
Rouge leader Pol Pot alleged the collusion between the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Cuba on an 
attack against Cambodia. He also tried to convince the Chinese leader of Vietnam’s regional 
ambition: “Not only does Vietnam want to annex Cambodia and Laos. It also wants to occupy 
the whole of Southeast Asia.”251 From 1975, China increased economic and military support to 
Cambodia. In Hanoi’s perspective, Vietnam also feared an encirclement by China and 
Cambodia, and complained about Beijing’s “big-nation expansionist and great-power 
hegemonistic ambitions toward our country and other countries in the region.”252  
The Khmer Rouge regime feared the Vietnamese influence to the point of paranoia. 
Domestically, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary leadership purged anyone with ties to Vietnam. This was 
later known as the Cambodian genocide. Internationally, they engaged in border clashes with the 
Vietnamese. These clashes were isolated at first and gradually increased in scale. With Soviet’s 
backing, Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia on Christmas Day in 1978. In 
January 1979, Vietnam managed to occupy Cambodia and it replaced the Khmer Rouge 
government with a puppet government.  
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In his conversation with President Carter during his visit right before the war, Deng used 
Vietnam’s regional ambition to legitimize the planned military attack. Deng also complained that 
“the so-called Indochinese Federation is to include more than three states…The three states is 
only the first step. Then Thailand is to be included.”253  
 
5. Signs of A Worsening Relationship: The Refugee Issue and the Border Dispute  
In a conversation with Le Duan in September 1975, Deng recognized that “There have been 
some problems in the relations between our countries.” He also expressed concern about the anti-
China propaganda that the Vietnamese media and textbooks were portraying China as “the threat 
from the North.”254 On top of the historical grievances, the geopolitical misalignment in relation 
to the Soviet Union and the United States, and the regional competition, the Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship was also plagued by a number of problems on the ground, among which the most 
prominent were the refugee issue and the border dispute. These two problems overlapped at the 
border.  
 
The Refugee Issue 
In February 1976, the Vietnamese authorities started citizen registration programs in the 
South.255 These programs forced the ethnic Chinese residents to adopt Vietnamese citizenship or 
leave, although many of whom had stayed in Vietnam for decades or even generations. In early 
1977, Vietnam adopted a “purifying” policy in the border areas, and ostracized the border 
residents to the Chinese side.256 In March 1978, Hanoi released a “socialization” decree, causing 
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“large and unmanageable numbers” of fleeing Chinese to arrive in South China.257 Starting from 
July 12, 1978, suspecting of the infiltration of Vietnamese spies, China refused to take any more 
refugees unless they “have documents issued by the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and Vietnamese 
exit visas.”258 By early 1979, the total Chinese expelled from Vietnam reached as many as 280, 
000.259 From August 8 to September 26, Beijing and Hanoi held negotiations over the issue, but 
did not make any progress because of the deeply divided opinions.  
 The two sides did not even agree on the basic facts. In a Chinese MoFA statement dated 
June 9, 1978, China claimed that “The Vietnamese side started early in 1977 to push a policy of 
purifying the border area in the provinces adjacent to China and expel back to China groups of 
border inhabitants who had moved from China to settle down in Viet Nam a long time ago…The 
numbers of expelled Chinese have increased daily over the past two months, from several 
hundred a day in early April to several thousand a day in late May, with their total exceeding 
100,000 by the end of May.”260 Vietnam, however, blamed China for spreading rumors and 
“deceived Hoa (Chinese) people in leaving Viet Nam on masse.”261 Hanoi condemned Beijing in 
“inventing the story about Vietnam ‘ostracizing, persecuting, and expelling’ Hoa people,” and 
declared that “The policy of the Party and Government of Vietnam towards Hoa people in 
Vietnam is correct and consistent. It is based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian 
internationalism, in keeping with the agreement between the two parties, and with the basic and 
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long-term interests of Hoa people in Vietnam.”262 Whatever their reasonings were, after the dusts 
have settled, historians agree and mounting evidence confirm that the discrimination and 
expulsion of ethnic Chinese by the Vietnamese authorities was a historical fact. But the point 
here is that the refugee issue reflected a deep rift between the two countries that had become 
increasingly difficult to reconcile.  
 The talks on the issue of the overseas Chinese ended in bitter accusations in September 
1978. The Chinese delegation head Zhong Xidong accused the Vietnamese side in “turning the 
talks into a forum for its anti-China propaganda.” These negotiations confirmed to China, as 
Zhong said, that “the ostracism of Chinese nationals by the Vietnamese authorities was part of its 
anti-China policy. Your switch from a policy of friendship towards China to an anti-China policy 
was prompted by the needs of Viet Nam and also by those of the Soviet Union. Your attitude at 
these talks further proves that the anti-China policy is your established policy. In order to push 
regional hegemonism, the Vietnamese authorities need to use the question of Chinese nationals 
to sow discord between China and the Southeast Asian countries…”263 
 
The Border Dispute 
The Sino-Vietnamese land border was 1,347 kilometers long, bordering two Chinese provinces – 
Guangxi and Yunnan, and seven Vietnamese provinces, namely Dien Bien, Lai Chau, Lao Cai, 
Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Quang Ninh. 164 spots of the border were disputed, totaling 
disputed area of 227 square kilometers.264 
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The root of the border dispute was a lack of demarcation. The militarization of the 
dispute and its escalations, however, reflected the larger strategic conflict between Beijing and 
Hanoi, as well as between Beijing and Moscow. The border was demarcated by the Qing-French 
Treaty of 1887 with about 300 border pillars. But because of the old age of the treaty and the 
constraints of technology in the old times, the maps were not accurate enough to reflect the 
complex terrains in the border area. Many areas between the widely-spaced border pillars 
remained un-demarcated. Some pillars were damaged over the years. Some rivers had changed 
course.265 The two governments had exchanged documents in 1957-58 agreeing to the principle 
of observing the status quo.266 But because of the poor demarcation, the two sides disagreed on 
where the border actually was and blamed each other for encroachment and violating the earlier 
agreement. 
In September 1975, Deng commented to Le Duan about the border dispute: “It’s nothing 
more than a problem of dozens of acres here or there. The dispute itself is not big. It shouldn’t be 
a difficult problem.”267 But the territorial dispute became one of the focal points that caused 
escalation of tension and the eventual Chinese attack. Because of the lack of demarcation, the 
local authorities, both Vietnamese and Chinese, in the context of increasing animosity between 
the two countries, engaged in tit-for-tat land grabbing and violence, which created further 
difficulties for negotiation between the leaders.268  
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There was evidence that both sides tried to constrain the local authorities from provoking 
border incidents. In July 1975, the Chinese State Council and the CMC released an order 
“requiring the local authorities to strictly follow the border policies and foreign affairs 
disciplines, and to prevent frictions and avoid conflicts.”269 Similarly, on the Vietnamese side, a 
directive was sent to the border provinces from the Prime Minister’s Office in July 1977, 
requiring the local authorities to “strictly follow the instruction of the Party Central Committee to 
decisively defend our territorial integrity, make every effort to prevent the Chinese 
encroachment, but avoid causing problems that the Chinese can use to blame us.”270 But perhaps 
because these policies were not always in place or maybe the implementation was not effective, 
these policies did not help getting the number of border clashes in check. The number of border 
clashes increased substantially year after year, from 125 episodes in 1974, to 423 in 1975, to 926 
in 1976, to 1,940 in 1977, to 2,175 in 1978.271 
Vietnamese sources confirm the deterioration of the border situation, though blaming the 
Chinese for the responsibility. The MoFA report for the first six months of 1976 wrote:  
“At the border between the two countries, China has intensified their encroachment on 
our territory; the number of encroachments, points of encroachment, and the number of 
Chinese people mobilized [to reside] have increased more than the last six months of 
1975, concentrating at the border provinces. Cao Lang and Lao Cai provinces are 
strategically important for our economy. Chinese fishing boats have encroached far into 
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our territorial sea in the South, up to Spratlys Islands (Truong Sa). We have taken 
initiatives to propose bilateral dialogue between the two countries’ delegations to push 
for bilateral economic relations, not allowing the relation to be cold, although we are 
determined to defend our territorial integrity.”272 
Similarly, the Chinese blamed the Vietnamese for the problem. In Li Xiannian’s memorandum to 
Pham Van Dong in June 1977, Li criticized the Vietnamese action on the dispute:  
“[T]he Vietnamese comrades delayed the commencement of the negotiation with us and 
continued to allow the lower levels [local People’s Committees at the borders] to illegally 
intrude into our territory, and then claimed possession over our land. They hindered what 
should have been normal work of our border defense forces, causing troubles and 
destruction to our people’s normal livelihood at the border, and violently assaulted our 
people, in a concerted attempt to unilaterally and forcefully change the status quo at the 
border. Because of that, border skirmishes have increased in the past few years; the 
situation there has become increasingly more serious – even there were cases where the 
Vietnamese border defense forces opened fire on our people at the border of Yunnan and 
Guangxi.”273 
Beijing and Hanoi initially resorted to peaceful negotiations to resolve the dispute. Negotiations 
were held twice, once between August and November in 1974 and the other between October 
1977 and August 1978. Both failed due to a deep rift in opinions, and these often turned into an 
accusation forum. Li Jiazhong, an interpreter at the 1977 negotiations, recalls that “their 
positions were too far apart. [they] cannot find a meeting point. The comments were almost 
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always finger-pointing at each other, sometimes with words quite harsh and acerbic… The lack 
of mutual trust made it difficult to communicate. The two sides only agreed that the border had 
already been delimited and that the border should be demarcated based on the Qing-French 
Treaty and the changed terrains. But beyond this, nothing was agreed upon.”274 
 In fact, the Vietnamese archives show that before the second round of negotiations started 
in October 1977, the Vietnamese government entrusted the local authorities to gather evidence 
for the Chinese encroachment in preparation for negotiations. The directive called the local 
cadres to “collect all existing contracts and physical evidences and so forth, as proof of our 
possession of the territory encroached by the Chinese,” to “take pictures of all territory 
encroached upon by the Chinese and border posts suspected of being removed by the Chinese,” 
and to “closely and timely follow the changing situation of border areas including the situation 
on the Chinese side and must report to the central government in a timely fashion.”275 This 
measure, although it may have meant no harm, was abused by local authorities in causing even 
more clashes at the border.276 
 On August 25, 1978, near the Youyi (Friendship) Pass between Vietnam’s Lang Son and 
China’s Pingxiang, the Vietnamese army and Vietnamese police expelled 2,500 refugees across 
the border, beat and stabbed many refugees and “nine Chinese civilian border workers” whom 
the Vietnamese claimed to be “Chinese armymen ‘in civilian clothing’.”277 The Vietnamese 
subsequently occupied the Pu Nian Ling area, which China claimed to be Chinese territory.278 
The Vietnamese troops soon “set up barbed wire” and “built machinegun emplacements” near 
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the area.279 The occurrence of the Youyi Pass incident poisoned the atmosphere of the border 
negotiations and the refugee negotiations and eventually doomed both. 
 By July 1978, Vietnam started to build a defense line with “bamboo and metal stakes, 
barbed wire and minefields” along the border. After the border negotiations had failed in late 
September, “Deputy Premier Li Xiannian told...personnel on 1 October that the dispute had gone 
beyond possible conciliation and that the situation would not be helped even if China were ‘to 
cede’ its two border provinces to Vietnam.”280 China started to forcibly tear down the 
Vietnamese fences, which only exacerbated the situation. 
 In response to the border problem and the refugee exodus, China started to take a more 
hardline approach. In May 1978, China conducted provocative overflights over the land border 
area and the Gulf of Tonkin, sometimes penetrating into Vietnamese airspace. This shows that 
Beijing had no qualms escalating the tension as early as in May. Hanoi, on the other hand, tried 
to limit the dispute on the ground level. It did not issue a protest until July 10 and the Vietnamese 
air force did not respond with their own fighters until September 14.281 Besides, according to an 
CIA analysis, “as a result of the killing of Chinese and signs of an imminent invasion of 
Kampuchea,” China started an “open fire” policy on the border between December 13 and 23 in 
1978, which permitted the border personnel to “open fire, not only in retaliation, but on sight of 
Vietnamese personnel,” as well as to “initiate aggressive, forward patrolling up to and beyond 
Vietnamese border defense posts.” The Chinese side also started to introduce PLA units into 
what used to be fist-fights at the border.282 
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6. The Point of No Return: The Break of the Relationship 
In a memorandum from National Security staff Michael Oksenberg to the President’s Assistant 
for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski on May 25, 1978, Oksenberg appraised his 
recent China trip and commented that the Chinese perception of Vietnam surprised him. He 
commented “The Chinese concern about Vietnam is extremely great, certainly much more than I 
had anticipated.”283 The June CIA assessment also concluded that “the relationship between 
Peking and Hanoi has moved into a new and probably protracted stage of political warfare…”284 
By summer of 1978, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship had shown signs of breaking up in all 
aspects – in rhetoric, diplomatic representations, economic assistance, and military strategy. 
First, the tension between the two countries came out into the open. Not only did the two 
leaderships talked about their differences publicly, but they talked about them in vilifying tones. 
In Pham Van Dong’s speech on the occasion of the Vietnamese National Day in September 
1978, he denounced China’s “dark and perfidious scheme” in “enticing, coercing and organizing 
tens of thousands of Hoa people in Viet Nam to leave for China,” so that China could accuse 
Vietnam of “ostracizing, persecuting and expelling” these people. On the border problem, “They 
organized all kinds of people to cross the border illegally, they used armed forces to encroach 
upon our border, used military aircraft to violate our air space, and naval crafts to encroach upon 
Viet Nam’s territorial waters, and built fortifications and concentrated their armed forces 
directed against Viet Nam.”285 The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping also did not hide his hostility 
against Vietnam publicly. At a diplomatic event in July 1978, as recalled by a Thai diplomat who 
283 “Memorandum from Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for 
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were present at the event, “the moment the topic of Vietnam came up, one could see something 
change in Deng Xiaoping. His hatred [for the Vietnamese] was just visceral.” “He spat forcefully 
into this spittoon and called the Vietnamese ‘dogs’.”286 
Second, diplomatic representations were downgraded. In June 1978, Beijing cancelled 
the appointment of consul-general to Ho Chi Minh City and notified Hanoi to close down three 
consulates-general in China.287  
Third, the economic relationship also zeroed out. China had halted all aid programs to 
Vietnam and had called back all Chinese experts by the end of July.288  
Last but not the least, militarily, the General Political Bureau of the Vietnamese People’s 
Army released orders on July 8 to adopt an “offensive strategy” against China and to “attack and 
counterattack within and beyond the border.” Two weeks later, the Vietnamese Communist 
Party’s Fourth Plenary Session labeled China as Vietnam’s “most direct and dangerous enemy” 
and a “new combat target,” and called for “doing everything to defeat China.”289 The session 
“passed a resolution alleging China’s hegemonic ambition to annex Vietnam.” It also reached the 
decision to send people abroad to carry out anti-China activities in other Southeast Asian 
countries.290 On September 28-30, the Vietnamese army conducted a military exercise having 
China as an imaginary opposing force.291 
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 7. Decision for War 
All these propelled China to consider using military force preemptively against Vietnam.  
In September, the General Staff of the PLA convened for the first time to contrive a war plan 
against Vietnam.292 The meeting was convened under the theme of “how to counter Vietnam’s 
encroachment on Chinese territory.” At the meeting, the key PLA persons involved in the 
decision making were informed of the atrocities the Vietnamese authorities had committed to the 
ethnic Chinese and Vietnam’s continuous military deployment on the border. They reached a 
consensus on launching a military campaign against Vietnam but could not agree on the scale of 
the attack. The goal of the military campaign was determined to be punitive, but also coercive, 
namely, to force Vietnam’s retreat from Cambodia, to stop the border encroachment, as well as 
to check Vietnam’s and hence the Soviet’s regional ambition in Southeast Asia. 
 It could also be deduced from Deng Xiaping’s array of diplomatic maneuvers from as 
early as September to right before the launch of the attack in February that he was clearly 
planning on a major action that was expected to have international ramifications. Deng started a 
series of foreign visits starting from North Korea in September 8-13, followed by Japan in 
October 22-29, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in November 5-14, his historic visit to the 
United States from January 29 to February 5, and then Japan again right before the attack. Part of 
the purpose could be gauging world opinion on the Vietnam issue, testing waters for a potential 
Chinese attack, and gaining support. Chanda’s estimate of the Chinese decision was even earlier: 
“a Peking official revealed to me that during one of its regular weekly meetings in early July 
292 For details of the meeting, see Yige Gaoji Canmouzhang, 239-43. 
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1978, the Chinese politburo decided to ‘teach Vietnam a lesson’ for its ‘ungrateful and arrogant’ 
behavior.”293  
 According the recollection of General Zhang Zhen, the then director of PLA’s Logistics 
Department and deputy chief of the General Staff from 1979 to 1985, a second meeting was 
convened by the CMC on November 23. At this meeting, the PLA generals “studied the situation 
at the border,” and confirmed “the necessity of a self-defense counter-attack.”294 On December 
31, an expanded politburo meeting was held to discuss specifically about the attack.295 The 
meeting decided “regardless the result of the war, our army will stop pursuing the enemy after 
reaching Lang Son and Cao Bang, and will retreat immediately.”296 
 The biggest risk for an attack on Vietnam would be a Soviet intervention. After all, the 
Vietnam-Soviet military treaty was signed just a few months back in early November; the ink 
was still fresh. It would be an ultimate test for the strength of the Vietnam-Soviet alliance and 
China’s resolve. A possible Soviet attack could take one of two forms: a massive attack in the 
form of direct invasion that threatens China’s survival and a small-medium attack that only 
hampers China’s military advance in the south. Although the first form was unlikely, the chance 
still existed; the second form was likely.  
The danger of a Soviet intervention was indeed real. In 1975-76, China and the Soviet 
Union each had 300,000 troops deployed along the border.297 But the Soviet force was much 
superior than the Chinese in terms of weaponry. The deployment of the SS-20 intermediate-
range ballistic missiles and the Backfire bomber on the border was unmatched by the Chinese 
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side.298 M.S. Kapitsa, a member of the Soviet collegiums, head of the first Far Eastern 
Department of the Soviet MoFA, told the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Mongolia on 
February 9, 1979: “If there is a need to strike against China to protect Vietnam, we’ll let you 
know. Our Far Eastern forces, and the Zabaikal military district are receiving special orders.”299 
A Chinese veteran of the war recalls in his memoir that the soldiers were first trained at a 
location with extreme cold, where they jokingly called “Siberia.” They were then sent secretly to 
the South but carried winter coats with them.300 This detail reveals that Beijing was prepared for 
a Soviet attack from the north, but the Chinese troops were not great in number to fight two wars 
at the same time, so they were prepared to send some troops back to the northern border if such 
needs arose. As revealed later, before the Chinese attack on Vietnam, Beijing had put its troops 
on the Sino-Soviet border on emergency war alert, and had evacuated about 300,000 civilians 
from the northern border.301  
This was, as believed by many, why Deng only planned for a limited war, so that Beijing 
could achieve its political goals while avoiding a Soviet intervention. In Zhou Deli’s memoir, 
Deng’s directive was “speedy advance, speedy withdrawal” (su zhan su hui).302 A limited lesson 
with restraint was also what Deng told Carter during his visit to the U.S. As estimated, the time it 
would take the Soviet Union to mobilize its troops deployed along the Sino-Soviet border to 
launch a major strike against China in order to hamper the Chinese effort in the south would be 
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at least half a month.303 As it turned out, from China’s launch of the attack on February 17 to its 
announcement of retreat on March 5, the military campaign lasted exactly sixteen days. A 
limited war could also dispel the domestic concern that the war efforts might distract from 
China’s economic reform program.  
 
8. Preparations for War: Deng’s U.S. Visit and Troop Deployment  
To deter a possible Soviet intervention, a major diplomatic effort was expediting the 
normalization of the U.S.-China relations. This is not to say that the normalization was solely for 
the purpose of deterring a possible Soviet attack – it might have played some role in 
incentivizing Beijing, but the normalization and Deng’s visit right before the attack could 
certainly have had such an effect on the Soviet’s consideration.  
 At a CCP politburo meeting on November 2, 1978, Deng asked the Foreign Ministry to 
“accelerate the normalization of relations with the United States.”304 Deng himself was 
personally involved in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Joint Communiqué on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on December 15, 1978.  
 At the invitation of President Carter, Deng visited the United States on January 29 - 
February 5. In his conversation with President Carter on January 29th, Deng revealed his plan to 
punish Vietnam with a “limited” military action. He laid out the many reasons China should use 
force against Vietnam – Vietnam’s alignment with the Soviets, its regional ambitions, its threats 
to China at the border, and the need to “disrupt Soviet strategic dispositions” and “putting a halt” 
on Vietnam’s “rampant ambitions.” “We consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild 
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ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited lesson.” Deng also said that 
the Chinese leadership had considered the possibility of a chain reaction, mainly a reaction from 
the Soviets. He estimated that a large reaction was unlikely. Given the “winter time” and that 
“large-scale operations in the North are not easy,” “if our action in the South is quickly 
completed, they won’t have time to react.” China had also considered the possibility of a large 
reaction in the worst scenario. In that case, “we are not afraid.” Given the Soviets’ limited 
deployment in the Far East and the time needed to shift forces, “we can hold out.” Deng asked 
for America’s “moral support in the international arena.”305 President Carter did not provide a 
definitive answer on the spot. He only expressed that “It would be difficult for us to encourage 
violence. We can give you intelligence briefings. We know of no recent movements of Soviet 
troops towards your borders.”306  
The next day, in his private meeting with Deng, Carter read his own notes to Deng and 
continued the discussion on Vietnam. In the note, Carter tried to discourage Deng. He said a 
military action would be “a serious mistake” and made the argument that such “a token action” 
would not be the best course to halt the Vietnamese ambitions and would do much damage to 
China’s international image, or even the settlement of Taiwan. He also cited the risks of 
escalations and of China being quagmired in such a conflict.307 But Deng insisted about the 
attack and said the matter had been “thoroughly vetted at the top of the Chinese government.” He 
stressed that the situation would only get worse if China did not counter with force and promised 
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that the attack would only last “10-20 days, to be followed by withdrawal.” Deng said he would 
appreciate America’s intelligence sharing.308 
 Later documents do suggest the U.S. Intelligence sharing. Robert Gates recalls in his 
memoir that Carter and Deng had reached an agreement for technical intelligence cooperation 
against the Soviet Union.309 In his book “About Face,” Mann claims that Brzezinski met with 
Chinese ambassador Chai Zemin daily during the Chinese attack, turning over American 
intelligence on Soviet military deployments at the Sino-Soviet border.310 Although the U.S. 
public discourse after the attack suggested that the U.S. did not want to be seen as a collaborator 
in the Chinese attack, it did try to deter a possible Soviet intervention through private channels. 
In a special coordination meeting on the subject attended by Cyrus Vance, Richard Holbrooke, 
Stansfield Turner, Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Aaron, Michel Oksenberg and several others, the 
group suggested the need to consider the option of informing Moscow, “if the Soviets appear to 
be moving toward acquiring Cam Ranh Bay for a naval base,” that “their action could lead to our 
reconsideration of our position that we would not enter into a security relationship with the 
People’s Republic of China.”311 
 On December 8, 1978, the Chinese CMC ordered the Guangzhou and Kunming Military 
Regions to get ready for military action against Vietnam by 10 January 1979.312 On December 
25, the Guangxi -Vietnamese border was closed as troops arrived nearby.313 On December 30, 
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“the Vietnam Army chief of staff held an emergency meeting…[predicted] there will be major 
conflicts at the border…[they] put the Northern Regional Force on an emergency war alert.”314 
When Deng visited U.S. in late January, he no longer tried to hide China’s intention to use force. 
He addressed a press conference at the end of his visit: “We call the Vietnamese the Cubans of 
the Orient. If you don’t teach them some necessary lessons, their provocations will increase … 
But as to what action to take, we will have to wait and see. I can say two things: one, we Chinese 
mean what we say; and two, we do not act rashly.”315 During his trip to Japan the following 
week, he once again confirmed to journalists that “there has been necessary military 
deployment.”316 At a CCP Politburo expanded session that discussed further about the military 
campaign on February 11, Beijing issued orders to Guangxi and Yunnan military commands to 
launch the attack on Feb 17.317 On February 14, the CCP Central Committee announced and 
justified an attack in a notice sent to party organizations of the provinces, military regions, 
government ministries, and asked them to disseminate the information to party cadres at all 
levels and basically all Chinese citizens.318 It was essentially war announced. The rest was 
history. 
  The Chinese troops fought a difficult war, but they managed to advance to as far as Lang 
Son. Lang Son was the last geographic barrier near the border. Past Lang Son, it was all plains, 
with a road and a railway connecting to Hanoi. The grave situation called the Vietnamese MoFA 
to issue an emergency retreat order of all foreign embassies in Hanoi on March 5.319 Yet on the 
314 YueNan Junshi Da Shi Ji, 125. 
315 Beijing Review, February 9, 1979, 13-14. 
316 Min 1993, 8. 
317 Zhou, Junlun, ed. 1999. Nie Rongzhen Nianpu (Chronicles of Nie Rongzhen). Beijing: Renmin., 1147; Jiang, 
Feng, Xiaochun Ma, and Yishan Dou. 1991. Yangyong Jiangjun Zhuan (Biography of General Yang Yong). Beijing: 
Jiefangjun., 496-97. 
318 For content of the notice, see Min 1993, 34. 
319 Min 1993, 63. 
136
same day, China declared withdrawal. By March 16, the Chinese troops had withdrawn 
completely to the Chinese side of the border. 
 Nonetheless, the war continued. On the same day Beijing announced withdrawal, Hanoi 
issued a national mobilization order enlisting all age-appropriate citizens (men with ages 
between 18 and 45 and women between 18 and 35) into the army and mobilizing all resources 
for the war.320 The border clashes continued. The two sides engaged in several more conflicts 
that dragged on for a decade. 
 
III. In the Lens of the (Mis)Alignment Theory 
In the text that follows, I examine whether the propaganda campaign before and during the Sino-
Vietnamese border war could be explained by the misalignment of public opinion and state 
policy intent and whether mobilization was one of the driving forces for the adoption of the 
propaganda campaign. I first evaluate how well the theoretical assumptions apply to the case. I 
then make judgements about the values of the independent variables and see if the predicted 
outcome is consistent with the actual outcome, just like what I did in the congruence test for each 
case. This is followed by tracing the mobilization process to test the theory’s observable 
implications elaborated in Chapter 2. In this part, I also assess the proposed agenda-setting, the 
priming, and the framing effects of mass media and see how they worked in the mobilization 
process. I then test the observable implications of the competing theories in their ability in 
explaining the case.  
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1. Rational Actor and the Role of Public Opinion in Foreign Policy Making in China of 
1980s 
Overall, the assumptions of the (mis)alignment theory fit the case. The first assumption is about 
the rational nature of the state actor – they seek regime survival domestically against competitors 
and state security internationally against external threats. The role of bureaucracies, factions, 
interest groups or individuals within the state should be minimal. The fact that China’s action 
and reaction in the war were largely driven by the strategic considerations in relation to Vietnam, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States, as demonstrated in the narrative of the case, confirms 
such an assumption.  
Some scholars stress the individual role of Deng Xiaoping in pursuing the war. For 
example, Zhang Xiaoming argues that “the decision to go to war was largely his alone. He 
formulated the arguments, he made the case, and he had the faith and confidence of the PLA. His 
will carried the day.”321 Not denying Deng’s personal role in pushing for the war, the decision, 
however, was not dictated by his personality or emotions, but rather it was calculated rationally 
based on the strategic security needs of China – the threat of the Soviet Union and Vietnam’s 
tilting towards the Soviets and its expansion of influence in Southeast Asia. Even Zhang himself 
made the argument elsewhere in his book that “Beijing’s decision to go to war with Vietnam in 
1979 was largely based on Deng’s assessment of China’s strategic situation, with a focus on 
what Soviet expansion meant to global security and what responsibility China should share for 
maintaining the balance of world power.”322 
A possible concern for the simplification of two domestic actors – the state as one actor 
and the public as another, is the power struggle between Deng and Hua Guofeng, the then 
321 Zhang 2015, 54. 
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chairman of the CCP and the CMC, that coincided with the early decision period of the war. But 
as to be argued in the competing theories section later, Deng’s motivation to go to war was not to 
use it as an opportunity in his power struggle with Hua. By Novembet 1978, Deng had already 
gained the upper hand in the upper echelon and did not need to use a costly war to confirm his 
already dominant position within the Party. Overall, despite the fact that the military and the 
border provinces each had their parochial interests in the subject, their divergence in opinions, if 
any, only mattered on a granular level, not on the grand level of pursuing the war, or the 
propaganda strategy. In this view, the Chinese state could be regarded as one coherent actor in 
motivating and pushing for the war, and hence the propaganda campaign that preceded it.  
The role of public opinion in foreign policy making in China of the late 1970s and the 
1980s also fit the second and the third assumptions, namely, the public could exert some pressure 
on the state’s foreign policy, but not to the degree that it can dictate foreign policy, because the 
state could manipulate public opinion to tailor its needs. As discussed previously in the 
“background” section in Chapter 3, the Chinese propaganda system was at the crossroads of 
commercialization and liberalization in the late 1970s and 1980s, so it had the characteristics of 
both the Mao and the Deng eras. The Mao era featured airtight state control of public opinion 
through a state media apparatus vividly described as the “throat and tongue” of the Party. Public 
opinion was not decisive in the leaders’ decision for war, but public influence was also not 
negligible especially on major foreign policy decisions such as war. The state mainly took a top-
down indoctrination approach towards influencing public opinion towards its foreign policy 
needs. Public opinion was evaluated by the state, only in the sense of acknowledging the basis of 
the “thought work,” not in the sense that it might affect foreign policy making. An example that 
demonstrates this relationship is the timing, the target audience, and the content of the notice 
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released by the CCP Central Committee on February 14, 1979 to the lower echelons and further 
to the masses. On the eve of the attack, the notice explained the reasons for the attack and asked 
the cadres “to pass on this information to the masses and border residents and to report back any 
reactions the public might have.”323 The fact that the public was notified at the last moment 
confirmed that it was not part of the decision-making process. But at the same time, public 
opinion mattered, so that the state cared to notify the public and to ask the cadres to report on it. 
Throughout the 1980s up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, which coincided with the 
Tiananmen Square student protests and the end of the Sino-Vietnam War, the state control of 
media softened; the media experienced privatization; and public opinion experienced a period of 
liberalization. But the state maintained a dominant control over media and public opinion. It 
supplemented its previous direct control with more nuanced means, such as through majority 
shareholding, controlling the appointment of top personnel, financial rewards to media outlets 
and journalists, legal and structural regulations, etc. But this was still before the advent of the 
Internet age, and before the rise of the popular nationalism, so the state did not have to deal with 
the challenges posed by the spread of the Internet and the ultranationalism. The relationship 
between the state and the public remained within the confines of the theoretical assumptions.  
 
2. Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
Before 1978, the Chinese public had little knowledge about the border dispute, let alone feeling 
strongly about it. In the 1970s, well before the advent of the digital age, the only source of news 
for the Chinese people was the official media outlets firmly gripped in the government’s hands. 
Before the dispute emerged in 1973, what the official media had been instilling into the Chinese 
323 Min 1993, 34. 
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people’s mind was a brotherly relationship with Vietnam featuring the Chinese people’s staunch 
support of Vietnam’s independence cause. Even when border skirmishes swelled to 926 in 1976, 
People’s Daily had no mention of it; the Chinese people had been kept in the dark.324  
The Chinese domestic political and economic background of the war even fueled some 
resistance. The year 1978 marks the beginning of the economic reform and opening-up, after a 
decade of political turmoil in the Cultural Revolution. The public sentiment was ripe for 
economic development and rehabilitation. “The newly adopted economic reform and opening-up 
policy brought great hope for a return to normalcy and increasing prosperity.”325 People feared a 
war might disrupt it. Zhang Xiaoming’s work comments specifically on the public opinion in the 
border provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan prior to the war: “Public opinion in these two 
provinces was pessimistic about Beijing’s war decision. The local communities had undergone 
much hardship in the Cultural Revolution and had made considerable sacrifices for the 
Vietnamese war effort…these areas remained socially and economically backward. 
Nevertheless, citizens there hoped that economic reform – now the highest national priority – 
would bring peace, development, and better standards of living. The people and local 
governments in these two provinces seemed unenthusiastic about the Chinese attack on Vietnam 
and feared that the military action would conflict with the economic development agenda.”326 
The refugee issue also burdened the border provinces the most. According to the History of 
Yunnan Province, 35,342 Chinese refugees from Vietnam up until late 1980 was displaced and 
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resettled to Yunnan.327 A war on the border would use more resources from these provinces and 
cause the influx of even more refugees.  
Lack of enthusiasm for the war, or even resistance to it, was especially common among 
soldiers. Even after mobilization and deployment orders were issued in December 1978, many 
soldiers were not sure “whether the military campaign was righteous or not, active or passive, 
invasion or counterattack.”328 They did not understand why “we support Vietnam in the past but 
punish it today.”329 A retired government official attests in an interview that, “Voicing 
oppositions against the war, some offspring of government officials even used their connections 
to flee the military.”330  
Historical works generally confirm this lack of enthusiasm towards the war in the PLA 
and the public.331 Andrew Scobell notes the “mixed views of the public” and the “varying 
opinions” of the intellectuals. A lack of enthusiasm for the war among the general public was 
picked up by foreign correspondents and freely voiced by intellectuals.332 During a visit to 
Kunming in August 1979, even after the war broke, Nayan Chanda reports that he was struck by 
“the population’s total apathy toward an exhibition in Kunming about China’s victorious 
‘counterattack in self-defense’.”333 
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3. The Misalignment: A Hardline State Policy Intent 
But China was determined to “teach Vietnam a lesson.” To be clear, China acted in restraint at 
the emergence of the refugee issue and the border dispute. This was evident not only in its 
internal deliberations, but also in its efforts to negotiate the matter. The meeting between Pham 
Van Dong and Li Xiannian in June 1977 was probably the last honest exchange between the top 
leaderships seeking to overhaul the deteriorating relationship. But that meeting also signaled a 
change in the relationship – that the two sides started to shed the pretense of cordiality and 
started to talk candidly about their problems, sometimes acrimoniously. In the meeting, Li 
Xiannian handed a written memorandum to Dong listing a litany of complaints of Vietnamese 
anti-China policy in words and in action. 
 In the Chinese written memo, Li listed Vietnam’s anti-China rhetoric, increased tension 
at the land border, the Vietnamese obstruction of the maintenance of a railroad on the Chinese 
side of the border, the maritime dispute over the Paracels, the Spratlys and the Gulf of Tonkin, 
and Vietnam’s mistreatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.334 In the Vietnamese archives 
recording Dong and Li’s subsequent unprepared discussion, Pham discredited his earlier 
recognition of China’s sovereignty over the Paracels and explained that the 1958 consent was 
made under the pressure of war.335 
 The conversation, however, arrived at no progress. In fact, during Le Duan’s last Beijing 
visit in November 1977, just a few months after the Li – Dong talk, Duan acted as though the 
conversation had never happened. Duan sought additional Chinese aid, praised the brotherly 
334 Pham Van Dong and Li Xiannian Meeting Memo Chinese Version. 
335 Pham Van Dong and Li Xiannian Meeting Memo Vietnamese Version. 
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Sino-Vietnamese relationship as usual, and completely ignored the problems Li had raised to 
Dong.336 
As these problems further deteriorated, the summer of 1978 marked a change in China’s 
position. The Chinese overflights that penetrated into the Vietnamese airspace was an escalated 
response to the border clashes. As the animosity thickened to a breaking point in rhetoric, 
diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of the relationship in the summer of 1978, and as the 
refugee negotiations and the border negotiations failed in September, the PLA generals 
deliberated on a preemptive attack. The planned attack, although labeled as “punitive” and “self-
defense,” was preemptive and escalatory in nature. This hardline policy was debated and 
confirmed subsequently. 
The international environment was also conducive to a Chinese hardline policy. 
Vietnam’s tilting towards the Soviet Union, the number one external threat of China’s at the 
time, eventually led to the conclusion of a formal Vietnam-Soviet alliance in November 1978. 
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in December 1978 further augmented this geopolitical threat 
to China from the south. In efforts to break the Soviet encirclement, China normalized 
relationship with the United States and Japan. During Deng’s visit to the U.S. right before the 
attack, although President Carter did not support the idea of an attack, he did not voice strong 
objections either. Before that, Deng had completed several foreign visits and he conveyed to 
Carter that he “expects divided international reactions [to the attack].” The Soviet Union would 
also need time to mobilize troops deployed along the Sino-Soviet border if it were to intervene. 
Thus, the global environment was conciliatory for a limited, yet destructive Chinese action 
against Vietnam. 
336 Zhang 2015, 37.  
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China’s eventual hardline position was of little debate in international history. The 1979 
campaign was a massive military operation involving seventeen Chinese armies of regular 
forces, totaling 220,000 troops.337 According to Vietnamese sources, “Beijing fielded almost 
600,000 regular troops including 11 army corps and many unattached divisions, about 700 
aircraft of various kinds, almost 600 tanks and armored vehicles, and thousands of artillery 
pieces.”338 The battle fought as far as to deep in the northern part of Vietnam. Despite the final 
withdrawal, it was an operation on a foreign country’s soil. Despite the claimed Vietnamese 




Once starting off this war path, mobilizing the public became a necessity given widespread lack 
of public enthusiasm. It was largely the state-public misalignment on the issue that had motived 
the propaganda campaign to mobilize. The case corroborates the observable implications of a 
mobilizing campaign listed in Chapter 2.  
Ha1 (State Concern): Government officials express concerns about the moderate/weak 
public opinion and the need to mobilize. Given the state’s hardline policy intent, the existing 
moderate/weak public opinion should cause leaders’ concerns. These expressed concerns, 
especially if expressed privately, reveal their motivations to bridge the gap. 
337 Min Li, 19.  
338 Truong-Chinh, “The Vietnamese people are determined to defeat any aggressive schemes of Chinese 
expansionism and hegemonism,” Nhan Dan, February 17, 1982. Truong-Chinh was a member of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam (CPV) Politburo and President of the Council of State. The piece was published on the third 
anniversary of the attack. 
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Interview of a retired government official discloses that the Chinese leadership was 
particularly concerned about the lack of public enthusiasm about the war. “The public might not 
comprehend this one-eighty-degree change – to them it seemed like a one-eighty-degree change, 
though to us it was accumulated reaction to provocations after provocations.”339  
This concern was also evident in the political work guidelines circulated internally within 
the Party organs and the PLA. Such concerns worried about public opinion especially soldiers’ 
morale in three aspects. First, concerns were expressed that people were not certain that the war 
was just. The attack target was a “comrade plus brother” in the past and public opinion might not 
turn fast enough to follow the transition. The attack territory was also foreign territory and 
concerns were expressed that the public, or soldiers, might have difficulty justifying such an 
action.340 Second, concerns were expressed that some soldiers, even those already deployed to 
the border, still believed that the Chinese government’s threats of punishment and military 
deployment were mere bluffing. “The focus of our work has changed to the four modernizations, 
[so we] don’t want to fight a war; our American and Japanese friends do not support a war either 
because they want to do business with us.”341 Third, concerns were expressed that the public, or 
soldiers, were not confident that they would win. “Vietnam has been fighting for almost thirty 
years and their officers have battlefield experience.” “Our troops have not fought a war for more 
than twenty years, and all commanders of battalions and below do not have any battlefield 
experience at all.”342 
339 Interview 25, June 2017, Beijing. 
340 Political Teaching Office of PLA Guangzhou Military Region Infantry School. 1979. ZhongYue Bianjing Ziwei 
Fanji Zuozhan Zhengzhi Gongzuo Ziliao (Selected Materials on Political Work during the Counterattack in Self-
Defense on the Sino-Vietnamese Border). Guangzhou junqu bubing xuexiao., 6. 
341 Ibid., 5. 
342 Ibid., 7. 
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 In fact, this concern for a weak public opinion was so severe that it was one of the 
reasons that the Chinese leaders postponed the attack to February. In the leaked report addressing 
the expanded Politburo meeting in January 1979, Geng Biao claimed that one reason for 
delaying the attack was to prepare public opinion for the war. Although he stressed on the world 
public opinion, he also mentioned the need to “strengthen the morale of the board masses of our 
officers and men.” He said “our repeated toleration will enable everyone to know the 
aggressiveness of the Cuba in the East. Only through such exposure can we…educate the 
people…”343 
 
Ha2 (Media Directives): The state issues media plans or directives to media outlets to 
mobilize the public. The mobilization should leave traces within the state apparatus, especially 
for “government-orchestrated, concerted efforts” such as these propaganda campaigns. Traces 
like these should amount to “smoking gun” evidence.344 
In the war preparation, the Department of Propaganda, People’s Daily top editorial staff, 
and the General Political Department of the PLA were all closely involved, and they issued 
further guidelines to their subordinates for political mobilization. A retired propaganda official 
confirms that the CCP Central Committee issued propaganda guidelines as early as the refugee 
issue blew out in the summer of 1978 and continued to monitor the situation and issued more 
directives throughout the entire war.345 These policy directives included general guidelines on 
“exposing the Vietnamese crimes against Chinese citizens and border residents, on educating the 
people about the swollen regional ambitions of Vietnam and its brazen invasion of Cambodia, as 
343 “Geng Biao Report,” 390. 
344 Collier 2011. 
345 Interview 25, June 2017, Beijing. 
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well as the socialist-imperialist ‘anti-China’ scheme of the Soviets behind the Sino-Vietnamese 
problems.” The various propaganda organs at the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), the 
PLA, and the state media outlets, also had specific guidelines on weekly themes to follow, how 
much each issue should be reported, where should they appear, and what arguments the articles 
should make.346 As the war continued, the propaganda efforts continued. “In 1985, the CCP’s 
propaganda department and the PLA’s political department intensified the campaign by sending 
war heroes and model soldiers selected from the entire armed forces to lecture around the 
country.”347 
Besides influencing the general public, the political apparatus also ran full steam 
mobilizing the local communities and the soldiers. The local communities in the border areas in 
Guangxi and Yunnan provinces played an instrumental role in providing the PLA with personnel 
(militia) and logistical (food and housing) support. For example, Longzhou County in Guangxi 
organized 10,700 militiamen and women in support of the PLA; Maguan County in Yunnan 
organized 25,000 militiamen and women.348 These militiamen and women transported food and 
supplies, built roads, bridges, and trenches, carried and cared for the wounded, among many 
other jobs. In order to obtain these supports and mobilize the local communities, “the CCP 
propaganda departments of both provinces sent city, district, county, and subdistrict party 
organizations long lists of Vietnam’s alleged crimes against China, requiring that the information 
be used to educate the local populace and arouse their patriotism in support of the war. Guangxi 
Autonomous Region held more than 530 mass meetings with a total attendance of 263,400.”349 
346 Ibid. 
347 Zhang 2015, 174.  
348 ZYBJ, 249, 257. 
349 Zhang 2015, 86, citing from Local History Compilation Committee of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, ed. 
1994. Guangxi Tongzhi Junshi Zhi (General History of Guangxi: Military History). Nanning: Guangxi Renmin 
Press, 322. 
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The CCP committee of Yunnan Province issued a mobilization order that called upon the local 
communities to “do all for the front and do all for victory.”350 
In the PLA, the mobilization efforts included denunciation meetings, setting up models 
and emulating heroes, exhibits and lectures by soldiers, villagers from the border areas, and 
Chinese refugees from Vietnam. One PLA political work guideline revealed that because of the 
limited time, mobilization was carried out on the road during the course of the deployment.351 
The several volumes published by the PLA’s Political Department on their experiences in 
mobilizing the soldiers serve as another piece of evidence of the mobilization process.352 In an 
order issued on February 12, 1979, the CMC and the PLA General Political Department 
stipulated the main task of the political work was to “strengthen war preparation education, incite 
hatred towards the Vietnamese revisionists, continuously encourage the troop’s fighting mood.” 
“The focus of the war preparation education is to expose and condemn the crimes of the 
Vietnamese revisionists…[arouse] hatred, despise and distain towards the Vietnamese 
revisionists…” “…listen to the radio stations…and read the newspapers, so that everyone can 
learn about the new expansionist crimes of the Vietnamese revisionists.”353  
These orders further spelled out the goals of the war-preparation education as threefold: 
first, to clear the understanding of the fundamental changes in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. 
The political work should educate the people that “Vietnam has become the Soviet revisionists’ 
lapdog, the ‘Cuba in the East,’ the hooligan in Asia, and a sinister enemy of our country.” “[We 
should] explain why we support Vietnam in its independence cause in the past, but have to 
350 Zhang 2015, 86, citing from War Preparation and Aid-the-Front Leading Group of Yunnan Province, and 
Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party Committee of Yunnan Province, eds. 1991. Yingxiong de 
Fengbei: Yunnan Renmin Shinian Zhiqian Jishi (Heroic Monument: True Record of the Ten-Year Aid-the-Front 
Work by the Yunnan People). Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Press, 531. 




punish it today. Make understand we have no choice but to counterattack in self-defense and our 
war is a just war.” Second, the political work should clarify the relationship between “punishing 
Vietnam and the four modernizations.” “The war will not impede on our four modernizations. In 
fact, the Vietnamese aggression has posed an acute threat to the four modernizations…Only a 
severe punishment to the Vietnamese could protect our socialist modernization.” Third, the 
political work should help strengthen the troops’ confidence in winning the war. “Educate on 
them our advantages, our strengths.”354 
 
Ha3 (Inflammatory Content): Media content is inflammatory – self-victimizing, 
accusing others for aggression, or implying injustice. The themes and the tones of the articles 
should generally be inflammatory to achieve a mobilizing objective. 
The media content focused on arousing public animosity towards Vietnam. The themes 
ranged from accusing Vietnam’s brutal treatment of the ethnic Chinese, recalling the sacrifice the 
Chinese people had made for Vietnam, condemning the “ingratitude” of the Vietnamese and 
“returning good with evil,” their frequent “infringement” on Chinese territory, their expansionist 
ambitions and invasion of Cambodia, “colluding” with the Soviet revisionists and “slandering” 
China. All these inflammatory themes aimed to rally public support for a hardline policy.  
The propaganda played the emotional card well. When reporting on the refugee issue, the 
articles used personal stories of the refugees and bloody images to condemn the cruelty of the 
Vietnamese authorities in persecuting the Chinese residents. In reporting on the border dispute, 
the articles recalled the great sacrifice the Chinese people had made for Vietnam, some of which 
were from personal experiences of border residents and veterans, and condemned the 
354 Ibid., 7. 
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Vietnamese ingratitude in repaying good with evil. In exposing Vietnam’s expansionist 
intention, the articles often cited arrogant remarks from the Vietnamese soldiers, such as “Phnom 
Penh has fallen. Aren’t you afraid?” or “We will soon advance to Dongxing (a town in Guangxi) 
to have breakfast there.”355 The articles portrayed Vietnam as a Soviet minion, often in mocking 
tones. After the war broke, the articles glorified the war efforts by providing examples of heroic 
soldiers, militiamen and women, and Vietnamese people who had positive experiences with the 
Chinese troops but negative ones with the Vietnamese troops. 
Besides newspaper articles, the Chinese propaganda also resorted to other forms of media 
to arouse an emotional response from the public. Literature works such as Li Cunbao’s Gaoshan 
xia de huahuan (Wreaths of Flowers at the Foot of the Mountains, 1982), which was later turned 
into a movie, extolled the heroic acts of the soldiers and incited patriotism among the public. 
There were other movies, such as “Leichang xiangsishu (The Lives They Left Behind, 1988),” 
and “Changpaishan zhi zhan (The Battle of Changpaishan, 1981),” as well as songs, such as 
“Shiwu de yueliang (The Moon on the Fifteenth, 1984)” and “Xueran de fengcai (The Blood-
Stained Valor, 1987).” Some of these became very popular among the people. The popular song 
“The Moon on the Fiftheeth” is about a soldier’s warm thoughts of his wife and family at home, 
setting a positive tone to defending family at the border. The song “The Blood-Stained Valor” 
commemorates the soldiers who lost their lives in the war, whom the country will be forever 
indebted to. These works added a personal and humane touch to the patriotic themes. A retired 
journalist recalls, “when a college-student-turned solider Xu Liang, who lost a leg in the war, 
was invited to the CCTV annual Chinese New Year gala to sing the song ‘The Blood-Stained 
Valor,’ it brought many audience to tears.”356 
355 “Shi ke ren, shu bu ke ren (If this can be tolerated, what cannot?),” People’s Daily, February 17, 1979, 1. 
356 Interview 40, June 2017, Beijing. 
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 Ha4 (Motivation Disappears for the Alignment Theory): Media coverage diminishes as 
execution of a hardline policy comes to an end.  
 As shown in Figure 5.1, the tapering off of the propaganda campaign in early 1990 
coincided with the end of the war. 
 
IV. Audience Cost? 
As argued previously in Chapter 2, both the audience cost theory and the diversionary war theory 
would predict a propaganda campaign in this scenario, but with different motivations. Audience 
cost theory would predict that the state would launch a propaganda campaign for coercive 
purposes; diversionary war theory would predict that the state would launch a propaganda 
campaign to divert public attention from a domestic crisis. 
 Was China seeking to use the publicity for coercive purposes? I evaluate the fit of an 
audience cost argument by assessing the four audience cost hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2. 
Hc1 (Hoop Test about Scope): The propaganda campaign should be adopted during an 
ongoing coercion with the foreign rival. The audience cost theory is a theory about coercions. 
Without ongoing coercions, the audience cost theory becomes irrelevant. Negotiations are signs 
of an ongoing coercion but are not a necessary condition, as sometimes bringing a target state to 
the negotiation table itself could be a coercive goal. In most circumstances, I examine whether 
the state has made demands to the foreign rival. 
China’s objective in the war was partly punitive – to teach its “treacherous” former ally 
“a lesson,” and was partly coercive – to curb the SRV and the Soviet’s expansion plan in 
Southeast Asia and to alleviate the threat of Vietnam at the border as a disturbance to China’s 
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economic reform and open programs. Concretely, Beijing demanded that Hanoi retreat from 
Cambodia and stop its encroachment at the border. This coercive goal was reflected in both the 
initiation and the end of the military conflicts – Vietnam’s regional ambition was used as a 
reason for the Chinese attack by Deng to Carter in 1978; the normalization of the relationship in 
1991 was preconditioned on Vietnam’s retreat from Cambodia. China’s demands were clearly 
expressed by Vice-Premier Li Xiannian to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in their meeting in 
June 1977. As mentioned earlier, the list included demands to stop the anti-China rhetoric in 
Vietnam, stop the conflicts at the border, stop the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese, etc. When the 
decision for war was deliberated in September 1978, the PLA leaders determined the military 
campaign to be punitive and coercive, for the goals of forcing Vietnam’s retreat from Cambodia, 
stopping Vietnam’s encroachment at the border, and check its regional ambitions. 
Hc2 (Tying Hands): Officials make public threats with substantive punishment. The 
key of an audience cost logic is that the state makes a clear threat public so that backing down 
would be costly and less attractive. This, in return, enhances the threat credibility and forces the 
opponent who fears a collision to back down. If the state issues no public threat, or the threat the 
state issues is vague in terms and hollow in content, then the state is not committed to a domestic 
cost, and the propaganda is likely for the purpose of mobilizing the domestic public, rather than 
for a foreign coercive purpose. 
As mentioned above, China expressed coercive demands privately as early as June 1977. 
But they did not publicize their demands until May 1978. The first People’s Daily article 
publicly demanding Hanoi to stop mistreating the ethnic Chinese was published on May 28, 
1978, but without any explicit threat.357 The first public threat was not issued until October 27, 
357 “Quanguo Qiaolian fuzeren, quanguo Zhengxie huaqiaozu chengyuan fabiao tanhua, jianjue yonghu wo zhengfu 
paichuan fu Yue jie qiao de jueding (Members of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese and 
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1978 and the wording was vague – People’s Daily reported a MoFA statement that Vietnam 
should “bear the consequences and all responsibility” for “violating China’s territorial 
sovereignty.”358 This public threat only came after the bilateral relationship had passed the point 
of breaking and a war decision was already being deliberated. By November 10, the language of 
the warning became “do not turn a deaf ear to China’s warning!” in a People’s Daily front-page 
editorial, stronger in tone and in a more salient place of the paper but still hollow.359 On 
December 14, the Chinese threat became even stronger in tone: “China’s patience and restraint 
have limits” in a People’s Daily front-page report of a MoFA diplomatic note.360 This strong 
warning, although still vague, occurred only after China had already decided on a punitive attack 
at the Central Work Conference in November and the Chinese CMC had already issued 
deployment orders on December 8. The tone of the Chinese warning reached its peak on the 
launch day of the Chinese attack on February 17, 1979, with a People’s Daily article entitled 
“Shi ke ren, shu bu ke ren (If this can be tolerated, what cannot?)” in the front page.361 The delay 
in making public threats and the fact that the threats remained vague demonstrates Beijing’s 
reluctance in engaging the public and tying its hands. Besides, for an audience cost logic to 
work, the threats should be made public before the coercion fails. But instead, the warnings 
strengthened gradually only after the situation became more and more dire, a war more and more 
members of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Group of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference issued a 
speech and resolutely supported the decision of the Chinese government to send ships to Vietnam to pick up the 
victimized Chinese,” People’s Daily, May 28, 1978, 2. 
358 “Wo guo Waijiaobu zhaohui Yuenan zhuhua shiguan, qianglie kangyi Yuefang qinfan Zhongguo lingtu zhuquan 
(Our Foreign Ministry delivered a diplomatic note to the Vietnamese embassy in China and strongly protested the 
violation of China’s territorial sovereignty by Vietnam),” People’s Daily, October 27, 1978, 4. 
359 “What does Vietnam want to do? (Yuenan dangju xiang gan shenme?)” People’s Daily, November 10, 1978, 1. 
360 “Wo guo Waijiaobu zhaohui Yuenan zhuhua dashiguan, qianglie kangyi Yuenan dangju buduan qinfan wo lingtu 
he zhizao yixilie de yanzhong liuxue shijian (Our Foreign Ministry delivered a diplomatic note to the Vietnamese 
embassy in China and strongly protested Vietnam’s repeated invasion of our territory and provoking a series of 
serious bloody events),” People’s Daily, December 14, 1978, 1. 
361 “Shi ke ren, shu bu ke ren (If this can be tolerated, what cannot?),” People’s Daily, February 17, 1979, 1. 
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probable, and the failure of the coercion more and more likely. Therefore, the warnings, 
especially those made public only after the war was decided, function more as stronger rhetoric 
to mobilize the public for war, not much for coercing Hanoi to reverse its course of action. The 
threat made on the day of the attack, hence the failure of the coercion, was obviously too late for 
a coercive purpose. 
Hc3 (Bargaining Advantage): On average, given the occurrence of the propaganda 
campaign, the international outcome should be more favorable to the government. This is 
borrowed and adapted from Weiss’ work on anti-foreign protests. She reasons that “Once the 
government has tied its hands and demonstrated resolve by allowing anti-foreign protests, the 
burden of conciliation falls to the foreign government. On average, therefore, anti-foreign 
protests should lead to a more advantageous bargain for the authoritarian government.”362 She 
also points out that the actual outcome also depends on the strategic interactions with the other 
parties, so that negotiations may collapse, and crises may escalate. Propaganda campaigns, like 
anti-foreign protests, could also be a costly signal to show the state’s resolve. So once engaged, 
the international outcome should be more favorable to the initiating state.   
It was not clear whether the occurrence of the propaganda campaign made the 
international outcome more favorable to China. The coercion had failed the moment China 
launched the military attack. Hanoi rallied up the whole country to fight back against China and 
the war dragged on for a decade. Hanoi eventually withdrew from Cambodia, but it was not due, 
even partly, to China’s propaganda campaign; it was a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Hc4 (Motivation Disappears): Media coverage diminishes as the coercion succeeds or 
fails. The propaganda campaign should end when the coercion has succeeded or has failed, 
362 Weiss 2008, 27. 
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because that is when the coercive motivation disappears. This directly contradicts Ha4 and Hb5 
of the (mis)alignment theory. 
The coercion failed on February 17, 1979 when China resorted to military means, but the 
propaganda campaign only started to climax by then and continued on. 
To summarize, although China had coercive goals in this crisis, its threats remained 
vague and were publicized in a delayed fashion. Some threats were made after a war decision 
was already made, or even on the day of the attack, so not allowing enough time for an audience 
cost logic to work. The publicity did not necessarily give China an advantage in the bargaining. 
The coercion failed but the propaganda continued. All these pieces of evidence are in tension 
with an audience cost logic.  
 
V. Diversionary War? 
Did the Chinese leadership propagandize the Sino-Vietnamese dispute for diversionary 
purposes? Let’s answer that by examining the three observable implications of the diversionary 
war theory, together with the parallel implications of the (mis)alignment theory.  
Hd1 (Hoop Test about Scope): States are more likely to adopt a propaganda campaign 
on a foreign dispute when they face domestic challenges. Because of the risks involved in 
inciting public anger, it is likely that states only resort to scapegoating and diversionary logics 
when they are faced with severe domestic challenges. These domestic challenges should be 
severe enough to cause legitimacy crisis at home that makes diversionary strategies appealing. 
 The only plausible crisis was one related to Deng’s re-ascendance in the Party, his power 
struggle with the then chairman of the CCP Hua Guofeng, as well as his policy initiative for 
reform and open. Even after the fall of the Gang of Four, Hua carried on many of Mao’s ideas 
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and policies. In a joint editorial published on February 7, 1977 by People’s Daily, the Journal of 
Red Flag, and the PLA Daily, Hua proclaimed the slogan of “the Two Whatevers”: “We will 
resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow 
whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.”363  
 Deng Xiaoping criticized the “Two Whatevers” as against the essence of Marxism even 
before his full rehabilitation.364 Deng was rehabilitated in July 1977 at the Third Plenum of the 
Tenth Party Congress. He regained his positions as the vice-chairman of the CCP, vice premier, 
vice chairman of the CMC, and the PLA general chief of staff. Deng’s approach to ideology and 
China’s future development, partly due to Deng’s personal experience in the Cultural 
Revolution, diverged with that of Hua. Deng pushed for the rehabilitation of victimized party 
officials in the Cultural Revolution, including Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, Wang 
Zhen, and Liu Shaoqi posthumously. On May 11, 1978, Guangming Daily published a front-
page editorial, entitled “Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Testing Truth.”365 This article imposed 
an implicit criticism against Hua’s “Two Whatevers” and was explicitly endorsed by Deng at the 
All-Army Political Work Conference in the following month. Deng sharply criticized those who 
regard “Marxist theory as lifeless dogma” and “odd quotations from Marxist-Leninist works as a 
ready-made panacea.”366 He cited Mao’s own method of “seeking truth from facts,” and insisted 
that “only through practice can the correctness of one’s ideas be proved, and there is no other 
way of testing truth.”367 In line with Deng’s ideological position, Deng advocated for employing 
363 Hua Guofeng, “Xue hao wenjian, zhua zhu gang (Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link),” People’s 
Daily, February 7, 1977, 1. 
364 CCP Central Documentary Editorial Committee 1993, 38. 
365 “Shijian shi jianyan zhenli de weiyi biaozhun (Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Testing Truth),” Guangming 
Daily, May 11, 1978, 1.  
366 CCP Central Documentary Editorial Committee, ed. 1993. Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping). Vol. 2. 3 vols. Beijing: Renmin, 116. 
367 Ibid., 117. 
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the western capitalist elements to the four modernizations and the reform and open as the focus 
of future work.  
 By fall of 1978, Deng had gradually won the ideological debate and the power struggle 
against Hua. Studies regard Hua’s toast at the National Day reception on September 30 as a clear 
sign that Hua decided to retreat. In that toast, Hua echoed Deng’s position by saying that “we 
must emancipate our minds,” which paraphrased Deng’s position on the “emancipation of the 
minds.”368 The Central Work Conference in November 1978 not only endorsed Deng’s dominant 
role in the leadership, the reform and open policy, but also the decision to attack Vietnam. These 
three decisions were rubberstamped by the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress the 
following month.   
 Because of the coincidence of the decision to attack Vietnam and the Deng-Hua power 
struggle, some might argue that Deng Xiaoping was using the propaganda and the war as a 
diversion from the power struggle, and to rally support for a domestic economic program. But 
this argument is flawed in three aspects. First, the power struggle was not a public crisis that the 
public attention needed to be diverted from – it was more of behind-the-scene jockeying. The 
ideological debate that peaked in the summer of 1978 was more open, but it was not a regime-
threatening crisis, so public attention did not need to be diverted from that either. Second, by 
November 1978, three months before the war broke, Deng had already gained the upper hand in 
the power struggle. He did not need a war to divert public attention from a struggle he had 
already won. But the critical war preparations, which took place after Deng’s consolidation of 
power, went on. Third, the economic reform was an obstacle, rather than a motive, for the war. 
As already argued in the public opinion section, many people feared that a war might distract 
368 Chen 1987, 74-75. 
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China’s efforts at the reform, so were against it. Even Deng himself was worried the war would 
burden the economic modernization.369 He specifically consulted Chen Yun, a Politburo member 
and vice chairman of the CCP who later played a key role in promoting the economic reform, to 
weigh the pros and cons of the attack.370  
 
Hd2 (Motivation Disappears for Diversionary War Theory): Media coverage 
diminishes as the predominant domestic challenge, if any, subsides. Diversion is no longer 
needed when the motivating domestic challenge is alleviated.  
The disappearance of the predominant domestic challenge, in this case, the establishment 
of Deng’s paramount power in the CCP leadership, took place in November 1978. But the 
propaganda campaign ended in early 1990. These considerations show that a diversionary war 
argument is also not supported by evidence. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979-1990 and its accompanying propaganda campaign has 
proven to be an archetypical mobilization case. The misalignment between the apathetic public 
opinion before the war and the hardline state policy intent called for the state to launch the most 
aggressive and long-lasting propaganda campaign ever in the Chinese modern history. The 
propaganda campaign was pivotal in agitating the general public, the local communities in the 
border provinces, and the soldiers towards supporting the war with the devotion of labor, 
resources, and even lives. Ample historical evidence corroborates the observable implications 
369 Zhang 2015, 58. 
370 Zhu, Jiamu. 2000. Chen Yun Nianpu (Chronicles of Chen Yun). Zhongyang wenxian (Central Party Literature 
Press), 235-36. 
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regarding leaders’ concerns about the weak public opinion, concrete propaganda directives and 
mobilizing orders disseminated top-down, generally inflammatory media content to agitate the 






















“Sometimes the politically correct stuff [in the media] are just not enough for the people. 
Only the language we often find in Global Times [a well-known hawkish newspaper under 
People’s Daily] help the public vent their spleen. They help the people let off steam by 
resonating their feelings.” 
– Author’s interview to a government official.371 
 
“When the tides are too high, the method of barrier blocking gives way to the drainage 
systems.” 
– Author’s interview to an editor at an official media’s online forum.372 
 
Chapter 6: The Sino-Philippines Arbitration on the South China Sea – A 
Pacifying Campaign 
 
The Sino-Philippines arbitration crisis in June and July of 2016 is a case of a pacifying 
propaganda campaign, in which propaganda is used to pacify a hardline public opinion to meet 
the moderate state policy intention. The case is recent but well-documented thanks to the 
documentations from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). I also rely on interviews with 
Chinese officials, scholars, editors, and journalists, who were involved in the foreign policy 
decision making or the reporting on the issue. These interviews were conducted in the summer of 
2017 when their memories of the events were still fresh. The case itself is important as it marks 
the lowest point in Sino-Philippines relations since the two countries normalized relationship in 
1975. 
 
I. A Hefty Propaganda Campaign 
From June 1, 2016, China launched a hefty propaganda campaign. In a short period of sixty-one 
days, People’s Daily published a total of two hundred and six articles, nine of which were in the 
front pages. These included an eight-part series of commentaries between July 13 and July 23 by 
“Zhong Sheng,” a special byline used by the editorial staff of the People’s Daily International 
371 Interview 41, June 9, 2017, Beijing. 
372 Interview 34, June 5, 2017, Beijing. 
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Department, a homophone for “the voice of the Central.” The time series line plot of People’s 
Daily coverage between 2010 and 2016 in Figure 6.1 exhibits a massive spike in June-July 2016. 
Xinhua News also published a ten-part editorial series in the ten days leading up to the release of 
the ruling on July 12. 
 




Internal notes circulated at major state media outlets indicate that this campaign was directed by 
the top Chinese leadership and was well-coordinated. An internal note dated July 11 called the 
editors to “continue to follow the Party Central Committee’s directives… and fight well this 
public opinion battle which concerns our sovereignty, security, and development interests.” A 
note on July 12 read: “We have large volumes (of articles) to turn around in a short time today 
and tomorrow. We should be particularly careful when processing these manuscripts…(We 
should) fully convey China’s voice, reflect China’s position.” A note on July 13 noted the 
upcoming release of the arbitration award that afternoon and called “the editorial departments 
and relevant branches to follow the leadership’s command and the reporting plan previously 
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“release news, commentaries and interviews in bundled format on various platforms, report 
leaders’ speeches and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) statements in a timely manner; 
elaborate our (government’s) policy comprehensively and accurately, reject the illegal tribunal 
ruling… search for and take advantage of news and information that work in our favor…”373 An 
author interview with a government official also confirms that these media trends were 
“authorized.”374 
This propaganda campaign was remarkable considering the traditional Chinese position 
of keeping the South China Sea dispute low-profile. Domestically, Beijing had been cautious in 
elevating the rhetoric on the South China Sea dispute. Even during the Scarborough Shoal crisis 
between China and the Philippines in 2012 and despite the extensive media coverage of the 
standoff, Beijing deliberately kept the news off the front pages and the prime times.375 Abroad, 
Beijing had always endeavored to avoid the internationalization of the issue and to keep the 
dispute off the agenda of multilateral forums. What then explains this hefty and deliberate 
propaganda campaign that reversed the low-profile approach? 
It seems that the Chinese government refrained from pursuing a hardline policy during 
the arbitration crisis. The two governments repaired relationship when the Philippine new 
president Rodrigo Duterte visited China in October following the release of the award. If the 
propaganda campaign was not for mobilizing the public for a hardline policy like China did in 
the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979-1991, what then had motivated this propaganda 
campaign and what purposes did it serve?  
373 These notes were quoted in various author interviews with Chinese journalists and editors in official media 
outlets, May 2017, Beijing. 
374 Interview 12, May 26, 2017, Beijing.  
375 See more detailed discussion in Chapter 4.  
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This chapter explains this propaganda campaign by applying the (mis)alignment theory. I 
argue that it is the misalignment of a hardline public opinion and a moderate state foreign policy 
intent that had propelled the state to launch this campaign. Yet divergent from the mobilizing 
motivation of the 1979-1990 campaign in the Sino-Vietnamese border case, this campaign had 
the opposite goal – to pacify a militant public and bring public opinion in line with an intended 
moderate foreign policy. In the text that follows, I first introduce the arbitration crisis and the 
South China Sea dispute writ at large. I then evaluate the assumptions, the independent variables, 
and the pacifying mechanisms of the (mis)alignment theory. I test whether the case bears out the 
observable implications of the theory in comparison to the audience cost and the diversionary 
war theory. 
 
II. The Arbitration and The Crisis 
On January 22, 2013, the Philippine government initiated an international arbitration case against 
China concerning maritime rights in the South China Sea. Manila handed to the Chinese 
Ambassador to the Philippines a Note Verbale containing a Notification and Statement of Claim 
that challenged before the Arbitral Tribunal China’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea 
and its “unlawful” activities that “violate the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the 
Philippines.”376 The arbitration procedures and the back and forth of communications lasted 
376 “Statement by Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against 
China to Achieve a Peaceful and Durable Solution to the Dispute in the WPS,” January 22, 2013, 
http://www.philippineembassy-usa.org/news/3071/300/Statement-by-Secretary-of-Foreign-Affairs-Albert-del-
Rosario-on-the-UNCLOS-Arbitral-Proceedings-against-China-to-Achieve-a-Peaceful-and-Durable-Solution-to-the-
Dispute-in-the-WPS/d,phildet/, accessed April 12, 2018. For full text of the Notification and Statement of Claim, see 
http://www.philippineembassy-usa.org/uploads/pdfs/embassy/2013/2013-0122-
Notification%20and%20Statement%20of%20Claim%20on%20West%20Philippine%20Sea.pdf, accessed April 12, 
2018. 
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three and half years. A diplomatic crisis arose on the dawn of the release of the award on July 12, 
2016 and lasted about two months during June and July of 2016. 
  
1. Manila’s Grievances 
The Philippines’ initiation of the arbitration case against China could be traced back to the 
grievances held by Manila from the Scarborough Shoal standoff between April 8 and June 18, 
2012. As described in more detail in Chapter 4 in one of the deviant cases, the Sino-Philippines 
standoff in the Scarborough Shoal is a case with a hardline public opinion and a hardline state 
policy intent, but the Chinese government launched a moderate propaganda campaign for 
coercive purposes. In that case, Beijing pursued a hardline foreign policy. It sent one of its most 
advanced China Marine Surveillance (CMS) ships, Yuzheng 310, to confront the Philippine 
ships. It adopted unofficial sanctions on the Philippine banana exports and tourism. After the 
2012 standoff, China returned and gained de facto control of the Shoal despite mutual agreement 
of withdrawal. China had reportedly “strung a barrier across the mouth of the shoal to block 
Philippine access” and “kept surveillance ships nearby.”377 
 The Philippine grievance was evident in an interview by Foreign Policy with Philippine 
Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario. Rosario said: “A year before [we started the arbitration in 
2013], they forced us out of the Scarborough Shoal, which is well within our economic zone. 
They continued to water-canon our fisherman, they chased down our boats, and deprived our 
fisherman of their livelihood. We consider these to be aggressive unilateral actions. This has 
377 “Manila takes a stand,” The Wall Street Journal Asia, Jan 25, 2013, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323539804578261140985134254, accessed April 13, 2018. 
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been happening for quite a long time.”378 Researcher Sourabh Gupta also holds that China’s 
occupation of the Scarborough Shoal was the “proximate provocation that led to the filing of the 
claim.”379 
 In October 2012, four months after the standoff dissipated, Vice-Foreign Minister Fu 
Ying became the first high-level Chinese official to visit Manila. Two days before her visit, the 
Philippines President Benigno Aquino revealed that there was a “little bettering of situation” 
with Beijing over the Shoal, but the situation was still “far from normal.”380 During Fu Ying’s 
trip, which was expected to mend the relationship after the standoff, Fu reportedly told Rosario 
“not to appeal to the U.N. to resolve the dispute… not to ‘internationalize’ the issue in forums 
such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), not to coordinate with any other 
country such as the U.S., and even not to issue press releases.”381 Fu essentially wanted Manila 
to accept China’s fait accompli on the Scarborough Shoal. 
The Scarborough Shoal standoff, Manila’s exposed vulnerability in the standoff, and 
Beijing’s subsequent occupation of the Shoal propelled Manila to strengthen security ties with 
Washington. Media reported that when receiving visiting U.S. State Department Assistant 
Secretary Kurt Campbell in Manila in December 2012, “the Philippines has said it wants to be in 
a better position to defend its claims in the South China Sea…the Philippines sees the United 
States as a party that can help to put it in a better position.”382 The two sides started to negotiate 
on the “Framework Agreement on Increased Rotational Presence and Enhanced Defense 
378 “Interview with Albert del Rosario: You Will Have Chaos and Anarchy,” Foreign Policy, October 5, 2015, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/05/you-will-have-chaos-and-anarchy-albert-del-rosario-philippines-south-china-
sea/, accessed April 13, 2018. 
379 Gupta 2016. 
380 “Aquino meets Chinese deputy foreign minister,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 20, 2012, 
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/53302/aquino-meets-chinese-deputy-foreign-minister, accessed April 13, 2016. 
381 “Manila takes a stand.” 
382 “Philippines Readies for Increased US Presence,” Voice of America (Asia), December 12, 2012, 
https://www.voanews.com/a/philippines-readies-for-increased-us-presence/1563463.html, accessed April 13, 2018. 
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Cooperation.” This “rotational presence” would allow the United States the advantage of forward 
deployment in Southeast Asia, while maintaining the flexibility of not residing in the locations 
permanently so as to avoid the Philippine public pushback for permanent U.S. bases. (The 
Philippines asked the United States to leave both Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in 1991). It 
could, therefore, undercut China’s anti-access/area denial strategy.383 A ten-year “Enhanced 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)” was signed on April 28, 2014, during President Barak 
Obama’s first state visit. Evan Medeiros, U.S. National Security Council Director for Asian 
affairs, called the accord “the most significant defense agreement that we have concluded with 
the Philippines in decades.” President Obama tried to clarify the American objective: “Our goal 
is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain China. Our goal is to make sure that 
international rules and norms are respected, and that includes in the area of maritime 
disputes.”384 This was interpreted by many analysts in China as alluding to the Scarborough 
Shoal standoff. 
The other measure the Philippines took to get back at China was to challenge China’s 
claims and actions before the international tribunal. Manila presented to the Tribunal fifteen 
submissions in five broad areas: 1) China’s nine-dash line claim to the South China Sea is 
inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and therefore invalid; 2) 
The land features in the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are rocks, not islands under Article 
121 of UNCLOS, so they are not capable of generating 200 nautical miles of Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) on their own and are only entitled to 12 nautical miles of territorial sea; 3) 
383 For more on China's anti-access/area denial strategy, see Cliff et al. 2007.   
384 “U.S., Philippines sign 10-year defense agreement amid rising tensions,” Washington Post, April 28, 2014, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-philippines-sign-10-year-defense-agreement-amid-rising-
tensions/2014/04/28/74a605d8-cec6-11e3-b812-0c92213941f4_story.html?utm_term=.c4cb49cf0842, accessed 
April 13, 2018. 
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The alleged Chinese harassment of the Filipino vessels are illegal; 4) The Chinese activities have 
damaged the marine environment, and in particular its land reclamation activities are harmful to 
the coral reef ecosystems; and 5) China’s large-scale land reclamation activities are unlawful and 
do not confer additional maritime entitlements. The last two were updated in light of Chinese 
island building activities that became intensified in 2015.  
 
2. Beijing’s Position: Non-Acceptance and Non-Participation 
In response to the Philippines’ initiation of the arbitration, China presented a Note Verbale to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines on February 19, 2013, rejected the arbitration, 
and returned the Notification and Statement of Claim to the Philippines. In its Note Verbale, 
China argued that the “direct cause” of the territorial disputes between the two countries in the 
South China Sea had been the “illegal occupation by the Philippines of some islands and reefs of 
China’s Nansha [Spratly] Islands”; it would neither accept nor participate in the arbitration.385  
 Over the next few months, China elaborated its non-acceptance and non-participation 
position in three points. First, by unilaterally initiating this third-party arbitration process without 
Beijing’s consent, Manila had violated its long-standing commitment to bilateral negotiations 
established through a series of bilateral instruments between the two countries and especially the 
DOC, which explicitly states that “The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial 
and jurisdictional disputes … through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states 
directly concerned.”386 By such agreements, Beijing believed that Manila’s unilaterally seeking 
385 “Note Verbale from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, No. (13) PG-039,” 19 February 2013, Memorial of the Philippines – Volume 
III, Annex 3, https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7, accessed April 12, 2018. 
386 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” 
November 2002, http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2, 
accessed April 16, 2018. 
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third-party arbitration was an act of bad faith. Hence the compulsory arbitration procedure 
should not apply and would have no force. Manila argued, however, that “the Philippines has 
exhausted almost all political and diplomatic avenues for a peaceful negotiated settlement of its 
maritime dispute with China,”387 but bilateral talks had led to nowhere. Beijing counter-argued 
that none of Manila submissions to the Tribunal had ever been discussed in bilateral talks. 
Second, Beijing held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the case. It argued that the 
Tribunal had no jurisdiction over sovereignty issues and the Philippines’ submissions cannot be 
judged in isolation from sovereignty issues. “The Philippines ‘skillfully’ fragments a big dispute 
with China into various free-standing-appearing entitlement claims and activities claims in order 
to conceal the sovereignty-delimitation nature of the dispute or claims.”388 In other words, “the 
claims dress up many land territorial matters as simple questions of status or qualification of 
certain maritime features or skirt these territorial matters and take a shortcut to the entitlement 
questions, reversing the logical sequence.”389 Hence the Tribunal was overstepping its bounds in 
accepting the case. Third, Beijing argued that the arbitration was detrimental to regional stability 
and the international legal system. It held that Manila’s purpose was to hurt China’s territorial 
claim by manipulating international law. It violated the spirit of friendly bilateral consultations 
and set a bad example for international law.  
Despite Beijing’s rejection and refusal to participate, a tribunal was formed in The Hague 
on June 21, 2013. Copies of administrative documents regarding the arbitration procedures and 
subsequent correspondence were transmitted to the Agent and Counsel for the Philippines and 
387 The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, “SFA Statement on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against 
China,” January 22, 2013, https://www.dfa.gov.ph/127-newsroom/unclos/216-sfa-statement-on-the-unclos-arbitral-
proceedings-against-china, accessed April 16, 2018. 
388 Yee 2014, 663. 
389 Yee 2014, 682. For similar argument, see Zhang 2016, 458. 
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the Chinese Embassy in the Netherlands. “Throughout the proceedings, the Chinese 
Embassy…reiterated that ‘it will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration unilaterally 
initiated by the Philippines.’”390 The Philippines officially presented its petition to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) on March 30, 2014. The Chinese MoFA Spokesperson Hong Lei 
reacted by reiterating China’s “non-participation” and “non-acceptance” position. He 
emphatically rejected the arbitration:  
“At the heart of the matter are the disputes between the two sides on the sovereignty over 
islands and reefs, and delimitation of maritime boundaries. Yet disputes such as these 
have already been excluded from arbitration procedures through a declaration made by 
China in 2006 pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In this 
context, China’s rejection of the Philippines’ submission for arbitration is solidly based 
on international law, and China’s lawful rights as a party to UNCLOS should be truly 
respected.”391 
On December 7, 2014, the Chinese MoFA released a position paper “on the Matter of 
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” 
which further elaborated the legal basis of China’s position.392 On February 6, 2015, the Chinese 
Ambassador to the Netherlands wrote to the members of the Tribunal and described China’s 
Position Paper as “having comprehensively explain[ed] why the Arbitral Tribunal … manifestly 
390 The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), “Award in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration between 
The Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China,” (hereinafter referred to as “The Award,”), July 
12, 2016, https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086, accessed April 12, 2018, 13. 
391 PRC MoFA, “Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei on the Philippines’ Submission of a 
Memorial to the Arbitral Tribunal in Relation to Disputes with China in the South China Sea,” March 30, 2014, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/fyrbt_1/t1142356.htm, accessed April 12, 2018. 
392 PRC MoFA, “Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction 
in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” (hereinafter referred to as “China’s 
Position Paper,”) December 7, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm, accessed 
April 12, 2018. 
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has no jurisdiction over the case.”393 The Tribunal considered these communications, including 
China’s Position Paper, effectively “constitute[d] a plea concerning this Arbitral Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction,” and decided to bifurcate the proceedings by convening a hearing on jurisdiction 
and admissibility before considering the merits of the Philippines’ submissions.394  
A hearing on jurisdiction was held from July 7 to 13, 2015. China reacted by saying: 
“[T]he arbitral proceeding unilaterally initiated by the Philippines…disregard… China’s 
legitimate rights… and [is] in breach of the agreement” affirmed by the two countries. China’s 
MoFA spokesperson claimed China, “a victim” under the Philippines’ “illegal occupation” of the 
Nansha Islands, “has been exercising utmost restraint.” “China opposes any move by the 
Philippines to initiate and push forward the arbitral proceeding” and “will never accept any 
imposed solution or unilaterally resorting to a third-party settlement.”395  
The Tribunal issued its award on jurisdiction on October 29, 2015 and ruled that the it 
was “properly constituted” over the case and would continue with it.396 China protested the 
decision with strong language. It called the award on jurisdiction “null and void.” It declared the 
Philippines’ “obstinate pushing forward” of the arbitration as “abusing the compulsory 
procedures for dispute settlement under UNCLOS” and “a political provocation under the cloak 
of law.” The Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal “have severely violated the legitimate rights” 
of China, “completely deviated from the purposes and objectives of the UNCLOS, and eroded 
the integrity and authority of the UNCLOS.” The arbitral proceeding “will lead to nothing.”397  
393 PCA, “The Award,” 15. 
394 PCA, “The Award,” 16. 
395 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the Conclusion of the Hearing on 
Issues Relating to Jurisdiction and Admissibility by the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Established at the 
Request of the Philippines,” July 14, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/fyrbt_1/t1281252.htm, accessed 
April 12, 2018. 
396 PCA, “The Award,” 19. 
397 PRC MoFA, “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the South China Sea Arbitration by the Arbitral Tribunal Established at the 
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The U.S.’ indirect role in the arbitration was also noteworthy. The U.S. is an ally of the 
Philippines. Although its position on the South China Sea dispute had been consistently “not 
taking sides,” it was openly supportive of the arbitration. China strongly protested against the 
U.S. position throughout the case. In a press appearance with the visiting then-Philippine 
President Benigno Aquino on April 28, 2014, President Obama said: “the United States supports 
his [Aquino’s] decision to pursue international arbitration concerning territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea.”398 Daniel Russel, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State also talked positively 
about the arbitration at the Fifth Annual South China Sea Conference held by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on July 21, 2015. Reacting to this, the Chinese MoFA 
spokesperson Lu Kang accused the U.S. acting like an “arbitrator outside the tribunal,” and 
urged the U.S. to “live up to its pledge of not taking sides.”399 In his testimony before the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 28, 2016, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. 
Blinken confirmed that “we have worked very hard to establish across the region an 
understanding that this [the arbitration] is an appropriate mechanism.”400 
 
3. Into A Crisis 
Request of the Republic of the Philippines,” October 30, 2015, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1310474.shtml, accessed April 12, 2018. 
398 The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint 
Press Conference,” April 28, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-
obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi, accessed April 16, 2018. 
399 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on the US Statement about Issues Relating to 
the Arbitration Unilaterally Initiated by the Philippines,” July 24, 2015, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/fyrbt_1/t1283808.htm, accessed April 12, 2018. 
400 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “America as a Pacific Power: Challenges and 
Opportunities in Asia,” 114th Congress, 2nd session, April 28, 2016, 
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hearing-america-as-a-pacific-power-challenges-and-opportunities-in-asia/, 
accessed April 16, 2016. 
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A hearing on the merits was held on November 24-26 and November 30, 2015. As China had 
always declared, it did not attend the hearing. As time drew closer to the release of the award, the 
issue became more and more intense. During a visit to the U.S. on February 25, 2016, the 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi accused the Philippines of “political provocation” in lodging 
the arbitration case against China without China’s consent.401 On February 29, the Philippine 
Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario urged China to “respect the forthcoming ruling of the 
arbitral tribunal.”402 
The situation developed into a full-blown diplomatic crisis as Beijing scrambled to deal 
preemptively with an expected negative ruling. The crisis lasted about two months in June and 
July 2016. Starting from early June, Beijing launched an aggressive domestic and worldwide 
propaganda campaign justifying its position and discrediting the Tribunal itself and the 
Philippines’ case. Besides the media campaign described at the beginning of this chapter, 
Chinese foreign policy makers, academics, and international law experts also came out to defend 
China’s position and its legal basis. On May 6, Director-General of the MoFA Department of 
Boundary and Ocean Affairs Ouyang Yujing gave a lengthy interview to Chinese and foreign 
media and explained China’s position in detail.403 On May 12, Director-General of the MoFA 
401 “China says Philippines guilty of ‘political provocation,’” Associated Press, February 25, 2016, 
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/02/25/1557009/china-says-philippines-guilty-political-provocation, 
accessed April 12, 2018. 
402 “Philippines asks China to respect sea dispute arbitration,” Reuters, February 29, 2016, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-southchinasea-philippines/philippines-asks-china-to-respect-sea-dispute-arbitration-
idUKKCN0W20RG, accessed April 12, 2018. 
403 PRC MoFA, “Director-General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Ouyang Yujing Gives Interview to Chinese and Foreign Media on South China Sea Issue,” May 6, 2016, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/wjbxw_1/t1365689.htm, accessed April 12, 2018. 
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Department of Treaty and Law Xu Hong also gave a briefing and fielded questions posed by 
journalists.404 These publicity endeavors were simply unseen before.  
Beijing also started rallying international support. On May 20, China claimed more than 
40 countries supported its position;405 On June 14, a question posed to the MoFA spokesperson 
Lu Kang at a regular press conference cited “nearly 60 countries ha[d] publicly endorsed China’s 
stance;406 That number rose to 70, reported by State Councilor Yang Jiechi in an interview to 
state media on July 15.407  
Expecting the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ summit to be held right after the release of the 
ruling, Chinese diplomats also worked to forestall the issuance of an ASEAN statement 
mentioning the ruling. Such mentioning in an official document of ASEAN would incur further 
reputational cost for China. On April 23, 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi carried out a 
whirlwind tour of Brunei, Cambodia and Laos, resulting in a four-point consensus among the 
four countries. The consensus states that the South China Sea disputes are not an ASEAN-China 
issue; the disputes should be resolved through dialogues and consultations by parties directly 
concerned; no unilateral will should be imposed on them; countries outside the region should 
404 PRC MoFA, “Briefing by XU Hong, Director-General of the Department of Treaty and Law on the South China 
Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Philippines,” May 12, 2016, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1364804.shtml, accessed April 26, 2018. 
405 “China says more than 40 countries support its stance on South China Sea dispute,” Reuters, May 20, 2016, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china/china-says-more-than-40-countries-support-its-stance-on-
south-china-sea-dispute-idUSKCN0YB1EO, accessed April 12, 2018. 
406 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on June 14, 2016,” June 14, 
2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1372136.shtml, accessed 
April 12, 2018. 
407 PRC MoFA, “Yang Jiechi Gives Interview to State Media on the So-called Award by the Arbitral Tribunal for 
the South China Sea Arbitration,” July 15, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1381740.shtml, 
accessed April 12, 2018. These numbers, however, are a little inflated. According to Sutter and Huang 2016, China 
“defined support for its position in a vague way that could elicit wider international support…it appeared that if a 
government or organization stated that it preferred that territorial disputes in the South China Sea should be settled 
through talks with the parties concerned, that was construed by Beijing as support for its position” (61). The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies also keeps an “Arbitration Support Tracker” that tracks the international 
support on the case (https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/). According to the CSIS tracker, there were 31 
countries who supported China’s position prior to the ruling.  
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play a constructive role.408 This consensus implicitly supports China’s position in resolving the 
dispute through bilateral negotiations, opposes the Philippines’ approach in seeking third-party 
arbitration, and criticizes outside powers such as the U.S. and Japan in their involvement in the 
dispute. 
Under the pressure from China, the ASEAN joint communiqué issued on July 24 turned 
out to be a watered-down version neglecting to mention the tribunal ruling. It only expressed 
concerns on the land reclamations but did not specify any country: “We remain seriously 
concerned over recent and ongoing developments and took note of the concerns expressed by 
some Ministers on the land reclamations and escalation of activities in the area, which have 
eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability 
in the region.”409 Dissatisfied with the statement, the US, Japan, and Australia issued a statement 
the next day calling the parties to abide by the tribunal ruling,410 which was later condemned by 
Wang Yi as “fanning the flames” and “inconsistent with the efforts being made by regional 
countries to safeguard stability in the South China Sea, inconsistent with the aspiration of 
regional people to lower the temperature surrounding the South China Sea situation, and 
inconsistent with the constructive role that non-regional countries should play.”411 
408 PRC MoFA, “Wang Yi Talks about China's Four-Point Consensus on South China Sea Issue with Brunei, 
Cambodia and Laos,” April 23, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1358478.shtml, accessed 
April 13, 2018. 
409 ASEAN, “Joint Communiqué of the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Vientiane, 24 July 2016,” July 24, 
2016, http://asean.org/joint-communique-of-the-49th-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting/, paragraph 174, accessed 
April 13, 2018. 
410 “Japan-United States-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” July 25, 2016, 
https://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2016/jb_mr_160725.aspx, accessed April 13, 2018. 
411 PRC MoFA, “Wang Yi Refuting the Joint Statement by US, Japan and Australia: Peacekeeper or Troublemaker,” 
July 27, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1384823.shtml, 
accessed April 13, 2018. 
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On June 29, the court announced its plan to issue the award on July 12. The Chinese 
MoFA acknowledged this in the spokesperson’s remarks, summarizing the timeline of the case 
and China’s position and criticizing the Philippines for breaching international law.412  
The situation showed signs of a turn, however, when Rodrigo Duterte sworn in as the 
new president of the Philippines on June 30. Duterte adopted a more conciliatory approach than 
his predecessor. He and his Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay met with the Chinese Ambassador 
to the Philippines on July 9. They agreed “not to make any provocative statements following the 
release of the ruling.” The Duterte administration also expressed willingness to resume bilateral 
talks on sharing the South China Sea resources even if it won the lawsuit.413  
On July 12, the award was published, ruling on almost every point in favor of the 
Philippines and against China.414 The Tribunal found that China’s nine-dash line claim and 
related “historic rights” have no legal basis; none of the land features in the Spratlys or the 
Scarborough Shoal are capable of sustaining human habitation or an economic life of its own, 
and therefore are rocks, not islands, which are only entitled to 12 nautical miles of territorial sea; 
China has violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines in interfering with fishing and in 
risking collisions on the sea; the Chinese activities in the disputed area, particularly its fishing 
and land reclamation activities, has caused irreparable environmental damage; its artificial 
islands contravene the international legal dispute resolution proceedings and do not confer 
additional maritime rights.  
412 PRC MoFA, “MFA Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on the Arbitral Tribunal's Claim That It Would Soon 
Issue the So-called Final Award of the South China Sea Arbitration Unilaterally Initiated by the Philippines,” June 
29, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/fyrbt_1/t1376307.htm, accessed April 13, 2018. 
413 “Philippines ‘wiling to share’ South China Sea resources,” Global Times, July 9, 2016, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/993126.shtml, accessed April 13, 2018. 
414 PCA, “The Award”. 
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This was an overwhelming victory for the Philippines, yet Manila chose not to flaunt it. 
The Philippine Foreign Secretary Yasay welcomed the result and called for “restraint and 
sobriety.”415 His speech on TV was notably measured in contrast to the public fervor on the 
streets of Manila.416  
The U.S. issued a statement calling both parties to abide by the ruling.417 Chinese MoFA 
spokesperson Lu Kang protested against the U.S. statement and sternly accused the U.S. of 
“turn[ing] a blind eye to the facts and endorsed a ruling that is illegal and invalid.” Lu also 
criticized the U.S. for being “selective” and hypocritical on matters of international law.418 
The Chinese government showered the country with official statements. The Chinese 
media was filled with reports. The Chinese President Xi Jinping, the PRC government, the 
Foreign Ministry, the National People’s Congress all issued statements on the ruling.419 All 
declared the ruling being “null and void with no binding force.” The State Council Information 
Office released a white paper entitled “China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through 
415 “Philippines urges ‘restraint and sobriety’ after South China Sea ruling,” Reuters, July 12, 2016, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-philippines/philippines-urges-restraint-and-sobriety-after-
south-china-sea-ruling-idUSKCN0ZS0W0, accessed April 13, 2018. 
416 “After Victory at Sea, Reality Sets In for Philippines,” New York Times, July 15, 2016, A3. 
417 John Kirby (U.S. Department of State Assistant Secretary and Spokesperson), “Decision in the Philippines-China 
Arbitration,” July 12, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm, accessed April 13, 2018. 
418 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on Statement by Spokesperson of US State 
Department on South China Sea Arbitration Ruling,” July 13, 2016, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/fyrbt_1/t1380409.htm, accessed April 13, 2018. 
419 “Xi Jinping Met with President of the European Council, Donald Tusk and President of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker,” Xinhua News, July 12, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-
07/12/c_1119207979.htm, accessed April 13, 2018. Xi made remarks on the ruling during the meeting; PRC MoFA 
“Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime 
Rights and Interests in the South China Sea,” July 12, 2016, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1379493.htm, accessed April 13, 2018; PRC MoFA, “Statement 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral 
Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines,” July 12, 
2016, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/snhwtlcwj/t1379490.htm, accessed April 13, 2018; The PRC National 
People’s Congress, “Statement of the People’s Republic of China National People’s Congress on the Award of 12 
July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Unilateral Request of the 
Republic of the Philippines,” July 14, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2016-07/14/content_1993891.htm, 
accessed April 13, 2018. 
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Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China 
Sea.”420 Like China’s December 2014 Position Paper, the White Paper is a comprehensive 
document detailing the history of the dispute and the legal basis of China’s claim, and calling for 
bilateral negotiations for dispute settlement. China’s Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin 
attended the press release of the White Paper and answered questions. During the press release, 
Liu warned that the decision to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South 
China Sea would depend on “a comprehensive judgement” on “our threat perception.”421 The 
Chinese bellicose stand, however, subsided dramatically within the week. The dispute faded out 
of people’s sight soon as Beijing and Manila took up steps to repair the relationship. 
 
II. The Maritime Dispute Writ at Large 
Before analyzing the case in the lens of the (mis)alignment theory and the alternative 
explanations, it is necessary to provide a brief background of the territorial dispute in question 
and the related issues that were at the core of the arbitration and the crisis.  
The South China Sea is a half-closed marginal sea of the Pacific Ocean surrounded by 
mainland China and Taiwan in the north, Vietnam in the west, the Philippines in the east, and 
Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia in the South. It consists of over two hundred land features 
including small islands, shoals, atolls, banks, cays and other low-tide elevations. These land 
features are grouped into four island groups - Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands), Paracel Islands 
420 For full text of the white paper in Chinese, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/2016-07/13/c_1119210479.htm; in 
English, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-07/13/c_135509153_2.htm, both accessed April 13, 
2018. 
421 PRC MoFA, “Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin Attends Press Release of the White Paper ‘China Adheres to 
the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South 
China Sea’ and Answers Questions,” July 13, 2016, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zygy_673101/liuzhenmin_673143/xgxw_673145/t1381069.shtml, 
accessed April 13, 2018. 
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(Xisha Islands), Macclesfield Islands (Zhongsha Islands), and Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands), 
with the Spratlys being the largest group. The entire sea covers 3.5 million square kilometers.422 
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve both land features and maritime rights 
these land features generate under the UNCLOS clauses. These disputes exist among six 
sovereign states/regimes, namely China (People’s Republic of China), Taiwan (Republic of 
China), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. China and Taiwan adhere to their 
historical rights to these land features and the maritime rights these territories generate. Their 
claims are usually ambiguously summarized by a nine-dash line based on a 1948 map, which 
predates the UNCLOS and delineates a large U-shaped area in the South China Sea as China’s 
sovereignty covering an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the entire area. China and Vietnam 
contested the Paracel Islands, which were occupied by China after a conflict between China and 
the South Vietnam regime in 1974. The Spratlys are contested among all claimants. Currently, 
Vietnam occupies twenty-one features in the Spratlys, China seven, the Philippines nine, 
Malaysia five, Brunei one, and Taiwan one - the largest naturally formed feature in the Spratlys, 
the Taiping/Itu Aba Island.423 The arbitration concerned only the Spratlys and the Scarborough 
Shoal.   
The value of the South China Sea lies in its economic and strategic importance. It has 
rich fishing stock and potential energy reserves. Critical shipping routes passes through the Sea, 
so it is strategic in terms of sea lanes of communication. As of 2016, about one third of global 
trade, an estimated value of $3.4 trillion, traverses through it.424 It connects the Pacific Ocean 
422 PCA, “The Award,” 1. 
423 Alexander Vuving, “South China Sea: Who Occupies What in the Spratlys?” May 6, 2016, The Diplomat, 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/south-china-sea-who-claims-what-in-the-spratlys/, accessed April 16, 2018. 
424 “How much trade transits the South China Sea?” Center for Strategic and International Studies China Power 
Project. https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/, accessed April 16, 2018. 
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with the Indian Ocean, so it is also key to projecting naval power, which has played a large role 
in the power play between China and the United States in the region. In the words of the former 
Chinese PLA navy commander, Admiral Liu Huaqing, “whoever controls the Spratlys will reap 
huge economic and military benefits.”425 In the Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del 
Rosario’s words, “They [China] want to be a maritime power but to be that, you need your own 
lake. We think they have selected the South China Sea as their lake.”426 
Two related issues were at the core of the arbitration: fishing disputes and China’s land 
reclamation activities. The Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 originated from fishing disputes. 
The Philippine coast guards attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen for alleged poaching near the 
Scarborough Shoal, but were intercepted by Chinese coast guards, which led to the standoff that 
lasted for two months. After the two sides disengaged and retreated at the onset of a typhoon, the 
Chinese ships returned and seized control of the shoal. The Philippines fishermen complained 
that the Chinese had blocked off the lagoon from Philippine access. The situation near the shoal 
continued throughout the arbitration. On February 25, 2014, the Philippines Foreign Ministry 
protested China’s use of water cannon on Filipino fishermen near the Shoal.427 On February 4, 
2015, the Philippines complained that a Chinese CMS ship had rammed three Philippine fishing 
boats near the shoal.428 The Chinese MoFA responded to these incidents by claiming that the 
Philippine vessels were in Chinese waters and the Chinese coast guard acted according to the 
425 Liu 2004, 538. 
426 “Interview with Albert del Rosario: You Will Have Chaos and Anarchy,” Foreign Policy, October 5, 2015, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/05/you-will-have-chaos-and-anarchy-albert-del-rosario-philippines-south-china-
sea/, accessed April 13, 2018. 
427 “Philippines protests over South China Sea water cannon incident,” Reuters, February 25, 2014, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-southchinasea/philippines-protests-over-south-china-sea-water-
cannon-incident-idUSBREA1O09P20140225, accessed April 17, 2018. 
428 “Philippines says Chinese ship rammed fishing boats in Scarborough Shoal,” Reuters, February 4, 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china/philippines-says-chinese-ship-rammed-fishing-boats-in-
scarborough-shoal-idUSKBN0L81IM20150204, accessed April 17, 2018. 
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law.429 A couple of fishing incidents in other areas of the South China Sea were also reported 
throughout the arbitration. For example, eleven Chinese fishermen were arrested by the 
Philippines police for alleged poaching near Half Moon Shoal (Banyue Jiao) in May 2014 and 
were later tried in a Philippine court.430 China insisted that the fishermen were in Chinese waters 
and the arrests were a “provocation.”431  
The other issue, China’s land reclamation activities in the Spratlys, was considered by the 
Tribunal as “aggravation and extension of the dispute during settlement proceedings” as part of 
the Philippine submissions. Before going into the details of China’s land reclamation activities, 
the alleged construction work by the Philippines on the Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin or 
Ren’ai Jiao) and a subsequent standoff between the two armed forces near the shoal deserve 
some attention here. On April 7, 2014, the Philippines presented additional submissions to the 
Tribunal regarding “China’s most recent actions in and around Second Thomas Shoal,” 
complaining China’s “prevention of the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel” stationed 
there.432 The dispute on the Second Thomas Shoal goes back to as early as 1999 when the 
Philippines purposefully wrecked a ship there to support a permanent presence near the shoal. 
China had protested several times since to have the Philippines tow away the vessel. China 
pointed out that the Philippines first used the excuse of “malfunction” of the ship and promised 
to tow it away (but never did), but then contradicted itself by admitting on March 14, 2014 that 
the vessel “was placed in Ayungin Shoal in 1999 to serve as a permanent Philippine Government 
429 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on February 5, 2015,” 
February 5, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1234787.shtml, accessed April 
17, 2018. 
430 “Chinese fishers face charges for crime in PH,” Rappler, https://www.rappler.com/nation/57621-filing-charges-
poaching-chinese-fishermen, accessed April 17, 2018. 
431 “Philippines convicts Chinese fishermen of poaching rare turtles,” BBC News, November 24, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30173962, accessed April 17, 2018. 
432 PCA, “The Award,” 13. 
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installation.”433 Around the same time, Manila complained the Chinese blockage of “navy-
commissioned civilian ships that was going to bring food and water to troops stationed in 
Ayungin.”434 But according to the Chinese MoFA spokesperson Qin Gang, the Philippine ships 
carried construction materials in an attempt to build permanent facilities on the shoal.435 The 
Tribunal eventually ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over this submission because of the 
involvement of military vessels.436 
The Second Thomas Shoal incident sheds lights on the island upgrading activities 
committed by all parties of the dispute and provides an important background of the Chinese 
land reclamation activities. To be clear, China came in late in both the occupation and the facility 
building on the land features in the Spratlys. When it started to act in 1988 and fought a brief 
battle with Vietnam near the Johnson Reef (Chigua Jiao), it found itself left only with slim 
pickings, as the “best” ones had already been taken. China occupies seven very small features in 
the Spratlys. By the time it started to physically upgrade the features aggressively in 2014, it 
“was the only claimant country without an airstrip in the Spratlys.”437  
But once it started, it started aggressively. The Chinese land reclamation activities were 
unprecedented both in scale and in speed. Since 2013, China has created 3,200 acres of new 
433 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on March 17, 2014,” March 
17, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1138083.shtml, accessed April 17, 
2018; The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, “DFA Statement on China’s Allegation that the Philippines 
Agreed to Pull-out of the Ayungin Shoal,” March 14, 2014, https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/dfa-releasesupdate/2333-
dfa-statement-on-china-s-allegation-that-philippines-agreed-to-pull-out-of-the-ayungin-shoal, accessed April 17, 
2018. 
434 “PH sending ships to Ayungin despite blockade,” Rappler, March 13, 2014, 
https://www.rappler.com/nation/52934-ph-sending-civilian-ships-ayungin-despite-blockade, accessed April 17, 
2018. 
435 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on Comments by the US State Department 
on China’s Expulsion of Philippine Ships that Transported Construction Materials to the Ren’ai Reef,” March 13, 
2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/fyrbt_1/t1137065.htm, accessed April 17, 2018. 
436 PCA, “The Award,” 456. 
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land.438 Hence, they were naturally more noticeable and unnerving to the other claimants. China 
insisted that the construction activities were for maritime purposes of “providing public service” 
to the region, not for militarization of the South China Sea.439 But this was hardly convincing to 
the other countries in the region, especially the Philippines and the U.S. On February 16, 2016, 
satellite imagery obtained by Fox News showed that China had deployed an advanced surface-
to-air missile system Hongqi 9 to Woody Island (Yongxing dao) in the Paracels.440 Pointing to 
the U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) which penetrated into 12 nautical miles of 
the Chinese-occupied land features, China blamed the U.S. for the militarization of the South 
China Sea. China’s deployment of Hongqi 9 on Woody Island on February 16 seemed to be a tit-
for-tat response to the USS Wilbur’s passing near the Triton Island on January 31, given the 
close timing and geographic proximity as both were within the Paracels Island Group. But the 
deployment of Hongqi 9 further deteriorated the threat perceptions of the Southeast Asian 
claimants and the United States. Even worse, the news came just as U.S. President Obama was 
welcoming ASEAN leaders for a summit in California and China’s most recent “provocation” 
became the “elephant in the room.”  
On July 30, 2014 and May 21, 2015, Manila wrote twice to the Tribunal expressing grave 
concerns about China’s dredging, artificial island-building, and construction activities on seven 
438 CSIS, “China Island Tracker,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/, 
accessed April 17, 2018. 
439 Chinese leaders and MoFA has repeated this point at various occasions. For example, PRC MoFA, “Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on April 9, 2015,” April 9, 2015, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1253488.shtml, accessed April 18, 2018; or see 
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin’s speech at the 10th East Asia Summit in Malaysia, cited in 
“Military Facilities Aren’t Militarization in the South China Sea: Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister,” The Diplomat, 
November 23, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/military-facilities-arent-militarization-in-the-south-china-sea-
chinese-deputy-foreign-minister/, accessed April 18, 2018. 
440 “Exclusive: China sends surface-to-air missiles to contested island in provocative move,” Fox News, February 16, 
2016, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/02/16/exclusive-china-sends-suface-to-air-missiles-to-contested-island-
in-provocative-move.html, accessed April 18, 2018. 
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features it occupied, namely, Cuarteron Reef (Huayang Jiao), Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu Jiao), 
Johnson Reef (Chigua Jiao), Hughes Reef (Dongmen Jiao), Gaven Reefs (Nanxun Jiao), Subi 
Reef (Zhubi Jiao), and Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao)441 It asked the Tribunal to judge on the legality 
and the environmental impacts of the Chinese activities, as well as whether the artificial features 
would generate additional maritime entitlements. Manila also resorted to ASEAN to respond to 
the Chinese reclamation. On January 22, 2015, ahead of an ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat, 
Philippines Foreign Secretary Rosario denounced China’s construction work a “threat” to all 
ASEAN countries and called the participants to discuss about the reclamation.442 Ahead of an 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Summit on April 26, 2016, Rosario once again called the ASEAN 
countries to act collectively to halt China’s reclamation, but apparently failed to raise widespread 
support.443 
The Philippines also developed closer ties with the U.S. and Japan as a response to their 
weakened security in the region due to China’s reclamation. To the U.S., the Chinese 
reclamation impinges more on China’s naval power projection capabilities in the Pacific, and 
less on the sovereignty dispute. As such, the U.S. reactions seemed even stronger and more 
substantial than those of the Philippines. The tug of war between the U.S. and China in the South 
China Sea became an important thread in the background of the ongoing arbitration.  
The U.S.’ response to the Chinese reclamation had three components: 1) name and 
shame: release satellite images to expose China’s reclamation activities and incur an 
international reputation cost for China; 2) conduct FONOPs that directly challenge China near 
441 PCA, “The Award,” 13, 16. 
442 “PH to take up China reclamation before ASEAN,” Rappler, January 22, 2015, 
https://www.rappler.com/nation/81657-philippines-china-reclamation-asean, accessed April 17, 2018. 
443 “Philippines calls on ASEAN to urge China to halt land reclamation,” Reuters, April 26, 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-summit-southchinasea/philippines-calls-on-asean-to-urge-china-to-halt-
land-reclamation-idUSKBN0NH03P20150426, accessed April 17, 2018. 
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the artificial islands; 3) provide diplomatic and military assistance to Southeast Asian claimants 
to strengthen an extended deterrence to China. On the first component, the IHS Jane’s Defense 
Weekly and the CSIS continuously released satellite images of China’s dredging activities, 
which sustained the attention of western media for quite some time.  
On the second component, the U.S. carried out at least five FONOPs near China-
occupied land features and all of them were highly publicized. On May 20, 2015, America’s 
most advanced surveillance aircraft P8-A Poseidon flew over the Fiery Cross Reef. With a CNN 
correspondent on board, the action broadcasted live to the public the Chinese construction scene 
and the Chinese warning to the U.S. aircraft to leave immediately.444 On Oct 27, 2015, a U.S. 
missile destroyer, USS Lassen, sailed to within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief and Subi reefs, 
causing a Chinese warship to shadow its movements and provoking an angry response from 
Beijing and its summoning of the U.S. ambassador.445 On January 30, 2016, a U.S. missile 
destroyer, USS Curtis Wilbur, passed within 12 nautical miles of the Triton Island of the 
Paracels.446 On April 19, 2016, a U.S. Pacific Command air contingent flew near the 
444 “Exclusive: China warns U.S. surveillance plane,” CNN, May 20, 2015, 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/05/20/politics/south-china-sea-navy-flight/index.html, accessed April 17, 2018. 
445 “ ‘Hope to see you again’: China warship to U.S. destroyer after South China Sea patrol,” Reuters, November 5, 
2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-warship/hope-to-see-you-again-china-warship-to-u-s-
destroyer-after-south-china-sea-patrol-idUSKCN0SV05420151106, accessed April 18, 2018; “Beijing summons US 
ambassador over warship in South China Sea,” The Guardian, October 27, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/27/us-warship-lassen-defies-beijing-sail-disputed-south-china-sea-
islands, accessed April 18, 2018. 
446 “U.S. missile destroyer sailed close to island claimed by China,” Washington Post, January 30, 2016, 
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Scarborough Shoal.447 On May 10, 2016, a U.S. destroyer USS William P. Lawrence passed 
within 12 nautical miles of the Fiery Cross Reef. 448 
On the third component, besides increasing military assistance and strengthening defense 
cooperation, the U.S. also criticized the Chinese action and offer support to the other claimants at 
multilateral forums. At the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Ashton Carter reacted to China’s reclamation: “There should be no mistake: the United States 
will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows…America, alongside its allies and 
partners…will not be deterred from exercising these rights…after all, turning an underwater rock 
into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on 
international air or maritime transit.”449 When addressing to the APEC meeting in Manila on 
November 18, 2015, President Obama singled China out and asked it to halt its reclamation 
activities.450 
 
III. In the Lens of the (Mis)Alignment Theory 
In the text that follows, I evaluate how well the theory explains the propaganda campaign 
adopted during the arbitration crisis in June and July 2016. I first assess whether the theoretical 
assumptions made under the theory are applicable to the case. I then evaluate evidence to 
447 U.S. Air Force, “PACAF A-10s, HH-60s fly first air contingent missions in Philippines,” April 22, 2016, 
http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/740671/pacaf-a-10s-hh-60s-fly-first-air-contingent-missions-in-
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448 “USS William P. Lawrence passes China-claimed reef,” Associated Press, May 10, 2016, 
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2016/05/10/uss-william-p-lawrence-passes-china-claimed-reef/, 
accessed April 19, 2018. 
449 Ashton Carter, “A Regional Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises,” speech delivered at IISS, Shanri-La 
Dialogue, Singapore, May 30, 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606676/, 
accessed April 18, 2018. 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/asia/obama-apec-summit-south-china-sea-philippines.html, accessed 
April 18, 2018. 
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determine the values of the independent variables. I find that existing public opinion was 
hardline, but the state intended for a moderate foreign policy. I argue that given this setup of 
conditions, the state launched a propaganda campaign to pacify the public opinion to meet the 
foreign policy demand. I trace the pacifying process to see whether and how well empirical 
evidence supports the observable implications of the theory.  
 
1. Theoretical Assumptions of Rational Actor and State-Public Interactions on Foreign 
Policy 
On the first assumption that the state is rationally-led and its top priorities are regime survival 
against domestic competitors and state security against external threats, the Chinese government 
in the 2016 arbitration crisis acted largely as a unitary, rational actor whose decisions were based 
on rational calculations of domestic concerns and external threats. The chain of reactions 
between China and the Philippines and between China and the U.S. are classic manifestations of 
the Realist security dilemma in international security. Take China’s land reclamation for 
example, the Chinese action was motivated by the long-term strategic need to catch up with the 
other claimants, and to enhance its naval projection power with perceived growing threats from 
the U.S. in the Asia Pacific. It was also spurred by the recent Philippine attempt to upgrade the 
Second Thomas Shoal, which gave it a feel of urgency resulting from a deteriorating claim 
strength in the South China Sea. 
 Some may argue that China’s policy of non-participation in the arbitration was unwise 
and therefore irrational. Indeed, my interview with senior policy advisor consulted by the state 
on the issue revealed that there were internal criticisms against the decision of non-participation, 
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even after the decision was made.451 The next sections will elaborate China’s inner thinking on 
the non-participation decision. But to summarize the point for the purpose here, the whole 
decision-making process reflected thorough vetting at the highest level. According to my 
interview with relevant government official, comprehensive considerations of legal expert advice 
was also part of the decision-making process and an internal legal document was produced on 
this matter.452 This further confirms the rationalist assumption of the state actor in this case. The 
fact that China had resolutely and consistently followed through with the policy strengthens our 
confidence in this assumption as well.  
 Some scholarly work stresses the parochial institutional role of various state agencies in 
the South China Sea dispute. For example, You argues for the centrality of the PLA both in the 
policy making at the top and the enforcement at the front-line.453 Goldstein demonstrates the 
impact of the competition between various government branches on the dispute.454 But these 
arguments had little applicability to the arbitration crisis. We can see from the narrative of events 
throughout the three and half years that the arbitration lasted, the PLA and other state agencies 
played little part. Perhaps due to the nature of the arbitration and the high national reputational 
stakes the case involved, the decision was highly centralized. Besides, since Xi Jinping took 
office in 2012, he had not only consolidated his personal power through a widespread anti-
corruption campaign, but also had streamlined the decision-making process, particularly on 
foreign policy issues, through a number of organizational restructuring efforts. Right now, the 
decision-making apparatus on the South China Sea dispute is composed of a Central Leading 
451 Interview 19, May 29, 2017, Beijing.  
452 Interview 41, June 9, 2017, Beijing.  
453 You 2017. 
454 Goldstein 2010. Other works along similar lines of argument include Saunders and Scobell 2015 and 
International Crisis Group 2012.  
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Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interest at the top, headed by Xi himself, and the 
State Maritime Administration in charge of the daily policy management and the China Coast 
Guard in policy enforcement.  
 As for the second and the third assumptions that public opinion has to play some, neither 
utterly submissive, nor overwhelmingly decisive, role in a state’s foreign policy making, they are 
also applicable to this case. The case took place in today’s digital age where information flow is 
a lot freer despite China’s sophisticated censorship system. As pointed out in Chapter 3 in the 
background section, concomitant with the freer flow of information is a more expressive and 
active public who were easily inflamed by popular nationalism. Therefore, public opinion has 
arguably played a larger role in the state’s foreign policy making. The fact that the Central 
Propaganda Department (CPD) ordered the media “not to hype” and “not to spread the news” on 
“recent illegal demonstrations” a week after the release of the award indirectly shows that the 
state cared about public opinion.455 These demonstrations targeted KFC as a scapegoat for the 
American support of the arbitration, and the government felt the need to take the situation under 
control exactly because of the potential power of public opinion.  
But as also argued in Chapter 3 in the background section, this more expressive and 
active public opinion does not necessarily mean a weakened state control. As the case played 
out, public opinion was never a critical factor in any of the critical decisions throughout the case, 
either the decision to not participate into the arbitration, or the conciliatory stance to make up 
with Manila soon after the release of the award. The elusive role the factor of public opinion 
played in the state decision making was evident in all the interviews conducted to the 
government officials and policy analysts involved in the case. This seeming paradox in the 
455 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department), “Feifa jihui youxing xinxi (Information on illegal gatherings and 
demonstrations),” China Digital Times, July 18, 2016, https://goo.gl/VrRV3Z, accessed April 24, 2018. 
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relations between public opinion and state foreign policy making, as I argued in Chapter 3, is due 
to the legion of resources and means available at the state’s disposal to influence public opinion 
to meet foreign policy needs. The pacifying propaganda, the focus of this chapter, is an important 
one of these means. 
 
2. A Hardline Public Opinion 
China’s land reclamation activities and the U.S. FONOPs near China’s artificial islands 
throughout 2015 and especially in the first half of 2016 significantly elevated the salience of the 
dispute in the Chinese public. There was a chain of reactions between the U.S. and China in the 
first half of 2016 and a downward spiral in the security relationship that reached a crisis level. As 
mentioned in the narrative of events earlier, China’s aggressive island-building activities spurred 
a U.S. response in conducting FONOPs near China’s artificial islands. The U.S. destroyer USS 
Wilbur’s passing through 12 nautical miles of the Triton Island of the Paracels on January 30, 
2016 may have provoked China to deploy the surface-to-air missile system to the Woody Island 
on February 16. The Chinese deployment of the missle further deteriorated the security 
perceptions of the Southeast Asian countries and the U.S., whose leaders happened to be 
convening in California talking about the security situation in the region. The U.S. further 
reacted by dispatching an aircraft carrier navy group to the South China Sea in early March.456 
Since January 2016, the U.S. conducted FONOPs near China-claimed islands almost every 
month leading up to the release of the award.  
456 “Navy aircraft carrier group moves into contested South China Sea,” Washington Post, March 3, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/03/navy-aircraft-carrier-group-moves-into-
contested-south-china-sea-pentagon-says/?utm_term=.67a7ece17ac2, accessed April 19, 2018. 
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 This rising tension was accompanied by a rancorous debate about who was really 
militarizing the South China Sea, featuring angry responses of high-level officials at prominent 
international arenas such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, the APEC summit, and the ASEAN 
summits. All of these caught the attention of the media and the public both internationally and 
within China. This, in the background of the Sino-Philippines arbitration, raised the awareness 
and intensified the emotions among the Chinese public. Before the arbitration entered into a 
crisis status in June and July of 2016, the public had already been amply agitated.  
 There was no credible public opinion survey measuring the Chinese public opinion taken 
right before the crisis towards this particular dispute, but the Beijing Area Study (BAS)457 survey 
carried out between April 10 and June 30, 2015 ranked the Philippines the second lowest in the 
country thermometers (36 out of 100), only after Japan (30 out of 100), against whom the 
Chinese nationalistic sentiment was notoriously acute.  
 The Baidu Search Index (BSI), an analytic tool that tracks the daily search activity on 
given keywords on China’s most dominant search engine baidu.com, offers a useful 
measurement for the level of public attention in China. Figure 6.2 shows an average of about 
four thousand in the search index for the word “South China Sea” during the one-year pre-crisis 
period, with several surges throughout the year. For comparison, the all-time average of search 
volume during non-crisis periods between January 1, 2011 and October 15, 2017 is 2,773. The 
average during the one year before the Sino-Vietnamese oil rig crisis in 2014 was below eighteen 




457 The Beijing Area Study is an annual opinion survey of Beijing residents in social and economic life. It started to 
add an international component from 1998. The question of country thermometer on the Philippines was added in 
2013. 
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The existing hardline public opinion was also evident in the initial public response. The court’s 
announcement sparked an enormous public outcry on the Internet. During July 1-20, the number 
of relevant microblog posts soared to over five million, mostly from China’s leading microblog 
Sina Weibo.458 Large-scale protests, despite their actual absence, were well expected, and the 
security of the Philippine Embassy in Beijing was strengthened. Scattered protests occurred in a 
number of cities, with people standing outside KFC restaurants condemning the U.S.’ 
involvement and calling for a boycott.459  
 
3. The Misalignment: A Moderate State Policy Intent 
Despite Beijing’s harsh rhetoric, strong evidence affirms its preference for a moderate 
policy. Interviews of scholars with privileged access to policy-making revealed that Beijing from 
the very beginning “wanted the issue to go away.”460 After Manila first initiated the case, there 
had been heated internal debates about whether to participate in the arbitration.  
458 Jiang and Luo 2016, 60.  
459 “KFC Targeted in Protests Over South China Sea,” New York Times, July 19, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/world/asia/south-china-sea-protests-kfc.html, accessed April 19, 2018. 
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Beijing faced a difficult choice. If it were to participate and lose a high-profile case like 
this, the domestic implications would be severe. It would also have regional ramifications on 
China’s other offshore disputes. The chance of losing the case was high. China’s nine-dash line 
claim predates the UNCLOS, so in many aspects it was not compatible with the UNCLOS 
clauses. The nine dashes do not even have coordinates and it was not clear what the dashes really 
mean. Beijing had deliberately left it ambiguous, in the hope of maintaining the status quo so it 
would neither “win” or “lose” an inch of its “ancestor land.” Besides, Chan and Li’s interviews 
with analysts from various Chinese think tanks suggest that China feared that “the process will 
not be fair as the President of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Shunji 
Yanai, is Japanese by nationality.”461 Even observers such as Greg Poling predicted in February 
2016 that “the judges will almost certainly rule that China’s nine-dash line is not a valid 
maritime claim and that China is not entitled to any historic rights beyond the regime of 
territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves laid out in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).”462 Also, there was no precedent on any of 
China’s territorial disputes to be resolved by international arbitration, so China was suspicious of 
such an approach. For the same reason, by declaring on August 28, 2006 the UNCLOS exclusion 
term Article 298, China had purposely excluded itself from the jurisdiction of international 
arbitration of disputes concerning maritime boundary delimitation, historic bays and titles, and 
military use of the ocean.463 
461 Chan and Li 2015, 38-39. 
462 Gregory B. Poling, “A Tumultuous 2016 in the South China Sea,” CSIS Commentary, February 18, 2016, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/tumultuous-2016-south-china-sea, accessed April 19, 2018. 
463 For China’s declaration under Article 298, see United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
“Declarations and Statements,” 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China%20after%20ratification; 
for content of Article 298, see http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm, 
accessed April 19, 2018. 
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By not participating, China would lose the opportunity to influence the ruling in its favor. 
For example, after the Philippines initiated the case on January 22, 2013, China would have the 
right to appoint an arbitrator, even a Chinese national. The tribunal based the hearing on China’s 
2014 Position Paper and the letters sent to the Tribunal by the Chinese Ambassador to the 
Netherlands, but these would be far less substantial than a real representation. Non-participation 
would also damage China’s soft power and taint China’s international image. Professor Jerome 
Cohen of the New York University School of Law comments that “This (non-participation and 
non-acceptance) makes China look bad to the world community … Now it looks like a bully that 
rejects its legal obligation to settle a dispute under UNCLOS.”464 This view was shared by many. 
Poling says that “Being branded an international outlaw will involve significant reputational 
costs for Beijing. It will undermine China’s narrative that it is a responsible rising power that 
deserves a greater hand in global governance. It will make other countries wary of Chinese 
commitments and will drive regional states even closer to Tokyo and Washington.”465 
After weighing the pros and cons of both choices, and consulting thoroughly with 
international legal experts, Beijing made a decision to not participate nor accept the arbitration. 
Throughout this process, punishing or threatening to punish the Philippines for challenging 
China in front of the International Tribunal was given little consideration, if any.466 Subsequent 
events proved that Beijing refrained from punishing Manila. Instead, China engaged in 
diplomatic efforts to make the Philippines drop the case. But such endeavors apparently failed – 
Manila was determined to pursue the case. As the case continued to develop and the situation 
464 “Beijing looks like a ‘bully’ by rejecting arbitration on South China Sea issue,” South China Morning Post, May 
25, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1245471/beijing-looks-bully-rejecting-arbitration-south-china-
sea-issue, April 19, 2018. 
465 Gregory B. Poling, “A Tumultuous 2016 in the South China Sea,” CSIS Commentary, February 18, 2016, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/tumultuous-2016-south-china-sea, accessed April 19, 2018. 
466 Interview 12, May 26, 2017, Beijing; Interview 19, May 29, 2017, Beijing. 
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became more and more clear with an impending ruling, China’s behavior became largely 
“reactive” and “remedial.”467 The domestic and international propaganda campaign, the 
diplomatic efforts to forestall an ASEAN statement mentioning the ruling, and the international 
campaign to rally support for China’s position, as mentioned in previous texts, were all 
components of the “reactive” and “remedial” policy. 
Actions speak louder than words. Even at the height of the crisis in late June, Beijing 
wasted no time in congratulating Rodrigo Duterte, who had just been sworn in as the Philippines’ 
new president. This is a strong indicator Beijing was seeking new diplomatic channels to resolve 
the issue and not seeking escalation or retaliation. Duterte said he was honored to receive the 
congratulatory message from the Chinese President Xi Jinping and continued to release positive 
signals to improve the relationship.468 Xi reciprocated by expressing that he was “willing to work 
with Duterte to push for improvement of relations between their two countries,” notably leaving 
out the ongoing arbitration.469  
After the tribunal released its ruling, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin said at a July 13 
press conference that China had “noted that the new Philippine government led by President 
Duterte was positive about resuming dialogue with China and moving forward the bilateral 
relationship from different aspects. We welcome that with our door widely open.”470 Beijing was 
ready to turn the page. In Feng Zhang’s analysis, “This [Beijing’s] position of ignoring the award 
while seeking negotiation with the Philippines is clear from two important documents the 
Chinese government released immediately after the award: a statement about China territorial 
467 Interview 6, May 22, 2017, Beijing; Interview 19, May 29, 2017, Beijing. 
468 “Philippines president-elect Duterte hails China’s Xi Jinping as ‘great president’,” Xinhua News, June 1, 2016, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/01/c_135404541.htm, accessed April 19, 2018. 
469 “Xi congratulates new Philippine president on inauguration,” Xinhua News, June 30, 2016, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/30/c_135478948.htm, accessed April 19, 2018. 
470 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on July 14, 2016,” July 14, 
2016, http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/fyrth/t1381622.htm, accessed April 19, 2018. 
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sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea and a white paper on settling the disputes 
with the Philippines through negotiation. Both documents mention the so-called nine-dash line 
map only in passing. Instead, the statement announces China’s readiness to make practical 
temporary arrangements with the Philippines to reduce tension and seek cooperation.”471 
On August 8 after the tribunal ruling, the Philippines sent former president Fidel V. 
Ramos as special envoy to Hong Kong as an “icebreaker” to renew friendship with the Chinese. 
Ramos met with Fu Ying, Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National 
People’s Congress and Wu Shicun, President of the National Institute for South China Sea 
Studies. They issued a statement in their personal capacities, which focused on cooperation and 
dialogue and did not mention about the ruling.472 Ramos also expressed his government’s 
interest in engaging in formal discussions to ease tensions with China.473 Ramos’ visit tested 
waters for the Chinese receptivity of a new Philippine conciliatory position and the subsequent 
visit by President Duterte proved that his good will was reciprocated. 
Besides sending cooperative signals to and reciprocating the good will of the Duterte 
government, Beijing also made a number of cooperative and conciliatory gestures. These 
behaviors were simply not of a state intending for a hardline policy. On the July 24 China-
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ summit right after the release of the ruling, besides the wrestling of 
keeping the language mentioning the ruling off the Joint Communiqué (as elaborated in earlier 
texts), Beijing notably made a concession by promising ASEAN not to carry out land 
471 Feng Zhang et al, “China’s Claims in the South China Sea Rejected,” ChinaFile, July 13, 2016, 
http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/chinas-claims-south-china-sea-rejected, accessed April 19, 2018. 
472 “Ramos the icebreaker: former Philippine president heads to Hong Kong to test China waters,” South China 
Morning Post, August 8, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2000842/former-
philippines-president-fidel-ramos-heads-beijing; for content of the joint statement, see 
https://www.chinausfocus.com/news/2016/0812/3714.html, accessed April 19, 2018. 
473 “Philippines wants formal talks to ease tensions with China, says ex-president Ramos,” South China Morning 
Post, August 12, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2002784/philippines-wants-
formal-talks-ease-tensions-china-says, accessed April 19, 2018. 
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reclamation on the Scarborough Shoal. Besides the Joint Communiqué, the summit also issued a 
Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China on the Full and 
Effective Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.474 
The Joint Statement carries the language that the Parties “refrain from action of inhabiting on the 
presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features.” This commitment 
precludes the Philippines from upgrading the Second Thomas Shoal, in just the same way as it 
constrains China from carrying out land reclamation on the Scarborough Shoal.  
On August 15-16, 2016, China and ASEAN member states held the 13th Senior 
Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and the 18th Joint Working Group Meeting on the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in China’s Manzhouli. 
This meeting ended with some tentative breakthroughs, which were confirmed at the September 
China-ASEAN summit. The meeting adopted guidelines for a hotline during maritime 
emergencies, a Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea 
in the South China Sea, and pledged to finalize a draft for a code of conduct for the South China 
Sea by the middle of 2017.475 President Duterte visited China on October 20. President Xi met 
with Duterte and the two agreed to resume direct talks on the South China Sea dispute. After 
Duterte’s visit, China reports that the “China-Philippine relations have been turned around and 
474 PRC MoFA, “Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China on the Full and 
Effective Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” July 25, 2016, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/zcfg_1/t1384245.htm, accessed April 20, 2018. 
475 “The 13th Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC Held in Manzhouli, Inner Mongolia,” 
August 16, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/wjbxw_1/t1389619.htm; “Can Manzhouli work its magic on 
the South China Sea disputes?” South China Morning Post, August 21, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/week-
asia/politics/article/2006260/can-manzhouli-work-its-magic-south-china-sea-disputes, accessed April 20, 2018. 
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put on a track of all-around improvement.”476 As a substantive cooperative gesture, China also 
allowed Filipino fishermen to return to the vicinity of the Scarborough Shoal.477 
 
4. A Pacifying Propaganda Campaign 
The existing hardline public opinion and the moderate state policy intent thus created a gap that 
the state needed to bridge before carrying out its preferred moderate policy. To recall the logic of 
the misalignment theory delineated in Chapter 2, when a state holding a moderate foreign policy 
intent is faced with a hardline public opinion, the state launches a pacifying propaganda 
campaign to counterintuitively calm the public opinion to align it with the intended moderate 
state policy. A pacifying propaganda campaign works in two ways. One is to appease the public 
by keeping up the appearances of a hard stand, as a strong rhetoric helps fend off nationalistic 
criticism, maintain social stability, and to save face. Recent research on public opinion in foreign 
policy shows evidence that citizens approve of government “bluster” – tough talk not followed 
up with tough action.478 The “issue attention cycle” (the short attention span of the public) 
characterized in Media Studies also offers support for the rationale behind this function.479 The 
other is to moderate public opinion by echoing their emotions and letting the public vent. Studies 
in social psychology and on effects of social media support this rationale. 
 The events that transpired in the arbitration crisis substantiate the observable implications 
of a pacifying propaganda campaign listed in Chapter 2. 
476 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on May 19,” May 19, 
2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1463588.shtml, accessed April 20, 2018. 
477 “Filipino fisherman back in disputed South China Sea shoal after Duterte’s Beijing pivot,” South China Morning 
Post, October 30, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2041371/filipino-fisherman-back-
disputed-south-china-sea-shoal, accessed April 20, 2018. 
478 Weiss and Dafoe 2017. 
479 Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Bodensteiner 1995; Downs 1972. 
198
Hb1 (Nationalistic Criticisms): The state is exposed to nationalistic criticisms. A 
government under nationalist attacks will be more motivated to align the public to its preferred 
moderate policy. 
The government was indeed vulnerable of criticisms given the difficult situation it was 
placed in. A senior Chinese scholar disclosed that many people including political elites thought 
the decision not to participate in the arbitration was erroneous and unwise. Many regarded the 
arbitration as a major diplomatic debacle and privately blamed the government. Several senior 
scholars interviewed by the author complained about the impairment of the ruling to China’s 
territorial claim in the South China Sea and the damage of China’s non-participation and non-
acceptance stance to China’s international image of complying to international law.480 A senior 
scholar involved in the decision-making process commented: “The government does not want 
the public to know that it actually made a mistake. When the issue was discussed internally 
within the government, we had two different opinions. One opinion is to participate in the 
arbitration, so that we can influence the result to our advantage. But the government went with 
the other opinion to not participate. The result turned out to be the most unfavorable to China. 
Then the government had to adopt a damage control approach.”481 
Strong nationalist views expressed online, some of which censored, harshly denounced 
the government’s preference for peaceful negotiations and referenced to the vast amount of land 
China had ceded to foreign states since 1949.482 “China must draw the sword (zhongguo bixu 
liang jian),” “No dried mango for our national interest (Guojia mianqian wu mangguo gan),” 
480 Interview 6, May 22, 2017, Beijing; interview 19, May 29, 2016, Beijing. 
481 Interview 19, May 29, 2017, Beijing. 
482 “The South China Sea Arbitration Ruling: Chinese Netizens Debate Whether to Fight a War (Nanhai zhongcai an 
panjue: zhongguo wangmin zhengbian yingfou kaizhan),” BBC Chinese, July 13, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2016/07/160713_south_china_sea_web_reax, accessed April 20, 2018. 
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“Whoever attacks China will be killed no matter how far the target is (fan wo zhonghua zhe, sui 
yuan bi zhu),” became popular expressions online. “No dried mango” was calling for boycotting 
mangos imported from the Philippines. Zhao observed right before the release of the award that 
“many people swore by war…once the ruling turns out to be unfavorable to China, street protests 
would almost certainly be expected; people might even attack the Philippine and the American 
Embassies.”483  
Scholarly works and interviews with government officials reveal and confirm the logic of 
the pacifying propaganda – the leaders were forced to appear strong-handed in front of a 
nationalistic domestic public, even at the risk of inflaming even stronger nationalism. Shi wrote 
that “although publicizing the American, the Philippine or the Japanese military activities in the 
South China Sea might fan too much popular nationalism, the government does not want to 
suppress coverage too bluntly as too little noise might make the government appear weak and 
easily cowed.”484 In You Ji’s analysis, “if dispute aversion is meant to help domestic stability its 
softness over sovereignty issues arouses public anger which challenges state legitimacy and thus 
just betrays the goal of domestic stability.”485 Interview to a government official confirmed the 
state’s concern about the hardline public opinion: “The government was worried that the public 
might hear about the arbitration from foreign media anyways, and this (the arbitration) has great 
impact on China’s national image.”486 So instead of passively reacting to a public outcry at the 
whims of foreign media, the state took the reins of its own propaganda machine to effectively 
shape public opinion to its foreign policy needs. 
483 Zhao 2016, 54. 
484 Shi 2015, 96. 
485 You 2014, 252. 
486 Interview 12, May 26, 2017, Beijing.  
200
Hb2 (Bark but No Bite): Official statements are harsh, but without any substantive 
threats of punishment. To keep up the appearances of a hard stand and to fend off nationalist 
criticisms, a government needs to adopt a particularly harsh rhetoric, sometimes even in 
hyperbole and colorful language. But the absence of any substantive threats of punishment belies 
its real moderate intentions. In the end, it is all bark but no bite. 
To protect itself from potential criticisms, the state issued strongly-worded statements, 
yet none threatening with substantive punishment. For example, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang 
Yesui stated: “China opposes and will not accept any proposition and action based on the award 
and will never negotiate with any other country over the South China Sea based on the illegal 
award.”487 The Foreign Minister Spokesperson Lu Kang criticized the U.S. for not being 
impartial as it had claimed to be and hypocrisy of the U.S. in supporting the ruling: “The US is 
always selective when it comes to the application of international law: citing international law 
when it sees fit and discarding international law when it sees otherwise. It keeps urging others to 
abide by the UNCLOS while refusing to ratify the Convention to this day.”488 The PRC 
ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai impugned the impartiality of the tribunal by saying that 
Shunji Yanai, the jurist who appointed most of the arbitrators, is “a right-wing Japanese intent on 
ridding Japan of post-war arrangements.”489 Former Chinese state councilor Dai Bingguo 
487 PRC MoFA, “China’s Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea Shall Not Be 
Affected by Arbitration Award,” July 16, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/wjbxw_1/t1382766.htm, 
accessed April 20, 2018. 
488 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on Statement by Spokesperson of US State 
Department on South China Sea Arbitration Ruling,” July 13, 2016, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1380409.shtml, accessed April 20, 2018. 
489 PRC MoFA, “Yang Jiechi Gives Interview to State Media on the So-called Award by the Arbitral Tribunal for 
the South China Sea Arbitration,” July 15, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1381740.shtml, 
accessed April 20, 2018. 
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dismissed the ruling as “nothing but a piece of waste paper.”490 State Councilor Yang Jiechi 
asserted on July 14 in an interview to state media that “Certain countries outside the region have 
attempted to deny China’s sovereign rights and interests in the South China Sea through the 
arbitration.”491 “Certain countries outside the region” refers to the U.S., Japan and some 
European countries. 
Notably, all these harsh words came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, few from the 
military. The silence on the military side was also a strong indicator that it was all bark but no 
bite. The public, as it turned out, were greatly satisfied by the strong rhetoric. For example, 
commenting on Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lu Kang’s statement that the ruling 
“will in no way affect China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the 
South China Sea,” Weibo posts praised the spokesperson as “domineering” and “cool.”492 
Hb3 (Non-Inflammatory Content): Media content is informative and analytical, not 
inflammatory. Besides echoing the hardline public emotion to release their anger, a significant 
portion of the media content should be geared towards guiding public opinion towards rational 
thoughts, so that the public would be less likely to resort to violence or collective actions that 
would endanger social stability or regime security. 
The second way a pacifying propaganda campaign works is to moderate the strong public 
opinion. Editors and journalists at main official media outlets covering the arbitration explained 
490 “Veteran Chinese Diplomat Warns on South China Sea Ruling,” The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2017, 
https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/07/06/veteran-chinese-diplomat-warns-on-south-china-sea-ruling/, 
accessed April 20, 2018. 
491 PRC MoFA, “Yang Jiechi Gives Interview to State Media on the So-called Award by the Arbitral Tribunal for 
the South China Sea Arbitration,” July 15, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1381740.shtml, 
accessed April 20, 2018. 
492 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on Statement by 
Spokesperson of US State Department on South China Sea Arbitration Ruling,” July 13, 2016, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1380409.shtml, accessed April 20, 2018; Jiang 
and Luo 2016, 60. 
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that the main purpose of the media campaign was to “prepare” and “guide” public opinion 
“before the release of the award.” “Because the ruling was expected to be unfavorable [to 
China], we need to help the public to understand it objectively and rationally. Thus, after the 
release [of the award], the public would know how to refute the ruling with reason, but not to 
vent their anger recklessly. The public does not have a clear understanding of this issue – they 
are either influenced by the Western media, or have extreme populist opinions. Our role is to 
clarify a couple of issues – the legal basis [of our position], different stands of different 
countries, the external and internal causes, and China’s historic rights [in the South China 
Sea].”493 A government official also admitted that the “domestic part of the public relations 
campaign” was to “prepare the public to accept and understand the ruling.” “Our main position is 
that the ruling and the arbitration itself were manipulated.”494 
The successful “channeling of public anger” was done in ways of echoing public 
sentiment and offering rational analysis of the issue. During the crisis, the official media echoed 
public emotion and offered rational analysis. Although some language were harsh for echoing 
purposes, but they were limited to accusation, excoriation, and ridicule; they were usually not 
strong enough to incite hatred, and they almost always end with a positive note. For example, 
one People’s Daily editorial by Zhong Sheng criticized the tribunal for setting “a ridiculous 
standard for the territorial status of islands and reefs,” and characterized the arbitration as “full of 
lies” and producing a “foul atmosphere.”495 Despite the acerbic language, the article ended with 
a positive note that called the Philippines to drop the case and return to the bilateral negotiation 
493 Interview 36, June 7, 2017, Beijing. 
494 Interview 41, June 9, 2017, Beijing.  
495 Zhong Sheng, “Tanpan xieshang shi jiejue nanhai wenti de weiyi chulu (Negotiation is the only way to solve the 
South China Sea Disputes),” People’s Daily, July 14, 2016, http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0714/c1003-
28553963.html, accessed April 22, 2018. 
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approach. The harsh language in the media shows the government’s recognition and agreement 
with the public sentiment, in order to gain the necessary public trust to further influence public 
opinion towards ways of public expression amenable to the regime interests. As one government 
official commented: “sometimes the politically correct stuff [in the media] are just not enough 
for the people. Only the language we often find in Global Times [a well-known hawkish 
newspaper under People’s Daily] help the public vent their spleen. They help the people let off 
steam by resonating their feelings.”496  
Meanwhile, the positive tone found in the media campaign helped to further direct public 
emotions to the regime’s likes. According to the South China Sea Public Opinion Newsletter 
published by the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing 
University, which regularly monitors public opinion on the South China Sea dispute, articles 
with positive attitudes continued to dominate the media throughout the crisis. In June 2016, 
articles with positive attitudes exceeded those with negative attitudes by 25.5%.497 This number 
rose even higher in July to 40%.498 This shows that the government was trying to spin a positive 
story out of a difficult situation. 
These techniques of echoing of public sentiment by using harsh language, instilling 
rationality by providing evidence-based analysis, and spinning a positive perspective were 
manifested in several main themes of media reports during this time. These themes focused on 
reasoning and analysis, with some accusations of the Philippines and the U.S. to provoke a sense 
of injustice, but none inciting hatred. One theme was to elaborate the government position and 
496 Interview 41, June 9, 2017, Beijing. 
497 Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University, South China Sea Public 
Opinion Newsletter, June 2016 issue, 1. 
498 Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University, South China Sea Public 
Opinion Newsletter, July 2016 issue, 1. The July issue has more discussion on the positive and negative attitudes on 
page 7. 
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explain the legal basis, stressing on China’s historic rights and rejecting the Philippine claim. 
This theme usually copied Chinese MoFA’s remarks, statements, and policy papers. Zhong 
Sheng also penned several editorials, with the title “China’s Historic Rights within the Nine-
Dash Line Brooks No Distortion,”499 “There is Only One Truth,”500 “The Territorial Status of 
South China Sea Islands and Reefs Does Not Depend on False Words that Makes White 
Black.”501 Other articles cited historical evidence for China’s territorial claim and against that of 
the Philippines;502 refuted the Philippine approach of segregating the South China Sea dispute 
into smaller pieces of entitlement-based disputes to fit into the Tribunal’s jurisdiction;503 
revealed the inconsistence of the Aquino Administration on the dispute,504 etc.  
Another theme was to cast doubt on the neutrality and authority of the Tribunal, from the 
appointment of the judges, the operation of the Tribunal, to the financial details of the arbitration. 
People’s Daily had a series of articles on the background of the Tribunal, calling it “temporary,” 
“lacks legitimacy,” a “troupe,” “a political tool” with money transactions with the Philippines, or 
even “the cancer cell of the international rule of law.”505  
499 Zhong Sheng, “Zhongguo zai nanhai duanxuxian nei de lishixing quanli bu rong wang yi he fouding,” People’s 
Daily, May 23, 2016, 3. 
500 Zhong Sheng, “Zhenxiang yongyuan zhiyou yige,” People’s Daily, May 25, 2016, 3. 
501 Zhong Sheng, “Nanhai daojiao de lingtu diwei bu qujueyu diandao heibai de bushi zhi ci,” People’s Daily, May 
27, 2016, 2. 
502 For example, “Zhongguo yongyou nanhai zhudao zhuquan de lishi shishi wu ke zheng bian (Historical Facts 
Indisputable on China’s Ownership of the South China Sea Features,” People’s Daily, May 24, 2016, 3. 
503 For example, “Feilvbin ‘qiege’ jiliang wufa fouding zhongguo nansha qundao de zhengtixing (The Philippines’ 
‘Fragmentation’ Tactics Cannot Deny the Integrity of China’s Nansha (Spratly) Islands),” People’s Daily, May 30, 
2016, 3. 
504 “Ajinuo zhengfu zai nanhai wenti shang sahuang (The Aquino Government Lied on the Issue of South China 
Sea,” People’s Daily, July 1, 2016, 2. 
505 For example, Zhong Sheng, “ ‘Zhongcaiting’ jing shi waibu shili dailiren (How the Tribunal is an agent for 
external forces)” People’s Daily, July 13, 2016, 2; “Sikai linshi zhongcaiting ‘fali quanwei’ de xujia baozhuang 
(Tearing the False Packaging of ‘Legal Authority’ of the Temporary Tribunal),” People’s Daily, July 15, 2016, 3; 
“Zhaiqu caotai banzi de guanghuan (qidi linshi zhongcaiting) (Taking off the halo of the ‘troupe’ (the temporary 
Tribunal revealed)),” People’s Daily, July 17, 2016, 3; “Guoji fazhi de ai xibao (qidi linshi zhongcaiting)  (The 
cancer cell of the international rule of law (the temporary Tribunal revealed)),” People’s Daily, July 22, 2016, 21; 
“Nanhai zhongcai zhangmu ying xiang shijie gongkai (The balance sheet of the South China Sea arbitration should 
be made public to the world),” People’s Daily, August 1, 2016, 3. 
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A third theme was to point out that the U.S. was the “invisible hand” behind the case – 
the Philippines were simply a cat’s paw. This theme also showed the U.S.’ hypocrisy in regards 
to international law and its intention to contain China. Articles argued that the freedom of 
navigation on the South China Sea issue was a “false proposition” to cover up the “ulterior 
motives”; the U.S. position on the South China Sea was self-contradictory; the U.S. showing off 
muscles in the South China Sea was a form of hegemonism; warning the U.S. “not to cross the 
bottom-line”; the U.S. exercised “double standards” on issues of international law.506 
A fourth theme argued for the negative regional and international ramifications of the 
arbitration, such as that the arbitration harmed the regionalization process by dividing ASEAN 
and damaged international rule of law. Articles accused the Philippines of “abusing international 
law,” “undermining international order,” and “disrupting regional security order and 
dialogue.”507 Articles also criticized the U.S. for “militarizing the South China Sea” and 
“endangering regional security.”508 After the release of the award, the Chinese ambassador to the 
Netherlands Wu Ken wrote an article in People’s Daily stating that the ruling had “humiliated” 
international law. But he also said that China and the Philippines were “permanent neighbors,” 
506 For example, “Nanhai hangxing he feiyue ziyou shi ge weimingti (Freedom of navigation is a false proposition),” 
People’s Daily, June 6, 2016, 3; “Meiguo zai Nanhai wenti shang zixiangmaodun (The U.S. attitude on the South 
China Sea issue self-contradictory),” People’s Daily, June 20, 2016, 21; Zhong Sheng, “Meiguo, xuanyao wuli 
jiushi gao baquan (The U.S., showing off muscles is hegemonism),” People’s Daily, June 22, 2016, 2; Zhong Sheng, 
“Meiguo bu yao zai Nanhai wenti shang chongzhuang dixian (The U.S. should not cross the bottom-line on the 
South China Sea issue),” People’s Daily, July 6, 2016, 3; Zhong Sheng, “Shuangchong biaozhun shi dui guoji fazhi 
de xiedu (Double standards is a the desecration of the international rule of law),” People’s Daily, July 15, 2016, 3. 
507 Zhong Sheng, “Lanyong guojifa jiu shi wa guoji zhixu qiangjiao (Abusing international law is undermining 
international order),” People’s Daily, June 28, 2016, 4; “Nanhai zhongcai an pohuai diqu anquan zhixu he duihua 
jizhi (The South China Sea arbitration damages regional security order and dialogue),” People’s Daily, June 30, 
2016, 10. 
508 Zhong Sheng, “Meiguo lumang zhi ju weihai yazhou anquan (The U.S.’ reckless move threatens Asian 
security),” People’s Daily, July 9, 2016, 2. 
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calling the new Philippine government to return to the bilateral approach and the “regional 
consensus.”509 
A fifth theme cited favorable remarks from international legal experts and kept 
enumerating the countries and organizations supporting China’s position. People’s Daily, Xinhua 
News, CCTV cited and interviewed British international law experts Antonios Tzanakopoulos 
and Chris Whomersley.510 Tzanakopoulos is an associate professor of public international law at 
the University of Oxford; Whomersley is a former deputy legal adviser to the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. Both had publications questioning the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over 
the case. Tzanakopoulos’s paper published in the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) 
discussed the danger of “shoehorning” disputes into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.511 Country 
supports from Niger, Kenya, Russia, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Sri 
Lanka, Malawi, etc, were all announced in People’s Daily, each as a stand-alone article. 
Supports of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, overseas Chinese, the China Law Society, 
China Fisheries Association, China Society for The Law of The Sea, etc, also received ample 
coverage.  
A sixth theme criticized Western countries and Western media in “hyping” the issue and 
distorting China’s position. For example, People’s Daily reproduced MoFA spokesperson Hua 
Chunying’s remarks on May 27, 2016 on Japan and G7’s “hyping up” of the South China Sea 
509 Wu Ken, “Feifa caijue ling guojifa mengxiu (Illegal ruling humiliates international law),” People’s Daily, July 
19, 2016, 21. 
510 “Yingguo guoji Haiyang fa zhuanjia zhiyi zhongcaiting dui Nanhai zhongcaian guanxiaquan (British 
international maritime law experts question the jurisdiction of the tribunal court over the South China Sea 
arbitration),” People’s Daily, June 22, 2016, 21; “Interview: Arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over South China Sea 
disputes questionable: expert,” CCTV, June 17, 2016, 
http://english.cctv.com/2016/06/17/ARTIVkY0mnv6pykrwg832BHV160617.shtml, accessed April 24, 2018; 
“Spotlight: Two law experts in Britain question arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction over South China Sea dispute,” 
Xinhua News, June 14, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/14/c_135436997.htm, accessed April 24, 
2018. 
511 Tzanakopoulos 2016. 
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issue.512 In another article, People’s Daily cited David Welch, professor at University of 
Waterloo, in enumerating how Western media has distorted China’s position with biased 
language.513 
Besides media reports, Chinese ambassadors throughout the world “were tasked with 
giving speeches and writing editorials in support of China’s position.”514 In order to instill into 
the public a rational perspective, academics and legal experts were also enlisted to help. On top 
of accepting interviews, scholars published 2,880 academic papers on the subject since January 
2013.515 Notably, this scholarly effort included an academic seminar held in The Hague on June 
26 from an international legal perspective. This seminar was organized by Leiden University’s 
Grotius Center for International Legal Studies and Wuhan University’s Institute for Boundary 
and Ocean Studies, and was participated by more than thirty international legal experts from 
around the world. Xinhua News and People’s Daily both reported on the seminar.516 The 
consensus of the seminar was that the interpretation of UNCLOS by the Arbitral Tribunal does 
not represent the mainstream view of the international law community. 
512 “Zhongfang dui riben he G7 chaozuo Nanhai wenti qianglie buman (China strongly dissatisfied with Japan and 
G7 hyping up the South China Sea issue),” People’s Daily, May 28, 2016, 3; For MoFA spokesperson Hua 
Chunyin’s remarks, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on May 27, 
2016 ,” May 27, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1367358.shtml, May 27, 
2016, accessed April 24, 2018. 
513 “Jianada xuezhe pi xifang meiti gei Nanhai wenti luantie biaoqian (Canadian scholar criticizes Western media in 
their biased wording on China’s position on the South China Sea issue),” People’s Daily, June 6, 2016, 3.  
514 Sutter and Huang 2016, 61. 
515 Zhao 2016, 53.  
516 “Zhe chang zai Haiya juban de yantaohui shang duo guo xuezhe qianglie zhiyi Nanhai zhongcaian (Scholars 
from many countries strongly question the arbitration case at this academic conference in The Hague),” Xinhua 
News, June 28, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-06/28/c_129095417.htm, accessed April 24, 2018; 
“Youli weihu guojifa de quanweixing – ji zai Haiya juban de Nanhai zhongcai an yu guoji fazhi yantao hui 
(Effectively maintaining the authority of international law – The Conference on the South China Sea Arbitration and 
international rule of law held in The Hague),” People’s Daily, June 29, 2016, 3; “Zhe ge yantao hui kai de hen jishi 
(This conference was held just in time),” People’s Daily, June 29, 2016, 3. 
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Hb4 (Hoop Test for Venting Mechanism): Venting venues such as social media and 
online forums are open, and venting is allowed or even encouraged. This is a necessary 
condition for the venting function of the media to work.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, since the internet arrived in China in 1995, its spread has 
been in explosive speed. By 2016, China had had 731 million internet users. That was 53.2 
percent of the Chinese population and 20 percent of the internet users worldwide. China also has 
an active social media community. Although all major U.S.-based social media platforms are 
blocked – Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Instagram, China has its own version of everything – 
Sina Weibo, Wechat, Renren, Youku. In 2016, Wechat had about 900 million active accounts.517 
All major official media outlets also established their public accounts on multiple social media 
platforms.  
Online forums and social media offered a platform for the public to vent their anger in a 
crisis like this. During the crisis, discussions on all major online platforms were not only 
allowed, but also encouraged. One official media’s online forum editor likened her job to flood 
control: “When the tides are too high, the method of barrier blocking gives way to the drainage 
systems.”518 Online forums such as “Tiexue” (Iron Blood), “Tianya,” and “zhonghua shequ” 
(China Club)519 were inundated with the outpour of public emotions.520 Between July 1 and 20, 
there were over five million online comments, mostly from Sina Weibo.521 Thirty-one hours 
after the release of the award on July 12, there were 3,941,730 comments on Weibo and 25,130 
517 Some people have multiple accounts. This number is from “2017 Weixin yonghu shuju baogao: huoyue yonghu 
da 8.89 yi (2017 Wechat User Statistics Report: Active Users Reached 889 Million),” Sohu, 
http://www.sohu.com/a/136382735_184641, accessed April 24, 2018. 
518 Interview 34, June 5, 2017, Beijing.  
519 This was closed on December 31, 2017. 
520 Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University, South China Sea Public 
Opinion Newsletter, June 2016 issue, 6 and July 2016 issue, 12. 
521 Jiang and Luo 2016, 60. 
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Wechat articles.522 Weibo accounts of People’s Daily, Global Times, and CCTV were all very 
active. People’s Daily’s threaded comment “The Philippines-initiated arbitral tribunal on the 
South China Sea released an illegal and null ruling. China declared non-acceptance and non-
recognition” was retweeted 444,587 times, with 53,149 comments.523 At the release of the 
award, People’s Daily’s official Weibo account set up a special topic discussion on the issue, 
with the hashtag “China: not even a bit can be left behind (Zhongguo, yidian dou bu neng shao).” 
The phrase is a pun implying China’s nine-dash line, as the Chinese word for “bit” is the same as 
that for “dash.” The topic discussion was retweeted over 1.5 million times by the evening on the 
same day.524 Scores of Chinese celebrities also voiced their support for China’s position on 
Weibo, which drew an even more fervent public response.  
Regarding the content of the online comments and the types of emotions involved, 
studies of social media behaviors during the crisis summarize the social media posts to be filled 
with anger, ridicule, and reproach. Xie and Zhu finds that the public comments were “overly 
entertaining” with a great number of jokes and spoofs. This corroborates the “venting” purpose 
of those posts, as calling for actions would be more serious. Examples include slogans like 
“boycotting dried mango,” parodies using the Goddess of Mercy to embody a peace-intended 
China, a cartoon of a girl holding a fish in her hand saying “I’d rather throw it away than giving 
it to you,” quipping at fish in the “sea” (the South China Sea), and using the word “the 
Philippines” as an adjective in phrases such as “Don’t be too Philippine (zuo ren bu yao tai 
Feilvbin).” 
522 Xie and Zhu 2016, 19. 
523 Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University, South China Sea Public 
Opinion Newsletter, July 2016 issue, 12. 
524 Xie and Zhu 2016, 19. 
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Interestingly, like the positive spin that dominated the media to guide public opinion, the 
state limited public reaction within the form of words as leaders were evidently concerned about 
social stability. Actions such as public protests were generally not approved.525 As mentioned 
earlier, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) ordered the media “not to hype or disseminate 
information on the recent illegal gatherings and protests.” This explains why large-scale protests 
were expected – the security of the Philippines Embassy in Beijing was strengthened, but did not 
occur except for a few scattered small-scale protests outside the capital city. 
 
IV. Evaluating Alternative Explanations 
Under the scenario of a hardline public opinion and a moderate state policy intent, the audience 
cost theory and the diversionary war theory would both predict propaganda efforts but for 
different reasons. Audience cost theory would argue that the state would use the publicity as a 
leverage for a defensive coercive purpose, if the state is involved in a coercion around the same 
time frame. Diversionary war theory would argue that the state would want to use the publicity 
to divert public attention from a domestic crisis, if there is one concurrent with the territorial 
crisis. This last section of the chapter assesses the validity of these alternative explanations by 
looking for empirical support for the testing hypotheses listed in Chapter 2.  
 
1. Audience Cost? 
Hc1 (Hoop Test about Scope): The propaganda campaign should be adopted during an 
ongoing coercion with the foreign rival. The audience cost theory is a theory about coercions. 
Without ongoing coercions, the audience cost theory becomes irrelevant. Negotiations are signs 
525 Several interviews confirmed this.  
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of an ongoing coercion but are not a necessary condition, as sometimes bringing a target state to 
the negotiation table itself could be a coercive goal. In most circumstances, I examine whether 
the state has made demands to the foreign rival. 
This case fails the hoop test of the audience cost scope that the state should be engaged in 
a coercion at the time of the propaganda. If the audience cost logic is at work, the state would 
have propagandized the arbitration much earlier, perhaps in 2013, when Manila first initiated the 
case, so that Beijing could use it to back up any substantive threats to compel Manila to drop the 
case. To be clear, Beijing did engage in coercion before and in the early stages of the arbitration. 
After the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff but before the Philippines publicly announced the 
initiation of the case, Beijing tried to coerce Manila to recognize the fait accompli around the 
Scarborough Shoal and to prevent Manila from internationalizing the issue. As mentioned 
earlier, during Madam Fu Ying’s visit to Manila in October 2012, Fu told Manila “not to appeal 
to the U.N. to resolve the dispute… not to ‘internationalize’ the issue in forums such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), not to coordinate with any other country such 
as the U.S., and even not to issue press releases.”526 But as Fu herself requested, the coercion 
went quietly without much noise in the Chinese media at all. Fu’s comments above was not 
reported by Chinese media and was reported only by Wall Street Journal in as late as January the 
following year. Beijing issued no official public threats whatsoever in deterring Manila to take 
up any action.  
After such deterrence had failed and Manila announced its plan to pursue Beijing in an 
international court in January 2013, Beijing tried to coerce Manila to drop the case and return to 
the bilateral approach. As recalled by Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario 
526 “Manila takes a stand.” 
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in the interview with Foreign Policy, Beijing had “come to us many times to say that arbitration 
should not be the answer to this dispute, this should be [done through] bilateral consultations.”527 
But a propaganda campaign was not launched until long after deterrence to prevent Manila from 
pursuing the case and compellence to force Manila to drop the case had both failed – the court 
went ahead with the case despite Beijing’s protest and non-participation; the Philippines 
officially submitted its petition to the PCA on March 30, 2014; the propaganda campaign was 
adopted in June 2016, too late in the arbitration process to coerce any change. The campaign, as 
accurately captured in a phrase uttered by a senior scholar, was mainly a “reactive” and 
“remedial” measure. While the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, the prelude to this arbitration 
case, maybe explained by the audience cost theory, the arbitration campaign itself is a case to 
remedy a failed coercion. As audience cost usually happens when a state proactively takes 
advantage of a situation, the nature of this propaganda campaign being “reactive” and “remedial” 
defies such a “premeditated” feature of the audience cost logic.  
Hc2 (Tying Hands): Officials make public threats with substantive punishment. The 
key of an audience cost logic is that the state makes a clear threat public so that backing down 
would be costly and less attractive. This, in return, enhances the threat credibility and forces the 
opponent who fears a collision to back down. This contrasts Hb2 of the (mis)alignment theory in 
whether the harsh official rhetoric commits the state to a substantive punishment. If the state 
issues no public threat, or the threat the state issues is vague in terms and hollow in content, then 
the state is not committed to a domestic cost, and the propaganda is likely for the purpose of 
pacifying the public, rather than for a foreign coercive purpose.  
527 “Interview with Albert del Rosario.” 
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As argued earlier, China used strongly-worded public statements to keep up the 
appearances of a hard stance, but none threatening with substantive punishment. China’s rhetoric 
was mostly reasoning, with some accusations. But no clear threat or warning was issued 
publicly.  
Without an ongoing coercion within a proper time window, and without any publicly-
issued threats, it is hard to make an audience cost argument of the case. But I will continue to 
evaluate the rest of the hypotheses to give it a comprehensive consideration. 
Hc3 (Bargaining Advantage): On average, given the occurrence of the propaganda 
campaign, the international outcome should be more favorable to the government. This is 
borrowed and adapted from Weiss’ work on anti-foreign protests. She reasons that “Once the 
government has tied its hands and demonstrated resolve by allowing anti-foreign protests, the 
burden of conciliation falls to the foreign government. On average, therefore, anti-foreign 
protests should lead to a more advantageous bargain for the authoritarian government.”528 She 
also points out that the actual outcome also depends on the strategic interactions with the other 
parties, so that negotiations may collapse, and crises may escalate. Propaganda campaigns, like 
anti-foreign protests, could also be a costly signal to show the state’s resolve. So once engaged, 
the international outcome should be more favorable to the initiating state.   
Given the occurrence of the propaganda campaign, the international outcome was more 
favorable to the government. China was able to win over some support to its side of the aisle and 
thereby arguably lessened the damage to its international reputation regarding respect for 
international law. But this was essentially due to the international part of the propaganda 
campaign targeted at foreign people and foreign states. The domestic part of the campaign raised 
528 Weiss 2008, 27. 
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public awareness of the dispute, but the domestic publicity was apparently not used for any 
notable coercive purposes. Besides, because of the public exposure of the issue resulting from 
China’s land reclamation and the U.S.’ FONOPs, public opinion had already become hardline 
prior to the propaganda campaign. So all that the government needed to do to incur an audience 
cost was to issue a public threat, which it did not do. Instead, it went through all the trouble to 
plan and organize a hefty propaganda campaign. These facts fly in the face of an audience cost 
logic. 
The final straw to break the audience cost explanation was the timing that the propaganda 
campaign ended, about which both theories have their respective predictions.  
The Misalignment Theory: Hb5 (Motivation Disappears): Media coverage diminishes 
as a moderate policy is carried out. As the goal of the media campaign is to subdue public 
opinion for a moderate policy, the campaign should come to a stop when that goal is achieved, 
that is, when the moderate policy is rolled out.  
Audience Cost: Hc4 (Motivation Disappears): Media coverage diminishes as the 
coercion succeeds or fails. The propaganda campaign should end when the coercion has 
succeeded or has failed, because that is when the coercive motivation disappears. This directly 
contradict Hb5 of the (mis)alignment theory. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, media coverage waned soon after the release of the award, with 
the campaign officially ended around late July or early August. Other observations of media 
coverage during this time confirm this judgment. According to the South China Sea Public 
Opinion Newsletter, media coverage dwindled immediately after the release of the award on July 
12, dropped to the lowest on July 17, backed up a little, but continued as low afterwards.529 
529 Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University, South China Sea Public 
Opinion Newsletter, July 2016 issue, 9. 
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The end of the propaganda campaign coincided with the timing when a moderate policy 
was rolled out. As mentioned earlier, at the July 24 China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ summit, 
Beijing promised ASEAN not to carry out land reclamation on the Scarborough Shoal. The “ice-
breaking” meeting between Philippine former president Ramos and Fu Ying and Wu Shicun 
occurred on August 8. A number of cooperative initiatives were reached at the China-ASEAN 
Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) in Manzhouli on August 15-16.  
In contrast, the end of the propaganda campaign did not coincide with the failure of the 
coercion as the audience cost theory predicts. Chinese deterrence failed as early as January 22, 
2013 when Manila first initiated the case. Chinese compellence for Manila to drop the case failed 
on March 30, 2014 when Manila officially presented its petitions to the Tribunal. The sequence 
of events is illustrated in Figure 6.3 below. 
 
 










As evidence show, the synchronization between the end of the propaganda campaign and the 
rollout of the moderate policy was by choice, not by chance. An editor observed that the Sino-
Philippines relationship had “entered into a new era immediately with the release of the ruling.” 
“After Ramos’ visit to Hong Kong, media rarely talked about the arbitration any more.”530 In 
fact, scholars recommended “downplaying the arbitration issue” after the release of the award. 
530 Interview 32, June 4, 2017, Beijing. 
Propaganda campaign ended 
Chinese coercion failed A moderate policy was rolled out 
Propaganda Campaign would have ended 
if audience cost logic is at work 
Mar. 2014 Aug. 2016 
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“China should stop criticizing the arbitration and stop requesting the Philippines to drop the 
case…both sides…should not touch the arbitration any more if possible and turn a blind eye to 
the ruling.”531 
 Public opinion seemed to correspond as the (mis)alignment theory predicts. A senior 
editor at an official media observes that “the public and the state was highly consistent when the 
ruling came out.”532 This means that the state achieved what it had wanted to do via the 
propaganda campaign. Another editor attests that after the ruling came out, “the public no longer 
cared much [about the arbitration].” “Before the result came out, the basic public stance was that 
the Philippines bullied China in the name of international law. But the public would not 
necessarily follow up with the actual policy the state pursues subsequently.”533 As expected by 
the (mis)alignment theory and affirmed by popular sentiment studies using Chinese social media 
data, public emotion subsided a few days after the release of the award and stayed low.534 
 
2. Diversionary War? 
Hd1 (Hoop Test about Scope): States are more likely to adopt a propaganda campaign on a 
foreign dispute when they face domestic challenges. Because of the risks involved in inciting 
public anger, it is likely that states only resort to scapegoating and diversionary logics when they 
are faced with severe domestic challenges. These domestic challenges should be severe enough 
to cause legitimacy crisis at home that makes diversionary strategies appealing. 
The diversionary war argument is hard to stand on this case because there was no notable 
concurrent domestic crisis that the public attention needed to be diverted from. The only suspect 
531 Zhang Mingliang 2016, 46. 
532 Interview 11, May 26, 2017, Beijing. 
533 Interview 10, May 26, 2017, Beijing. 
534 Kang and Yan 2016, 12; Jiang and Luo 2016, 59. 
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was the stock market turbulence that started in the summer of 2015 that propelled speculations of 
a possible economic collapse with global repercussions in early 2016.535 But the turbulence was 
far from a real crisis and the speculations about a collapse did not gain much traction until they 
completely died down. The timing of the propaganda campaign was determined by the 
development of the territorial crisis, with the looming announcement of the Tribunal ruling. It is 
hard to link it to any other crisis that the Chinese government was facing, if anything at all. 
Given the absence of a severe domestic crisis, there is no need to evaluate Hd2, which assumes 
the existence of such a crisis.  
 
3. Duterte’s Election and Policy Reversal as an Exogenous Shock 
As shown in the narrative of events, Duterte’s electoral victory and quick efforts to 
accommodate China and to ignore the Tribunal ruling, although ad hoc, seemed to have played a 
large role in promoting the eventual reconciliation of the two sides. So it might appear plausible 
that Beijing’s moderate policy was only a reaction to Duterte’s cooperative signals after his 
election, but not an intended policy Beijing had originally planned. If that is the case, the 
propaganda campaign Beijing launched might be for preparing the public for hostilities or for 
tying its hands for a coercive purpose (as in an audience cost logic).  
But this alternative story has two problems. First, Beijing had already shown a moderate 
policy tendency long before Duterte was elected, not only as a reaction to Duterte’s expressed 
good will after his election. After Manila initiated the case to challenge China in front of the 
535 “China’s stock market crash...in 2 minutes,” CNN, August 27, 2015, 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/09/investing/china-crash-in-two-minutes/, accessed April 26, 2018; “China Faces 
2016 Crisis as Bad as U.S. Mortgage Meltdown,” TheStreet, January 3, 2016, 
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13407258/1/china-faces-2016-crisis-as-bad-as-u-s-mortgage-meltdown.html, 
accessed April 26, 2018. 
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International Tribunal in January 2013, Beijing had plenty of opportunities to punish or threaten 
to punish Manila. But Beijing refrained from doing so. Instead, China engaged in diplomatic 
efforts to make the Philippines change its mind. As Rosario has conveyed: Beijing had “come to 
us many times to say that arbitration should not be the answer to this dispute, this should be 
[done through] bilateral consultations.”536 The fact that Beijing “wanted the issue to go away” 
from the very beginning, the little role the military played throughout the crisis, the fact that 
Beijing engaged in diplomatic efforts before the May 9 election to minimize the anticipated 
negative impacts of the ruling, such as Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s tour of three southeast Asian 
countries in April and other diplomatic efforts to rally international support, and the fact that all 
these measures being “reactive” and “remedial” to a difficult situation, are all proofs that Beijing 
had moderate intentions before Duterte’s election. In fact, it was Xi who first offered the olive 
branch to Duterte instead of the other way around – Xi congratulated Duterte soon after the 
Philippine Congress proclaimed Duterte’s presidency on May 30.  
Second, the content of the propaganda does not support the claim that Beijing was using 
it to prepare the public for hostilities or to tie its hands. The majority of rational analysis in the 
campaign, the echoing of public emotion staying away from indignation, the consistent emphasis 
on the positive perspectives in most publications, are hard to reconcile with a typical 
antagonizing media campaign used to incite hostilities or to engage audience cost. Besides, the 
absence of a public threat from Beijing and the preemptively repressed public protests contradict 
an audience cost logic.  
  
V. Conclusion 
536 “Interview with Albert del Rosario.” 
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Overwhelming evidence supports the logic of a pacifying propaganda campaign in the 
(mis)alignment theory. An audience cost or a diversionary war argument is hard to make because 
the case does not satisfactorily fulfills the scope conditions of either theory, be it the concurrence 
of a foreign coercion or a domestic challenge. An alternative story concerning Duterte’s election 




















Chapter 7: The Sino-Vietnamese Cable Cutting Incidents in 2011 and Oil Rig 
Crisis in 2014 – Three More Tests537 
 
As the congruence test results in Chapter 4 has demonstrated, the hardline public opinion – 
hardline state policy intent composition in the (mis)alignment theoretical framework is the cell 
with the most deviant cases – two out of the three cases in that cell can be better explained by the 
audience cost theory. It is, therefore, imperative to look at the other case to see whether and how 
it conforms to the (mis)alignment theory. The congruence test suggests that the hardline-hardline 
scenario might be a more suitable scenario for the audience cost theory. But the conforming case 
in this chapter, if established, can show that the alignment logic is still possible under certain 
circumstances. The goal of this exercise is not to “defeat” the audience cost theory and show that 
it does not have explanatory power. But rather, the objective is to establish this one causal 
scenario among many possible others – the alignment and misalignment of public opinion and 
state policy intent as explanation for state propaganda behavior, as equifinality is after all a 
common feature of this complex world. The same rationale applies to the moderate – moderate 
case being tested in this chapter.  
 This comes down to two diplomatic crises, the cable cutting incidents in 2011 and the oil 
rig crisis in 2014. Both are on the South China Sea dispute, between China and Vietnam in the 
2010s. The cable-cutting incidents, although discrete, reflected a larger dispute regarding oil 
exploration activities in the South China Sea and caused weekly Vietnamese public protests and 
live-fire naval exercises from both sides. Hence, they are considered as one crisis. As the 
background of the South China Sea dispute has already been covered in the previous chapter, this 
chapter will delve right into the details of these two crises. Also, because these two cases 
537 Part of this chapter uses materials from a co-authored paper with Brantly Womack, “Jawing through Crises: 
Chinese and Vietnamese Media Strategies in the South China Sea.” As of May 31, 2018, the paper has been 
conditionally accepted by the Journal of Contemporary China. 
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occurred around similar time frame as the 2016 arbitration case, the larger background in terms 
of the state’s decision making and the state-public relations still holds, so I will also skip the step 
of justifying the applicability of the theoretical assumptions and jump right into the tests. 
The Vietnamese side of the story in the oil rig crisis provides a valuable additional test 
for the hardline – moderate scenario. Although this shifts the analysis from the Chinese context 
to a Vietnamese one, yet because of the counterintuitive nature of the pacifying propaganda 
campaign and the weight of that logic in the entire theoretical framework, this additional test is 
warranted. Given the similarity between the Chinese and the Vietnamese propaganda systems, it 
also offers an ideal opportunity as a first step to extend the external validity of the theory to other 
authoritarian states beyond China.  
 
I. The Cable-Cutting Incidents in 2011 
On May 26, 2011, three Chinese maritime surveillance vessels confronted a Vietnamese oil 
exploration ship Binh Minh 02 around 120 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast and severed 
its seismic survey cables.538 The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry (MoFA) handed a diplomatic note 
to the Chinese embassy in Hanoi protesting the Chinese action that “violate Vietnam’s sovereign 
right to its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf” and demanding compensation for the 
damages. The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded on May 28 that Vietnam’s oil exploration 
activities “undermine China’s rights and interests as well as jurisdiction over the South China 
Sea.” The Chinese actions were “regular maritime law enforcement and surveillance activities in 
538 “VN condemns Chinese intrusion,” VietnamNet, May 28, 2011, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/en/politics/8839/vn-
condemns-chinese-intrusion.html, accessed May 4, 2018. 
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the waters under the jurisdiction of China.”539 The Vietnamese MoFA further responded the next 
day, repeating its earlier protest and rejecting China’s claim that the incident occurred in 
disputed areas: “It is neither a disputed area nor is it an area ‘managed by China.’ China has 
deliberately misled the public into thinking that it is a disputed area.”540 The Chinese MoFA 
reiterated on May 31 that Vietnamese oil operations were “illegal,” the Chinese actions were 
“completely justified,” and Vietnam should “immediately stop infringement activities and refrain 
from creating new troubles.”541 
On June 9, a similar incident occurred involving a Chinese fishing boat ensnaring the 
cables of a Vietnamese survey ship Viking II in the waters off Vanguard Bank (Wan’an Tan in 
Chinese and Bãi Tư Chính in Vietnamese). The Chinese fishing boat was reportedly supported 
by two Chinese fishery administration vessels. The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry lodged a strong 
protest to the Chinese embassy in Hanoi and claimed that the Chinese action was “totally 
intentional, thoroughly deliberated and planned.” The Vietnamese MoFA reported that the 
Chinese fishing boat, equipped with a “specialized cable slashing device,” “headed on and 
rammed the exploration cables of Viking II,” and “was consequently trapped in Viking II’s 
cables, jamming Viking II’s operation.”542 The Chinese MoFA responded that the Vietnamese 
remarks “do not tally with the fact.” It blamed the second incident on armed Vietnamese ships 
chasing away the Chinese fishing boat, causing it to be tangled with the cables of the Vietnamese 
539 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Remarks on China’s Maritime Law Enforcement and 
Surveillance on the South China Sea,” May 28, 2011, http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/fyrth/t826601.htm, 
accessed May 3, 2018. 
540 Vietnam MoFA, “Press Conference on Chinese maritime surveillance vessel’s cutting exploration cable of 
PetroViet Nam Seismic Vessel,” May 29, 2011, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110530220030, 
accessed May 4, 2018. 
541 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on May 31, 2011,” June 1, 
2011, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t827089.htm, accessed May 3, 2018. 
542 Vietnam MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga answers question from the media at the 
Press Conference on June 9, 2011 concerning the Viking II incident,” June 9, 2011, 
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110610100618, accessed May 4, 2018. 
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survey ship. It claimed that “the Vietnamese vessel dragged the Chinese fishing boat for more 
than one hour, with the latter’s tail facing the front,” forcing the Chinese fishermen “to cut off 
the fishing net so as to separate the two vessels.” It accused the Vietnamese ships in “illegally” 
operating in waters under China’s jurisdiction and “endangering” Chinese fishermen’s lives, who 
had operated in the same waters “for generations.”543 
From June 5 on, the Vietnamese public organized weekly protests against the Chinese 
actions on the streets of Hanoi and in front of the Chinese embassy. The Chinese navy held two 
military exercises, one on June 6 in unidentified area in the South China Sea, and the other on 
June 16-19 near China’s Hainan Island. The Vietnamese navy also conducted live-fire drills near 
its Hon Ong Island on June 13-16. The crisis subsided when Chinese State Councilor Dai 
Bingguo met with Vietnamese special envoy Ho Xuan Son on June 26 in Beijing. China Central 
Television (CCTV)’s scripted report depicted the meeting in a highly positive tone, describing 
the relationship as “good friends, good neighbors, good comrades, and good partners.” The 
positive tone is consistent with how CCTV usually depicts international issues. But it unusually 
mentioned about maritime issues and the situation in the South China Sea. It urged the two sides 
to “strengthen correct guidance of public opinion, avoiding words and actions that would harm 
the friendship and mutual trust of the two peoples.”544 
 Throughout this short diplomatic crisis between May 26 and June 26 of 2011, China did 
not launch a propaganda campaign and constrained commercial media coverage. People’s Daily 
coverage of the cable-cutting incidents was negligible. There were only two articles in the thirty-
543 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on Vietnamese Ships Chasing away Chinese 
Fishing Boats in the Waters off the Nansha Islands,” June 9, 2011, http://na.china-
embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t829427.htm, accessed May 4, 2018. 
544 “Dai Bingguo huijian Yuenan lingdaoren teshi Hu Chunshan (Dai Bingguo meets Vietnamese leadership’s 
special envoy Ho Xuan Son),” CCTV Xinwen Lianbo (Network News), June 26, 2011.  
http://tv.cntv.cn/video/C16624/b7fda32c294a45da9b0eb09c82d97a2b, accessed May 4, 2018. 
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one days of the crisis – neither was in the front page, and one copied the June 9 MoFA press 
conference statement. CCTV News, including both Network News and Evening News, had no 
mention of the incidents at all throughout the crisis. Only the Dai-Ho meeting on June 26 was 
reported by both CCTV programs, using carefully calibrated language alluding to the incidents, 
so that only the watchers who had already known about the incidents might link to the special 
context of the meeting.  
 Leaked internal notice from the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Information Department 
showed that the government demanded media outlets to use the MoFA official language on 
reporting the June 9 incident.545 Indeed, commercial reports on both the May 26 and June 9 
incidents were led by Xinhua’s report on the MoFA official response. Commercial media also 
carried the topic with much restraint. Even Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), a commercialized 
official news outlet under People’s Daily known to carry hardline and nationalist articles, tuned 
down its voice from a sensational editorial under the state “guidance.”546 A May 30 Global 
Times editorial reads “China’s restraint has limits.”547 But an editorial on June 9 has the headline 
“Anger is not the right way to handle the South China Sea dispute.”548 This turn shows the state 
was working to avoid fanning the nationalist sentiment. Chubb agrees that the Chinese 
government’s behavior displayed after the incidents showed that it was not trying to draw 
domestic public attention. These include the content of the MoFA statements and the fact that the 
initial statement was issued on a Saturday when there was usually less public attention. The bare-
545 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department), “Guanyu Yuenan zai Nanhai kaicai youqitian deng wenti (About Vietnam’s 
oil exploration activities in the South China Sea),” China Digital Times, June 10, 2011, https://goo.gl/qKvMvM, 
accessed May 4, 2018. 
546 Interview 18, May 29, 2017, Beijing. 
547 “Yuenan Nanhai maoxian niaotou zengjia; Zhongguo kezhi shi you xiandu de (Vietnam’s risky ideas in the South 
China Sea increase; China’s restraint has limits),” Huangqiu Shibao (Global Times), May 30, 2011.  
548 “Fennu bu shi chuli Nanhai zhengduan zheng dao (Anger is not the right way to handle the South China Sea 
dispute),” Huangqiu Shibao (Global Times), June 9, 2011. 
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bones of Chinese media coverage were merely responding to the growing international media 
coverage.549 
 I find that this absence of a propaganda campaign was due to the alignment between a 
hardline public opinion and a hardline state policy intent, so that the state lacked the incentive to 
use the propaganda’s alignment functions. In other words, the state did not need to mobilize an 
already strongly-agitated public for a hardline policy. 
A series of provocative events had already hardened public opinion before the 2011 
incidents. These include a heated discussion of the dispute led by the then-U.S. Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010 hosted by Vietnam, and China’s 
alleged labeling of the South China Sea as a “core interest.” These events contributed to the 
publicization of the issue and the emotional buildup among the Chinese public. At the ASEAN 
Regional Forum in 2010, Hilary Clinton declared the South China Sea issue an American 
“national interest” and supported the resolution of the dispute “without coercion.”550 China’s 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi characterized Clinton’s remarks as “an attack on China” and 
rebutted with seven points including that the South China Sea is generally peaceful, that the 
South China Sea issue is not an issue between China and ASEAN, and that the freedom of 
navigation has not been hindered, etc.551 This debate piqued public interest in the matter. China’s 
alleged labeling the South China Sea issue as a “core interest,” although lacking the back up of 
official sources, further elevated public awareness and agitated public emotions.552  
549 Chubb 2016, 469. 
550 Hilary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at Press Availability,” U.S. Department of State, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm, accessed May 8, 2018. 
551 PRC MoFA, “Yang Jiechi waizhang bochi Nanhai wenti shang de wailun (Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi refutes 
fallacies on the South China Sea issue),” July 25, 2010, 
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/wjb/wjbz/zyhd/t719371.htm, accessed May 4, 2018.  
552 The whole South China Sea as a “core interest” meme was discussed in detail in Swaine 2011. 
226
As a result, Chinese public emotions reached a sensational high at no instigation of the 
state after hearing the news of the cable-cutting incidents. Despite the absence of state 
propaganda on the issue, a search of the word “South China Sea” on Baidu Search Index (BSI) 
during the months of June and July shows that the public attention to the issue swelled to a daily 
average of above 10,000 and peaked at 29,000 in mid-June, compared to an all-time average of 
5,351 between 2011 and 2018.553  
War-mongering was a common theme in online discussions. For example, a People’s 
Daily editorial by Zhong Sheng with the title “The Time of Using Non-Peaceful Means to 
Resolve Territorial Dispute Has Passed” was reposted on ifeng, a popular news portal affiliated 
with Phoenix TV, providing an opportunity for readers to comment on the article. It ended up 
with 216 comments 29674 people clicked to agree or disagree. Some of the most-agreed user 
comments were:  
“Or it should be changed to: wake up from the dream of using peaceful means to resolve 
dispute.”  
“‘The time of using non-peaceful means to resolve territorial dispute has passed’ is self-
deceiving non-sense. Is People’s Daily people’s newspaper? It should rather be changed 
to ‘World Harmony Daily.’ People’s Daily at this very sensitive and critical time 
expressed such thoughtless, stupid comment. Does it know how serious the consequences 
and outcomes will be?” 
“The so-called ‘restraining principle’ means while you are negotiating with them, they 
are holding joint military exercise. Who are you restraining? The so-called time of using 
553 The BSI data did not become available until after January 1, 2011, so there is not enough data to do a similar one-
year pre-crisis average index comparable to those I did on the arbitration case in 2016 in Chapter 6 or the oil rig 
crisis in 2014 in the text below. 
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non-peaceful means to resolve conflict has passed! Then why the US, France and UK do 
not sit and talk to Gaddafi?” 
“The Chinese Communist Party must not hand over our country’s islands which we 
inherited from our ancestors to others. That would make it an eternal sinner.” 
“Negotiation needs to be backed up by strong military strength.”554 
 
As more examples of the online war-mongering, shortly after the May 26 incident, translations of 
a Vietnamese report of Chinese warships firing warning shots at Vietnamese fishing boats in the 
Spratlys made the top commented post on the Tiexue (Iron Blood) forum.555 The reported event 
was flatly denied by the Chinese authorities, but it still provoked waves of jingoist public 
expressions online.556 On June 8, a website under the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry was hacked, 
showing the Chinese national flag and a slogan in Chinese that read “the Spratlys belong to 
China.”557 An article by ambassador Wu Jianmin with moderate views “The South China Sea 
Dispute: Restraint is A Kind of Confidence” was lambasted on the Tianya forum.558 
554 The original People’s Daily’s article had the title “Meiyou yige hao huanjing jiu bu keneng jiejue Nanhai wenti 
(It is impossible to solve the South China Sea problem without a good environment).” See Zhong Sheng, People’s 
Daily, July 20, 2011, 3. The article was reposted with the title “Tongguo fei heping shouduan jiejue zhengduan de 
shidai yi guoqu (The time of using non-peaceful means to resolve territorial disputes has passed)” at 
http://news.ifeng.com/mil/4/detail_2011_07/22/7876049_9.shtml, accessed May 7, 2018. 
555 For the original Vietnamese report, see “Nội dung cuộc điện đàm với ngư dân (The content of the conversation 
with fishermen),” VN Express, June 1, 2011, http://vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/thoi-su/tau-quan-su-trung-quoc-no-sung-
ban-duoi-tau-viet-nam-2196554-p2.html, accessed May 8, 2018. For the Chinese translation and reposting on 
Tiexue Forum, together with the comments, see http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_5113116_1.html, accessed May 8, 2018. 
556 “Waijiaobu: Zhongguo chuan Xiang Yuenan yumin mingqiang baodao zixuwuyou (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
Chinese ship firing shots at Vietnamese fishermen is fabricated),” China News, June 4, 2011, 
https://news.qq.com/a/20110604/000002.htm, accessed May 8, 2018. 
557 “Yuenan guanfang wangzhan zao heike gongji, wangye shang chuxian Zhongguo guoqi (Vietnamese official 
website attacked by hackers, the Chinese national flag appears on the website),” Global Times, June 9, 2011, 
http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2011-06/1744628.html, accessed May 8, 2018. 
558 For the reposting and the thread of comments, see http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-worldlook-360420-1.shtml, accessed 
May 8, 2018. Wu was a renown Chinese diplomat who served as the MoFA spokesperson, ambassador to the 
Netherlands, Geneva, and France, as well as President of China Foreign Affairs University. 
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Online militarism like these abound both before and throughout the crisis. Granted that 
the Chinese netizens are not representative of the whole Chinese population, these widespread 
war-mongering remarks nonetheless suggest that the Chinese government faced a hawkish 
opinion climate, particularly among the more salient opinions of Chinese netizens. The fact that 
these remarks were commonplace in online forums and social media also suggests that they had 
some traction within the public.  
Evidence also suggests that these waves of public nationalistic expressions were 
spontaneous rather than state-instigated. They might have resulted partially from previous state 
media policy of allowing or even encouraging coverage, but they were not endogenous to the 
state media policy in this crisis. The fact that the flurry of online criticisms often attacked the 
Chinese government affirmed the spontaneous and genuine nature of the hardline public 
opinion.559 Common lines accused the Chinese foreign policy being too soft, even traitorous, 
often likened to the Qing dynasty, which collapsed following territorial encroachment by foreign 
powers, or reminiscing Mao’s era of “defeating America twice” and “teaching India a lesson.” 
Another line of argument also linked to the state corruption: “Corrupt officials running amok, 
unable to fight, let’s just give the South China Sea away.”560 
This hardline public opinion naturally aligned with the hardline policy intent of the 
government. Both incidents occurred in the marginal areas within China’s nine-dash line, but 
beyond any EEZ China would have hoped to generate under UNCLOS based on its claimed 
sovereignty over the Paracels or the Spratlys (although whether these land features could 
559 For examples of these harsh criticisms, see Chubb 2016, 212-13. 
560 This comment was one of many posted on a short video clip published by Phoenix TV. See “Zhongguo wo san 
wangpai, ding Nanhai daju (China’s three trump cards will determine the outcome on the South China Sea),” ifeng, 
June 30, 2011, http://v.ifeng.com/v/sanwangpai/index.shtml#e9253db1-9ecd-4e1c-9af3-abb78271a2d4, accessed 
May 8, 2018. 
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generate EEZ is still debatable). But these locations do fall into Vietnam’s EEZ from its coastal 
baseline. Given the obscure nature of the nine-dash line, the Chinese actions were therefore 
based on precarious grounds. In Chinese experts’ analysis, the Chinese actions were motivated 
by a mixture of concerns on energy security and a perceived declining claim strength in the 
disputed areas. You argues that Beijing feared that the erection of oil structures in the disputed 
areas might eventually lead to Vietnam’s de facto control, which could be used against China’s 
claim in the future by international legal bodies, thus increasing the possibility of China’s losing 
these areas permanently.561 However warranted or paranoid these concerns may sound, they 
reflect Beijing’s outlook of a losing prospect. According to the prospect theory, one would be 
more risk-acceptant in the realm of losses.  
  There is contradictory evidence as to whether the June 9 cable cutting was premediated 
and deliberate as believed by Hanoi. You’s sources indicate that the order was made by “the 
Navy’s Xisha Surveillance District after consulting its superiors,” but it was made out of safety 
concerns of the boat and the crew on board given that the boat was entangled with the 
Vietnamese cables and was dragged on for “two hours.”562 This story is consistent with the 
Chinese official story. But curiously enough, the Vietnamese media had already reported on 
harassment of Viking II by suspected Chinese vessels days before the incident.563 
Even if the June 9 Viking II incident were truly an accident as Beijing claimed, the cable-
cuttings were part of an aggressive trend in the Chinese maritime behavior around that time. On 
May 2, just weeks before the first incident, China Daily reported that “China marine surveillance 
561 You 2014, 251. 
562 Ibid. 
563 “1 more Vietnam ship harassed by foreign vessels,” VietnamNet Bridge, June 1, 2011, 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/society/8634/1-more-vietnam-ship-harassed-by-foreign-vessels.html, accessed May 
8, 2018. 
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(CMS) forces will expand rapidly to better protect the country’s marine security… more than 
1,000 people will join the CMS staff by the end of 2011…”564 On May 20, just days before the 
first incident, a mega Chinese oil and gas-drilling platform “Hai Yang Shi You 720” was 
officially put into operation.565 On May 24, CNOOC announced the open tendering of nineteen 
new blocks in the South China Sea, covering an area of 52,006 square kilometers.566  
The incidents suggest a change for more aggressiveness in China’s handling of oil 
exploration activities by other littoral states. Although the involvement of the PLA was 
unclear,567 China’s interference seemed to be authorized at least on the level of the CMS. Chubb 
points out that normal Chinese law enforcement activities in similar situations were limited to 
“hailing announcements”; ad hoc coercive operations, such as the severing maneuvers on May 
26, needed to be authorized.568 Together with the Reed Bank incident earlier in March569 and a 
later incident in 2012, there were at least four unique incidents involving China’s interference in 
foreign oil companies’ seismic survey activities.570 The repetitive nature of these incidents 
presented a pattern.571 If the incidents were against the Chinese intention, the Chinese policy 
makers would have had a chance after the initial incidents to restrain the operational units, so 
that subsequent confrontations could have been avoided. Instead, fifty Chinese coast guards were 
564 China Daily, May 2, 2011, 2.  
565 People’s Daily, June 13, 2013, 2. 
566 CNOOC 2011.  
567 China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie claimed no involvement of the PLA in the May 26 incident at the 
Shangri-La Dialogue on June 3-5, 2011 in Singapore.  
568 Chubb 2016, 468.  
569 The Reed Bank incident is a brief confrontation between two Chinese patrol boats and a Philippine survey ship 
on March 2, 2011. This study does not include it as a separate case, because it failed to escalate into a crisis and 
resembles many other similar episodes that occur frequently in the South China Sea. It is, however, similar to the 
Sino-Vietnamese cable-cutting incidents that followed within the same year, so in a way it is still covered by this 
analysis.  
570 Carlyle Thayer reports that another incident occurred on June 30, in which “Vietnamese escort vessels were able 
to chase off the Chinese boats.” But this incident has been “kept under wraps by Vietnamese authorities.” See 
Thayer 2011a, 1-2.  
571 Thayer 2011. 
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awarded for the first time on July 23 for their “heroic acts” in defending China’s maritime 
rights.572  
Given the alignment of public opinion and state policy intent, the state stayed quiet and 
kept a tight rein on public nationalistic expressions. The quiet media behavior would have been 
difficult to be explained by audience cost theory or diversionary war theory because they would 
predict that the state should have made big noises to either use it as a leverage in coercions or to 
divert public attention away from a domestic crisis. But the state did not purposely make noises. 
If anything, it also constrained the commercial media in doing so.  
 
II. The 2014 Oil Rig Crisis from Beijing’s Perspective: Keeping Quiet 
The Sino-Vietnamese oil rig crisis started on May 2, 2014 when the state-owned China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) moved its Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig, a semi-submersible 
drilling platform built in 2012 at a cost of US$ one billion, to a location of maritime dispute 
between the two countries without prior consultation with Vietnam. The oil rig location, 
although changed slightly a couple of times throughout the crisis, is about 17 nautical miles 
South of the Paracel Islands claimed by both countries but currently occupied by China. The 
location is 130 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast and 180 nautical miles off China’s 
Hainan Island, so if the Paracel claims are ignored, it lies on the Vietnam side of the equidistance 
line between the coast of Vietnam and Hainan, and within the two countries’ overlapping 
EEZs.573 China’s placement of the oil rig in this location triggered dangerous actions by both 
572 “2011 nian Zhongguo haijian da shi ji (2011 China Marine Surveillance Memorabilia),” June 28, 2012, Xinhua 
News, http://guoqing.china.com.cn/2012-06/28/content_25756969.htm, accessed May 8, 2018. 
573 PRC MoFA, “The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position,” June 
8, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163264.shtml, accessed May 8, 2018; Vietnam MoFA, 
“Remarks by FM Spokesman Le Hai Binh on 4th May 2014,” May 4, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140505232230, accessed May 8. 
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sides at sea in the vicinity of the rig, such as ramming vessels and firing water cannons and 
large-scale deadly riots in Vietnam burning down foreign-owned factories.574 The crisis ended 
on July 15 when China declared that Haiyang Shiyou had completed its task one month ahead of 
schedule and withdrew from the area.575 
Like the 2011 cable-cutting incidents, the Chinese media in the oil rig crisis stayed 
remarkably quiet. The government made conscious efforts to control information, discourage 
coverage, and even censor content on the dispute. I argue that this is due to the overall alignment 
of a moderate public opinion and a moderate state policy intent.  
Beijing’s reluctance to publicize the dispute is evident in four media features. First, delay 
in reporting. Anti-China protests started on May 11 in Hanoi and a few other cities and escalated 
to violent riots on the 13th and 14th. But Xinhua News did not release any Chinese report of the 
riots until midnight of the 15th – that is almost two days’ delay. Other Chinese media were all 
cautious in reporting the issue. They did not report on the riots until the Xinhua report came out 
and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made an official protest.576  
Second, limited coverage. People’s Daily, the most authoritative official Chinese 
newspaper, had little coverage of the dispute– a total of 36 articles and no front-page articles 
during the 74 days of the crisis between May 2 – July 15. China’s limited reportage was only 
reactive to Vietnam’s aggressive propaganda campaign, especially its international campaign. 
Chinese MoFA Spokesperson Hua Chunying said on June 9th Press Conference: “[Vietnam] 
574 Kate Hodal and Jonathan Kaiman, “At Least 21 Dead in Vietnam Anti-China Protests over Oil Rig,” The 
Guardian, May 15, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/vietnam-anti-china-protests-oil-rig-dead-
injured, accessed May 8, 2018. 
575 “Vietnam Anti-China Protest: Factories Burnt,” BBC News, May 14, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-27403851, accessed May 8, 2018. 
576 “Zhongguo Meiti Jinshen Baodao Yuenan Shitai (Chinese Media Cautious in Reporting the Vietnam Incident),” 
BBC Chinese, May 16, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/05/140516_china_vietnam_press, 
accessed May 9, 2018. 
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spreading rumors around the world to vilify and hurt China unscrupulously and groundlessly. 
Given that, we must present the facts in front of the international community so as to set the 
record straight.” Besides these reactive coverage, the Chinese reporting was sparse. 
Third, keeping the dispute coverage buried in low-traffic subsections of newspapers. 
Similar patterns were observed on all official media outlets and major commercial news 
portals.577 Official websites of People’s Daily and Xinhua both had “Private cars will be 
exempted from inspection for the first six years starting from September” as their headlines, 
while having news on the riots only as the fourth and the fifth item of the day. This technique 
made the dispute less visible, while still making information available in case if people heard 
about it from other sources and actively searched for it. In this way the CPC could dampen the 
issue without losing the opportunity to frame the issue to the Western media. 
Fourth, softening the tone in accusing the Vietnamese government. After the riots 
occurred, Chinese MoFA Spokesperson Hua Chunying blamed the violence on the “Vietnamese 
government’s indulgence and connivance toward domestic anti-China forces and criminals.”578 
But the wording in the final released official transcript was changed to “the Vietnamese side has 
an inescapable responsibility for the beating, smashing, looting and burning targeted at China 
and other countries.”579 After all, “connivance” was a major accusation and changing it to the 
general wording of “inescapable responsibility” was much softer. 
577 Andrew Chubb, “China’s Information Management in the Sino-Vietnamese Confrontation: Caution and 
Sophistication in the Internet Era,” China Brief, Vol. 14, Issue 11, June 4, 2014, 15, 
https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-information-management-in-the-sino-vietnamese-confrontation-caution-and-
sophistication-in-the-internet-era/, accessed May 9, 2018. 
578 Ibid., 16, 17, quoting from Bloomberg, May 15, 2014, http://www.oregonlive.com/playbooks-
profits/index.ssf/2014/05/vietnam_factory_protests_resul.html, accessed May 9, 2018. 
579 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on 
May 15, 2014,” May 15, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1156451.shtml, 
accessed May 9, 2018. 
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These media features substantiate the media policy directives leaked by China Digital 
Times. There are four leaked policy directives on the dispute. On May 7, propaganda authorities 
instructed online media to “continue to find and delete reports on Sino-Vietnamese ship 
collisions and maritime standoff, and report on work progress in a timely manner.”580 On the 
anti-China riots, an order was issued on May 14th to “not report on the issue, republish foreign 
coverage, or allow discussion in online forums.”581 After Xinhua released the news, the order 
was changed on the 15th to “use only the Xinhua copy or information from the Foreign 
Ministry’s website.”582 On the 18th, the state issued a second warning that the media must “use 
Xinhua copy only.”583  
My interviews with Chinese editors and journalists corroborate these leaked media 
directives. Editors from a hardline newspaper revealed that after publishing a couple of articles 
on the dispute, they were asked to “tone down their voice.”584 
Why did the Chinese authorities not stoke nationalism and use it to coerce Hanoi into 
accepting the fait accompli on the sea? This is due to the state-public alignment on the issue: the 
state had a moderate policy intent, so it wanted to reserve policy flexibility by restricting public 
participation; the existing relatively weak public opinion allowed the government to pursue such 
580 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department), “Gao Yu, Waitao Tanguan, Yuenan Haijun, he Bitebi” (Gao Yu, Fled Corrupt 
Officials, Vietnamese Navy and Bitcoin), China Digital Times, May 7, 2014, https://goo.gl/mpFi7s, accessed May 9, 
2018. 
581 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department), “Zai Yue Zhongzi Qiye Bei Yuenanren Chongji” (Chinese Companies in 
Vietnam Were Attacked), China Digital Times, May 14, 2014, https://goo.gl/uT1Evq, accessed May 9, 2018. 
582 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department), “Zai Yue Qiye, Wei Pengyuan, Zhuanjiyin Liangyou, he Shenzhen Kuaibo” 
(Chinese Companies in Vietnam, Wei Pengyuan, Genetically Modified Grain and Oil, and Shenzhen QVOD 
Player), China Digital Times, May 15, 2014, https://goo.gl/v94Dyn, accessed May 9, 2018. 
583 Zhenlibu (The Truth Department), “Xinjiang Keshi An, Yuenan Qiye he Zhongguo de Aidashi” (Xinjiang 
Kashgar Incident, Factories in Vietnam, and A Chinese History of Being Bullied), China Digital Times, May 18, 
2014, https://goo.gl/4JhQKu, accessed May 9, 2018. 
584 Interview 18, May 29, 2017, Beijing; Interview 21, May 31, 2017, Beijing. 
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a policy without having to resort to the propaganda’s pacifying effect. In other words, the state 
did not need to pacify an already moderate public opinion. 
Despite the appearance of Chinese provocation by placing the oil rig in the disputed area 
and engaging in dangerous confrontation with the Vietnamese ships, strong evidence suggests 
that Beijing had a moderate policy intent.  
Why China moved the oil rig to disputed waters in the first place is still unclear and 
disputed by analysts. As mentioned earlier, the bilateral relationship was showing a promising 
upward trend since early 2013 that Beijing should have little incentive to disrupt. Prior to the 
crisis, the two countries had enjoyed a rather cordial relationship, marked by the exchange of 
high-level visits by Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang to Beijing in June 2013 and Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang to Hanoi in October. During these visits, the two sides restated their 
commitment to peace and stability in the South China Sea. As a concrete result of the visits, the 
China-Vietnam expert group for low-sensitivity maritime cooperation and consultation was 
established in December 2013,585 just months before the crisis was touched off. China also 
engaged with ASEAN on the Implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea (DOC) at the tenth joint working group meeting in Singapore on March 18 and 
was working out a number of confidence building measures under the DOC at the seventh 
ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC in Thailand on 
April 21. These took place just weeks before the placement of the oil rig.  
Therefore, the placement of the oil rig really came as a shock to many observers, as it 
reversed the previous Chinese behavior and did not appear like an ad hoc decision made by an 
585 PRC MoFA, “China and Vietnam Held Plenary Meeting of the Governmental Delegation on Border 
Negotiation,” December 7, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1108277.shtml, accessed May 9, 
2018. 
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unruly CNOOC acting alone. According to the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, the oil rig was 
protected by “109 and 125 vessels” formed in “3 rings,” “including 4-6 warships, 2 missile 
frigates numbered 534 and 572 operating at 20-25 nautical miles from the oil rig, 2 pairs of 
minesweepers vessels numbered 840, 843 or 839, 842 (rotating daily) at about 15-25 nautical 
miles from the rig, and 2 pairs of fast attack ships numbered 751, 756 or 753 and an unidentified 
ship (rotating daily).”586 As a Chinese scholar Shi Yinhong pointed out at the time, no agency 
other than the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can command navy warships, especially 
on this scale.587 The PLAN was clearly involved.  
What then explains this sudden reversal of Chinese behavior towards the Vietnamese? 
Among the many speculations,588 an explanation of irrational decision making combining a lack 
of inter-organizational coordination, an underestimate of Vietnamese reaction, and path 
dependency seems to prevail. If this explanation is true, the Chinese initial provocation was then 
a result of unintended miscalculation. As disclosed in private interviews to policy analysts close 
to the decision-making process, moving the oil rig to the disputed area was “without the proper 
consultation with the Foreign Ministry, and likely without direct involvement of the top 
leadership.”589 A retired government official frequently consulted on Vietnamese affairs attests: 
“our policy (in placing the rig) in 2014 was not very stable…it was not a decision made by the 
top leadership after careful rumination.”590 When asked on June 11 to confirm the Vietnamese 
586 Vietnam MoFA, “The 6th Regular Press Conference,” June 26, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/tcbc/ns140628000810, accessed May 9, 2018. 
587 As quoted in Jane Perlez, “Vietnamese Officials Intolerant of Violence as Standoff with China Continues,” New 
York Times, May 17, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/asia/vietnamese-officials-intolerant-of-
violence-as-standoff-with-china-continues.html, accessed May 9, 2018. 
588 For an enumeration of these speculations, see Carl Thayer, “China’s Oil Rig Gambit: South China Sea Game-
Changer?” The Diplomat, May 12, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-south-china-sea-
game-changer/, accessed May 9, 2018. 
589 Interview 22, May 31, 2017, Beijing. 
590 Interview 25, June 2, 2017, Beijing.  
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remarks that “China has sent six warships to guard its oil rig,” Chinese MoFA spokesperson Hua 
Chunying replied “we have sent government vessels to the site for security.”591 “Government 
vessels” should mean maritime law enforcement vessels, not navy ships. This happened again on 
June 13 with MoFA Deputy Director General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs 
Yi Xianliang. When asked whether the Vietnamese statement about China sending navy 
warships was true, Yi said “…we had to send Coast Guard ships…”592 It is not clear, however, 
whether Hua and Yi were skillfully deflecting the question or simply not notified of the navy 
ships. In late August, Vietnamese special envoy Le Hong Anh visited Beijing in an effort to 
mend fences. In his talks with Chinese Party seniors, he unusually stressed the need for the two 
parties to “tighten their instructions.” The words “tighten instructions” were repeated four times 
in a short two-page report of the meeting.593 This implies that the explanation given privately to 
Anh involved a lack of coordination on the Chinese side. 
A Crisis Group report offers a slightly different story, but also confirms the irrational 
decision model. Based on an interview with a “security agency-affiliated Chinese analyst,” the 
report asserts that “The Central Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests, 
created in 2012 and reportedly led, at least initially, directly by Xi, made the decision in the oil 
rig case. The foreign ministry was said to be represented by the Department of Boundary and 
Ocean Affairs, whose ‘primary concern is sovereignty’, without Department of Asian Affairs 
input.” Thus the decision was made without “consultation with experts who understand 
591 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on 
June 11, 2014,” June 11, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1164598.shtml, 
accessed May 9, 2018. 
592 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Deputy Director General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs 
Yi Xianliang’s Press Conference on the Zhongjiannan Project [in Chinese],” June 14, 2014, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/t1165600.shtml, accessed May 9, 2018. 
593 “Vietnam, China agree to restore, develop ties,” Nhan Dan/VNA, August 27, 2014, 
http://en.nhandan.org.vn/politics/external-relations/item/2753802-na-chairman-meets-young-japanese-
parliamentarians.html, accessed May 9, 2018. 
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Vietnam.”594 My own interviews with persons routinely consulted on Vietnamese Affairs by 
Beijing indirectly confirm this latter point. They said that the placement of the rig “came as a 
shock,”, so it was clear that Vietnam experts generally were not consulted on the matter.595 The 
report also points out that “in internal memos, closed-door conferences, and briefings to senior 
officials,” the mainstream view among Chinese analysts was that the decision was erroneous and 
unwise.596 
If the irrational model is true, then this case deviates from the rational actor assumption 
of the (mis)alignment theory a bit. There was no reason, however, to believe that subsequent 
Chinese actions were irrational or uncoordinated. I will continue to analyze the case with the 
notion that the initiation of the crisis might not be explained by the theory.  
There also seems to be an element of path dependency in the decision. In June 2012, in 
retaliation to Vietnam’s state oil and gas group PetroVietnam’s plan to invite Japanese firms to 
participate in the joint development of about 20 oil and gas projects597 and the “Vietnamese Law 
of the Sea” passed by the Vietnamese National Assembly, CNOOC announced just a few days 
later the invitation of international bids for 9 oil and gas blocks.598 This explains why Chinese 
MoFA spokesperson had at various occasions claimed that similar Chinese exploration and 
594 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea (III): A Fleeting Opportunity for Calm,” Report 
No.267, May 7, 2015, 10, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/stirring-south-china-sea-iii-
fleeting-opportunity-calm, accessed May 9, 2018. 
595 Interview 25, June 2, 2017, Beijing; Interview 46, November 20, 2017, Washington DC. 
596 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea,” 5. 
597 “Vietnam to propose oil, gas development with Japan,” Thanh Nien News, June 13, 2012, 
http://www.thanhniennews.com/business/vietnam-to-propose-oil-gas-development-with-japan-media-6807.html, 
accessed May 9, 2018. 
598 “CNOOC Opens Tender to Foreign Companies for 9 Oil and Gas Blocks [in Chinese],” Tencent News, June 26, 
2012, https://news.qq.com/a/20120626/001565.htm, accessed May 9, 2018. 
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drilling activities had been going on for “a decade in the same waters,” and the placement of the 
oil rig in 2014 was only a “natural continuation” of past activities.599  
Hanoi reacted forcefully to the Chinese placement of the oil rig. According to the deputy 
commander/chief of staff of the Vietnam Maritime Police Ngo Ngoc Thu, they immediately 
dispatched six vessels to “examine and prevent the illegal intrusion of China’s oil rig and the 
escort ships.” Both sides reinforced their presence near the disputed area subsequently. At the 
peak time, there were over a hundred Chinese vessels and sixty Vietnamese vessels present on 
the waters, engaging in a massive standoff.600 A number of serious collisions ensued.601 After a 
phone call between Vietnam Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and China’s State Councilor 
Yang Jiechi on May 6 failed to reach an agreement, Hanoi appealed to the UN, the ASEAN, and 
the U.S. for support.602 On May 7, Vietnam circulated a note at the UN to protest the Chinese 
action. On May 11, Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung delivered a speech at the 24th 
ASEAN Summit, stressing that “the incident constituted a direct threat to peace, stability, 
maritime safety and security in the East Sea.”603 Dung also threatened to pursue international 
legal measures against Beijing. On May 6, the U.S. State Department spokesperson singled out 
599 These wordings have been mentioned at multiple occasions, for an example see PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on June 18, 2014,” June 19, 2014, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1166826.shtml, accessed May 9, 2018. 
600 Ngo Ngoc Thu, “The Situation on the Area with China’s Illegal Drilling Rig HD981 within Vietnam’s Waters,” 
Vietnam MoFA press briefing, Hanoi, May 7, 2014; “Video shows ‘Vietnamese boat ramming Chinese ships’ in 
disputed waters,” South China Morning Post, June 14, 2014, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1532371/beijing-accuses-vietnam-ramming-vessels-over-1500-times, 
accessed May 9, 2018; Green et al 2017, 208-209. 
601 Both sides released video clips of these collisions, accusing the other side as the aggressor. See “Waijiaobu 
Bianhaisi fusizhang Yi Xianliang jiu Zhongjiannan xiangmu juxing chuifenghui (Deputy director general of MoFA 
Department of Boundary and Oceanic Affairs Yi Xianliang’s press briefing),” PRC MoFA Press Briefing, June 13, 
2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/t1165600.shtml, accessed May 9, 2018; Ngo Ngoc 
Thu, “The Situation on the Area.” 
602 Vietnam MoFA, “Họp báo quốc tế về việc Trung Quốc hạ đặt giàn khoan trái phép trong vùng biển Việt Nam 
(International press conference on China’s drilling rig in Vietnam’s waters),” May 7, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140509011156, accessed May 9, 2018. 
603 Vietnam MoFA, “Regular Press Briefing by MOFA’s Spokesperson Le Hai Binh On May 15, 2014,” May 15, 
2014, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140516233943, accessed May 9, 2018. 
240
China’s behavior as “provocative and unhelpful.”604 The U.S. State released a press statement 
the next day accusing China’s “unilateral action” as “part of a broader pattern of Chinese 
behavior to advance its claims over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and 
stability in the region.”605 On May 21, Vietnam Foreign Minister Pham Bihn Minh called U.S. 
secretary of State John Kerry to discuss the matter.606  
Caught off-guard by the chain of reactions and realizing the grave risk of tipping the 
Vietnamese domestic political scale further towards the anti-China faction, Beijing needed a 
face-saving retreat as a way out of the conundrum. Retreating immediately was certainly not 
appealing, because that would signal Beijing’s weakness to both a domestic and an international 
audience. State Councilor Yang Jiechi’s visit to Hanoi on June 18th is a strong signal that both 
sides were willing to talk and work out a peaceful solution. The Vietnam-China Joint Steering 
Committee for Bilateral Cooperation, under whose umbrella State Councilor Yang visited Hanoi, 
“ha[s] an established practice of meeting annually,” but the specific timing of the meeting is 
decided on short notice.607 As is common with Chinese foreign policy practice, using seemingly 
routine meetings at long-established multilateral or bilateral frameworks is a traditional face-
saving way for Beijing to initiate talks on more urgent matters without appearing too eager. In 
Beijing’s perspective, the Vietnamese government tolerated, if not “connived,” the rioters in 
burning down several Chinese-owned factories and caused deaths and damages, so China 
deserved an apology and should not appear too eager to make up.  
604 Jen Psaki, “Daily Press Briefing: May 6, 2014,” U.S. Department of State, May 6, 2014, Washington DC, 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/05/225687.htm, accessed May 9, 2018.  
605 Jen Psaki, “Vietnam/China: Chinese Oil Rig Operations Near the Paracel Islands,” May 7, 2014, Washington 
DC, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225750.htm, accessed May 9, 2018. 
606 Thayer 2014b. 
607 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on June 17, 2014,” 
June 17, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1166317.shtml. 
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Beijing also needed to stand its ground on the sea in the confrontations with Vietnamese 
ships in order to uphold its territorial claims and to protect the valuable and vulnerable oil rig. As 
for Hanoi’s accusation of the Chinese physical aggressiveness on the sea, such as ramming 
Vietnamese ships and firing water cannons, the Chinese cordon was obviously there to protect 
the oil rig, not to harass the Vietnamese ships, unless they misunderstood the Vietnamese ships’ 
intentions. Even the Vietnamese MoFA spokesperson used the word “protect” when he was 
saying that “China used between 109 and 125 vessels to protect Haiyang Shiyou oil rig 981.”608 
But it does not exclude the possibility that the Chinese ships might mistake some of the innocent 
Vietnamese fishing boats for their intention to obstruct the oil rig operation and caused damage. 
Besides, incidental collisions in such a crowded space is almost unavoidable. 
Some also cite examples of economic sanctions as Chinese aggressive intention towards 
Vietnam. Malesky and Morris-Jung state that “Retail trade with China dipped noticeably in the 
second half of 2014,”609 but Poh reports that “the trade account between China and Vietnam in 
2014 continued to increase.”610 My own examination of data from the World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) and the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSOV) confirms Poh’s 
observation.611 Total retail bilateral trade increased from 50.0 billion (US Dollars) in 2013 to 
58.6 billion in 2014, and continued to rise since. The second half of 2014 did not dip either, with 
the first half of 27.8 billion and the second half of 30.8 billion. The only dip is in tourism, but the 
travel advisories and cancelled chartered flights were not limited to China.612 According to Poh’s 
608 Vietnam MoFA, “The 6th Regular Press Conference,” June 28, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/tcbc/ns140628000810, accessed May 9, 2018. 
609 Malesky and Morris-Jung 2015, 172. 
610 Poh 2017, 153. 
611 The WITS incorporates data from the World Bank, the UNSD Commodity Trade (UN Comtrade) (UN 
Comtrade) database, the WTO’s Integrated Data Base (IDB) and others. There is only trivial difference between the 
WITS data and the GSOV data. No data source is cited with the Malesky and Morris-Jung claim.  
612 Poh 2017, 153. 
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interviews with Vietnamese diplomats and analysts, although sanctions were expected, they were 
not employed or threatened. A Vietnamese analyst also told Poh that “it was his understanding 
that local officials in China – such as those in Yunnan and Guangxi – were ‘specifically 
instructed’ to ensure that economic interactions along the border between China and Vietnam 
were not affected by the dispute. These local Chinese officials … proactively approached their 
Vietnamese counterparts to ensure that economic interactions were sustained, even as bilateral 
tensions continued to rise.”613 
Fortunately, Beijing faced a relatively moderate public opinion, so it did not need to 
resort to a pacifying propaganda to pursue a moderate policy. Despite the overall strong 
nationalism in China on the South China Sea dispute in general, the public held a relatively mild 
opinion towards the specific dispute with Vietnam particularly in 2014. The year 2013 and the 
first half of 2014 is an uneventful period between China and Vietnam on the South China Sea 
dispute. The absence of any major disturbance on the sea for an extended period of time, together 
with the Chinese state refraining from stoking nationalism on the issue with Vietnam, gave the 
relationship a respite, allowing the nationalist emotions to subside temporarily. Although still 
having the potential to be rekindled, the Chinese nationalist sentiment on this dispute at this 
particular time was calm. Several journalists and editors interviewed observed public opinion 
before and during the crisis to be “calm,” if not “aloof,” and “definitely less feverish than before 
the Sino-Philippines Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 or the arbitration case in 2016.” They 
generally see “little news value” in the ongoing events, except for the riots.614  
Figure 7.1 shows the daily search index of the word “South China Sea” in the Baidu 
Search Index (BSI) during the one-year pre-crisis period. This period featured stable and 
613 Ibid, 154. 
614 Interview 18, May 29, 2017; Interview 20, May 31, 2017; Interview 23, June 1, 2017. 
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relatively low index compared to other periods, with just a few mild surges and averaged at 
1,713. For comparison, as mentioned in Chapter 6, the all-time average of search volume during 
all-time non-crisis periods between January 1, 2011 and October 15, 2017 is 2,773. The average 
during the one-year pre-crisis period before the 2016 arbitration crisis is over four thousand, 
which I interpret as high public attention.  





According to South China Sea Public Opinion Newsletter, the first half of 2014 shows low level 
of public attention in social media, and almost all online discussions were exclusively about the 
dispute with the Philippines or the U.S.’ involvement.615 Reports of very few protesters showing 
up for a scheduled anti-Vietnam rally in Kunming on May 19th also confirm the nonchalant 
public opinion.616  
Given the weak public opinion and Beijing’s moderate policy intent, a propaganda 
campaign to mollify public opinion is not necessary, a propaganda campaign to mobilize the 
615 Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University, The South China Sea Public 
Opinion Newsletter, January, February, March, and April 2014.  
616 Brian Eyler, “The anti-Vietnam protest that didn’t happen,” May 19, 2014, http://www.eastbysoutheast.com/anti-
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public is certainly not desired. On the contrary, the state chose to keep the dispute out of the 
public’s sight. China’s position on the dispute was still clarified and made readily available 
partly in response to the loud noises on the Vietnamese side and partly in case if people hear 
about it from foreign media.  
Beijing did develop coercive goals in the crisis: to stop the Vietnamese interference in the 
oil rig’s exploration activities and to prevent the Vietnamese ships from ramming the rig; to keep 
Hanoi from enlarging the matter by resorting to international forums such as the UN or the 
ASEAN, pursuing legal means, or appealing to the U.S. and other powers; to have Hanoi keep a 
lid on domestic nationalist expressions and clamp down on the riots. But Beijing chose to forgo 
the opportunity of incurring audience cost to buttress these coercions. The outcome of China’s 
media behavior would therefore contradict an audience cost prediction. This is due to the 
concern that a hardline public opinion would constrain flexibility for a moderate policy choice, 
which is paradoxically also part of the audience cost logic. It is ultimately the public-state 
alignment that explained the absence of a propaganda campaign. 
 
III. The Vietnamese Pacifying Propaganda Campaign 
The Vietnamese media behavior on the oil rig crisis contrasted to the Chinese media behavior. 
Despite of being involved in the same dispute, Hanoi launched a media campaign instead of 
keeping quiet like China did. During the seventy-four days of the crisis between May 2 and July 
17, 2014, Nhan Dan (The People), the Vietnamese equivalent of China’s People’s Daily, 
published 224 articles, averaging at three articles a day on the dispute. When a propaganda 
campaign is present, the most prominent characteristic is that everything seems to be relevant. 
Even a news article on the beauty pageant reads that contestants “call[ed] for actions to support 
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Vietnam Government to defend its sovereignty in the East Sea and asking China to immediately 
withdraw its illegal Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig and ships off Vietnam’s waters.”617 Thanh Nien 
News (Youth News), one of the five most influential newspapers in Vietnam, published 570 
articles on the subject, averaging at eight articles a day.618  
The Vietnamese media behavior offers another piece of evidence for the pacifying 
function of a propaganda campaign. The combination of a moderate state policy intent and a 
hardline public opinion motivated Hanoi to use a pacifying propaganda campaign to achieve its 
policy goals. Before delving into the Vietnamese side of the oil rig crisis below, a brief overview 
of the Vietnamese political and propaganda system is warranted since the discussion will shift 
the context from a Chinese system to a Vietnamese one, although they are quite similar. 
 
1. The Vietnamese and the Chinese Context in Comparison 
 Both Vietnam and China have party-state systems, in which the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) have the preponderant power in their respective 
country’s political, economic and social life. All print media are owned by or under effective 
control of the respective Communist party. Although there are various degrees of 
commercialization among a diverse range of media outlets, both states maintain effective 
administrative and legal means to regulate media. The government supervises senior personnel 
appointments at main media outlets, monitors and censors media content on a day-to-day basis, 
issues general guidelines and specific directives on what issues to cover and how they should be 
covered, and sanctions or even jails journalists who go against the state mandate.  
617 “Dang Thu Thao crowned Miss Vietnam Oceans 2014,” Nhan Dan, May 26, 2014, 
http://en.nhandan.com.vn/culture/lifestyle/item/2536502-dang-thu-thao-crowned-miss-vietnam-oceans-2014.html, 
accessed May 10, 2018. 
618 Bui 2017. 
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Having been through a long period of colonialization and several major wars against 
foreign powers, Vietnam has a relatively shorter time for state building and economic 
development, so it arguably has weaker central control than China. As a result, civil society is 
much more active in Vietnam than in China. Internet use is also freer in Vietnam than in 
China.619 For example, Google and New York Times websites are accessible in Vietnam but are 
blocked in China. Despite these differentials in the degree of control, the organizational and legal 
means for the CPV to tighten the rein of media control when they feel the need are still in place 
and frequently resorted to.620 For example, Google is required to maintain its servers inside 
Vietnam, so that it is easier for Hanoi to censor content whenever it feels the need to.621 Freedom 
House reports that “In 2013, the [Vietnamese] government increased its repression of print and 
online journalists, jailing more than twice as many writers and bloggers in 2013 as it did the 
previous year.”622 “In September [2013], the state introduced Decree 72, which restricted all 
websites and social media from publishing anything that ‘provides information that is against 
Vietnam.’”623 Freedom House rates both countries a score of 4 out of 16 in 2014 on “Freedom of 
Expression and Belief.”624 
Besides the authoritarian rule and tight media control, both countries have witnessed the 
rise of popular nationalism in recent years. Some scholars argue that this is a direct result of state 
instigation, in part to divert public attention away from domestic problems such as rampant 
619 These judgements are made based on the author’s personal experiences and discussions with people and analysts 
who are familiar with both countries’ political systems. 
620 Broadcasting Board of Governors, “Media Use in Vietnam 2013,” 2013, http://www. 
bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2013/12/Vietnam-research-brief-final1.pdf, accessed May 9, 2018. 
621 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014, Vietnam,” 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2014/vietnam, accessed May 9, 2018. 
622 Ibid. 
623 Ibid. 
624 Ibid.; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014, China,” 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2014/china, accessed May 9, 2018. 
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corruption, growing inequality and sluggish economic performance since the 2008 global 
financial crisis.625 Others argue that nationalism is promoted to fill the ideological gap to 
consolidate regime legitimacy after both countries’ loosening the Marxist-Leninist ideals to 
incorporate the capitalist economic instruments.626 Besides the effects of the government media 
policy, the market-based economic success of both countries and the mushrooming of the 
internet and social media have increased the opportunities and the capabilities for citizens to 
voice their opinions. 
 
2. The Oil Rig Crisis from Hanoi’s Perspective: Defending the Fatherland 
At the beginning of the crisis, the Vietnamese government faced an existing strong and hardline 
public opinion, yet the state itself preferred an overall moderate policy. Analysts observe a 
growing rift between a nationalist public and a reserved government during the oil rig crisis in 
Vietnam. Malesky and Morris-Jung note that “the oil rig crisis highlighted a growing gap 
between state leadership and the wider Vietnamese society” and “increasing polarization 
between state and society.”627 Bui’s examination of 570 Thanh Nien News articles during the 
crisis also shows “some gap between the official news stories and readers’ comments,” and that 
“The public’s response is arguably more emotional and more demanding of a tougher 
position.”628 
The surge in Vietnamese public opinion against China regarding South China Sea 
sovereignty issues could be traced back to 2007. A senior Vietnam specialist in China revealed 
625 Le Hong Hiep, “Performance-based legitimacy: the case of the communist party of Vietnam and Doi Moi,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 34(2), 2012, 145-172. 
626 Zhao 2004; Gries 2004. 
627 Malesky and Morris-Jung 2015, 169-70. 
628 Bui 2017, 183. 
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that anti-China protests on the South China Sea dispute started in 2007 when internal Chinese 
consideration of elevating the administrative status of Sansha county to the prefecture level 
leaked to Hanoi. Hanoi decided to mobilize college students to stage regular protests to pressure 
the Chinese to drop the plan.629 The staged anti-China protests succeeded in deterring Beijing 
from pursuing the Sansha City plan until June 2012 when the Vietnamese National Assembly 
passed the “Vietnamese Law of the Sea” making claims to the Paracels and the Spratlys. Beijing 
retaliated by following through with the Sansha City plan one month later. The regular weekend 
protests, however, raised awareness and intensified emotions on the dispute among the 
Vietnamese public, marking the beginning of a downward spiral in the Vietnamese public 
opinion against China.  
The strong public opinion on the South China Sea dispute against China gained 
momentum at the encouragement of America’s “Pivot to Asia” policy, with a benchmark event 
in July 2010 featuring a heated debate at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi led by the then 
U.S. State Secretary Hilary Clinton. Vietnam’s nationalist public opinion reached a small climax 
during the cable-cutting incidents in the summer of 2011. Angry Vietnamese once again took to 
the street, but this time more bottom-up than top-down and the protests continued for two 
months. Interviews with observers who experienced the protests confirm the spontaneous nature 
of these protests.630 
The bilateral relationship received a respite from the South China Sea dispute in 2013 and 
early 2014, featuring a relatively uneventful year on the dispute between the two countries, the 
exchange of high-level visits by top Vietnamese and Chinese leaders, and the establishment of a 
new bilateral expert group on maritime cooperation and consultation. But even during this 
629 Interview 46, November 20, 2017, Washington DC. 
630 Interview 47, February 21, 2017, Hanoi. 
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relatively calm period, anti-China rallies flared anew in the summer of 2013 and were cracked 
down by the government, demonstrating the ongoing genuine and strong public emotions on the 
issue.631 A Pew Global Attitudes Survey taken during April 16 – May 8, 2014 in Vietnam right 
before and at the very beginning of the oil rig crisis shows that 78% of respondents had 
unfavorable opinion of China and only 16% of respondents had favorable opinion, in sharp 
contrast to the Vietnamese’ overwhelming favorability towards all other major powers in the 
region – the United States (76% favorable), Russia (75% favorable), Japan (79% favorable) and 
India (67% favorable).632 
Yet logical deductions and evidence of the actual policy pursued by Hanoi suggest a 
moderate state policy intent. First, Hanoi had little incentive to escalate the tension and damage 
the bilateral relationship with China. The Vietnamese economy was asymmetrically dependent 
on China. Prior to the crisis, China had become Vietnam’s largest trading partner, reaching about 
$50 billion total turnover in 2013.633 China was also “the sixth-largest investor by the number of 
projects and fourteenth largest by the total capital (about $14.7 billion) invested, respectively.”634 
Given China’s rapidly growing appetite for overseas investment, there was great potential for 
further growth in bilateral investment.  
Granted, Hanoi’s attitude towards the public protests at the beginning was permissive, at 
times even encouraging. The Vietnamese police watched as hundreds (which later grew into 
thousands) of demonstrators marched around the country and protested outside the Chinese 
631 “Rare Protest in Vietnam Raises a Call to Curb China,” New York Times, June 3, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/world/asia/rare-protest-in-vietnam-raises-call-to-curb-china.html, accessed 
May 9, 2018. 
632 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends Datasets, available at http://www.pewglobal.org/datasets/. For 
more information on the 2014 survey in Vietnam, see http://www.pewresearch.org/methodology/international-
survey-research/international-methodology/global-attitudes-survey/vietnam/2014, accessed May 9, 2018. 
633 “China remains Vietnam’s biggest trade partner in 2013,” Xinhua News, January 29, 2014, accessed at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/chinadata/2014-01/29/content_17264283.htm, accessed May 9, 2018. 
634 Malesky and Morris-Jung, “Vietnam in 2014,” 172. 
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embassy. They even cheered the demonstrators on by “broadcasting complaints about China’s 
actions” using loudspeakers “atop police vans,” inviting state television to record the event, and 
handing out banners saying “We entirely trust the party, the government and the people’s 
army.”635 Nevertheless, Hanoi was well aware of the danger of public protests turning against 
itself. The violent riots that took place on May 13-14, 2014 gave a sobering alarm to the CPV 
leaders that the strong public opinion, if left unfettered, could go out of control. Scores of 
factories were damaged in the rampage, including the ones managed by South Koreans and 
Taiwanese. One Chinese company reported 4 deaths and 130 casualties.636 The Vietnamese 
leadership responded quickly, arresting 300 persons involved in the rioting. China evacuated 
more than 3000 of its citizens and, not surprisingly, Chinese tourism dried up.637 As General 
Hoang Cong Tu of the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security put it, “they [the rioters] have 
seriously undermined the country’s image, and such action has to be punished.”638 
No government looks kindly on riots, but the CPV had additional reasons to worry about 
anti-China disturbances. Hanoi knew well that anti-China sentiment could easily connect to an 
agenda critical of the regime. An open letter by 61 party members in late July illustrates the 
linkage: on one hand, the letter called for “liberating … from dependence upon China” and 
“promptly sue China at an international tribunal”; on the other, it blamed the regime for the 
current situation, and demanded “abandoning the erroneous policies of building socialism and 
635 “Vietnam Allows Anti- China Protest over Oil Rig,” Daily Mail, May 10, 2014, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2625366/Vietnam-allows-anti-China-protest-oil-rig.html, accessed May 
10, 2018. 
636 Gerry Mulany, “Chinese Company puts Death Toll in Vietnam Riots at 4,” New York Times, May 21, 2014.  
https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/chinese-company-puts-death-toll-in-vietnam-riots-at-4/, accessed 
May 9, 2018. 
637 Jane Perlez, “Vietnamese Officials Intolerant of Violence as Standoff with China Continues,” New York Times, 
May 17, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/asia/vietnamese-officials-intolerant-of-violence-as-
standoff-with-china-continues.html, accessed May 9, 2018. 
638 As quoted in ibid. 
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decisively veering towards a national and democratic direction, focusing on a moderate 
transformation of the political regime from its present totalitarianism to a democratic system.”639 
Senior Vietnamese analysts affiliated with a government think tank pointed to the internal debate 
and the cleavage between the anti-China, more liberal faction led by the then Prime Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dung and the pro-China, more conservative faction led by the Party General 
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, with one constantly checked and balanced by the other.640 This is 
also evident in the CPV Central Committee’s ninth plenary session, which took place during 
May 8-14, a few days after the Chinese placement of the oil rig and whilst the riots broke out. “A 
heated debate erupted about how Vietnam should respond to China’s challenge.”641 
As the oil rig crisis continued, Hanoi adopted a three-pronged response – sending law 
enforcement vessels to the location of the rig to protest and disrupt the Chinese activities; 
establishing bilateral channels for negotiations; and rallying international pressure to force the 
Chinese to retreat. There is only some hardline element in the first type of response. China 
accused Vietnam for ramming Chinese ships “for a total of 1,416 times,” in addition to 
“send[ing] frogmen and other underwater agents to the area, and dropped large numbers of 
obstacles, including fishing nets and floating objects, in the waters.” 642 But it was not clear 
whether the Vietnamese vessels were there merely to voice protest, or they were aggressively 
breaking through the Chinese cordon and disrupting the Chinese activities by ramming Chinese 
639 “An Open Letter by 61 Party Members to The Central Executive Committee and all members of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam,” July 28, 2014, 
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/custom_search/Letter%20from%2061%20Vietnamese%20P
arty%20members.pdf, accessed May 9, 2018. 
640 Interview 48, February 23, 2014, Hanoi. 
641 Carl Thayer, “4 Reasons China Removed Oil Rig HYSY-981 Sooner Than Planned,” The Diplomat, July 22, 
2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/4-reasons-china-removed-oil-rig-hysy-981-sooner-than-planned/, accessed 
May 9, 2018. 
642 PRC MoFA, “The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position,” June 
8, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163264.shtml, accessed May 9, 2018. 
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ships. It is reasonable to believe that there were some ramming on both sides’ account and some 
incidental collisions due to the crowded space. A ship’s actions could also be easily 
misunderstood for aggression given such a situation. While the jury is still out on this point, one 
thing that is certain is that the Vietnamese presence in the disputed area was required if it were to 
maintain its claim strength to the Paracels. As Womack points out, “The method of establishing 
territorial claims in international law has the pernicious effect of maximizing confrontation and 
hostility… unchallenged occupation is nine-tenths of the law. Thus each has an incentive to 
increase its presence and to protest or oppose occupation by others, and all parties to the dispute 
have done both repeatedly over the past forty years.”643 Therefore, without immediate and 
effective protests, the lack of action on the Vietnamese part could potentially be used by China 
as Hanoi’s tacit consent of the fait accompli. So even if the Chinese accusation was true, the 
Vietnamese actions had a defensive nature. 
Besides, Hanoi was very proactive in seeking out bilateral channels with their Chinese 
counterparts. “Immediately after the oil rig crisis broke out, Vietnam’s leaders adopted a 
conciliatory diplomatic posture.” Hanoi requested the activation of a hotline between senior 
leaders, offered to send a special envoy and pressed for a visit by its party secretary general.644 
On May 6, Vietnamese foreign minister Pham Binh Minh called Chinese state councilor Yang 
Jiechi. With all things considered, Vietnam’s actual policy was reactive and proportionate, 
providing further proof for a moderate policy intent. 
643 Brantly Womack, “The Spratlys: from dangerous ground to apple of discord,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 
33, no. 3 (2011): 373-374. 
644 Thayer 2014b. 
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The bellicose public opinion required the CPV to align public opinion with its intended 
moderate policy before carrying it out. As a result, Hanoi utilized a pacifying propaganda 
campaign to clear the way for a moderate foreign policy.  
First, Hanoi used the harsh rhetoric in a propaganda campaign to keep up the appearances 
of a tough stand towards China to appeal to the public demand, though none threatening any 
substantive punishment. The challenge of nationalistic public criticism was strong and real. Bui 
reports that “[readers] posted comments [below the news articles] were critical of the 
government’s late reporting of the oil rig installation and the relatively mild statements by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson in the first few days.”645 To appease the nationalistic 
public demand, the state issued strongly-worded statements, condemning the Chinese placement 
of the oil rig as “brazen,” “illegal,” and “void,” and the actions by Chinese maritime patrol ships 
as “aggressive” and “intimidating.”646 At the ASEAN Summit on May 11, Vietnamese Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made a high-profile pitch to other ASEAN leaders and criticized 
China’s behavior as a “direct threat” to regional peace and stability. Vietnamese media covered 
these statements extensively.  
But none of these statements had real teeth. Bui confirms that “these statements remained 
vague about Vietnam’s likely response. For example, they stated that ‘China needs to take 
responsibilities for its actions’, and if China continued with its aggressive behavior, ‘Vietnam 
has to take defensive measures in response’ or ‘Vietnam will take appropriate measures.’”647 
When asked whether Vietnam will follow the example of the Philippines to sue China in 
international court, the Foreign Ministry answered “priority is given to negotiating disputes with 
645 Bui 2017, 180. 
646 Vietnam MoFA, “Regular Press Briefing by MOFA’s Spokesperson Le Hai Binh On May 15, 2014,” May 15, 
2014, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140516233943, accessed May 9, 2018. 
647 Bui 2017, 175. 
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neighboring countries, but does not exclude any other peaceful means.”648 Even Prime Minister 
Dung, the strongest advocate of this legal action, stated that “timing was crucial.”649 Defense 
Minister Phung Quang Thanh’s remark at the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 31 that the legal 
action was only “a last resort” also confirms the hollow content of the strong rhetoric.650 
The Vietnamese media also gave broad coverage to confrontations in the conflict zone. 
But instead of focusing on the Chinese aggressiveness on the sea, the media focused on the 
heroic actions of the maritime law enforcement officers “defending the fatherland.” In Bui’s 
content analysis of the Thanh Nien News articles, this theme took up the majority of the articles 
(146 out of 570 articles (25.6%)). This averaged at two such articles a day.651 This type of 
framing serves the purpose of showcasing that the government was indeed taking active actions, 
so as to fend off the nationalistic criticisms against the government. This media approach to 
“channel popular anger and animosity into a more positive form of pro-government 
nationalism”652 confirms the causal logic of the (mis)alignment theory. 
Secondly, the state used the propaganda campaign to subdue the strong public emotions 
so that a moderate policy could be carried out. On one hand, the state allowed the public to vent 
on social media and online comment sections. Unless the online posts explicitly targeted at the 
Vietnamese leadership or called for anti-government actions, public discussions to express 
outrage and vent frustrations were generally allowed and even encouraged. On the other, the 
state walked the fine line between criticizing the Chinese actions and avoiding intensifying anti-
648 Vietnam MoFA, “International press conference on China’s downed drilling rig in Vietnam’s waters,” May 7, 
2014, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140509011156, accessed May 9, 2018. 
649 Thayer, “4 Reasons.” 
650 Shangri_La Dialogue Report, 13th Asia Security Summit, Singapore, 30 May – 1 June 2014, International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 29, https://www.iiss.org/-/media/Silos/ShangriLa/2014/Shangri-La-Dialogue-Report-
2014.pdf, accessed May 9, 2018. 
651 Bui, “Managing Anti-China Nationalism in Vietnam,” 178. 
652 Ibid., 169. 
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China sentiments. The state achieved this through three approaches: 1) Channeling public anger 
towards patriotism and national unity, as mentioned earlier. Bui finds the Thanh Nien News 
articles highlighting “the need for national unity, encouragement for maritime enforcement 
officers, relief for affected fishermen, and above all, confidence in the government’s ability to 
resolve the situation.”653 2) Echoing anti-China pubic emotions in a smart way. Bui finds that 
“Anti-China rhetoric was not absent from the media coverage, but highly negative assessments 
of China were actually mostly confined to analyses by foreign observers and scholars.”654 
Echoing provides a sense of agreement and support; but echoing in moderation and in foreign 
observers’ assessments prevents the exacerbation of the nationalist emotions and the unintended 
escalations with the foreign rival. 3) Refraining from referencing to historical disputes. The fact 
that Bui found very few articles referencing to the historical disputes between the two countries 
provides strong evidence that the Vietnamese government was not overly enthusiastic about 
inciting domestic public emotion on the current crisis. Recalling historical grievances is the 
easiest way to ignite public hatred. But “China’s forceful expulsion of Vietnamese forces from 
the Crescent Group in the Paracel islands in 1974, the Johnson South Reef skirmish in 1988, or 
even the border war in 1979 were hardly mentioned in most reports.”655 
 
3. Audience Cost? 
Could the Vietnamese propaganda campaign be better explained by the audience cost theory? 
Hanoi had coercive goals during the crisis. Its most important coercive goal was to prevent the 
Chinese oil rig from drilling in the area and to force it to leave. As argued earlier, Hanoi did 
653 Ibid., 169. 
654 Ibid., 179. 
655 Ibid. 
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make public threats but most of its threats were vague such as “Vietnam has to take defensive 
measures in response” or “Vietnam will take appropriate measures” if China did not comply. Its 
only concrete threat was to seek international legal action, but even on this, the Vietnamese 
attitude was far from firm. At various occasions, Hanoi conveyed that the legal action would be 
“a last resort,” conditional on “timing,” and should cede priority to bilateral negotiations with 
Beijing.656 
 To further evaluate the strength of an audience cost explanation, three questions remain: 
1) Was the nationalist expression organic or state-instigated? In other words, did Hanoi try to tie 
its own hands by encouraging nationalist expressions and thus incurring an audience cost? 2) Did 
Hanoi use the strong nationalist sentiment as a leverage in negotiations with Beijing? 3) Did 
Beijing believe that Hanoi was constrained domestically by its public sentiment?657 If Hanoi 
deliberately tied its hands by instigating nationalism, then used it in coercing Beijing to move the 
rig, and if Beijing believed that Hanoi was really constrained by its domestic public, then an 
audience cost explanation would be strongly supported.  
 The answer to the first question is a limited yes. As mentioned earlier, Hanoi allowed and 
at times even encouraged the public protests. But genuinely strong public opinion had already 
existed before the crisis. What Hanoi played in the crisis was a facilitating role that aided the 
strong expressions of public sentiment but with limits – once it got out of hand on May 13, the 
government clamped down.  
 On the second question, the content of the conversations between the two countries’ 
leaders and diplomatic representatives is not fully available to evaluate whether domestic public 
656 These wordings were respectively expressed by Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh, Prime Minister Nguyen 
Tan Dung, and Vietnam MoFA. Refer to earlier discussion for details. 
657 This is suggested by Weeks 2008 that outsiders should be able “observe the possibility of domestic sanctions for 
backing down.” 
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opinion was used as a leverage. But from what was reported, there was generally a lack of 
evidence to support the utility of the strong public opinion to Hanoi’s position. If anything, the 
public protests, which started on May 11 and soon turned violent just two days later, became 
more of a liability than a leverage. Beijing put the blame squarely on Hanoi in failing to prevent 
the riots. Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea, whose factories were all targeted, 
expressed grave concerns for public safety. Investor confidence was also hurt. Vietnamese stocks 
tumbled. All this took place without a clear, resolute threat being issued by Hanoi. So it was 
highly unlikely that the strong public opinion was ever used as a leverage in coercing Beijing to 
retreat.  
 On the third question, Beijing had good reasons to be skeptical to the constraining power 
of an audience cost to Hanoi. Sharing the same regime type and from its own experience dealing 
with public opinion, Beijing understood Hanoi had means to deescalate the rhetoric and calm the 
public. Frames such as invoking the nation’s peaceful identity, the economic costs of war, 
possible mediation by the UN, and the threat of economic sanctions have proven effect in 
reducing the public opinion cost from backing down in a Chinese context.658 If Hanoi chose to, 
Beijing believed that Hanoi also had the set of tools available to China. In fact, Beijing ridiculed 
Hanoi’s blunder in fermenting extreme nationalist sentiment and causing it to backfire. A Global 
Times editorial commented that Hanoi “does not know the danger of playing with extreme 
nationalism and does not have the ability to control violence.”659 As events turned and as Hanoi 
took the reins of nationalism, it was able to perform a moderate approach without much domestic 
constraint.   
658 Quek and Johnston 2018. 
659 “Sheping: Yuenan da za qiang shao zai shijie mianqian diurenxianyan (Editorial: The beating, smashing, looting 
and burning shamed Vietnam in front of the whole world),” Global Times, May 16, 2014, 
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2014-05/4996625.html, accessed May 11, 2018. 
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 As the above reasoning suggests, although evidence cannot rule out the possibility of an 
intention by Hanoi to incur a domestic audience cost to enhance its threat credibility against 
China, the lack of a clear and resolute threat cast doubt on such a possibility. We will not know 
for certain until documents on the internal Vietnamese deliberations become available in the 
future. But it is certain that Hanoi was not successful in incurring an audience cost or using it 
against China. From the last point, it would also be difficult for an audience cost to ever be 
convincing to a counterpart like China. So the likelihood for an audience cost argument to hold is 
rather low.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented two negative cases in which a propaganda campaign is absent. In both 
cases, the public opinion and the state policy intent were aligned so that the state did not have the 
incentives to either mobilize an already hardline public opinion or pacify an already moderate 
public opinion. These cases could not be explained by the audience cost theory or the 
diversionary war theory as both theories would predict the opposite outcome – a propaganda 
campaign to coerce or to divert. These cases further increase our confidence in the 
(mis)alignment theory. 
 The oil rig case from the Vietnamese perspective provides a third case in this chapter that 
further confirms the pacifying propaganda logic. The state sought to use the strong rhetoric to 
fend off nationalist criticisms and to calm the strong public opinion by echoing their emotions 
and letting them vent. The stark contrast between the Chinese and the Vietnamese media 
behavior was due to the differentials in the existing public opinion and how they were aligned or 
misaligned with the state policy intent.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has sought to explain why authoritarian states launch propaganda campaigns in 
the context of nineteen Chinese diplomatic crises on territorial disputes. In the process, I have 
also delineated how authoritarian states manage public opinion on territorial disputes through 
their control of the media. The project is important because it examines the domestic factors that 
shape a state’s international policy. More often than not, domestic factors matter as much as, if 
not more than, international factors on issues of conflicts especially for authoritarian states. The 
use of media on matters of foreign policy is prevalent in both autocracies and democracies, yet 
their functions, especially in autocracies, are not well understood. This project provides a 
window into the domestic constrains and motivations and the resulting statecraft in managing its 
domestic public on foreign policy issues. Studying authoritarian state media behavior also 
provides an extra tool to decipher the policy intent of these states and deep insights in the 
pressure and constraints that these autocrats face. 
The theoretical argument has the following components: 1) when there is a misalignment 
between state policy intent and existing public opinion, authoritarian leaders engage in 
aggressive propaganda campaigns. 2) There are two kinds of misalignments: state intent is more 
aggressive than public opinion (case A), and state intent is more moderate than public opinion 
(case B); in case A, the propaganda campaign is to mobilize the public, and in case B the 
campaign is to pacify the public by keeping up the appearances of a hard stand to appease the 
nationalist demand on one hand and by echoing the public and letting the public vent to mollify 
the public sentiment on the other. Social Psychology and Media Studies support this rationale. 3) 
When state policy intent and public opinion are aligned, the state media would stay quiet.  
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This theory builds on studies of public opinion in foreign policy in International 
Relations and authoritarian public opinion in Comparative Politics. The two literatures offer 
empirical support that public opinion matters in authoritarian states in the sense that it can 
pressure or restrain a state’s foreign policy choices. But these literatures also suggest that this 
“mattering” is not decisive because the pressures or the constraints public opinion places on the 
regime are not unremovable – the state is endowed with various means and ways to manipulate 
public opinion to meet their foreign policy needs. This is not to say that they always succeed in 
doing so, but just that these tools are available to them and studies have proven that they are 
capable of doing so. This theory contributes back to these two literatures by illuminating two 
mechanisms through which states could manipulate public opinion to meet their foreign policy 
goals – to mobilize and to pacify. The pacifying propaganda campaign is worth special notion 
because it is not commonly understood, but is commonly practiced by authoritarian states, and 
increasingly so as a way in dealing with rising nationalist sentiment in many of these countries. 
 
I. Summary of Findings 
The empirical test of the theory is done on nineteen Chinese territorial crises and four plus one 
detailed case studies among the nineteen crises. The medium-n study on the nineteen cases codes 
the values of the independent and the dependent variables based on a transparent set of rubrics 
and short qualitative justifications. The results show that fifteen of the nineteen cases conform to 
the predictions of the (mis)alignment theory. The average numbers of People’s Daily articles in 
the misalignment cases are also remarkably higher than in the alignment cases. In addition, the 
medium-n study in Chapter 4 offers a more detailed investigation into the four deviant cases. 
Further investigation concludes that one of the four deviant cases could be explained by a 
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variation of the theory, one by an ad hoc factor that the crisis occurred amidst a major war 
between the two countries, and the two other cases could be better explained by the audience 
cost theory, but they are borderline propaganda campaigns, in which the state showed significant 
reservations in publicizing the dispute. By suggesting that the state does not go “all the way” in 
engaging audience cost, the two ambiguous cases thus adds nuances to the audience cost theory 
and confirms previous challenges to the audience cost theory that the state does leave leeway in 
tying its own hands. These results do falsify the hardline – hardline quadrant, thus suggesting the 
alignment incentive being one of many possible causes for the adoption and non-adoption of 
propaganda campaigns.  
The subsequent chapters carried out a controlled comparison study on the four most 
similar cases with one in each corner of the two-by-two theoretical framework, thus covering all 
possible scenarios resulting from different values on the independent variables. The first case is 
the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979-1990 with a moderate/weak public opinion and a 
hardline state policy intent. The state launched a decade-long propaganda campaign to mobilize 
the public to support the state’s decision for war. Although intuitive, this mobilizing explanation 
of the propaganda campaign is not uncontroversial in academic studies that stress the 
explanatory power of the diversionary war or the audience cost theory. Both theories would 
predict the same outcome – the launch of a propaganda campaign, but for different purposes – to 
divert or to coerce. The diversionary war theory would argue that the propaganda campaign was 
to divert public attention away from the Deng-Hua power struggle. But this explanation does not 
square with the facts that the power struggle was not public that the public attention needed to be 
diverted away from. The timing was also wrong in that Deng had already gained the upper hand 
in the struggle by the time the propaganda campaign was launched. The audience cost theory 
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would argue that the state was mobilizing the public not for their support for the foreign policy, 
but to use the strong public sentiment as a leverage in coercing Hanoi to comply with Beijing’s 
demands – to cease the encroachment and violence at the border, to withdraw from Cambodia, to 
stop expelling the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, to stop realigning with the Soviet Union, to stop 
the anti-China campaign in the media. But by the time the propaganda campaign was launched in 
November 1978, most of these coercive goals had already failed, the relationship had broken to a 
point of no return, and war was already decided. This case lends support to the observation that 
even in authoritarian states where the state could wield stricter control of the information flow, 
public opinion matters in foreign policy because of the resources, the morale, and the 
moralization of the state decision. 
The second case is the Sino-Philippines arbitration case in 2016 with a hardline public 
opinion and a moderate state policy intent. The Chinese state also launched an aggressive media 
campaign, but this time to pacify a hardline public. Because of its disparate goal from the 
mobilizing campaign, its content was also distinct from the mobilizing one. There was harsh 
polemic, but only to fend off nationalist criticism which abounds at the time, to avoid large-scale 
public protests that would threaten social stability, and to save face for a diplomatic failure. The 
harsh rhetoric had no real teeth, not even threats of punishment or retaliation. The media content, 
although voluminous, concentrated on mass persuasion in rejecting the arbitration and justifying 
China’s position, rather than inciting hatred against the foreign rival. The goal of the media 
campaign was to prepare the public with rational analysis, so the public would be less inclined 
towards resorting to violence or collective actions that would threaten social stability or regime 
security. The media campaign sought to help the public vent their anger and frustration by 
echoing with excoriation and ridicule, but not strong enough to incite hatred and always added 
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with a positive note, and by allowing the public to let off steam on social media, online forums, 
and online comment sections. 
The third case is the cable cutting incidents between China and Vietnam in 2011. These 
incidents, although discrete, reflected a larger dispute regarding oil exploration activities in the 
South China Sea and caused weekly Vietnamese public protests and live-fire naval exercises 
from both sides. Hence, they are considered as one case. In this case, the hardline public opinion 
aligned with the hardline state policy intent. Because the state did not have the incentive to 
mobilize an already agitated public to support its policy, it refrained from a propaganda 
campaign and disciplined the commercial media to keep quiet. Audience cost or diversionary 
war theory would be hard to explain the case as both would predict a propaganda campaign, an 
opposite outcome from the actual outcome of the case.  
The fourth case is the oil rig crisis between China and Vietnam in 2014. This case 
marked the lowest point in Sino-Vietnamese relations since the 1979 border war and led to 
dangerous encounters on the sea and deadly riots in Vietnam. The case itself is puzzling given 
that it occurred right after the exchange of high-level bilateral visits in the previous year and both 
sides were committed to positive steps in managing the South China Sea dispute. Based on 
interviews with officials and analysts and logical deductions, my basic judgement is that the 
decision to place the oil rig in the disputed area was not a well-informed one. This is further 
confirmed by the fact that China never placed the oil rig in the Vietnamese side of the 
equidistance line again after the incident. In this case, a moderate/weak public opinion aligned 
with a moderate state policy intent, so that the state lacked the incentive to pacify an already 
moderate public and a propaganda campaign was therefore not adopted.  
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The fifth case is the oil rig crisis from the Vietnamese perspective, which offers an 
opportunity to extend the argument from a Chinese context to another authoritarian state. The 
Vietnamese public, given the government’s previous deliberate instigation and Vietnam’s 
vulnerable status in an asymmetric relationship with China, exhibited a stronger sentiment and a 
more hardline position towards the dispute than the government. This conforms to the conditions 
of a pacifying propaganda campaign and thus offers an additional test of the most 
counterintuitive part of the misalignment theory. In contrast to the Chinese quietness, Hanoi 
launched an aggressive propaganda campaign. On one hand, the campaign’s harsh rhetoric 
helped the government to fend off nationalist criticism, but it did not come with any substantive 
threats. The only concrete threat of resorting to international legal means did not come off as 
clear, which belied significant government reservations about such intentions. On the other, the 
state used media to guide public opinion by concentrating on the positive – the “heroic” acts of 
the coast guards in defending the “fatherland,” by letting the public vent – allowing lively social 
media and online discussions and public protests to a certain extent, and by refraining from 
invoking the old scores such as the 1979 border war. These are consistent with the pacifying 
mechanisms of the misalignment theory. In contrast, an audience cost argument, although 
plausible given the existence of Hanoi’s coercive goals and its tacit permission or even limited 
encouragement of the public protests at least at the beginning, lacks factual support in the case. 
Public opinion turned to more of a liability than a leverage for Hanoi and Beijing would not 
believe that Hanoi was really constrained by its public.  
Held together, these evidence, including the medium-n congruence test and the four plus 
one cases that followed, strengthens our confidence in the misalignment theory.  
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II. Implications to International Relations, Comparative Politics, and Policy 
The misalignment theory builds on other domestic theories of international relations and 
contributes to the particular line of work that stresses the role of public opinion, adding the 
element of media control as a statecraft. But instead of examining how domestic factors affect a 
state’s foreign policy, this dissertation has focused on understanding how states manage their 
publics for the sake of foreign policy. The basic logic is that public opinion wields pressures and 
constraints to the state in terms of foreign policy choices and implementation. Because of these 
expected pressures and constraints, the state utilizes its manipulation of the media to align public 
opinion with its foreign policy intent.  
This is similar to the literature on threat inflation but applied in an authoritarian context. 
Studies on threat inflation investigate how states inflate external threats by manipulating political 
and media agendas to rally public support for preventive wars such as the 2003 Iraq War.660 The 
mobilizing for war logic is consistent with the mobilizing propaganda campaign of the 
misalignment theory. But rarely has any study specified or even noted an equally important 
function of the media – a pacifying function. A pacifying propaganda campaign works to loosen 
the constraints public opinion places on a state’s foreign policy choices and implementation, thus 
works best in scenarios with strong nationalist sentiment on salient international disputes. A 
mobilizing function and a pacifying function combined, therefore, provides a fuller picture of 
how authoritarian states utilize media to serve its foreign policy needs.  
This dissertation also contributes to the authoritarian public opinion literature in 
Comparative Politics it draws on. The four plus one detailed case studies lends further support to 
the two-way relationship between the state and the public in authoritarian states: the public 
660 For example, see Mearsheimer 2011 and 2013; Walt 2009, 2010 and 2013. 
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pressures and constrains the state, but the state can manipulate public opinion through media 
control to align with its policy. In other words, public opinion matters in authoritarian states, but 
its influence is not decisive; the state is not omnipotent but is capable of changing public opinion 
to meet its policy needs. Issues of foreign policy also offers a unique yet important testing field 
of these arguments having been made in the context of domestic politics. Foreign policy differs 
from domestic policy in that it is more likely to affect a small fraction of the population 
(especially territorial disputes). It may also have higher national stakes but lower stakes for the 
public, because it is less likely to have immediate impact on the everyday lives of the masses. 
Foreign policy issues may not threaten regime survival as severely and directly as some domestic 
issues may. These features enable a pacifying campaign more appealing, because it renders the 
“short attention span” of the public, makes “bluster” more acceptable to the public, and enables 
echoing and online venting less likely to induce collective actions, so less likely to backfire.  
This dissertation also has important practical implications. As mentioned in the 
introduction chapter, aggressive rhetoric is commonly interpreted as aggressive foreign policy 
intent, by the masses, the media, the intelligence community, and even state leaders. Although 
the latter is more cautious in making such inference, it is necessary to make the pacifying 
campaign more explicit and better understood. With the rise of popular nationalism in many of 
these authoritarian states, the pacifying campaigns are used more commonly and warrants further 
studies. Distinguishing the two kinds of campaigns also helps policy makers in reading an 
autocrat’s foreign policy preferences. Better interpretation of state intentions could reduce 
miscalculations that are so prevalent in crises and conflict situations. Given the lack of 
transparency in authoritarian states, reading their intentions could be particularly challenging, 
thus adding to the danger of misperceptions and miscalculations in the conduct of foreign policy. 
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Last but not the least, this dissertation is deeply embedded in contemporary issues, such 
as the South China Sea maritime dispute, the rise of China, media manipulation and censorship 
by authoritarian regimes and authoritarian resilience. Despite arguments that territoriality is 
becoming less and less important due to the effects of globalization and trade, territorial disputes 
in recent years continue to wreak havoc in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and Ukraine. 
This study contributes to our understanding of state behaviors in territorial disputes and could 
help to mitigate this most contentious type of interstate dispute. The studies of contemporary 
Chinese territorial disputes also speak to the policy debate on China’s rise and regional tension in 
the Asia Pacific that has been pivotal to American foreign policy and national security. Studying 
how China has been constrained by territorial disputes and how China has used and manipulated 
these disputes for strategic considerations will sharpen our perspectives on Chinese intentions 
and approaches, which are much needed at historical moments of power transitions and 
fluctuations such as ours today. 
 
III. Limitations of the Argument 
No theory is perfect, and thus a precaution of its limitations is necessary. First, the misalignment 
theory cannot explain all the cases, not even all the cases in the nineteen Chinese sample, 
although a considerable number of them. What stood out in the medium-n congruence test was 
the significant number of cases (two out of three) in the hardline-hardline scenario it could not 
explain. This seems to confirm the intuition that the handline-hardline composition is the most 
archetypical scenario for an audience cost argument to work, because it is plausible that a state 
with a hardline policy intent is more likely to engage in a coercion and is more likely to use 
domestic public as a leverage in the coercion when existing public opinion is already hardline. 
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The hardline-hardline scenario is one of the “negative” scenarios in which the alignment 
incentive is absent. That is to say, the prediction of no propaganda campaign is made based on 
the absence of the alignment incentive. The two deviant cases in this quadrant of the two-by-two 
theoretical framework, therefore, suggest that when the alignment incentive is absent, there could 
be other incentives present, such as an audience cost incentive. This might mean that the state-
public misalignment is likely a sufficient but not necessary condition for the adoption of a 
propaganda campaign. Put it differently, the mis(alignment) theory is only one of many causal 
pathways that could explain the presence/absence of propaganda campaigns.  
 Second, the focus of the dissertation is on domestic propaganda campaigns, most easily 
distinguished by the language the media is in (Chinese versus English), although the 
international propaganda campaigns certainly deserve a whole new project to look into. But 
because of the foreign policy context of these domestic campaigns, the international audience is 
an inescapable aspect of this study.  
An international audience comes into the picture in three ways. First, a domestic 
campaign could have a spillover effect on a foreign audience if the domestic campaign is 
observed by foreign governments especially the foreign rival, or if the content of the domestic 
campaign is reported in the international media. Both are possible. These possibilities challenge 
the pacifying logic in that a foreign rival may interpret an aggressive but pacifying campaign as a 
hardline position by the government and react with its own hardline position. This dynamic can 
lead to a conflict that neither side wanted. A pacifying campaign could therefore be self-
defeating for a goal of successfully implementing a moderate policy. Second, a state might 
expect and internalize this risk of inadvertent crisis escalation. The risk in turn might deter the 
state from pursuing a pacifying campaign in the first place.  
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To mitigate these threats to the internal validity of the pacifying logic, I argue that 
although such a risk truly exists, it is not entirely deterministic. This is due to the natural barrier 
between a domestic campaign and its international portrayal. Especially when there is a language 
barrier (Chinese versus English), the international media or the foreign rival does not always 
pick up a domestic campaign. If they did, the details of a pacifying campaign are hard to miss, 
such as the lack of a concrete threat of punishment amidst the harsh rhetoric, the positive tone 
that undergirds the voluminous coverage, the rational fact-based media reporting style, the 
refraining from inciting hatred by invoking the old scores, the avoiding intensifying anti-foreign 
sentiment and echoing such sentiments only in moderation and in foreign observers’ 
assessments, etc. These distinct characteristics of a pacifying campaign may not catch the 
attention of a foreign public but are likely to be noticed and analyzed by the state leaders 
especially of the foreign rival. Even if only caught in a fleeting glimpse, these characteristics 
could signal an underlying moderate intent. These signals could at least caution the foreign rival 
from jumping to the conclusion of a hardline position by the government. Besides, a state has 
myriads of back channels to convey their real intentions to their foreign rival. Although some of 
these back channels are less credible than others, foreign states have become more sophisticated 
to look underneath the surface, especially the surface of a rhetoric campaign, to make 
independent judgements.  
A third possibility for an international audience to become relevant is when a state not 
only considers the possible reaction of a foreign rival, but also aims at influencing the 
international public opinion. This would be an international propaganda campaign beyond the 
scope of the current study. This dissertation is hence limited when an international campaign 
concurs with a domestic one, which is the case in both pacifying campaigns being studied here. 
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In the Sino-Philippines arbitration case in 2016, besides the domestic pacifying campaign, 
Beijing also launched an aggressive international campaign to justify and defend its own 
position, to reject Manila’s claims, and to delegitimize the Arbitral Tribunal and its rulings. In 
the Sino-Vietnamese oil rig crisis in 2014, besides the domestic pacifying campaign, Hanoi also 
launched an aggressive international campaign to rally international support for its position and 
to call for international pressure on Beijing to retreat from the area. These campaigns were 
carried out in English either in the English sections of their own media outlets or in the 
international media. The misalignment theory does not seek to explain the international 
campaigns and does not assess any possible interactive effects between the international and the 
domestic campaigns. These questions deserve further investigation.  
A third limitation with the argument is that it does not consider the outcomes of the 
propaganda campaigns. Like any other state programs, these campaigns certainly run the risk of 
failure. Propaganda is an art about winning the hearts and minds, so it takes time to be effective. 
But sometimes the time window of a crisis does not allow enough time for a propaganda 
campaign to be successfully implemented. Sometimes an exogenous shock might disrupt a 
propaganda campaign and divert the public attention. Other times, a propaganda campaign aimed 
to mobilize or to pacify may elicit pushback and cause it to backfire. This latter point has been 
addressed partially as a threat to internal validity in the theory chapter, but as a theory about 
motivations, the misalignment theory does not concern much about the outcomes of these 
campaigns. As much as states learn from their past experiences and a possible feedback loop that 
affects a state’s current policy preferences might exist, this limitation deserves further 
deliberation.  
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A fourth limitation is on the empirical test. One of the biggest challenges in testing the 
hypotheses is how to make objective, transparent, and replicable judgements on the state policy 
“intent” and the public opinion before the era of opinion surveys. I have sought to overcome this 
challenge by accessing internal documents that reflect the decision-making deliberations and by 
interviewing people in the “inner circles.” But political sensitivity puts constraints on the kind of 
documents and interviewees I could possibly access to. The archival research and the interviews 
took place in the first half of 2017. With President Xi Jinping’s sweeping anti-corruption 
campaign and the upcoming 19th Party Congress in October 2017, the tense political climate 
made many sources unavailable. I benefited especially from the personal network as a graduate 
from one of the top elite universities in China. Many alumni, who held various key positions in 
the foreign policy and media organs, helped immensely. But most of these elites could be 
considered as liberals in the Chinese political system and could therefore have biased views. The 
different perspectives of these documents and the hidden agendas held by the interviewees 
unknown to me are also something I could not overcome. As more documents become available 
in the future, these tests need to be reevaluated for accuracy.  
The hardline/moderate division of a state’s policy intent, despite its clear definition, is 
merely a simplification of the reality. In reality, a state’s foreign policy might have the element 
of both or reflect a point on a spectrum rather than one of two categories. The misalignment 
theory is also not a dynamic theory adept at coping with varied state policy intent over time. 
Although the theory has successfully explained the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization crisis in 2012, in which Beijing reversed its previous policy 
intent due to the rise of new situations (the Soviet’s threat of a nuclear war or Japan’s 
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nationalization of the disputed islands), the theory is not designed to cope with changes beyond 
these simple and clear-cut reversals.  
 
IV. Extending the Argument and Future Research  
The argument could possibly be extended to three areas. First, extension to other authoritarian 
states need to be further tested. The oil rig crisis from the Vietnamese perspective in Chapter 
Seven extends the pacifying argument to Vietnam, a country with a propaganda system very 
similar to that of China’s. But extending to other authoritarian states with varied degrees of 
media control and the application of the other parts of the misalignment theory to these other 
countries need to be further tested. In Chapter Three, I have shown that the Chinese propaganda 
system is of no difference in substance but only varies in degree. The Chinese internet 
censorship, for example, is being emulated by other authoritarian (and sometimes non-
authoritarian) states. This should give us confidence in the extension of the argument to other 
authoritarian states.  
 As pointed out in the introduction chapter, the wide variation in state media behaviors 
abound in territorial disputes that these authoritarian states frequently engage in. For example, 
when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the state-controlled media first shied away from reporting 
the issue. “Treading carefully, many mainstream Russian newspapers are giving prominence to 
stories other than Ukraine, including President Vladimir Putin attending the opening ceremony 
of a new football stadium in Moscow.”661 But once the invasion was out in the open, Putin 
launched an aggressive propaganda campaign painting the violent separatists as “supporters of 
federalization” and justifying the incursion as “rescuing Russians and Russian-speakers from the 
661 “Russian media report ‘invasion of Ukraine,” BBC News, August 28, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-28965597, accessed May 21, 2018. 
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depredations of Fascists.”662 On the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea which led to 
a nasty two-year war, Eritrea played ballads on state television about Badme, a disputed piece of 
land with no strategic importance or valuable resources.663 In contrast, alleged border clashes 
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the 1980s were never confirmed by the Saudi authorities 
and were kept from the public sight.664 Applying the misalignment theory to these interesting 
cases would help us better understand the politics of these authoritarian states. 
 Second, a natural area to extend the argument is non-territorial foreign policy issues. A 
question that came up often in the case selection process of the study is the scope of territorial 
disputes. The study is confined within territorial disputes because territorial disputes are believed 
to be the most salient cases to study authoritarian public opinion control. When studying a very 
little explored subject like this, the best strategy is to examine the cases in which patterns are the 
most salient so are easily detectible. As argued in the introduction chapter, the control and 
manipulation of publicity is particularly salient in territorial disputes. Territorial disputes could 
therefore provide the best environment for theory development.   
Because of the territorial scope, I debated about whether to include the 2005 Sino-Japan 
crisis, in which the territorial dispute is only a small part of the dispute. To a lesser extent, the 
inclusion of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war might also face a similar challenge that the 
territorial dispute is only partly the cause for the war. Beyond these cases that ended up being 
included, there are other cases that were excluded because of their non-territorial nature, such as 
the three crises on the Taiwan issue and recent China-U.S. close encounters in the South China 
662  “In Ukraine, Russia Plays a Weighted Word Game,” New York Times, April 17, 2014, A9; Dougherty 2014. 
663 “Badme Journal; Torn Town Changes Countries, but Not Conviction,” New York Times, April 16, 2002, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/16/world/badme-journal-torn-town-changes-countries-but-not-conviction.html, 
accessed May 21, 2018. 
664 Allcock et al 1992, 398. 
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Sea arising from Chinese building of artificial islands and the U.S. freedom of navigation 
operations in the South China Sea. The Taiwan issue is essentially a dispute about regime, not 
about the territory per se. The Sino-American offshore encounters are also excluded because 
there is no territorial dispute between the two countries. But seen from these borderline cases that 
could possibly have been part of the study, a natural next step seems to be extending the 
argument to these cases. Other non-territorial cases also deserve investigation, such as the major 
contemporary Sino-American diplomatic crises including the 1999 Belgrade Embassy bombing, 
the 2003 EP3 incident, and the 2009 Impeccable incident. I intend to explore these cases as part 
of the dissertation book project.  
Third, another interesting area to extend the argument to is democracies. The selection of 
the authoritarian state scope followed the same logic above of having cases with salient media 
control. But this is not to say that there is no media control in democracies – the means and ways 
might be more subtle. The threat inflation literature provides strong evidence that this is often the 
case. But besides inflating a threat and mobilizing the public for an aggressive foreign policy 
such as preventive wars, can a democracy pacify the public like autocracies do? Are there 
existing cases that democracies have successfully quelled a nationalist public for a moderate 
foreign policy purpose? If there are, how did the democracies achieve that? These are some 
riveting questions for future investigation.  
Finally, as indicated earlier, there are many other different types of propaganda than the 
two studied in this dissertation. By focusing on the single dimension of volume and salience of 
coverage, this research is limited in detailing out the variety of propaganda states might adopt but 
serves as a necessary first step.  
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Held together, these projects should further advance our knowledge in understanding the 
triangular relationship between the public, the media, and the state in the context of foreign 
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Nineteen Chinese Diplomatic Crises on Territorial Disputes: Coding Justifications of the 
Independent Variables and Explanations of the Deviant Cases1 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 
(Deviant cases are in italic; ambiguous cases are marked with asterisks *; cases for process 
tracing are in bold.) 
 
1. 1959 Sino-Indian Border Clashes at Longju and Kongka Pass 
 
See Chapter 4.   
 
2. 1962 Sino-Indian Border War 
 
In response to the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s “Forward Policy,” the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) launched a major strike at the Eastern and the Western sections of the 
Sino-Indian border on October 20, 1962. One month later, after a landslide victory, China 
declared a ceasefire and withdrew from the Eastern section. 
 
Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
Public knowledge and public emotion about the border dispute remained limited despite the 
propaganda campaign in 1959. This was due to the restrained nature of the 1959 campaign and 
the fact that these border areas being sparsely populated and remotely located.  
 
State Policy Intent: Hardline 
Despite the fact that China’s attack was provoked, and that the Chinese military withdrew to the 
Line of Actual Control (LAC) shortly after its victory, the nature of the attack was preemptive 
and the scale of the attack unprecedented. The hardening of China’s policy did, however, took a 
1 These justifications are based on the coding rules and observables listed in Table 3.3. In cases where original 
sources are limited, I base my judgement on logical deductions and consultations with area specialists.  
 State Policy Intent 
 











Sino-Indian Border 1962 
Sino-Soviet Border 1969 
Sino-Vietnamese Paracels 1974 
Sino-Vietnamese Border 1979-1991 
Sino-Vietnamese Spratlys 1988 
Sino-Indian Border 1959, 1967, 
1986, 2013 and 2014 
Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku 1978 




Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku 2010* 
Sino-Vietnamese Cable-Cuttings 2011 
Sino-Philippines Scarborough Shoal 
2012* 
Sino-Japanese Various Dispute 2005 
Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku 2012 
Sino-Philippines Arbitration 2016 
Sino-Indian Border 2017 
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long process, including several failed diplomatic attempts and numerous strong verbal 
warnings.2  
 
Predicted Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Mobilize 
 
Actual Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Mobilize 
 
3. 1967 Sino-Indian Border Clashes at Nathu La and Cho La 
 
In September and October 1967, the Sino-Indian border broke out into a series of military 
clashes alongside the border of Sikkim, including the Nathu La clash on September 11-14 and 
the Cho La clash on October 1. 
 
Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
Located in a remote frontier area, the Sino-Indian border was fought and easily forgotten, at least 
by the Chinese ordinary people. The war made the dispute widely known, but few people cared 
about the dispute strongly. Besides, dispute on the central section of the Sino-Indian border in 
Sikkim specific to this crisis was barely known. On top of these factors, 1967 marked a year 
when the Chinese people were preoccupied by the Cultural Revolution. As Chinese domestic 
politics spun out of control over the summer of 1967, a public preoccupied with domestic politics 
barely paid any attention to the border dispute.  
 
State Policy Intent: Moderate 
These incidents were low-level militarized encounters that were unlikely authorized by the 
Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC).3 Fravel infers this observation from General 
Wang Chenghan’s memoir, a participant in the exchange of fire at Nathu La in 1967.4 Wang 
states that a frontline headquarter was not established until after September 11. According to 
Fravel, “For the PLA, the establishment of a frontline headquarter …usually precedes the 
initiation of any authorized operation.”5 Besides, after these incidents, Zhou Enlai issued 
instructions to the Chinese forces to return fire only fired upon. The lack of top authorization of 
the military engagement and the defensive nature of the instruction after the incidents indicate a 
moderate state policy intent.  
 
Predicted Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
 
Actual Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
 
4. 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflict 
 
The Sino-Soviet split that emerged in the late 1950s culminated in an intense border conflict in 
1969 and brought the two countries to the edge of a nuclear war.  
 
2 For detailed account of the hardening process of China’s policy, see Maxwell 1970; Garver 2006, 107-11.  
3 Fravel 2008, 199.  
4 Wang 2004, 482. 
5 Fravel 2008, 199. 
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Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
Before the conflict broke in March 1979, despite all the publicity the deepening Sino-Soviet split 
had received, the Chinese public was not well aware of the border dispute. Between October 
1964 and February 1969, border incidents totaled 4,180,6 but there were hardly any media 
exposure. Before March 1969, People’s Daily coverage of the border dispute was close to none. 
With official media dominating information flow at the time, the Chinese people had little other 
source to learn about the dispute, let alone supporting the use of force against a much stronger 
former ally.  
 
State Policy Intent: Initially Hardline, But Moderate Later 
In response to the Soviet Union’s territorial transgressions, China initially adopted a hardline 
policy – an escalated response of a planned ambush on March 2, 1979. But when Soviet’s 
reaction exceeded the Chinese leaders’ expectations and when the risk of a Soviet nuclear strike 
became real and imminent, the Chinese leaders grabbed the opportunity to lower the tension. The 
timing of the policy change and the timing of the propaganda campaign confirms the logic of the 
theory. It is almost a consensus among historians that “it was the Chinese who initiated the 
March 1969 border conflict…”7 As early as January 1968 when the Qiliqin incident occurred, 
the CPC Central Military Commission (CMC) had considered launching military counterattacks 
against the Soviets.8 Archives show that the March 2 incident was a Chinese ambush in 
retaliation to earlier Soviet transgressions to the Zhenbao Island; and the March 15 incident was 
a prepared Chinese counterattack when the Soviet soldiers retaliated. China’s cutting off direct 
communication between the top leaders of the two countries lends further credence to the initial 
hardline policy China pursued.9 As a result, China launched an aggressive propaganda campaign 
in March. But it was never their intention to escalate the conflict to a total war.10 That was why 
the propaganda campaign came to a sudden stop in September of 1969 after the Soviet leaders 
threatened a nuclear strike and the Chinese leaders evacuated out of Beijing.  
 
Predicted Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Mobilize 
 
Actual Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Mobilize 
 
5. 1974 Sino-Vietnamese Clash in the Paracels 
 
On January 19, 1974, the Chinese and the South Vietnamese navies fought a brief battle near the 
disputed Paracel Islands. The Chinese won and have kept control of the Islands till today.  
 
Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
The Chinese public had little knowledge of the offshore dispute in the Paracels before the clash, 
so public opinion was weak.  
 
6 Yang Guihua, “1969 nian Zhenbaodao Ziwei Fanjizhan (Zhenbao Island Self-Defense Counterattack in 1969),” 
people.com.cn, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/192/8559/8564/20020704/768476.html, accessed June 1, 2018. 
7 Yang 2000, 21. 
8 Ibid., 27-28. 
9 Ibid., 36. 
10 Ibid., 22; Interview 40, June 8, 2017, Beijing. 
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State Policy Intent: Hardline 
China had strong incentives to pursue a hardline policy. January 1974 was a time when the U.S. 
had already withdrawn from Vietnam, and North Vietnam had not won the war yet. So on one 
hand, a battle like this would have little chance of escalation in the sense of causing a U.S. 
intervention. On the other, North Vietnam could not have publicly objected to it, since the 
Chinese and the Vietnamese were still fighting the same enemy.  
 
Despite the short duration of the battle, the decision was made directly from China’s top leaders. 
The directive was originally defensive in nature – “not to fire the first shot; fight back when 
attacked.”11 But as the battle developed, China quickly expanded its victory to seize three islands, 
and the initial defensive posture proved to be nothing but a tactic to win the moral high ground. 
After the battle, China drew in its missile-armed frigates in preparation for the possible 
retaliation of the Saigon regime. After the dust had settled, the Chinese leaders took steps to 
consolidate its presence on the Paracels, which all corroborate a hardline policy China had 
intended.12 
 
Predicted Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Mobilize 
 
Actual Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Mobilize 
 
6. 1978 Sino-Japanese Fishing Boat Incident near Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
 
On April 12, 1978, just months before the conclusion of a monumental peace treaty between 
China and Japan, over 80 Chinese fishing boats appeared in the waters around the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and persisted for about a week.13 
 
Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
There is no direct data on the Chinese public opinion on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute 
prior to the 1978 crisis, but three things led to the conclusion that the existing public opinion was 
moderate/weak. First, although the issue had already become publicized, Beijing had stayed 
silent on the dispute for six years since the two countries normalized relationship in 1972.14 
People’s Daily had not mentioned the word “Diaoyudao” (Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands) since July 
1972. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the public emotion on the issue had calmed. 
Second, seen from today’s Sino-Japanese relations, two issues have plagued the relationship and 
poisoned the popular feelings towards each other: the different interpretation of World War II 
history and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial dispute. Yet the history issue did not arise 
until 1982.15 Lastly, like the timing of the Sino-Vietnamese Border War, China was at a critical 
juncture when the ten years’ turmoil of the Cultural Revolution was still fresh in people’s 
memory and when the country was headed towards fast economic growth under the reform and 
11 Li 2013, 23. Li was a cryptographer working in the intelligence section of the South Sea Fleet headquarters. 
12 Liu 2007, 338-43. Liu was PLA Navy’s deputy chief of staff, appointed to take charge of garrisoning the Paracels 
after the 1974 battle.  
13 For details of the incident, see Tretiak1978. 
14 The dispute received much media exposure when the U.S. turned over the administrative rights of the Islands to 
Japan in May 1972.  
15 He 2006. 
302
open-up policy. It was a time when people would be particularly resistant against any hardline 
policy that might disrupt the reform. 
 
State Policy Intent: Moderate 
Due to a lack of information, historians do not agree on why the incident happened. But inferring 
from China’s subsequent behaviors, it is clear that China did not intend for the incident to 
interfere with the signing of the peace treaty. On the territorial dispute, China insisted on a 
“shelving” policy, to delay settlement and to even avoid discussion of it. Three days after the 
incident, Vice Premier Geng Biao tried to calm the Japanese protests by claiming the incident 
was “neither intentional nor deliberate.” He added that “we should not argue the island problem 
and we should resolve that problem in the future.”16 The crisis was successfully sidestepped 
when Japanese Ambassador Sato Shoji and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong agreed 
not to discuss the issue again before concluding the peace treaty.17 
 
Predicted Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
 
Actual Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
 
7. 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border 
 
See Chapter 5.  
 
8. 1986 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Sumdorong Chu 
 
After remaining peaceful for almost twenty years, the Sino-Indian border erupted again in 1986. 
It started from Indian discovery of Chinese soldiers’ occupying a seasonal Indian patrol point in 
the Sumdorong Chu valley. Tensions escalated when both sides deployed large number of troops 
and conducted military exercises around the area. 
 
Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
Eight years into Reform and Open, the Chinese public cared more about their economic well-
being than a remote border such as the Sino-Indian border. Although most people knew about the 
dispute from the 1962 border war, very few cared strongly about it to support a hardline policy.  
 
State Policy Intent: Moderate  
There are four reasons why China’s policy intention in 1986-87 should be interpreted as 
moderate. 
 
First, although large-scale forces were mobilized – “By May [1987], troop levels around 
Sumdorong Chu exceeded those at the start of the 1962 war, reaching as high as 50,000,” the 
Chinese deployment of forces remained proportional to that of India.18 China’s deployment of 
troops was also “limited to one small area” and “under the pretext of military exercises.”19 This 
16 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, April 17, 1978, A6-8. 
17 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: PRC, May 11, 1978, A17-18. 
18 Fravel 2008, 200-201. 
19 Ibid. 
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restraint signals China’s intention to keep the situation under control and desire to leave leeway 
to stand down if such conditions arose.  
 
Second, the PLA’s occupation of an Indian patrol point in Sumdorong Chu in May 1986 is 
considered by many to be the initial provocation that had touched off the crisis. But from China’s 
perspective, the establishment of the Indian patrol point, which China occupied only seasonally, 
was in itself an earlier breach of the status quo by the Indian soldiers.20 The patrol post 
established by the Indian soldiers in 1984 is located in the neutral zone between the McMahon 
Line and high ridge line, which had been unoccupied by either side. By building the post there, it 
was the Indian side who first shattered the long-held status quo since 1967. 
 
Third, western media claimed the strong state rhetoric from Beijing resembled much that of the 
1962 war. For example, in October 1986, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping warned India, via the 
U.S. Defense Secretary, that China would have to “teach India a lesson.”21 But it should be the 
policy China actually pursued that counts. When Indian Prime Minister N.D. Tiwari visited 
Beijing in May 1987 and brought with him a message from Indian leaders that they had no 
intention to “aggravate the situation,” Beijing immediately agreed to withdraw troops and 
resume the border talks.  
 
Last but not the least, China was at the time still fighting a war with Vietnam (1979-1990). The 
Chinese army would be spread too thin if fighting two wars at the same time. So from a strategic 
stand point, it should not have preferred a hardline policy with India.  
 
Predicted Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
 
Actual Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
 
9. 1988 Sino-Vietnamese Clash in the Spratlys 
 
See Chapter 4. 
 
10. 2005 Japanese History Textbook, Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute, and Japan’s Bid for 
the U.N. Security Council 
 
In April 2005, nationwide anti-Japanese protests broke out in China and lasted for over three 
weeks, some of which even turned violent. These protests were spurred by a series of issues 
ranging from Japan’s bid for the United Nations Security Council permanent membership, its 
glossing over World War II atrocities in history textbooks, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
territorial dispute.  
 
Public Opinion: Hardline 
20 Bhattacharjea 1988, 152, 156. 
21 “The Story of the Sumdorong Chu Standoff – When India Avoided War with China Through Sheer Diplomacy,” 
India Times, August 20, 2016, http://www.indiatimes.com/news/the-story-of-the-sumdorong-chu-standoff-when-
india-avoided-war-with-china-through-sheer-diplomacy-260266.html, accessed June 1, 2018. 
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Existing public opinion on this case was hardline. As previously mentioned, the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute had already become publicized even before China and Japan normalized 
relationship in 1972. Although the Chinese state was able to keep public emotion at bay for most 
of the 1970s, the rise of the history issue from 1982 onward rekindled the public sentiment. The 
strong public emotion was demonstrated in the unprecedented scale of the protests. The online 
signature campaign amassed 22 million signatures against Japan’s U.N. bid.22 The protest on 
April 16 outside the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai alone was participated by more than 10,000 
protestors.23 Studies of the protests show that the public emotion was genuine, and the protests 
were not engineered by the government.24 
 
State Policy Intent: Moderate 
In February 2005, Japan announced it had placed a Japanese right-wingers’ lighthouse on the 
Islands under the state control. In April 2005, Tokyo officially allowed Japanese companies to 
begin drilling oil and gas in the disputed waters near the Islands. Despite these provocations, the 
Chinese government only issued verbal protests and did not respond by any substantive 
punishment.  
 
Predicted Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Pacify 
 
Actual Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Pacify 
 
11. 2010 Sino-Japanese Boat Incident Near Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
 
See Chapter 4.  
 
12. 2011 Sino-Vietnamese Cable-Cutting Incidents 
 
See Chapter 7. 
 
13. 2012 Sino-Philippines Scarborough Shoal Standoff 
 
See Chapter 4. 
 
14. 2012 Japanese Nationalization of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
 
The year of 2012 marks the fortieth anniversary of the normalization of the China-Japan 
relationship and perhaps the lowest point of the relationship in history since the normalization. 
With the intention to prevent the right-wing Tokyo major Shintaro Ishihara to purchase the 
disputed Islands and to use them for further provocations, the Japanese government nationalized 
22 “22 Million Chinese Seek to Block Japan's Bid to Join U.N. Council,” New York Times, March 31, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/31/international/asia/22-million-chinese-seek-to-block-japans-bid-to-join-
un.html?mcubz=0, accessed June 1, 2018. 
23 “New Anti-Japanese Protests Erupt in China,” Washington Post, April 16, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58567-2005Apr16.html, accessed June 1, 2018. 
24 See, for example, Weiss 2014; Tam 2007. 
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the islands on September 11, 2012, defying repeated Chinese warnings. The Japanese action 
drove the largest anti-Japanese protests in China and a serious face-off between the two countries.  
 
Public Opinion: Hardline 
 
See justification in case #11. 
 
State Policy Intent: Moderate First, Hardline Later 
The Sino-Japanese crisis in 2012 presents a complex situation where the state policy intent was 
moderate going into the crisis, but it turned into an escalated response later. Yet the political 
timing of the crisis – occurring two months before the 18th Party Congress, which officially 
announced the next new Chinese leadership – belied the largely moderate intentions of the 
Chinese state, thus calling for a propaganda campaign to bridge the gap between a militant public 
and a moderate state. The escalations later on might be due to the dramatic fashion the Chinese 
deterrence had failed – Japan went ahead with the purchase just one day after the Chinese 
president Hu Jintao issued warning in a high profile.  
 
First, the Chinese government had moderate intentions before and at the beginning of the crisis. 
With the once-in-a-decade leadership transition on the horizon, the least China desired would be 
a severe diplomatic crisis spurring the largest protests risking social stability two months before 
the leadership reshuffle. Setting the stage for the fortieth anniversary, a flurry of cooperative 
exchanges took place in 2011.25 Besides, China had moderate responses in the beginning when it 
first learned about Japan’s plan to purchase the Islands up until Japan’s official announcement of 
the deal, so moderate that Japan mistook it as China’s willingness to accept it. Despite repeated 
strong representations, Chinese officials also continued to emphasize the “larger interest” of the 
bilateral relationship.26 
 
Chinese behavior, however, took a turn on September 11 when Japanese Prime Minister Noda 
went ahead with the deal. Besides the unprecedently tough rhetoric and the cancellation of 
fortieth-anniversary celebrations and high-level exchanges, the most substantive 
countermeasures China undertook was declaring baselines around the Islands, and increasing 
maritime patrols to essentially undermine Japan’s de facto control over the Islands. At the same 
25 See, for example, “Japanese PM Noda Vows Not to Visit Yasukuni Shrine during Tenure,” Xinhua News, 
September 2, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-09/02/content_13609646.htm; PRC Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, “Hu Jintao Meets with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda,” November 11, 2011,  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/hjtAPEC_665728/t877239.shtml; “Noda Calls for Early 
Resumption of Gas Treaty Talks with China,” Japan Times, November 14, 2011, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/11/14/national/noda-calls-for-early-resumption-of-gas-treaty-talks-with-
china/#.WbqeK8iGNPZ; “Japan PM Visit, Military Exchanges Show Warming Ties,” China Daily, December 15, 
2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-12/15/content_14268242.htm; Li Xiaokun and Zhang Yunbi, 
“China, Japan Keen to Improve Ties,” China Daily, December 27, 2011,  
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-12/27/content_14331920.htm, accessed June 1, 2018. 
26 Tang Jiaxuan, “Uphold Larger Interest and Manage Crisis for Sound and Steady Development of China-Japan 
Relations,” Speech at the International Seminar on the 40th Anniversary of Normalization of China-Japan Relations 
Organized by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), August 29, 2012, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t980262.shtml, accessed June 1, 2018. 
306
time, the PLA Navy and Air Force conducted joint drills near the disputed area.27 Notably, China 
refrained from resorting to economic measures like it did with rare earth mineral exports in 2010, 
though tourism was inadvertently dampened. While the baseline move and the display of force 
could be considered proportionate responses to Japan’s nationalization and to the earlier U.S.-
Japan joint exercises in the area, the increased maritime patrols that challenged Japan’s de facto 
control and that persisted beyond the duration of the crisis was an escalated action.  
 
However, senior analysts argue that the hardline moves were more of a “show” than of 
substance.28 The deterrence failed in such a dramatic fashion – Japan went ahead with the 
purchase just one day after President Hu’s highly-publicized warning, that Beijing was forced to 
show some muscle to save face. The timing of Chinese leadership change also required China 
not to show any sign of weakness.  
 
Predicted Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Pacify 
 
Actual Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Pacify 
 
15. 2013 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Ladakh 
 
On April 15, 2013, Chinese soldiers pitched tents in Ladakh near the LAC triggering a three-
week standoff between the Indian and the Chinese troops.  
 
Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
Public opinion on the border dispute remained weak – many people knew about it from the 1962 
war but very few felt strongly. After the 1986 incident, the two sides signed a series of crisis 
management and confidence building agreements. These further reduced the chance of a hostile 
confrontation. When the crisis occurred, the dispute had stayed dormant for twenty-seven years.  
 
State Policy Intent: Moderate 
China preferred a peaceful resolution. Although some quote China’s tent pitching in the disputed 
area as provocative, in the Chinese perspective however, it was reacting to India’s increasing 
infrastructure buildup near the border.29 The fact that the two armies resorted to flag meetings to 
negotiate a resolution proved both side’s peaceful intention.  
 
Some also speculate that the timing of the incident just ahead of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s 
visit to India and Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid’s visit to Beijing was 
intentional on the Chinese side. There is no evidence supporting this speculation, but if it were 
27 “China and Japan face off: Tiny islands, big dispute,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 2, 2012, 
https://m.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2012/1002/China-and-Japan-face-off-Tiny-islands-big-dispute, 
accessed June 1, 2018. 
28 Interview 6, May 22, 2017, Washington DC; Interview 19, May 29, 2017, Beijing. 
29 Since the LAC has never been clearly demarcated, China and India have different perceptions of where the Line 
actually is. The Chinese tents were pitched in-between the Chinese perceived LAC and the Indian perceived LAC. 
“China Sore with India Bid to Build Infrastructure along LAC,” The Economic Times, April 25, 2013, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/and/nation/China-sore-with-Indian-bid-to-build-infrastructure-
along-LAC/articleshow/19719917.cms, accessed June 1, 2018. 
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true, the timing would make it convenient for leaders to take control if the situation on the 
ground escalated inadvertently.  
 
Predicted Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
 
Actual Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
 
16. 2014 Sino-Vietnamese Oil Rig Standoff  
 
See Chapter 7.  
 
17. 2014 Sino-Indian Border Standoff at Ladakh 
 
In September 2014, a similar standoff between Chinese and Indian soldiers took place again in 
Ladakh.30 The chain of events that escalated to the standoff began with the Indian construction of 
an irrigation canal near the LAC, which was protested by the Chinese and was subsequently 
halted. The tension continued as Indian troops built an observation hut along the LAC, which 
was responded by Chinese troops crossing into the area with cranes and bulldozers for road 
building. The standoff between hundreds of Chinese and Indian solders caused India’s army 
chief to cancel a foreign trip to monitor the situation and overshadowed the Chinese President Xi 
Jinping’s visit to New Delhi.31  
 
Public Opinion: Moderate/Weak 
Public opinion on the border dispute remained weak. Despite the militarization of the dispute in 
the previous year, the dispute only maintained limited attention within a small circle of experts 
and keen observers. Baidu Search Index shows mild surges to as high as the 600s that were 
followed by a few news reports only near the end of the crisis.  
 
State Policy Intent: Moderate 
China’s public response to the standoff was remarkably measured. China’s Ministry of Defense 
spokesperson Geng Yansheng said “The Sino-Indian border has not been fully demarcated. The 
rise of individual circumstances is thus unavoidable, but will not affect the overall friendly 
cooperation between the two countries.”32 The fact that the confrontations at the border impaired 
the effectiveness of Xi’s visit and left him embarrassed revealed that it should not be his 
intention to escalate the tensions in the first place.  
 
Predicted Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
30 A similar flareup occurred at Ladakh in 2015. Since it followed the same pattern and is much smaller in scale, I 
am not including it here in the congruence test. 
31 “India: Standoff with China Eases,” New York Times, September 27, 2014, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/world/asia/india-china-ladakh-dispute.html; “Insight - With canal and hut, 
India stands up to China on disputed frontier,” Reuters, September 24, 2014, https://in.reuters.com/article/india-
china-modi-chumar-army-ladakh/insight-with-canal-and-hut-india-stands-up-to-china-on-disputed-frontier-
idINKCN0HJ2FU20140924, accessed June 1, 2018. 
32 PRC Ministry of Defense, “Zhongyin Shuangfang Youxiao Guankong Bianjing Diqu Jushi (Effective Control of 
the Sino-Indian Border),” September 25, 2014, http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2014-09/25/content_4539874.htm, 
accessed June 1, 2018. 
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Actual Outcome: No Propaganda Campaign 
 
18. 2016 International Tribunal Ruling of Sino-Philippines Arbitration 
 
See Chapter 6.  
 
19. 2017 Sino-Indian Border Standoff near Doklam 
 
On June 16, 2017, Chinese military road crews began to extend a road in Doklam, an area near 
the China-India-Bhutan trijunction and disputed between China and Bhutan. Two days later, 
Indian troops entered the area and physically impeded the construction. This confrontation set off 
a two-month standoff between the two armies, separated only by a few hundred feet. On August 
28, the two troops disengaged, and China suspended the construction.  
 
Public Opinion: Hardline 
 
By 2017, the Sino-Indian border issue had been repeatedly militarized. A few days after the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the issue, it caught the attention of the public on the 
internet. An online public opinion study reports that by July 1, the online discussion about the 
dispute had reached the “red” level of warning, the highest level in their routine monitoring of 
online activities.33 A search of the term “Sino-India” on Baidu Index confirms this trend. 
 
The timing of the propaganda campaign also confirms that the surge in public attention is not 
endogenous to the state propaganda, but genuine and spontaneous. Before the surge of public 
opinion near the end of June, there was no noticeable propaganda efforts by the state media. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a short blurb on its website confirming the confrontation.34 
People’s Daily reprinted the blurb the next day, in a small corner on page 21. And that was it; 
CCTV news did not mention it. But the public immediately picked up on the news and public 
emotion surged. In fact, official coverage did not pick up until early July, days after the hardline 
public opinion has manifested itself online. Official media reports did not peak until after August 
2 when the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a document clarifying China’s position.35 
Within twenty-four hours, the People’s Daily, Xinhua News, Guangming Daily, PLA Daily, and 
Jiefang Daily all reprinted the document in the most visible sections if not the front pages, and 
several published strongly-worded editorials.36 Interviews with Chinese journalists confirm that 
33 Qingbo Yuqing (Qingbo Public Opinion), “The Sino-Indian Standoff for Nearly 30 Days – A Most 
Comprehensive Public Opinion Analysis,” July 7, 2017, http://home.gsdata.cn/news-report/articles/1881.html. 
34 PRC MoFA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Remarks on Indian Border Troops Overstepping 
China-India Boundary at Sikkim Section,” June 26 2017, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1473280.shtml, accessed June 1, 2018. 
35 PRC MoFA, “The Facts and China’s Position Concerning the Indian Border Troops’ Crossing of the China-India 
Boundary in the Sikkim Sector into the Chinese Territory,” August 2 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
08/02/c_136494625.htm, accessed June 1, 2018. 
36 For the editorials, see Zhong Sheng, “Jielu Yinjun Feifa Yuejie Zhenxiang (Exposing the Truth of the Illegal 
Border Transgression by the Indian Army,” People’s Daily, August 4, 2017, 3; Wu Liming, “Gei Yindu de Sandian 
‘Zhonggao’ (Three Pieces of Advice to India),” Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-
08/03/c_1121427634.htm, accessed June 1, 2018; Jun Sheng, “Zhongguo Lingtu Zhuquan Jueburong Qinfan 
(China’s Territorial Sovereignty Inviolable),” PLA Daily, August 3, 2017, 4; “Yin Ying Liji Wutiaojian Chehui 
309
the Indian reporting of the issue had already gained traction online in China before the Chinese 
media reported on it.37 
 
State Policy Intent: Moderate 
Even though the crisis first started on June 18, the Chinese side did not publicize it until June 26 
when the PRC MoFA and the Ministry of Defense confirmed the issue and voiced protests. 
Besides, the timing of this occurring right before important political events dictated the Chinese 
interest in not letting this to go out of hand. The BRICS summit was about to take place early 
September and India was a participant. The 19th Party Congress, which announced the comes 
and goes of the next Chinese leadership, was also scheduled in the fall. As a result, China 
suspended its road construction in the disputed area which had provoked the Indian intervention 
in the first place. 
 
Predicted Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Pacify 
 
Actual Outcome: Propaganda Campaign to Pacify 
 
 
Yuejie Budui (India Should Withdraw Its Transgressive Troops Immediately and Unconditionally),” Jiefang Daily, 
August 3, 2017, 3.  





Note: These questions are intended for semi-structured interviews, so they are intended to be 
open questions that serve as prompts for me to engage the interviewees in in-depth discussions 
that aim at the recollection of their experiences, as accurate as possible. Some questions are 
meant to be repetitive to ensure the validity of the answers.  
 
Standard Interview Procedure:  
- At the beginning of each interview, I will read to the interviewee the consent script for the IRB.  
  
- With their consent, I then ask the set of questions below.  
 
- At the end of each interview, I will ask the interviewee 1) the extent of clarity to which I can 
reference him/her and 2) whether he/she would like to see the transcript before I use it. I will also 
ask the interviewee 3) whether he/she knows anyone who might be useful for me to interview 
and whether he/she could inform the other person about my research and see if the other person 
is interested to be contacted. I then 4) thank the interviewee and 5) ask him/her whether it is okay 
for me to contact him/her for further clarifications or follow-up questions if any. 
 
Interview Questions: 




2. [Former] Affiliation:  
 
3. What’s your role at your organization? What are your responsibilities? 
 
4. How do the various state propaganda branches work together on a foreign issue? What is the 
workflow like? Who responds to who? 
 
5. On issues of international disputes, territorial disputes in particular, what are the general 
guidelines on what to report, what not to report, and how to report them? Who decides on these 
guidelines? How do you understand and execute them? Could you explicate your answers using 
an example? 
 
6. The state sometimes launches a propaganda campaign on a certain territorial dispute (a period 
of time with concentrated and deliberate efforts to publicize a dispute). Were you involved with 
any of them? Could you talk about your experience in managing propaganda on these disputes? 
 
7) In particular, were you managing propaganda on the following cases? 
1) Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979-1991; 
2) Sino-Vietnamese cable-cutting incidents in 2011; 
3) Sino-Vietnamese oil rig crisis 2014; or  
4) Sino-Philippines arbitration in 2016. 
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8. Now let’s talk about the case(s) you worked on one by one. On case #, 
 
1) How did you get involved in managing propaganda on the case? 
 
2) Before the propaganda campaign, what was happening on it? What were the Chinese and the 
Vietnamese (or the Philippines) government doing? Was the bilateral relationship already 
problematic? 
 
3) Before the propaganda campaign, did you feel the public care about the dispute? How did you 
get such an impression that they cared or did not care? Did the public or average people you 
know favor a hardline or a moderate position on the issue?  
 
4) Before the propaganda campaign, what was the Chinese government’s intended policy on the 
issue? Was the government ready to use force, make necessary compromises to maintain peace, 
or keep the status quo? 
 
5) Was the decision to use force already made before or after the decision to launch a 
propaganda campaign was made? In other words, was the propaganda campaign serving the 
purpose, at least partially, of war preparation?  
 
6) Before the propaganda campaign, were there already news reports on the case? If yes, by 
which media outlet? 
 
7) Was the government satisfied with the scale and the content of publicity the issue had received 
prior to the propaganda campaign? If not, what were they trying to change? 
 
8) Did you receive or make the decision to increase media coverage of the dispute? How was the 
decision made? What were the motivations for such a propaganda campaign? What goals were 
the government trying to achieve through that propaganda campaign? Was there any concerns in 
launching such a campaign? 
 
9) How did you decide on the timing of launching a propaganda campaign? In other words, why 
was the campaign initiated when it was (instead of earlier or later)? 
 
10) If there was no propaganda campaign on the dispute, why did your organization refrain from 
launching one? Did the government have to censor content from commercial media or the 
Internet (if applicable)? 
 
11) Who was the main target of the propaganda campaign? 
 
12) If the main target of the propaganda campaign was the domestic public, was the propaganda 
campaign used to divert the public attention away from a domestic issue? 
 
13) How did you implement such a campaign? What was your role in it? Were there any 
difficulties in implementing such a campaign? 
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14) When did the campaign start and end? 
 
15) Were the original goals achieved? 
 
16) Did the government use the high publicity achieved through the campaign to coerce the 
target country? For example, to issue a public threat and say “our hands are tied by our domestic 
public”? 
 
17) As events on the issue developed, were there any changes to the original decision on the 
propaganda campaign? Why were the changes necessary if any? 
 





2. [Former] Affiliation:  
 
3. What’s your role at your organization [media outlet]? What is your daily work schedule like? 
 
4. How decisions are made at your organization in regard to what issues/topics to cover and what 
not to cover? 
 
5. On issues of territorial disputes, what are the general guidelines you receive/exercise on what 
to report, what not to report, and how to report them? Who decides on these guidelines? How do 
you understand and execute them? Could you explicate your answers using an example? 
 
6. Did you work on one or more of the following cases? 
1) Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979-1991; 
2) Sino-Vietnamese cable-cutting incidents in 2011; 
3) Sino-Vietnamese oil rig crisis 2014; or  
4) Sino-Philippines arbitration in 2016. 
 
7. Now let’s talk about the case(s) you worked on one by one. On case #,  
 
1) How did you get involved in reporting/editing on the case? 
 
2) Before you worked on the case, what was happening on it? What were the Chinese and the 
Vietnamese (or the Philippines) government doing? Where did most of your information come 
from before you worked on it?  
 
3) Before you worked on the case, did you feel the public care about the dispute? How did you 
get such an impression that they cared or did not care? Did the public or average people you 
know favor a hardline or a moderate position on the issue?  
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4) Before you worked on the case, were there already news reports on the case? If yes, by which 
media outlet? What was their focus? 
 
5) How were you selected to work on the case? Did you receive any instructions before you 
worked on it? If yes, from whom and what were they? 
 
6) How did you start working on the case? Were you sent to the field? 
 
7) If you were, what did you see and do there? Who did you talk to while you were there? What 
did you learn? 
 
8) If you received instructions prior to your trip, how did you understand and execute them? 
 
9) Were you given a quota on the number of the articles the newspaper had to reach during a 
certain period (the period of the propaganda campaign)? If yes, how many? 
 
10) Did you receive any further instructions as the case developed? If yes, from whom and what 
were they? how did you understand and execute them? 
 
11) The report(s) you wrote, were it a piece of news or an op-ed? What was the goal you were 
trying to achieve in writing the report? Did you have or were you given a point to get across to 
the Chinese public?  
 
12) Were you aware of any international report on the dispute at the time? How did your report 
differ from those international reports? 
 
13) [To journalists] Were you under any pressure to add or censor things you write? If yes, 
pressure from whom? 
 
14) [To journalists] In your writing of the report, did you deliberately select certain aspects to 
emphasize and certain aspects to avoid? Why?  
 
15) [To editors] Did you ask your reporter to select certain aspects to emphasize and certain 
aspects to avoid? Why?  
 
16) [To journalists] After you submitted your initial report, were you asked to make any major 
changes? If yes, why? 
 
17) [To editors] Did you have to change or delete any part of the report sent from your 
reporter(s)? If yes, why? 
 
18) Were there aspects or events you did not cover or were not encouraged/allowed to cover? 
Why? 
 
19) Did you receive any feedback to the article you wrote/edited? If yes, what were they? 
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